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
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
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
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WARSAW PACT:
THE QUESTION OF COHESION
PHASE II - VOLUME 2
POLAND, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
AND ROMANIA

by

TERESA RAKOWSKA HARMSTONE
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ABSTRACT

Volume II of Phase II of this study contains the first part of an analysis of the individual military contingents of the member states of the Warsaw Pact. It discusses the national armies of two countries in the Northern Tier of the Warsaw Pact (Poland and the German Democratic Republic) and of Romania, which is in the Southern Tier of the Warsaw Pact. The first two are "loyal" armies and are fully integrated into the military coalition system of the Pact. Romania's armed forces are considered to be an independent entity, which is coordinated but not integrated with the other members of the system.

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RÉSUMÉ

Le volume II de la phase II de la présente étude renferme la première partie d'une analyse portant sur les forces militaires de chaque état membre du Pacte de Varsovie. Il traite notamment des armées nationales de deux pays du flanc nord du Pacte (la Pologne et la République démocratique allemande) et d'un pays du flanc sud (la Roumanie). Les deux premières sont des armées dites "loyales" et sont entièrement intégrées au système militaire du Pacte; l'armée roumaine est considérée comme une entité distincte, non intégrée, mais dont les activités sont coordonnées à celles des armées des autres membres du Pacte de Varsovie.

WARSAW PACT: THE QUESTION OF COHESION
Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Christopher D. Jones,
and Ivan Sylvain

Vol. II. POLAND, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, AND ROMANIA

Executive Summary

Volume II of Phase II of this study contains the first part of an analysis of the individual military contingents of the member states of the Warsaw Pact. It discusses the national armies of two countries in the Northern Tier of the Warsaw Pact (Poland and the German Democratic Republic) and of Romania, which is in the Southern Tier of the Warsaw Pact. The first two are "loyal" armies and are fully integrated into the military coalition system of the Pact. Romania's armed forces are considered to be an independent entity, which is coordinated but not integrated with the other members of the system.

The national armies of the Northern Tier are of major military and strategic importance for the Warsaw Pact Joint Command, and thus for the maintenance of the regional system of "socialist" states led by the USSR. They display integration characteristics typical of the "loyal" armies:

1. Explicit prohibition of a distinct national military doctrine apart from the coalition (Soviet) military doctrine. This implies the denial of national control over components of the national defence systems, and of the capability to organize for the defence of national territory.
2. Deployment of national forces for the performance of the double duty envisaged by the coalition military doctrine; that is, missions on both the internal and external fronts. The external front designation entails the operational subordination of individual national contingents to the Warsaw Pact Joint Command. Internal front deployment is coordinated under the auspices of the Joint Command.
3. On the external front, the Soviet garrison in each country plays a key role in maintaining unit-to-unit ties and in conducting joint exercises,

which facilitate the incorporation of individual components of the national armed forces into predominantly Soviet coalition formations.

4. On the internal front, the maintenance of parallel and substantial paramilitary forces.

5. A cadre/conscript placement pattern which reflects the requirements of political reliability. This includes:

a. a high percentage of career personnel in units of external designation, particularly in elite units and in naval and air force units;

b. the assignment of conscripts (in particular elements considered to be politically unreliable) to work on civilian economic projects.

From the point of view of national attitudes, the "loyal" armies are schizophrenic armies. Within the definition of integration established in Volume I of Phase II of this study, the functional integration of the troops for joint missions has been achieved. But there has been a total failure in achieving attitudinal integration. This failure reflects the impact of prevalent social attitudes on the forces' conscript base and on the professional cadre. The cadre, characterized overall by a high level of professional competence, has been given a personal stake in the maintenance of the system, but only the top senior cadre can be considered integrated in attitudinal as well as in functional terms.

The Romanian Armed Forces are an exception to the rules of integration within the Warsaw Pact military coalition system. Under the national Romanian military doctrine, the forces are organized, trained, and deployed for the defence of the national territory. The regular forces are augmented for this purpose by a national territorial defence system which is similar to the territorial defence systems of Yugoslavia and Albania. The Romanian Armed Forces participate in the military activities of the Warsaw Pact only in so far as these are compatible with Romanian military doctrine, and thus are neither functionally nor attitudinally integrated into the Warsaw Pact military coalition system.

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Chapter 1

POLAND

Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone

I. INTRODUCTION

In size and strategic location Poland is the pivotal member of the East European component of the Warsaw Pact, but it is also the most volatile politically. The country is strategically located between the Soviet Union and the GDR, and it is directly astride vital Soviet supply and communications routes. Its topography allows for free passage from East to West and, apart from the Baltic coast, it is entirely surrounded by other bloc countries. Poland's military contingent in the Warsaw Pact -- numbering 340,000 in 1983/84 -- is the largest among East European Pact members, as is its population of 36 million. Poland's stability is therefore vital to the security of the Pact as a whole, and the loyalty or at least the quiescence of the population is vital to the Pact's effective performance, as is the functional integration (at the very least) of the Polish Armed Forces. Poland is also an important partner in CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) economic exchanges, and the country's perennial economic shortfalls as well as a disastrous foreign debt (\$27 billion in 1984), have complicated economic relations with the Soviet Union and its allies. It is this background which made the Polish crisis of 1980/81 a major threat to the stability of the Soviet bloc and thus a threat to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and, ultimately, to the very survival of the Soviet political system.

In comparison with the interwar period the country's size, boundaries and population have all changed drastically. The area decreased by 77,043 square kilometres and the whole country was bodily shifted from east to west by over 200 kilometres: the eastern regions were lost to the USSR, while the so-called "Recovered Territories" of eastern Germany were incorporated in the west. The population in 1939 was 34.5 million. Six million died in the six years of WW II: 10.7 per cent as a result of war operations and 89.3 per cent as a result of executions and pacifications. Of the total who died, 3 million were ethnic Poles and 2.9 million were Polish Jews, of whom there were 3.4 million in Poland in 1939. Moreover, mass transfers of the population took place in the war years. Approximately 1.5 million Polish citizens were deported to the Soviet interior from Polish territories occupied by the Soviet Union in 1939 (the total population of these territories was 13 million, of whom 5 million were ethnic Poles). No more than two million Poles were eventually repatriated (in 1945-47, and after the Soviet amnesty of 1956). Two million Poles were expelled to central Poland (Generalgouvernement) from areas incorporated into the German Reich in 1939, and a million and a half were sent to Germany for forced labour from both areas. Baltic Germans were resettled in the territories incorporated into the Reich in 1940-41, only to be expelled in 1945-47 together with the indigenous German population which inhabited the territories incorporated into Poland in 1945. In addition, there were population transfers within Poland to adjust to boundary changes, and within the USSR affecting the incorporated areas. Of the Polish Displaced Persons in Western Europe and the veterans of the Polish

Army in the West, some 500,000 decided to remain abroad. All in all, Norman Davies estimates that about 25 million people were affected by the maelstrom.²

The net result for the "new" Poland was a radical change in the size (23.9 million in 1946) and structure of the country's population. Before 1939 Poland had substantial minorities which constituted about one-third of the population (15% Ukrainians, 8.5% Jews, 4.7% Belorussians, 2.2% Germans, and less than one per cent each Russians, Lithuanians and Czechs in 1931);³ the post-war population is almost entirely homogeneous. Ethnic Poles, almost all of whom are Roman Catholic, account for over 95 per cent of the total. Small Ukrainian, Belorussian, German and Jewish minorities remain, although almost all the Polish Jews who survived WW II emigrated to Israel or were expelled from Poland in 1968. The establishment of communist rule in Poland and the political upheavals which followed resulted in new migrations to the West: many left in 1945-47; the so-called "revisionists" emigrated after 1958; and there was a substantial exodus in 1980-81 for political as well as non-political reasons.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1. Historical and Military Traditions

Poland has an ancient and turbulent history, the record of which began with the Piast Dynasty (850 - 1370 A.D.) and baptism into the Roman Catholic Church in 966 A.D. Its apogee was the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Rzeczpospolita) under the Jagiellon Dynasty (1385-1572); its nadir the 18th century Partitions (1772, 1793, 1795) and subsequently over a century under tripartite foreign rule. After 21 years of independence (the Second Republic, 1918-1939), Poland was again divided between Nazi Germany

and the Soviet Union (1939). The period of German occupation (1939-1945) was followed by inclusion into a Soviet-dominated regional system. Reflecting this history, the Poles have the strongest military-patriotic ethos in East Central Europe, forged by centuries of struggle with Tatars and Teutonic Knights, Swedes, Tsarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire, and by resistance to foreign rule. In the national psyche the defence of nationhood has been interwoven with the defence of Christianity and with the defence of national dignity. "God, Honour and the Fatherland" (Bog, Honor i Ojczyzna) has been a centuries-old battle rallying cry. Roman Catholicism is an integral part of Polish nationalism. The identification of religion with nationhood was the basis of the strength of the Church in Poland and at the same time it formed the core of national self-awareness which preserved a sense of Polish nationhood in the 123 years under foreign rule, divided among three different state systems. Now more than ever, the Church remains an integral part of the Polish national psyche. This double heritage was powerfully reflected in the Third of May anniversary sermon by Cardinal Karol Wojtyla, Archbishop of Cracow, on the eve of his election to the Papacy in 1978:

... each one of us possesses a heritage within us -- a heritage to which generations and centuries of achievement and calamity, of triumph and failure, have contributed: a heritage which somehow takes deeper root and grows new tissues from every one of us. We cannot live without it. It is our soul. It is this heritage, variously labelled the Fatherland or the Nation, by which we live. As Christians, we live by this Polish

heritage, this Polish Millenium, this Polish Christianity of ours. Such is the law of reality ... 4

A strong perception of national honour has made it difficult for the Poles to bend to a foreign will and has generated a history of seemingly hopeless uprisings and a reputation for romanticism. There is a recurrent debate in Poland on whether the nation's survival is better served by such "romantic insurrectionism," or by "organic work." Insurrections repeatedly eliminate the leading elements of the nation's youth -- the last such cycle was the 1944 Warsaw Uprising and the civil war of 1945-47 -- but they also serve to renew the heroic myth for succeeding generations. And as the myth lives on so does the nation.

This message was conveyed by one of the last broadcasts from the Warsaw Uprising, picked up in London in October 1944, which described the fight of the soldiers, women, and children of Warsaw:

Immortal is the nation that can muster such universal heroism. For those who have died have conquered, and those who live on will fight on, will conquer and again bear witness that Poland lives when the Poles live.5

The tradition of "organic work," which emerged in the 1860s in reaction to a series of disastrous uprisings, advocates national preservation through grass-roots social, political and economic work. It is a patriotic tradition, for it also serves to preserve the nation although, necessarily, through accommodation to and collaboration with alien rule. The debate rages today much as it did in the 19th century, and with the same degree of relevance.

Both points of view have their ardent partisans. Polish historians take the view that both trends contributed to the preservation of the nation. According to professor Stefan Kieniewicz of Warsaw University, who in his assessment repeats the judgement of an eminent interwar Cracow historian, Michal Bobrzynski, both traditions equally served their purpose and were equally justified in Poland's quest for independence.⁷

Poland's two modern enemies have been Germany and Russia. In recent history the horrors of Nazi occupation have left a legacy of lasting bitterness. But historically Russia has been the main enemy. Hatred for both is linked, for the most tragic moments of Polish history resulted from collusion between the two. Prussia and Austro-Hungary were Russia's partners in the 18th-century Partitions, and the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact sealed yet another partition when the Red Army crossed Polish frontiers in September 17, 1939 to join hands with the Wehrmacht on the Bug river. In addition, as the Polish Home Army rose against the Germans in Warsaw in 1944 and fought unaided for 63 days, Soviet troops contented themselves with looking on from across the Vistula. Most Polish national insurrections were against the Russians: they include the 1794 Kosciuszko Insurrection and the two major revolts of the 18th century -- the November Uprising of 1830-31 and the January Uprising of 1863-64.

The struggle for independence included fighting under foreign command and participating in various questionable undertakings. Poles fought on the side of Napoleon, hoping that he would recreate an independent Poland: the Polish military ethos includes the heroic (and suicidal) 1808 Somosierra cavalry charge in Spain and the 1812 defence of the Berezina crossing during Napoleon's

final retreat. They fought on the side of the Turks in many Russo-Turkish wars. In World War I Pilsudski fought on the side of the Central Powers, but there were also Polish units in Russia and in France. This time Polish efforts were crowned with success, as Russia and Germany collapsed and an independent Poland was established on November 11, 1918. In World War II the Polish Army in the West fought in the Battle of Britain, in Norway, North Africa, Italy, Normandy, Belgium and the Netherlands. After 1943 the Polish First Army fought on the Eastern front under Soviet command. The underground Home Army (Armia Krajowa -- AK) and its predecessors, subordinated to the Polish Government-in-Exile in London, fought the Germans for six long years, only to be annihilated by incoming Soviet forces in 1944-45. As a British historian caustically comments, Polish efforts brought little support from erstwhile allies in the matter which mattered most, Poland's independence:

In the Battle of Britain in 1940, Polish pilots accounted for some 15 percent of enemy losses, thus contributing significantly to the salvation of Great Britain. Yet no reciprocal gesture was ever made by the British, either in 1939-40 or in 1944-45, for the salvation of Poland. At Lenino on the Ukrainian Front in October 1943, at Monte Cassino in Italy in May 1944, and at Arnhem in September 1944, Polish units showed immense courage and suffered heavy casualties in the course of operations of doubtful value ... The considerable Polish effort in the war against Hitler was not matched by any corresponding benefits relating to Poland's future destiny.⁸

This point, as it reflects on Poland's Western allies, has not escaped the attention of communist military historians. An authoritative book published on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact notes:

Paradoxically, and despite the agreements signed, it was Poland which helped the Western Allies rather than the Allies which helped Poland when it was invaded by Hitler. When in 1939 Polish soldiers fought alone against an avalanche of fascist armies, France and Great Britain did literally nothing to lighten their burden. In contrast, Polish divisions made a real contribution to the defence of France in June 1940 ... Polish destroyers and merchant marine ships participated in the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk ... The Polish Air Force played a significant role in the air battle for Great Britain ...⁹

Not surprisingly, the authors fail to add that Polish soldiers "fought alone" not only against the "fascist avalanche" but also against the Red Army, which marched into Poland hand-in-hand with Hitler. Following the Soviet lead, Polish historiography treats the 1939 Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact as a non-event. The most that is ever said on the subject echoes the line given to the Polish ambassador in Moscow by Molotov in September 1939: since the Polish republic no longer existed, measures had been taken to protect the inhabitants of Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia.
¹⁰

It is little wonder, therefore, that contemporary Poles have few illusions on the subject of allies and "fraternal" friendship, as well as little faith in Western

support and assistance. Nevertheless, past martial exploits are still very much a part of a living tradition. The celebrated August 1920 "Miracle on the Vistula" (in the 1919-1920 Polish-Soviet war), the 1944 AK Warsaw Uprising, the battle for Monte Cassino and the legendary exploits of AK units are all now a part of the heroic traditions which nurture today's Polish children, along with Henryk Sienkiewicz's Trilogy (a national epic of the 17th century wars), Stefan Zeromski's Ashes (a tragedy of the Napoleonic wars), tales of past insurrections, and the music of Chopin.

Historical conflicts with Poland's major neighbours have been accompanied by lesser regional conflicts which still have bearings on contemporary attitudes. Polish-Ukrainian antagonism dates back to the 17th century Cossack revolt, led by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky against the Poles, which ultimately resulted in the submission of Eastern Ukraine to Russian rule. In the 19th century Polish-Ukrainian relations were exacerbated by class differences between the Polish manor and the Ukrainian village both in Eastern and Western Ukraine (under Russian and Austro-Hungarian rule, respectively). In the interwar period the conflict intensified over Ukrainian separatist demands and terrorist activities (Galicia and Volhynia became part of Poland under the terms of the 1921 Treaty of Riga), their suppression by the police and the army, and the resulting persecution of the Ukrainians. Conflicting Polish and Ukrainian claims to the city of Lwow (Lviv) and to the Lwow and Volhynia regions erupted in open fighting during World War I, and in partisan warfare during World War II.

Despite a long common history a similar conflict

developed with the Lithuanians over the city of Wilno (Vilnius) and the Wilno region, which was annexed by Poland in 1920. The Soviet Union resolved both problems by taking over both of the disputed territories, which were incorporated into the Ukrainian and Lithuanian Soviet republics, respectively. Polish-Ukrainian and Polish-Lithuanian antagonisms may have lessened now, given a common perception that the Russians are the common enemy.

Polish-Czech relations in the interwar period were aggravated by a territorial dispute over Teschen (Cieszyn), a region where Poles predominated. It was annexed by Czechoslovakia (with the blessing of the Council of Ambassadors) in 1919-1920 at the time of the Polish-Soviet War, when a Polish defeat seemed imminent. Poland, in turn, annexed the region in 1938, during the post-Munich dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. Stalin "impartially" restored the interwar boundary in 1945. Thus antagonism lingers, although both countries now profess "fraternal friendship." In contrast, Polish-Hungarian relations have traditionally been cordial; there were common kings and complementary policies and, for the Galician Poles, shared interests under Habsburg rule. This friendship was strengthened by the assistance extended to refugee Poles by Hungary in 1939 despite the official Hungarian alliance with the Axis powers. There are no residual conflicts with Romania and Bulgaria.

2. The War Years and the Communist Consolidation of Power

In the popular mind 1945 marks the beginning of yet another Russian occupation, a perception that goes far to explain social attitudes and behaviour towards the postwar communist government. These attitudes are based on the

history of the communist takeover and Soviet actions and policies during and after World War II. This history, as well as the main characteristics of Polish war-time resistance, are described here in some detail because of their importance for gaining an understanding of the crisis of 1980-81 and its aftermath. Two generations still living have personal memories of the period, which they have passed on to their children and grandchildren. Moreover, interest in the events of the war period (and of the period of independence) is enormous, and uncensored publications on the subject appeared in great numbers during the late 70s, throughout the Solidarity period, and even after the imposition of martial law in December 1981. It appears that the supply of these publications cannot keep up with the demand.

Soviet policy towards Poland in 1939-41 paralleled that of Hitler in the German zone of occupation: to obliterate Poland and to destroy the Polish political, professional and cultural elite. The occupied territories were incorporated into the Belorussian and Ukrainian SSRs via phoney elections, about 1.5 million Polish citizens were deported, and large numbers of Polish soldiers and officers taken prisoner were interned and dispersed through the Gulag. Of the 14,920 officers placed in three camps in the western USSR, the bodies of 4,250 were found by invading German armies in 1943 in mass graves in the Katyn forest near Smolensk, with documentary and physical evidence indicating that they were murdered by the NKVD in March-April 1940; 10,670 disappeared without a trace and without any explanation.¹¹ Upon the discovery of the graves in Katyn, Moscow blamed the murders on the Germans.

The situation changed with the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, for the USSR needed the help of the Western allies and the support of the Poles in the struggle with the Germans. Relations were established with the Polish Government-in-Exile in London on July 30, 1941, based on an initial promise to annul the Nazi-Soviet Pact with regard to Poland and to release all Polish internees, and a Convention was signed which provided for the formation of a Polish Army in the USSR. General Wladyslaw Anders was released from the Lubianka prison to command this army, and the surviving Polish soldiers and officers, as well as other deportees, began to emerge from prisons, camps and exile. But bad will on the part of the Soviets made relations difficult. They deteriorated rapidly over the question of future boundaries, over delays in the release of Polish prisoners, and over the uncertainty of the fate of the missing officers. In mid-1942 the Anders Army was evacuated to the Middle East, along with many Polish civilians, and Moscow broke with the Polish Government in London in April 1943. Ostensibly the break was the result of the Polish Government's request to the International Red Cross to investigate the Katyn murder. But it appears that the real purpose was to allow for the preparation of alternative Polish political-military structures, under Soviet control, which could then be used to further Soviet interests as the Red Army eventually reentered Poland.

From 1943 on Soviet policy was directed at the reestablishment of Poland, but a Poland controlled by the Soviet Union and within its sphere of political influence. The Western allies were convinced by Stalin to accept this prospect (the details were never spelled out) already at the Teheran Conference in 1943 (together with the


acceptance of the Curzon line as the future boundary), and this acceptance, confirmed at Yalta and Potsdam, has not been challenged to this day.

The communist underground in Poland, and Polish communist organizations in the USSR, were established even before the break with the Polish London government. These organizations, and their military units in Poland and the USSR, were the nuclei of the postwar Polish communist government and the Polish People's Army (LWP) respectively. The Union of Polish Patriots (ZPP) was established in Moscow in March 1943; its membership was comprised of the survivors of the Polish Communist Party (KPP) (dissolved by Stalin in 1938) and leftist refugees and opportunists. The first units of the LWP were formed in the same year. In Poland, a new communist party (Polish Workers Party -- PPR) was established in Warsaw in January 1942 by three Comintern-trained Polish communists parachuted into Poland.¹² The first communist partisan groups were also formed in 1942. But contacts between Moscow and the PPR were tenuous in 1942-43, and a degree of rivalry developed between the PPR -- under the leadership of Wladyslaw Gomulka -- and the ZPP. This friction was to continue after the "Muscovites" and the Home-grown elements were eventually merged after the "liberation," but the former enjoyed a definitive advantage.¹³

Despite the claims of postwar communist propaganda the communist underground was weak and could not compare with the extensive political and military structures of the underground loyal to the Polish Government-in-Exile in London, which dominated the struggle against the German occupiers. The Polish underground state was headed by the Home Delegate, who was ex-officio vice-premier of the London government.¹⁴ It was composed of the Council of

National Unity (Rada Jednosci Narodowej -- RJN), which constituted an underground parliament of 17 members representing four major prewar parties and five other important political groupings,¹⁵ the Delegate's Executive Office (Delegatura, with departments duplicating government ministries), the AK (the commander-in-chief (C-in-C) of which was ex-officio deputy C-in-C of the Polish Armed Forces), and three special agencies within the AK Command: the Diversion Command (KEDYW), the Bureau of Information and Propaganda (BIP), and the Directorate of Civil Struggle (KWC), each with a network of auxiliary agencies (liaison, communications, supply, production, etc.) and operational and regional units. All the activities of the Home Army and of the three special agencies were coordinated (from July 1943) by the Directorate of Underground Struggle (KWP), composed of the AK C-in-C and his chief of staff, and the heads of the three agencies.

The AK was formed on the basis of the Union for Armed Struggle (ZWZ), created by members of the regular army in November 1939. It included members of the Polish Boy Scouts Association (the so-called Grey Ranks -- Szare Szeregi) and the military units of all the major parties: the military organization of the PPS, the Peasant Battalions (BCh) of the Peasant Party (SL), which constituted about one half of the AK's total strength, and the military units of the right of centre National Party (SN), the National Military Organization (NOW). The only military units which remained outside the AK command were the communist People's Guard (GL, later the People's Army -- AL), the splinter socialist left Polish People's Army (PAL), and military units of the extreme right National Radical Camp (ONR). The latter had a separate military



Figures 1 and 2. Polish Military and Political Organizations (1939-45). Source: Norman Davies, God's

Playground: A History of Poland, Vol. II (1795 to the Present) (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1982), pp. 468-9.

organization, the National Armed Forces (NSZ). Even so, a part of the NSZ joined the AK in early 1944.¹⁶ The AK was the largest of all European Resistance formations; it had approximately 400,000 men under arms. The communist AL never exceeded 10,000 men under arms.¹⁷

As the tide of victory turned in favour of the Soviet forces and their westward advance began in 1943, the Polish underground and the Polish government in London faced a basic dilemma. Both the Poles and the Soviet Union were members of the Allied camp fighting the Germans, but it was clear that the Soviet Union intended to dictate a postwar settlement which would suit its interests as soon as Soviet troops once again occupied Poland. This left little hope for national sovereignty for, as noted above, Moscow withdrew recognition from the Polish London government in April 1943 and, subsequently, a vigorous Soviet propaganda campaign began against this government and its Home Underground. All efforts at negotiation with the Soviet authorities were refused except on the condition that the London government give up all claims to the territories which the Soviet Union occupied in 1939.

The policy finally adopted by the London Polish government and the Home authorities was intended to overcome this dilemma: the AK was to collaborate with the advancing Soviet troops while at the same time attempting to establish military and civilian control in the liberated territories. AK units were instructed to intensify anti-German sabotage as German troops retreated, to mobilize for an open uprising in the German rear as the front moved in, and to coordinate military action with Soviet units, greet them as allies, and fight them only in self-defence. This was to be accompanied by the emergence of Polish civilian authorities, who were to take over the

administration of the liberated areas. The operation was code-named Burza (Tempest). Cities were excluded from the plan to minimize civilian losses; the timing of an anti-German uprising in Warsaw, the capital, was to be determined by circumstances.¹⁸

Soviet troops crossed the 1939 Polish-Soviet boundary on 3-4 January 1944, and "Tempest" went into effect first in the Volhynia, Wilno (Vilnius) and Lwow (Lviv) regions, followed by the Lublin, Bialystok and Polesie regions, and areas further west, as the Germans retreated. In a military sense "Tempest" was an unqualified success. But politically it did not -- and could not -- work because of Soviet policy objectives, the superior strength of the Soviet forces, and a lack of understanding and support from the Western allies. The result was a tragedy which culminated in the destruction of the AK. The pattern of Soviet policy, which emerged clearly as they reached Polish territories, was subsequently repeated throughout Poland. Front-line Soviet troops gladly accepted AK cooperation and did not question its independent military and political status, since AK units were willing to fight under Soviet operational command. However, as the front-line troops moved out, NKVD troops moved in, and Polish commanders and civilian authorities were invited for "conferences" or "banquets" where they were promptly either shot, or arrested and deported to the USSR. AK units (deprived of their senior officers) were then either dispersed and forcibly incorporated into units of the LWP, or deported to Soviet camps. Some were placed in penal battalions. Some units were able to break through, regroup and return to the underground. This was more common in central and western Poland, as news of

Soviet treachery spread. The situation was further complicated by massive Soviet drops of military personnel (many of Polish ethnic background were recruited from among partisans who had fought in Belorussia and Ukraine), who strengthened the communist underground operating in Poland. As the Germans retreated, a multi-front civil war developed in the "liberated" areas: NKVD troops supported by AL units operated against AK units, NSZ units, and Ukrainian nationalists in the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army), the latter in the southeastern regions of the Lwow and Volhynia regions.

The Warsaw Uprising began on August 1, 1944, as Soviet troops reached the Vistula, with the aim of establishing an independent Polish administration in the nation's capital. But the Soviet troops halted their advance, and Moscow allowed the Germans to complete the task of destroying the directing centre of the Polish underground. After 63 days of desperate resistance the uprising's commander-in-chief, general Bor-Komorowski, and the AK soldiers were taken prisoner by the Germans and were subsequently liberated by the Western Allies.¹⁹

Soviet diplomatic and political activities complemented their military advance. With Soviet troops on Polish soil, the ZPP, together with the KRN, were reconstituted into a Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN). This happened in Moscow on July 22, 1944 (the Committee was then flown to Lublin and became known as the "Lublin Committee"), and the new body was dominated by ZPP elements: of the PKWN's 15 members, 10 were from the ZPP; of the five from the KRN, the two PPR leaders, Gomulka and Bierut, were informed of its formation only ex-post facto. The PPR leadership was

reconstituted with the addition of ZPP members; five entered the new Politbureau, which retained only three of its original members. These were Gomulka, Spychalski and Bierut, the latter a trusted Comintern agent. Of the 16 members of the Central Committee, only five were "Home Communists."²⁰ As Davies points out, and regardless of legends manufactured later, the PKWN was totally a creature of Moscow. Its key members, such as Osobka-Morawski, Radkiewicz and Rola-Zymierski (later, respectively, the Prime Minister, Minister of State Security, and Minister of Defence) were non-party "Soviet employees," others were communist "NKVD appointees" (Bierut, Berman, Minc, Zambrowski, Zawadzki).²¹ Four days later (26 July), the Soviet Union recognized the PKWN as "the true representative of the Polish people." On 31 December 1944 it was redesignated the Provisional Government of the Polish republic (RTRP).

Meeting with Stalin at Yalta (4-11 February 1945), Western leaders recognized the Soviet-sponsored Provisional Government on the condition that representatives of the London Government and the Home Poles should join it to form a new Provisional Government of National Unity (TRJN), but there was no question that the RTRP was to be the core of the new government. The Yalta Agreements also recognized the Curzon line as the new Soviet-Polish boundary, with Poland to be compensated in the west by territories taken from Germany. On 21 April 1945 the Provisional Government signed a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union which legalized Soviet hegemony in Poland for the next 20 years. This was done without any reference to the Western Allies.²²

The Provisional Government of National Unity was

formed on 28 June 1944. It included 17 members of the PKWN, and 4 individuals from London and the underground, but one of the four was Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, last premier of the Polish London government. Boleslaw Bierut became the President of Poland. The conscience of the West was salvaged by a provision for free elections in Poland, whereby the Poles were supposed to independently determine their political fate. These arrangements were subsequently confirmed by the 1945 Potsdam Conference.

The Polish Resistance authorities regrouped after the Warsaw Uprising, but the presence of Soviet troops, the deconspiration of many AK units as they fought the Germans, and communist penetration, made it difficult for the AK to operate. It was therefore dissolved on 19 January 1945. Those AK members who were unwilling to accept the new regime continued their resistance in a new military organization, NIE (Niepodleglosc -- Independence). When the RTRP was recognized by the Western Allies the continued work of the civilian Home authorities became very difficult. In March 1945, leaders of the underground state (including the Delegate, Bor's successor as AK commander-in-chief, and party leaders), were invited for "talks" by Soviet military authorities near Warsaw, their safety guaranteed by a "letter of immunity." Nevertheless they were arrested, shipped to Moscow, and in June 1945 they were tried for "subversion" by a Soviet military tribunal (the "Trial of the Sixteen"). Political realities had to be faced, and by a decision of the reconstituted underground parliament (RJN), the Polish underground state ceased to exist in July 1945.
²³

But resistance continued. There were three separate partisan centres: NSZ units operated in the

Beskid Mountains (until the end of 1945); the Ukrainian UPA operated in the southeast (until the end of 1947); and NIE, as well as its successor, WIN (Freedom and Independence), was active throughout Poland. NIE had been penetrated too strongly to be effective; it was dissolved in May 1945 and was replaced by WIN, which fought in an organized fashion until early 1947.²⁴ It is estimated that some 80,000 armed partisans were operating in the first five months of 1945, the peak of the civil war.²⁵ The pacification campaign was conducted by Soviet NKVD troops supported by Polish troops and newly-formed Polish security units. The first set of WIN leaders was tried in January 1946; the second in August 1947. Organized resistance was broken by the end of that year, but some partisan units continued to operate into the early 50s.

Under the Yalta agreements only "non-fascist" political parties were allowed to participate in political life in Eastern Europe. But in Poland one of them, the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) represented genuine opposition. It was led by Mikolajczyk, who became one of the two first deputy premiers and the Minister of Agriculture in the Government of National Unity. The PSL was the old SL under a new name, for the old one was taken over by its left wing, which was penetrated by the communists. The SL, the PPS and the Democratic Party (SD, representing the professional intelligentsia), formed the so-called "National Front" led by the PPR. The PPS and the SD were both taken over by their left wings, under crypto-communist leadership.

Two political amnesties (August 2, 1945 and February 22, 1947) were granted to members of the military underground willing to reenter civilian life. According to

official data, 55,277 people emerged: including 22,887 members of WIN; 4,892 members of the NSZ; 8,432 members of "forest bands"; and 7,448 deserters from the LWP. ²⁶

As the date of the promised elections approached (January 19, 1947), terror against the opposition mounted. 118 regional organizers of the PSL were murdered and approximately 100,000 members were harassed by periodic arrests. The election results were known in advance, giving the PSL only a token number of seats. Voters were intimidated, PSL representatives were barred from counting ballots, and voting results were falsified. It is unofficially estimated that the PSL received 68 per cent of the votes, but it was given only 28 out of 444 seats in the Sejm. The final curtain fell when the three PSL leaders (Mikolajczyk, Korbonski -- the last Home Delegate, and Baginski, one of the 16 tried in Moscow but later released) ²⁷ had to flee the country in late 1947 to escape arrest.

Nationalist elements in the PPR also came under fire, and in September 1948 Gomulka was replaced by President Bierut as the PPR's First Secretary. The elimination of independent political parties and factions was now complete, and was crowned by the PPR-PPS "unity congress" in December 1948, when the two parties merged into the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR). Thus by 1948 the consolidation phase of the communist regime in Poland had been completed, and the so-called "Stalinist" phase began.

The war period, the communist takeover, and subsequent repressions left deep scars in the Polish consciousness. As the history of the Polish wartime Resistance indicates, the commitment to independent statehood was not limited to the professional intelligentsia and the nobility, but embraced broad masses

of workers and peasants who participated in the Resistance. This made it very difficult for the new government to establish any degree of true legitimacy. Nevertheless, promises of social and economic reform and social advancement appealed to the more radical and youthful elements, which became the recruiting ground for new communist elites.

3. Political Culture

In contrast to Russia, the political history of which did not allow for the development of restraints on the arbitrary power of the tsars, the power of the Polish kings was from the outset limited by an elected Diet (Sejm) and an appointive Senate. The Sejm was composed of representatives of the landed nobility (szlachta), which constituted an estimated 10 per cent of the population. The Sejm was elected by regional gatherings of the szlachta and met periodically, while the Senate was composed of the Kingdom's top officials. The Jagiellonian monarchy (which was founded when Poland and Lithuania were joined as a result of the marriage of Polish Queen Jadwiga and Lithuanian Grand Duke Jagiello in 1385), was a limited monarchy, and the approval of the Sejm was required for each king's accession to the throne, with concessions exacted each time. Immunities for the nobles were first granted by the Statute of Kosice (1374), and a statute of noble immunity from arbitrary arrest (Neminem Captivabimus), comparable to the Magna Carta, was granted in 1425. This was followed by other privileges, including the prohibition of the introduction of new policies without consultation (Nihil Novi, 1505) and an agreement on religious toleration (1537).²⁸

After the last Jagiellon died, childless, in 1572, all Polish kings were elected by the Sejm and each had to sign a charter of the nobility (Pacta Conventa) upon accession to the throne. The kings could not raise taxes or declare war without the Sejm's consent, and could not marry without the approval of the Senate. Weak royal powers and the growing irresponsibility of the nobility contributed to the decline of Poland. The shock of the first Partition (1772) stimulated a great patriotic revival, and the Great Four Years' Sejm (1788-1792) adopted a new constitution on May 3, 1791. It established a democratic constitutional system matched by none, at the time, except for that found in the United States. Poland was made a hereditary monarchy with a parliament elected every two years and ministers responsible to it; cities were given judicial and administrative autonomy and parliamentary representation; peasants were placed under the protection of the law and serfdom was abolished. The Constitution also provided for a permanent standing army.

None of these provisions were ever implemented because the second (1793) and the third (1795) Partitions immediately followed and Poland ceased to exist. But the memory of the Constitution is revered, and the 3rd of May became a national holiday when independence was restored in 1918. After the Partitions the concept of political representation for the lower classes was swept away, together with the Constitution, and pre-Partition class stratification and privileges were reinforced within the respective socio-political structures of Imperial Russia, Prussia and Austro-Hungary.

The highly individualistic yet contentious Polish

political culture, pluralistic and egalitarian, but class-conscious and nostalgic for authority figures, was reflected in the political history of the Second Republic. It was dominated by Jozef Pilsudski (1867-1935), the founder of the Polish Legions, whose leadership was crucial in the establishment of an independent Poland. Pilsudski retired in 1921, but returned to power in a coup d'état in 1926. The Constitution of 1921, adopted by a Sejm elected in 1919, provided for parliamentary supremacy and cabinet government. But because of the multiplicity of parties and numerous problems facing the new country, coalition governments proved to be extremely unstable (creating conditions strongly reminiscent of those prevalent in the French Fourth Republic), and this triggered the 1926 coup. A new constitution, adopted in 1935, established a strong presidential system. Under Pilsudski's epigons, "the Colonels," the freedom of political parties was gradually curtailed and the powers of parliament were eroded so that the political opposition lost most of its effectiveness. But it should be noted that political pluralism revived under the Nazi occupation, when all major political parties agreed to participate in the underground Polish state on the basis of parliamentary democracy.

On the whole, the basic features of Polish political culture are totally incompatible with Marxism-Leninism, which combines the Russian authoritarian heritage with the millenialist Marxist ideology. This incongruity, reinforced by nationalism and religion, has been at the source of the political instability which has plagued communist Poland throughout the almost 40 years of its existence.

4. Social Values and Attitudes; Change and Continuity in the Value System

Poland is one of the few bloc countries where a tradition of sociological research had developed before World War II. Starting in 1956, in the period of relative relaxation after Gomulka's accession to power, Polish sociologists were able to resume field research. Their findings were rarely published because of constraints imposed by the system. But as in Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring period, sociological data became increasingly available in the seventies and during the 1980-81 Solidarity period. A summary of twenty years of sociological research investigating the transformation of attitudes and values in Polish society appeared in an article published in 1981 by Stefan Nowak, one of the sociologists involved in this research.³⁰ This section largely follows Nowak's analysis, starting with his definition that the values of a person are "the standards that define for him how people should behave, what actions or events merit approval or condemnation, and what pattern of relations should prevail among people, groups and institutions."³¹

The findings indicated continuity in terms of the content and hierarchy of values, but at the same time document a major transformation in the structure of the value system brought about by the impact of the war and of the communist regime, the latter particularly in the Stalinist period, compared by Nowak to a "grinding mill." Social transformation was effected by an unprecedented increase in social mobility: horizontal mobility because of the relocation and shifts of population on a massive scale, and vertical mobility because of losses sustained by

the intelligentsia and upper social strata (the target of both Nazi and communist repression) and the upward movement of the lower strata. This mobility was stimulated by the industrialization, urbanization and bureaucratization of the country as well as by the regime's social and economic policies (nationalization of industry and land reform) and its preferential treatment of workers and peasants based on class and political loyalty criteria. A political transformation took place as a result of the policy of eliminating and destroying all autonomous political and social organizations (the Church alone retained its autonomy, but only in the private domain) and the imposition of a monopoly on social communications coupled with intensive indoctrination in Marxism-Leninism.

The result has been a remarkable homogenization of values and attitudes. In the statistical structure of the value system this was reflected in "an almost random statistical aggregate of values and attitudes," with little differentiation by personal or group identity: "In people's absorption of values their personal and group identity seemed to play at most the role of weak filters, not of independent factors shaping their values."³² Thus, the surveys of the late 50s revealed a single system of values with no subsystems and no "confrontation over differing Weltanschauungen"; a remarkable finding for a society where the political spectrum prior to 1945 included political and social views ranging from the extreme right to the extreme left, and which is now highly stratified by task, occupation and privilege.

The findings relating to the content of the value system are equally interesting, indicating a selective absorption of some of the new values which were compatible

with old values which "persisted somewhere deep in people's minds," in a synthesis which "began to exert pressure on the course of events on a national level in about 1956."³³

As shown by surveys conducted in the late 50s, the new values which were accepted can be subsumed under the broad designation of "socialism." These included nationalization of industry, economic planning, land reform, and abolition of prewar class distinctions. The value absorbed most strongly was that of egalitarianism. Particularly strong approval was given to equality of opportunity, including the idea of preferential treatment for the underdog; the regime was even given credit for its effort to equalize opportunities. Some inequality of income distribution was found acceptable, but within a narrow range, and a majority felt that social stratification in Poland at the time was far in excess of permissible bounds.

At the same time, a strong preference was expressed for "the Polish road to socialism," which meant

democratizing the political system, removing the most drastic limitations on citizens' rights and the major sources of their fear, promoting freedom of speech and expression, increasing the influence of people in the government and, after the Yugoslavian model, encouraging the participation of workers' councils in the management of factories. The 'Polish road to socialism' was also suffused with the patriotic feelings people attach to nation as distinguished from state.³⁴

These ideas had little in common with orthodox Marxism-Leninism and, in fact, no such association was assumed by the respondents. Indeed, only two per cent of a sample of Warsaw university students in 1958 declared themselves to be Marxists. There was, however, a strong association with religious and nationalist sentiments and egalitarianism,³⁵ values which are strongly rooted in the Polish past and Polish political culture. The egalitarian nature of Polish political traditions has been expressed in proverbs such as the widely quoted "a gentleman on his homestead is equal to a senator."³⁶ Although his work was highly censored, the well-known sociologist Jan Szczepanski indirectly admitted, in a study of Polish society, that although the nobility had been eliminated as a social class along with its economic base, szlachta class values had survived and had been internalized³⁷ by the workers and peasants of the new socialist society.

It can be argued that the regime has succeeded only too well in inculcating the basic tenets of its ruling myth, the general effect of which has been detrimental to the legitimization of its power. Developments since 1956 have brought into increasingly sharp focus a growing gap between the socialist myth professed by the PZPR and the prevalent reality. Poor economic management has been accompanied by an ever greater differentiation of the social structure and by the political elite's conspicuous consumption, all of which flies in the face of socialist standards of social equality. Surveys taken between 1961 and 1978 "showed that disparities in income and wealth were perceived by a great majority as the main factor dividing people and as a primary source of social tension."³⁸ They also demonstrated a growing dissatisfaction with the

performance of the system and its leadership, with political repression, and with living conditions, in particular shortages of consumer goods and housing. This dissatisfaction accelerated in the late 70s, and stimulated the reprivatization of life pursuits, indifference and apathy towards public life and communist social institutions, and open cynicism. At the same time the hierarchy of values which characterized a "just" society in the popular mind did not change, continuing to rank equality of opportunity, satisfaction of basic needs, freedom of speech, and participation in the governmental process as top values. It is significant that the less educated the respondents were, the more egalitarian were their views, and that freedom of speech was valued more highly by workers, particularly skilled workers, than by intellectuals. As Nowak notes, "this explains to some extent why skilled workers are now the main social force in Poland, demanding social and economic justice and freedom of speech at the same time."³⁹

A sense of alienation prevented popular identification with any of the new social institutions promoted by the regime. When asked which groups automatically evoked a "we" perception, Polish respondents ranked "self," "family" and "friends" first, followed immediately by "nation." As Nowak comments, this not only confirmed the stereotype of Polish patriotism, but also revealed a "social vacuum between the level of primary groups and that of a nation."⁴⁰ The social alienation expressed in the "We-They" dichotomy also goes far to explain the inability of the Polish communist leadership to motivate the people for better economic performance. The problem is well illustrated in a commentary by a

Poland-based correspondent for the Paris Polish-language monthly, Kultura:

... such a dichotomy is a logical consequence of any system in which power is imposed rather than derived from elections. In the case when such a system is described as socialist but when it is in fact the owner of three-fourths of the national resources, the "We-They" dichotomy begins to function in a flawed, obviously sick way. The sense of any ownership becomes obliterated, responsibility and initiative disappear, and the vacuum is filled with ethical anarchy. "They" are obliged to provide housing and work ... "They" have to secure raw materials and markets, and besides, "they" are enemies and thus one works every which way (byle jak), and steals "their" property wherever possible (byle gdzie). A very bitter joke emerged at the time of the strikes (1980): what is the difference between striking and working? The difference is that one does not drink when on strike.⁴¹

The growing alienation and apathy among Warsaw university students was expressed in a sharp decline in willingness to risk life for worthy causes (human life, family, country, human dignity, friends, truth, religion, social ideas) between 1958 and 1978, except for one value, that of the country (nation). The responses in this category did not change; 82 per cent of the respondents in both samples declared their willingness to risk their life for the fatherland.

5. The Crisis of 1980/81

Incongruity between national traditions and the political system, compounded by economic problems, social frustration and police oppression, resulted in endemic political instability. Since 1945 there have been five waves of popular unrest in Poland, three of which necessitated a change in the party leadership.⁴²

In June 1956 workers rioted in Poznan over poor living conditions; force was used and many were killed. The reverberations, in the context of the post-Stalin interregnum in Moscow, brought Wladyslaw Gomulka back to power and swept away the Stalinists. Gomulka and his supporters stood up to the threat of a Soviet intervention and, by evoking the promise of democratization and of the promotion of national interests, awakened new hopes which were reflected in the surveys of the late 50s. Heavy-handed persecution of the Church ceased, and agricultural collectivization was reversed. But all other hopes were short-lived as the regime remained ideologically orthodox and economically inefficient.

In 1968 the professional and creative intelligentsia and the students demonstrated in the streets of Warsaw and other cities, demanding greater freedom. But the demonstrators were roughed up, and the regime's response was an anti-"revisionist," anti-Semitic campaign and purges.

The strikes of Baltic shipyard workers over price increases in December 1970 were suppressed with great brutality. Troops were used and there were many casualties. The impact of this event resulted in the ouster of Gomulka and his replacement by Edward Gierek as the party's first secretary. Again, promises were made and

hopes were high. But Gierek failed to establish the dialogue demanded by society and, by the mid-70s, the economy quickly deteriorated, while "New Class" privileges became blatant and popular frustrations mounted.

Problems again came to a head in 1975-76. The 1975 amendments to the constitution, designed to legitimize Poland's "socialist" character and its subservience to Soviet foreign policy (in line with the other bloc states), caused vigorous opposition in intellectual circles which spilled over into the Sejm debates. And in the summer of 1976 the workers struck again, in another attempt to get wages raised, and were again suppressed and persecuted.

Out of these two events a new coalition came into being, linking the intelligentsia, students, and workers, and creating a new political opposition without precedent in the communist world. A number of opposition groups sprang up, most of them openly organized, and a veritable flood of unofficial (not subject to censorship) publications appeared which expressed a variety of viewpoints. As this movement grew the regime seemed unable to act -- in part because many in the party were sympathetic to reform -- and contented itself with sporadic harassment. As peasant representatives and priests joined the debates the movement's base broadened. The decision to "go open," i.e., to organize openly, was a milestone which provided a focus for the self-mobilization of society, and the first group to do so was the Committee for the Defence of the Workers (KOR), established in 1976 to assist the workers who were persecuted in the wake of the strikes. Given this background the election of a Polish Pope, and the Pope's triumphant tour of Poland in the summer of 1979, proved to be a catalyst in mobilizing popular support

behind the movement for reforms, which later became known as the "Renewal" (Odnowa) movement.

The July 1980 government decision to introduce another price increase was a spark which ignited country-wide strikes representing the last and the most powerful wave of popular resistance. It toppled Gierek as well as other party and government leaders and brought into being a genuinely independent trade union, Solidarity (Solidarnosc). It ushered in the "Solidarity Period," a period of the spontaneous rebirth of civil society which was short-lived but had remarkable dimensions and effects. This period of civic renewal, behind which stood the Polish workers, was cut short by the imposition of martial law by the Polish People's Army on 13 December 1981.

It is important to present certain highlights of the 1980-81 period, for they provide a background which is essential if one wishes to understand the role which the armed forces have played in the political life of the country and the post-martial law relationship between the armed forces and society.

The sequence of events began on 1 July 1980, when scattered strikes were called after the government announced price increases, and by mid-August the strike effort was coordinated across the country by newly-organized inter-factory strike committees. Poland's economy was brought to a standstill and the party leadership capitulated on August 30, signing crucial agreements with Baltic shipyard workers and Silesian miners. The remarkable gains of this strike phase (July-August 30, 1980) were made possible by the support of almost all segments of Polish society. The workers' leaders displayed exceptional maturity and restraint, as

well as organizational skills, which prevented violence and allowed for the coordination of the strikes. In this task they were assisted by KOR, which acted as the public information agent, communications link and political advisory body of the factory committees.

The 21 demands incorporated in the Gdansk Agreement and signed on behalf of the workers by Lech Walesa, the leader of the new Solidarity union, became the basis for country-wide settlements. They reflected the broad spectrum of social demands and were closely related to the hierarchy of values found in the above-mentioned surveys. The first set of provisions concerned the establishment of independent, self-governing trade unions (within the meaning of the ILO Conventions, of which communist Poland had been a signatory) with the right to strike and to bargain collectively. The second set concentrated on wages, work conditions and overall economic improvement, inclusive of far-reaching economic reforms. The third and crucial set of provisions consisted of political demands: freedom of thought and worship; freedom of information; and the curtailment of censorship and of arbitrary police powers. The demands directly challenged the key principles of the communist system: the monopoly of power exercised by the party, and the attendant monopoly of communications and arbitrary powers of enforcement. In effect, the emergence of autonomous trade unions (an anathema to communists, starting with the so-called "Workers' Opposition" in Russia suppressed by the Bolsheviks in 1921) opened up the gates of pluralism.

Students, as well as members of the professional and creative intelligentsia, soon added their voices to the demands for freedoms and reforms, and the peasants formed

formed their own organization, Rural Solidarity. The membership of Solidarity mushroomed, which became its major source of strength but also a source of weakness. The umbrella-like organization included a broad spectrum of revived Polish public opinion -- from trade unionists to revisionists and extreme nationalists -- which made it very difficult for the leaders to formulate and implement policies, and to control their grass roots. The problems of control were augmented by an emphasis on egalitarianism and democratic procedures, and by the predominant youthfulness of the membership, which made it more volatile. On the other hand the territorial base of the organization (as distinct from the branch-production base of communist-type unions), was an important strength of Solidarity when dealing with the authorities, especially in a local and regional setting.

As Nowak pointed out at the time, the speed with which Solidarity assembled its membership of 10 million testified both to the needs and to the degree of political frustration of the people. It stimulated the process of the reintegration of society, with many social organizations, such as students', writers' and journalists' associations, universities, etc., "undergoing democratic rebirth," "electing their own boards and defining policies and tasks by democratic procedures without external control":

By uniting and organizing, the people
... see ... the possibility of
influencing things even at the
national level. They lose the feeling
of powerlessness and replace it with
the feeling of national dignity
One cannot understand the events in
Poland without reference to restored
human dignity.43

The Gierek team, which was forced to sign the agreements, was swept out of power. The new team -- the new PZPR First Secretary was Stanislaw Kania, an apparatchik with a background in military and police work -- was outwardly conciliatory. But under extreme pressure from the Soviet Union (sabre-rattling, visits by high-level functionaries, a vituperative anti-Solidarity propaganda campaign), and using the threat of a Soviet intervention, they did everything in their power to resist, to slow down and to subvert the process of change. But they also had to cope with the virtual collapse of the party as an instrument of power, and the successful penetration by Solidarity not only of the party (where a so-called "horizontal reform" movement began) but also of other bastions of power such as the militia. The obstructionist measures taken by the government failed to stop the momentum of the movement, and on 11 February 1981 the armed forces took a first step into the power vacuum when General Wojciech Jaruzelski, the Minister of National Defence and a member of the PZPR Politbureau, took over as Prime Minister.

The Kania-Jaruzelski leadership signalled an apparent change in policy in favour of concessions and a dialogue with Solidarity and the Episcopate, the two major forces representing society's interests. Taken at face value at the time in Poland and abroad, in retrospect this seems to have just been a change of tactics, as preparations for the coup soon began. Jaruzelski's taking over the government was followed within a month by the Bydgoszcz incident (the first time a police force was used to brutally break up a Solidarity sit-in), which was blamed at the time on party hard-liners. During the resulting

confrontation, Solidarity's threat of a general strike was called off at the last minute. Many analysts see this as the turning point in the fate of the movement: the regime began to regroup and Solidarity began to lose its momentum.

The apparent concessions included a limited response to the demands put forward by party reformists. An extraordinary PZPR Congress took place July 14-18, 1981; delegates to it were selected by secret ballot, and a secret ballot was used for the election of the leaders (an unprecedented first in communist practice). Kania was reelected but the Central Committee retained only 10 per cent of its pre-Congress membership, the Politbureau -- only four of its old members. But few genuine reformers seem to have entered the new leadership and the Congress failed to come up with any reform programme. It reaffirmed, however, the two Soviet-imposed imperatives: one-party rule and adherence to the socialist "alliance," and pledged to fight "counter-revolutionary elements." Not surprisingly, the general perception of the limits imposed by the Soviet Union's looming presence was shared by Solidarity, which was called by many a "self-limiting revolution." The very first issue of Solidarity's newspaper stressed the imperative need "to tread a narrow path" between the two cardinal facts of life in Poland: the enormous impetus of social demands and the country's geopolitical situation.

The first Solidarity Congress took place on 3-7 October 1981. It witnessed a strong challenge to Lech Walesa's moderate leadership by local branches, maximal in their demands and fired by sharp conflicts with local party, government and industrial administrations which were dominated by hard-line elements. But Walesa was reelected

and the Congress adopted a programme consistent with general social values and demands , asking for free elections, freedom of speech, and worker control of the economy, education and the media. In a challenge to the Soviet Union and other "fraternal" regimes, the Congress appealed to workers in other bloc countries to follow Solidarity's example and establish similar organizations.

Overall, conditions continued to deteriorate throughout 1981. The "Big Three" (Walesa, Jaruzelski and Cardinal Jozef Glemp, the Primate of Poland) negotiated plans for a national unity coalition, but the plans were never realized. Clashes between local Solidarity activists and party and government functionaries multiplied; many of the clashes bore the earmarks of deliberate police provocation. The economy deteriorated, but more because of a shortage of materials and spare parts, and growing indebtedness to the West, than as a result of strikes (as claimed by the government). Meeting on October 19, a Plenum of the Central Committee of the PZPR replaced Kania by Jaruzelski, and this represents the second turning point of 1981. General Jaruzelski thus assumed a dominant position in the government, holding the three most important positions: the leadership of the party, the leadership of the government and command of the armed forces.

By late October the food situation had deteriorated, local conflicts accelerated, and wildcat strikes (unauthorized by the Solidarity leadership) multiplied. As economic disaster loomed the key issue was to prevent further strikes, an imperative understood by the leadership of all contending forces. But economic grievances and social unrest were increasingly difficult to

control. While Walesa was making a major effort to convince local Solidarity branches to heed the call to cease strikes, the government organized and deployed Military Task Groups throughout the country. At the same time the Sejm was considering limitations on the right to strike. But, paradoxically for a body "elected" in the best communist traditions prior to August 1980, it could not muster a majority of votes to do so.

By early December the government had intensified its anti-Solidarity propaganda, and Solidarity leaders were accused of "counterrevolutionary" tendencies. In retrospect, it appears that the helicopter raid staged on December 2 on the Higher Firefighters' Officer School of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW) in Warsaw, where cadets had attempted a strike, was a rehearsal for the forthcoming coup. Still, when martial law was imposed on the night of December 12, 1981, it caught everyone by surprise.

The military operation was carried out with great efficiency. There was no resistance except in isolated mines and factories, and relatively little bloodshed. Solidarity was proscribed (and subsequently delegalized), and the country was completely paralyzed by a total blackout of communications and a ban on all movement and travel. At one stroke all the gains of 1980/81 were lost. When martial law (formally "the state of war") was proclaimed all power was taken over by a committee of generals under General Jaruzelski, the Military Committee of National Salvation (WRON). Military commissars were appointed to run the factories and to supervise the operation of the government, and the Polish People's Army moved into the political centre stage. With this

background in mind it is now appropriate to examine the genesis and evolution of the Polish Armed Forces and the role which they have played in Polish society.

III. GENESIS AND EVOLUTION OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S ARMY (LWP)

There is little doubt that the Polish People's Army saved communist rule in Poland from inevitable collapse in 1980/81 and that, within the "socialist coalition," it is also very likely that by doing so the LWP spared Poland a Soviet military intervention which would have followed had a collapse occurred. But how was it possible for the Polish Armed Forces to wage war on Polish society in the interests of the maintenance of the Soviet hegemonic role in East-Central Europe, and what role are they likely to play in the future? The discussion which follows traces the evolution of the LWP within the historical context sketched above, focusing on its relationship with the Soviet Armed Forces and on the role the military has played in Poland since 1945.⁴⁶

Five distinct phases in the evolution of the LWP are recognized in Polish military historiography:

1. Origins and Wartime Development (1942-1945);
2. Consolidation of Power in Poland and Establishment of Peacetime Structures (1945-1948);
3. First Period of Modernization (1949-1955);
4. Second Period of Modernization and Adaptation to Nuclear War (1956-1960);
5. Third Modernization Period, Integration into the Joint Forces of the Warsaw Pact (1961 to the Present).⁴⁷

1. Origins and Wartime Development: 1942-1945

The Polish People's Army (Ludowe Wojsko Polskie -- LWP) originated in the merger of two separate Soviet-sponsored military organizations: the Polish Army in the USSR and the communist partisan units which operated in Poland under German occupation.

The First "Tadeusz Kosciuszko" Infantry Division was organized in May 1943 in Seltse, near Riazan, under the auspices of the Union of Polish Patriots (ZPP). Polish communists had petitioned Stalin to allow the formation of an army under Soviet command ever since the Nazi invasion, but permission was refused until it suited Soviet national interests. General Zygmunt Berling (a Polish colonel willing to collaborate who was promoted to the rank of general by Stalin) was named the division's commander, and was assisted by Soviet officers. As new units were formed, the Division became part of the First Polish Corps in August 1943, and this in turn became the First Polish Army in March 1944.⁴⁸ In July 1944 the First Polish Army numbered 107,000 men.

In Poland, the PPR started to organize military units in 1942. The first units of the People's Guards (Gwardia Ludowa -- GL) were formed in May 1942, and in January 1944 the GL was transformed into the People's Army (Armia Ludowa -- AL). The AL's commander was General Michal "Rola" Zymierski (a prewar officer once convicted of financial irregularities), who became the first Minister of National Defence in the Government of National Unity and the commander of the LWP when it was created, by a decree of the KRN (the National Home Council), by merging the AL and the First Polish Army on 21 July 1944. The formation of the Second Polish Army began immediately, its ranks

being filled by the AL, some AK personnel (some were impressed and some were volunteers), and by conscription. General Karol Swierczewski became its commander, and when the Soviet and Polish forces occupied Berlin in May 1945⁴⁹ the total strength of the LWP was 400,000 men.

The LWP was the largest of the non-Soviet national formations which was given combat tasks alongside Soviet units. It was organized and trained on the Soviet model and was commanded by Soviet officers. It fought under Soviet operational command, with Polish units deployed by Soviet commanders within Soviet formations according to current combat requirements. Its mission, however, was primarily political. Both points are clearly emphasized in official Soviet and Polish sources. In political terms the LWP was an army of a "new type" because of its class base, and thus its mission was both "national" and "social"⁵⁰ liberation. In fact, no regrets are ever expressed concerning the exodus of the Anders Army, for its commanding cadre was "ideologically alien" and thus could not have created an army of the new type.⁵¹

Although LWP organization and training were based in Soviet models, there were certain differences, which were dictated by its future mission. One of these was the use of and special role played by Soviet officers; others, such as reducing the number of levels in the chain of command, were dictated by the need for greater flexibility.⁵² The LWP, however, had a special, political mission:

The Soviet command ... saved the First Army in order to use it for especially important tasks ...: to move it into the forefront of the fighting once the

Polish border was crossed ... The key function ... was to allow the heroic but martyred city of Warsaw ... to be liberated with the participation of the First Army, the new army of a new People's Poland. ... The Second Army was directed to Lower Silesia to fight for these ancient Polish lands. Later it took part in the liberation of fraternal Czechoslovakia. In this, too, there was a deep political purpose.⁵³

The same point is made in the memoirs of General Shtemenko, the wartime Soviet chief of staff:

The fact that the First Polish Army was singled out as the first to attack in the Warsaw Region was very important both from the military and moral-political points of view. The Soviet Command had been sparing it, and only now decided that it had the right to bring it into action. The Polish comrades were given a chance to demonstrate their patriotic feelings directly under the walls of Warsaw ... Now the First Polish Army was the main core of ... an increasingly strong military mainstay of People's Poland -- the Polish Army.⁵⁴

The 1944 AK Warsaw Uprising upset these plans, although this is not mentioned in official sources. The First Army was prevented from helping the AK in Warsaw -- in fact General Berling was removed from his command for attempting to do so -- and the real symbolism of the First Army's actual entry into the ruins of the city in January 1945 was very different from that intended, both for the soldiers and for the population that was no longer there.

Nevertheless, the political mission for which the Polish units in the USSR had been prepared -- to "liberate" the country and to serve as the nucleus of communist power there -- was served. It was comparable to that assigned to the Baltic national military formations of the Soviet forces in the "liberation" of the three Baltic states in 1944. In this sense the Polish First Army was simply one of the many Soviet national formations created for similar purposes before and during WW II.⁵⁵

The special position of Soviet officers in the Polish Army in the USSR was dictated by necessity as much as by political considerations. After Katyn and the exit of the Anders Army, there were practically no Polish officers left in the USSR. The problem of political control also loomed large, as shall be seen below. According to General Bordzilowski (who should know, because he was himself a Soviet officer):

Polish units were commanded mostly by Soviet officers who had served for years in the Soviet Armed Forces. They were not seconded as advisers but took over command positions directly at various levels. (This was possible because in the units there were Polish political representatives who were politically compatible) ... The Soviet officers brought into the Polish Army not only their military knowledge and training methods but also definitive ideas. For the bourgeois government of Czechoslovakia and even more so, for royal Romania, the same Soviet officers were of great value from the point of view of their combat experience, but they could only serve (in Czechoslovak and Romanian units) as advisers.⁵⁶

Bordzilowski also states that the presence of Polish political officers "made Soviet officers in the ranks of the Polish Army feel as if they were in the Soviet Army," a telling comment.

The number of Soviet officers who served in the Polish Army between 1943 and 1945 was approximately 20,000,⁵⁷ 36 of whom were general officers. A Soviet source gives the figure of 20,000 generals and officers (presumably inclusive of majors), and 13,000 "younger commanders and specialists."⁵⁸ More than a thousand were killed in combat.⁵⁹ The proportion of Soviet officers ranged from approximately three-fourths to one-half of the total membership of the officer corps: the figures were 75.8% in October 1943, 65.8% in July 1943, 58.6% in January 1944, and 53% in March 1945.⁶⁰ In addition to Soviet officers in the regular Polish Army, Soviet military personnel were dispersed throughout Poland via Soviet partisan units dropped behind German lines in 1944. Information on this subject is readily available from Soviet sources. A Soviet military historian reports that about 10,000 Soviet citizens served in GL and AL units, and that there were 12,000 Soviet partisan units in Poland. This was in addition to Polish citizens who were sought out in Western Ukraine and Belorussia and parachuted into Poland.⁶¹ General Epishev states that on April 3, 1944, the CPSU Politbureau instructed the Central Committees of the Belorussian and Ukrainian parties to search out Poles who were fighting in Ukrainian and Belorussian partisan units, to form them into special detachments, and to send them to Poland under experienced commanders to join the Polish partisans.⁶² Informal Polish sources indicate that the establishment of a Soviet partisan staff in Poland

in the crucial year of 1944 was designed both to beef up the numerically meagre communist partisan effort and to take over direction from AL elements which were not considered to be trustworthy.

Many Soviet officers who were seconded to Polish units were of Polish ethnic origin (although few could speak Polish); they wore Polish uniforms and meticulously followed Polish national traditions (introduced, at Soviet behest, by the few members of the pre-1939 professional Polish military cadre, such as Berling, who were among these officers), inclusive of attendance at the Catholic mass. Many of these Soviet officers stayed on, eventually taking Polish citizenship, although they probably retained Soviet citizenship as well. The latter group included several generals such as Poplawski, Korczyc and Bordzilowski, and an unknown number of senior and junior personnel; some of the latter must have eventually reached senior ranks by the 70s.

The First Army's officer corps had other special features: it was heavily politicized, with a large contingent of Polish communists recruited as educational/political officers, and it had a high proportion of Jews. The first group, composed largely of survivors of Stalin's purges (and thus almost certainly saved either by having been imprisoned in Polish jails at the time or by their NKVD/Comintern connections), was directed to political work in Polish military units as soon as these were formed because of the importance attached by the Soviet command to the indoctrination of their troops. These first Polish units were largely composed of Polish citizens who had been deported to the Soviet interior in 1939-41, and this had aggravated their traditional hostility toward Russia. This hostility was

not concealed, and is frequently mentioned by all authors of memoirs and studies dealing with this period.⁶³ As for the political officers, led by Aleksander Zawadzki (a KPP, NKVD and GRU veteran), they comprised a veritable who's who of Polish communist leaders-to-be in the period 1945-1956.

Jewish officers formed a high proportion of the latter group; an estimated 40 per cent of political officers in the First Polish Corps in August 1943 were Jews.⁶⁴ Overall, Nussbaum estimates that Jewish officers accounted for approximately 20 per cent of all officers in the First Polish Army. There were several reasons for the high percentage of Jews among the officers. First of all, the density of the Jewish population in the eastern territories of Poland occupied by the Soviet Union in 1939 was high, and many had been deported into the Soviet interior; in addition, many fled to Soviet territory from the areas occupied by the Germans. Thus, ZPP data indicate that approximately one-third of the Polish citizens in the USSR during the war were Jewish. Moreover, more Jews were eligible to become officers because many Jews among the deportees and refugees were better educated than the Poles. And, finally, Jews were numerous among the Polish communist cadre, especially among KPP (Polish Communist Party) survivors.

Not only were Soviet officers in command of the first Polish Army but, despite the verbal camouflage of Polish military historians, it is quite clear, from all sources, that all important decisions related to Poland or to Polish military units were taken either personally by Stalin or by the Scviet high command. When in 1944 the

Soviet Armed Forces crossed the Polish border in pursuit of the Germans, their regulars, as well as NKVD troops, proceeded to deal with "hostile" Polish elements on their own authority and without reference to the PKWN or to the Provisional Government. However, Moscow ensured that there was a formal legal basis to do so; Article 9 of the Treaty signed between the Soviet government and the PKWN on 26 July 1944 gave the Soviet authorities full control over civilian security in the Soviet Army's rear.⁶⁶ A Soviet military historian, for example, specifically credits the Soviet Armed Forces with creating the conditions which made the establishment of the Polish Army (and, implicitly, the communist government) possible:

The impact on the Polish territories of the Liberator Soviet Army was such that it deprived, in practice, the internal and foreign imperialist reaction of any possibility to break up the formation of the new (Polish) Army.⁶⁷

We learn further that it was the Stavka (Soviet High Command) which ordered Soviet commanders in Poland to destroy the AK; this "not only assured peace in the Soviet rear, but made possible the normal activity of the PKWN, and allowed for the mobilization of youth and for the creation of the Polish Army."⁶⁸ Soviet commanders replaced local officials with their nominees, confiscated livestock and foodstuffs from the peasants, and conducted operations against AK (and other resistance) units entirely on their own. The arrest of "The Sixteen" in March 1945, and their subsequent military trial, was apparently carried out without even informing the Provisional Government.⁶⁹

Although totally dependent on Soviet political and military support, Polish communist leaders, and particularly the home-grown (PPR) elements, resented this dependence and its constraints. As Norman Davies correctly notes:

In its essentials, the political history of post-war Poland is extremely simple. It tells how the USSR handed power to its chosen protégés, and how it has kept them in place ever since. In detail, however, it is extremely complicated, and largely hidden from public view.⁷⁰

The history of the LWP illustrates this point. From the beginning it was, and still is, the instrument for the preservation of a Soviet-sponsored communist regime; but there were, and are, enormous complexities in the implementation of this role, which has not always been performed willingly. The political leaders of the PKWN and the leaders and political officers of the LWP were in most cases one and the same in the early period: all dependent for survival on the backup of their army which, in turn, was not viable without the support of the Soviet Armed Forces. Yet the political loyalty of these leaders was seen by Moscow as tenuous, and the reliability of the LWP as questionable, a situation not without relevance to the post-1981 period.

From the very beginning there was a rivalry between the "Moscow" Poles and the "Home" Poles; the leadership of the latter, after the death of Nowotko and Finder, was composed almost entirely of home-grown elements from the group around Gomulka and the GL "forest" group. As noted

above, the ZPP competed with the PPR (and its "representative" Home National Council -- KRN) over which group would form the nucleus of a future government, and these squabbles had to be adjudicated either by Georgi Dimitrov, as the chairman of the Comintern, or by Stalin himself.⁷¹ In the final analysis the KRN was chosen by Stalin as the base of the government, but key positions in the new government and the consolidated PPR were entrusted to ZPP alumnae and "fellow travellers," since Stalin distrusted the home-nurtured elements of the original PPR. Among the PPR AL group there was also hostility towards what they saw as the predominance of Jews in the Soviet-preferred faction. This animosity, which continued to linger in the background, was to come into the open during periods when anti-Semitism was openly promoted by the CPSU: in the late Stalin period; and in the sixties, particularly in 1967-68.⁷²

A review of the available documentary evidence indicates that Moscow's supervision was direct and immediate. In addition to the inundation of the country by Soviet troops and Soviet partisans, and the penetration of the PKWN and its successor government by Soviet agents, official Soviet representatives watched over all branches of the new administration and the PPR leadership reported directly and frequently to Stalin; Bierut, and to a lesser extent Jakub Berman (the KPP, Comintern, and ZPP veteran)⁷³ were the key contact men.

A. The Question of Reliability

The Polish communists and fellow-travellers, especially those from the "domestic" group, inevitably resented Soviet tutelage, perhaps because they still had

certain ideological illusions. Their resentment was augmented by their perception of total dependence on Soviet help and was directed, in particular, "at the dominance of Soviet advisers in all areas of national life," and at high-handed Soviet methods.⁷⁴ There were also policy differences (the Gomulka group wanted to push forward with the Marxist transformation of society and was unhappy with the pragmatic coalition tactics imposed by Moscow),⁷⁵ fears that new territorial gains in the west might be jeopardized by a softer Soviet line on Germany, and frustration because the Red Army had taken over the struggle with the AK.

Franciszek Jozwiak (an ex-AL leader and the commander of the militia) commented in 1945 that they should be dealing with the AK themselves instead of letting the Red Army do it, but "we are not masters in our own home,"⁷⁶ a comment wryly echoed by Gomulka: "We are unable to fight the reactionaries without the assistance of the Red Army. That says something about our base."⁷⁷ Gomulka also noted that "deportations and mistakes by Soviet organs "reinforced popular suspicions and popular perceptions that the USSR was another version of tsarist Russia.⁷⁸ But Gomulka did not support Ochab (a ZPP member) who, after complaining that "our central problem is state sovereignty," suggested that "since the war is over the Red Army should quit Poland" (the exchange took place in May 1945). Gomulka said that the Polish forces were not strong enough to replace the Soviet forces,⁷⁹ implying that the Provisional Government could not survive without the Soviet military occupation of the country. There were many complaints, nevertheless, concerning the arbitrary actions of Soviet commanders and the looting and violence

of Soviet soldiers.⁸⁰

The problem of Soviet inaction at the time of the 1944 Warsaw Uprising was also a sore point. An explanation was sought from Stalin himself, who replied with the standard Soviet argument that after a period of sustained advance the Soviet forces were overextended and had to pause. He added that, in the circumstances, General Bor's action was "criminal." These explanations were then passed on by the PPR to the populace.⁸¹ But among the "Muscovites" there emerged a tendency to identify with the interests of "their" country, i.e., to aspire seriously to the responsibilities of governing. The Teschen question, for example, was another foreign policy issue raised with Moscow, although without satisfaction.

The AK threat loomed large in 1944-1945 and it affected both the development and the reliability of the LWP. But the question of reliability had existed there from the very beginning. The first doubts were expressed by Dimitrov in his capacity as head of the Comintern. "Tell me," he is reported asking a Polish communist -- "in the case that we set up a Polish army, will it be possible to rely on it?"⁸² His doubts were justified, for not only was the Kosciuszko Division made up of basically untrustworthy elements, but even Polish communists were prone to heretical ideas, especially since there was no organized Polish party in Moscow to keep them in line. Among the ZPP members there were apparently many free-wheeling discussions and disagreements over the future Polish communist state and the role of the future Polish communist army. A group of ZPP members among the newly designated political officers in the Division even evolved the idea of a future Poland as an "organized democracy" run

by the army, the so-called "Thesis Number 1." It found little favour, however, with the Soviet authorities, was labelled "neo-fascist" by fellow ZPP members,⁸³ and negatively affected the careers of its protagonists.

Another idea with future relevance was that of a "Polish Front," put forth in the PKWN period by, presumably, AL elements in the Ministry of Defence. It was suggested that a "Polish Front," composed of three Polish armies under Polish command and acting as a single operational formation, be created as part of the anti-German war effort. This idea was vetoed by Stalin on the grounds of insufficient personnel, but observers felt at the time that the refusal was dictated by Stalin's mistrust of Polish loyalty.⁸⁴ A third Polish Army was in fact in the works, but plans were scrapped because, as all sources assert, of a shortage of officers.⁸⁵ This was true enough, for AL veterans did not flock in as expected, and few AK officers were forthcoming. The official Polish line at the time (1944) was to welcome AK veterans from the peasant battalions (BCh), while shunning "fascist" ex-Sanacja and other "right-wing" elements. In fact, complaints were voiced in party circles that the Red Army's repression of the AK undercut the LWP recruitment drive.

Three inter-related problems plagued the LWP in late 1944 and early 1945: the failure of the recruitment drive; desertions "to the forest"; and concern over the influence which AK officers were said to have in the army.⁸⁶ Although most AK veterans were not receptive to the idea of becoming communist soldiers, some joined in the course of 1944 and some in response to an AK directive of 6 November 1944 which instructed AK officers to infiltrate the army and the militia. It is estimated that

approximately 10 per cent of the LWP officers at the time were ex-members of the AK. They enjoyed considerable authority because of their war record, and were reported to have taken over important positions and to have exercised a "negative" influence on the soldiers.⁸⁷ In November 1944, perhaps in response to the AK directive,⁸⁸ Gomulka accused the AK of trying to "take over the army."

Gomulka also reported that desertions from the LWP were "numerous," and that "the terrorist tendencies in the army were disquieting."⁸⁹ A celebrated case was that of the desertion, en masse, of the 31st Infantry Regiment of the Second Army on 13 October 1944. An additional problem was the resentment, by the men, of Soviet officers. The popular name for them was "PoP," the acronym for a "person who discharges the duty of a Pole," but which also means a Russian Orthodox priest. In talking to Bierut in October 1944 Stalin expressed his anger over the desertions, as well as over the alleged bad treatment of Red Army personnel in Poland.⁹⁰ Polish "ingratitude" has long been a sore point with the Russians. As Bordzilowski points out, "in the liberation of Poland more than 600,000 Soviet soldiers paid with their lives";⁹¹ yet few Poles appreciated the experience of being liberated by the Red Army.

The discussion of military problems apparently took up much of the PPR Politbureau's time. By October 1944, urged on by the Soviets and prompted by sabotage and desertions, the PPR decided to adopt a hard line towards the admission and treatment of ex-AK personnel in the LWP. At the same time steps were taken to improve party and political work in military units. But the anti-AK policy was not adopted without controversy. As late as May 1945

Marian Spychalski (first deputy minister of Defence at the time) complained that the attacks on the AK were a sign of "sectarianism," and added that "nothing is said about the ex-AK contribution to the Polish Army" while the contributions of the First Army and the AL were always praised. He was joined by Aleksander Kowalski, a leader of the communist youth, who said: "People go too far with the AK; some comrades who were not in Poland during the occupation do not really understand the situation."⁹² This remark was fairly characteristic of the feelings among many AL veterans, but by the end of 1944 an organized campaign against the AK was started, and pacification efforts were intensified.

In the light of the political situation in Poland at the end of the war, and the "infection" by society to which the troops were continuously exposed, the LWP's political reliability remained questionable. Thus the control mechanisms which had been developed in the USSR stayed firmly in place: Soviet officers remained in command positions; the intensive programme of political indoctrination continued; and the counterintelligence apparatus was staffed largely by Soviet personnel and subordinated to Smersh.⁹³

In view of the fact that popular attitudes in Poland towards the communist system and Soviet hegemonism have not changed, it is no surprise to find precedents in the formative period of the LWP both for the "nationalist deviation" of 1956-57 and for the establishment of martial law in 1981. In the latter case, there has been a merger of political and military elites at the top, and they are directly dependent on the armed forces for political survival in the absence of a popular national political

power base. Ultimately these elites are dependent on the Soviet military presence in the area. There is also the precedent of direct military rule imposed on substantial areas of the country when "pacification" was in progress. There is finally the legacy, within the party-military milieu (the present leaders were then junior officers) of the ideas inherent in Thesis Number One.

2. Consolidation of Power and Peacetime Structures,
1945-1948

The end of the war marked the beginning of a crisis period for the LWP. The civil war continued for at least two more years, with NKVD troops and Polish military and security units engaged in the suppression of partisans. Many rank-and-file members of the LWP had strong sympathies for the partisans, hated the Russians, and felt that they were caught between popular contempt and their Russian officers. As noted above, desertions were common; this is shown by the fact that more than 7,000 deserters were eventually included in the amnesties of 1945 and 1947.

The official Polish military view of this period stresses the struggle with the AK and emphasizes the acts of violence committed by the "bandits" and "counterrevolutionaries." This description has two special features: it exaggerates the number of acts of violence which were committed; and it fails to mention the role played in the civil war by Soviet troops. We are told, for example, that in 1945 alone the "reactionary underground" launched 6,983 armed actions and murdered 7,373 people.⁹⁴ Non-communist sources report that 800 party members and 317 Soviets were killed in the first five months of 1945, the period regarded as the peak of the

95 anti-communist resistance. Nevertheless, the official figures given for 1945 mention 10,000 armed actions, with a total for the 1945-1948 period of 30,000 armed actions and 15,000 victims. Whatever the actual numbers, the militia and newly-formed security troop units were unable to cope, and regular troops had to be brought in. Military rule was extended to Bialystok, Lublin and Rzeszow regions, and to parts of Warsaw and Krakow regions. When General Swierczewski was killed on 28 March 1947 by Ukrainian UPA fighters, a special operation, code-named "Vistula," was mounted. It involved 4 Polish infantry divisions, one KBW (Internal Security Corps) division, several militia units, and lasted four months (April-July 1947).⁹⁶ Soviet participation in this action, which is known to have been substantial, is not mentioned. At least four members of the 1981 Committee of National Salvation (WRON), including General Jaruzelski, participated in the 1945-1947 pacification efforts as junior officers, and it is rumoured that during the "Vistula" operation Jaruzelski, then a young Polish officer, met and was noticed by some of the future leaders of the Soviet Union, who were also involved in the pacification drive against the UPA.

The civil war ended about the same time as the process of elimination of the organized political opposition, but 1945-1948 was still a "coalition" period, and thus a period of relative liberalism in the LWP. The army was demobilized to the level of approximately 100,000 men, officers' schools were organized, training methods were reviewed, and the political education system was revamped.⁹⁷ Regular army units were generally reduced to the cadre level. General Spychalski, as the deputy minister of Defence, presided over personnel changes which

involved a reduction in the number of Soviet officers and the admission of prewar professional cadre returning from the West. Many Russian officers returned home after demobilization, leaving behind a skeleton staff of approximately 12,000 officers. At the same time some 65,000 soldiers and officers were repatriated from Great Britain; some of them joined the LWP.⁹⁸

Data on resulting changes in the officer corps differ. According to Checinski, an ex-Polish officer who is now in the West, the command-level officers -- a total of 1,570 men -- were almost evenly divided between prewar cadre (46%) and Soviet officers (38%), with the remainder made up of the original LWP cadre (16%).⁹⁹ An official breakdown of the composition of the officer corps as a whole in 1949 gives very different figures: LWP veterans, including those who gained their officer rank in Spain or in partisan warfare in Polish and Soviet units and in the French Resistance -- 68%; prewar Polish Army cadre and AK veterans -- 26%; Soviet officers -- 6%.¹⁰⁰ Apart from the probability of a countervailing bias, the discrepancy is less troublesome than it would seem. Checinski's figures refer to the command cadre only, where Soviet officers were concentrated. Moreover, the first LWP category given by Walczuk includes officers who, in other sources, are counted as Soviet officers, such as General Swierczewski (veteran of the Spanish Civil war) and partisan military personnel. Also, in the light of other evidence which is available, Walczuk's figures for Soviet officers are ludicrous, and are much too low for the London/AK group. Not surprisingly, many officers returning from the West were given marginal and secondary positions, and some were promptly retired. Of the three senior generals who

returned two, General Rommel and General Bieruta-Spiechowicz, received no assignments; a third, General Paszkiewicz, was first put in charge of the pacification of the Bialystok region, and subsequently became the commander of the Warsaw district.¹⁰¹

Thus the LWP lost some of its Soviet character and gained some respectability. Still, the forces' social prestige was low. Popular anecdotes made fun of the Soviet officers in Polish uniforms, and of the new officers promoted for their class origin and political loyalty rather than professional skills or education. These were known as "officers made by heartfelt desire, not matriculation," and they received little respect in the ranks or among the people. Economic conditions in the LWP were poor and soldiers were frequently used for economic and construction tasks. Many of the demobilized soldiers settled in the so-called "Recovered Territories," probably because so many of them were originally from prewar Poland's eastern territories, now a part of the Soviet Union.

In terms of attitudes in the LWP there is no evidence of much change in comparison with the preceding period. Although the resistance movement had been liquidated, many of its ex-members were still in the ranks of the LWP, and the influence of the non-communist cadre was augmented by an influx of officers returning from the West. It must be remembered that, politically, this was still a "coalition" period. But, as 1948 drew to a close, so did the need for the pretence of "collaboration" with non-"socialist" elements.

3. The Rokossovsky Period: Re-Sovietization, 1949-1956

1949 was a crucial year in the Soviet bloc. Communist ascendancy in domestic politics was supreme, and the beginnings of the "Cold War" had a major impact on the domestic and foreign policies of bloc member countries. It appears that, based on American conduct in Korea, Stalin had decided that the US would not use atomic weapons if attacked in Europe, was not a threat without them, and thus began to mobilize for an invasion in the early 50s. Evidence for this assumption is based on archival materials of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party which were taken out of Czechoslovakia in 1968;¹⁰² the factual evidence which supports this assumption is the change in economic plans imposed on all the East European countries, Poland included, which redirected investments into building up their heavy industry, the armaments industry in particular,¹⁰³ and into the modernization of their armies.

Whatever the reason for the change, the man who was put in charge in Poland was Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky, one of the Soviet commanders during World War II who happened to be of Polish ethnic origin. Rokossovsky clearly came to Poland as Moscow's proconsul; this indicated that, given the existing conditions in Poland, none of the communist leaders there inspired sufficient confidence in Stalin to be entrusted with the task of transforming the country, and particularly the army, to Soviet specifications. What was needed was the elimination, once and for all, of unruly nationalist elements from the party itself, the transformation of the LWP into a reliable, modern, and efficient military force, and a new defence industry.

The first steps on the road to the new policy were taken in 1948 and bear all the earmarks of direct Soviet intervention. In February the economic planning system was revamped on the Soviet model, and by the summer Moscow exerted pressure to introduce the Soviet model wholesale in social and political life. Between the June and September plenary meetings of the Central Committee of the PPR, Gomulka pitted his "national road" views against the Soviet line; was denounced by two of his associates (Spychalski and Ochab, which did not save Spychalski -- he was subsequently arrested and his job as deputy minister of Defence was taken over by Ochab); was forced to recant (he accused himself of failing to grasp the importance of the USSR vis-à-vis the PPR "on the higher plane"); was replaced as First Secretary by President Bierut; and was placed under arrest.¹⁰⁴ But, unlike many of his followers in the PPR/AL group and his counterparts elsewhere in the bloc, Gomulka was not tried. As noted previously, Gomulka's removal was followed by the merger of the PPR and the PPS, and the creation of the PZPR. Marshal Rokossovsky was sent to Poland to reorganize the LWP in November 1949, when he was made a Polish marshal, appointed first deputy prime minister and Minister of National Defence, and became a voting member of the PZPR Politbureau.¹⁰⁵ Between Beirut and Rokossovsky Poland was secure for any ventures which Stalin was contemplating.

Marshal Rokossovsky's major task was to restructure the LWP on the Soviet model. The focus was on three areas: to rebuild the officer corps and the system of political education (both designed to ensure political reliability) and to modernize the forces in the technical sense. An additional task was to establish a strong defence industry.

The purge of "alien" elements from the officer corps took place simultaneously with the purge of the Gomulka group in civilian life. The main victims were AL veterans and AK veterans, as well as the officers of the prewar cadre who joined the LWP upon returning from the West. A celebrated case was that of General Tatar and 19 senior Polish officers, of all service branches, who were subjected to two years of interrogation and torture by the Military Information (Informacja Wojskowa), the notorious counterintelligence organization staffed and controlled by the KGB and Soviet military counterintelligence. They were finally executed, for "organizing a conspiracy in the armed forces," in May 1953. They were rehabilitated after 106
1956.

Simultaneously, the LWP saw a new influx of Soviet officers, mostly into positions of command. General Bordzilowski took over as chief of the General Staff, and one source reports that after Rokossovsky's reorganization Soviet officers occupied 90 per cent of the top positions in the Ministry of National Defence (MON) and of the command positions in military district and key service branches; the remaining 10 per cent of MON positions were 107 staffed by ZPP/First Army veterans. It is estimated that by the end of 1950 prewar professional officers constituted between 4 and 5 per cent of the total cadre, and were employed only in subordinate positions. 108 When the purge was going on the morale of the forces hit rock bottom. There were a number of suicides and resignations, and alcoholism increased.

The reform of the political education system in the armed forces was designed to instill the same kind of political loyalty which prevailed in the SAF, and intensive

political socialization programmes were introduced (pre-induction as well as in-service) which copied Soviet practice. In 1949 party cells were officially established in military units and institutions (only 39.5% of the officers were party members in 1949) as well as in the communist youth organization (ZMP), the Polish equivalent of the Soviet Komsomol. The political apparat in the army was reinforced by party activists from territorial party organizations, and the Military Political Academy (WAP) was established. According to a Polish military source, "the basic directions, methods and forms of ideological-political education ... worked out at the time ... have hardly changed, and remain valid to this day."¹⁰⁹

At the same time the forces were extensively modernized and their training improved, especially that of the infantry. Under General Ivan Turkiel (a Soviet officer), the Air Force was substantially built up; soon 60 per cent of its planes were jets and Air Force personnel accounted for 30 per cent of total military personnel. The country's Air Defence Corps (WOPK) was established during this period, and became part of the Soviet air defence system. Naval and shore defences were also developed (the officer in command was a First Army veteran, Admiral Z. Studzinski), including the formation of special units for the defence of the sea-shore, and an airborne division was formed. A higher military academy for technical training, the Technical Military Academy (WAT) joined WAP as the third university-level military academy (the General Staff Academy was set up in 1947). Military conscription was first introduced in 1949, and the permanent establishment of the LWP was raised to 400,000 men.¹¹⁰ For the modern Polish Army Rokossovsky's reforms were the

first and major step on the road to integration with the Soviet Armed Forces.

On the whole Marshal Rokossovsky is credited with the beginning of the effective military modernization of the LWP, with the establishment of an all-pervasive political education system, and with the creation of a brand-new armaments industry as an integral part of the Soviet defence buildup.¹¹¹ But the problem of morale in the LWP, and its negative image in society, remained. Military service continued to be regarded as unattractive by most young men, and few chose it as a profession. Political constraints and Soviet tutelage were very visible, the educational standards of officers were still low, and the harsh training conditions as well as the absence of economic rewards which prevailed in the service failed to attract ambitious young men.

4. The AL Returns: the "Polish Front," 1956-1960.

A major change came after the death of Stalin in March 1953, for the struggle for power among his successors slowly opened up new possibilities in the bloc. Finally, in February 1956, the 21st CPSU Congress was held in Moscow and N.S. Khrushchev made his famous "secret" speech. Bierut, who attended the Congress, died there, and although suicide is officially given as the cause of death, he may have been liquidated because he knew too much about various behind-the-scenes machinations. He was replaced by Edward Ochab. With Stalinists under fire everywhere in the bloc, the feud between them and the national faction in the PZPR revived. Gomulka had been released from detention in December 1954, and tensions were further raised by the return to Poland of thousands of Poles released from the

Gulag by Khrushchev's amnesty.

In May 1956 Jakub Berman, the number two man after Bierut, was removed from office. Polish workers rioted in Poznan in June under the slogans "Bread and Freedom" and "Russians go Home"; the regular troops refused to shoot at them, and the Internal Security Corps (the KBW) had to be brought in for this purpose; 53 people were killed.¹¹² In the party Gomulka's supporters were getting stronger, and the October 21 Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee returned him to power as First Secretary despite a rumoured attempt at a coup by Marshal Rokossovsky.¹¹³ General Spychalski and other former AL officers who were released in the post-1953 period of relaxation supported Gomulka in his confrontation with Khrushchev. In fact, local KBW units, under their new commander General Waclaw Komar (formerly of the AL), placed their troops in and around Warsaw, ready to resist Soviet intervention. Most of the regular army was paralyzed by the presence of Soviet officers, but two Polish officers were ready to fight: Frey-Bielecki, the commander of a Poznan bomber squadron; and Jan Wisniewski, the commander of coastal defence units, who closed Poland's Baltic ports to Soviet ships.

The 1956 Polish-Soviet confrontation was an attempt to terminate direct Soviet tutelage. It was not a challenge to the communist system (as was the second phase of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution). Thus, in the short term, a tactical Soviet retreat was possible, as was Soviet acceptance of Gomulka as the new Polish leader. But, contrary to popular expectations, the new leadership had little to offer society to meet its demands and expectations. Wladyslaw Gomulka's national posture obscured, for a while, his basic ideological orientation

and earned him, erroneously, the label of a "liberal."

Control over the armed forces was the crucial requirement for emancipation from Soviet tutelage. General Spychalski took over the Defence Ministry from Rokossovsky, who returned to the Soviet Union and took with him most of the remaining Soviet personnel. The one Soviet survivor in a top position was General Bordzilowski, who remained as Chief of the General Staff; this was interpreted as a gesture of goodwill towards the Soviet leadership. Other vacated top positions were filled with GL/AL veterans (many of whom went through the Military Information gehenna), and a few other officers who had been persecuted during the Stalinist period; loyalty to Spychalski and Gomulka was the key criterion for advancement. New appointments included the Chief Inspector of Training (Gen. Zygmunt Duszynski), the Chief of the Main Political Administration (GZP) (General Janusz Zarzycki), and chief of the MON cadres department (Gen. Jerzy Fonkowicz), all three AL veterans. One of the most important changes was in military counterintelligence which, since the First Army days, had been a Soviet agency in the heart of the LWP and a direct conduit to Moscow. This agency was "polonized," and to emphasize the change and to escape past notoriety, the agency got a new name, the Internal Military Service (WSW).

Its new chief, General Aleksander Kokoszyn, was supposed to guard against infiltration by both the West and the East, while, of course, maintaining close collaboration and sharing information with the latter. The new head of military intelligence (General Grzegorz Korczynski) had been imprisoned after WW II and was loyal to Gomulka. The chiefs of the services were also changed, with General Frey-Bielecki taking over the Air Force,

and Admiral Wisniewski -- the Navy.¹¹⁴ Most of the new military appointments were drawn from among the so-called "intellectuals" among the AL veterans close to Spychalski, as distinguished from the hard-line AL nationalists grouped around Mieczyslaw Moczar in the security police and in the veterans' organization, the Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy (ZBoWiD).

Spychalski continued the reforms designed to modernize the forces, but also placed an emphasis on improving the well-being of its personnel and upgrading the cadre's professional standards. National defence training was instituted, and many officers who did not measure up were eventually dismissed. The armaments industry was further developed, in collaboration with the Soviet Union, but with an emphasis on Polish needs. It is interesting to note that during the upward climb of investments in the Polish defence industry over the years (including the 70s), 1957 was the only year in which there was a decline in military expenditures.¹¹⁵

A special emphasis was placed on the restoration of the Polish character of the armed forces and the revival of genuine Polish military traditions. Also, as seen in the changes of personnel, the thrust of the reforms was directed at the elimination of direct infiltration by Soviet agents and, in the operational sense, at restructuring the LWP as a sovereign entity, albeit within the socialist coalition and maintaining the principles of broad collaboration with the Soviet Union. This was reflected in two of Spychalski's key initiatives: the reorganization of the service which provided for the establishment of a territorial defence system (OTK), and a proposal for the establishment of a "Polish Front." The

first initiative was to provide a capability for mobilization for defence against an invasion from any quarter, the second -- to make available to the Warsaw Pact Joint Command a cohesive national military contingent, under Polish command, for offensive operations against NATO. The new system was to be a Polish version of the internal and external functions, respectively, of socialist armies (as explicated in Soviet strategic-military doctrine¹¹⁶), but within the framework of a new independent national Polish military doctrine.

The OTK system bore a striking resemblance to the Yugoslav system of territorial national defence and to the system subsequently adopted by Romania.¹¹⁷ According to a current and critical description of this system in an official Polish military source, the OTK system was based "on a military doctrine which created an 'internal front' for the defence of the country" which was "exempted from joint operations with the Soviet Armed Forces" (i.e., it excluded such joint operations: "wyjety spod wspolnych dzialan z Armia Radziecka"), and "it was accompanied by the doctrine of a 'Polish Front'." According to this source the forces under the the OTK included: the Country's Air Defence Corps (WOPK); the Internal Defence Corps (WOW -- the old KBW); the Border Defence Corps (WOP); territorial defence units; operational-technical support units of the operational forces; medical, transportation and air liaison units; training, reserve and other units.¹¹⁸ As shall be seen below, the OTK system still exists, but as a part of the Soviet system for the security of the rear; i.e., it is an integral part of joint operations.

The concept of the "Polish Front" is credited to a group of officers led by General Duszynski, but it seems

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likely that Spychalski, if not a party to its elaboration, was at least kept informed. What it involved was a separate, compact, well-defined "Polish Front"

intended as an exclusive theatre of operations for the Polish troops, who would enjoy the support and cooperation of the corresponding units of the Soviet Army, the exact details and nature of such support to be agreed upon in advance with the Soviet high command. This type of collaboration with the WTO would provide for an independent Polish armaments industry with its own military R&D programs, and for the recognition of a specifically Polish infra-structure and national military doctrine.¹¹⁹

What the concept meant, according to a present-day Polish military source, was that "in the case of an attack against the West, the LWP (was to) form three armies of its own, the so-called "Polish Front" which would remain under Polish command." We are further told that the cadre responsible for the "Polish Front" concept "was located in the Inspectorate of Training and was led by its chief, deputy minister of National Defence General Duszynski, who was later dismissed for nationalism."¹²⁰ The resemblance of this concept to that put forward by the AL cadre at the time of the PKWN is striking; so is the similarity of Soviet reaction to it.

The Duszynski group is reported to have also pressed for the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in Poland.¹²¹ Not surprisingly, the concept of the "Polish Front" found as little favour in the Soviet Union in the fifties as it did in the forties, and any idea of the

removal of Soviet troops was resisted. Instead, a new status of forces agreement was signed between Poland and the Soviet garrison in Legnica (Silesia), although it included a clause on the Soviet troops' "non-interference" in Polish domestic affairs. It is interesting to speculate why the Poles were unable to gain military autonomy of the kind subsequently won by Romania (inclusive of the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1958). Obviously the history of communist Poland,¹²² the country's strategic location, and the size of its military establishment made concessions of this kind unacceptable to the Soviet Union.

Another aspect of Spychalski's reform was an effort to minimize the penetration of the armed forces by the party and political-education apparatus. This is a dream, it seems, of professional military men throughout communist countries, as illustrated, for example, by the 1957 Marshal Zhukov affair in the Soviet Union to which the Polish affair was, perhaps, not unrelated. The Polish communist mass youth organization, the ZMP, was dissolved on 11 January 1957, and so were ZMP primary organizations in the LWP. This occurred at a time when only a few soldiers and approximately one-half of the officer cadre were members of the party. Present-day commentaries on this effort to depoliticize the armed forces, and on the whole thrust of the 1957-57 attempt at reform, are scathing:

(In the 1955-1960 period) there were tendencies that were dysfunctional to the construction of a broadly-defined defence posture. Moreover, these tendencies touched the one aspect (of the work in the armed forces) that is decisive for national and military cohesion: ideological education.

(The presence of these tendencies) caused well-justified concern among the professional cadre, and in particular within the political and party apparatus of the armed forces.

Hiding under the criticism of manifestations which ran rampant in the so-called "previous" period (i.e. in the Stalinist period), the revisionist forces at home and abroad were attacking, in fact, the very bases of our (political) system; what they attacked were not marginal matters but the cardinal principles of Marxism-Leninism. The activities of these forces were also noted in the army.

The very aims of political education were being undermined. A thesis was being popularized that the army was solid in the political sense; that an overwhelming majority of the officers were trained in the LWP; that a large percentage of the officer cadre were party members ... Using these arguments the revisionist forces unequivocally questioned the further existence, in the armed forces, of the political apparat. Not everyone, unfortunately, stood fast in the face of these arguments.¹²³

It is interesting to note the linkage in this passage between foreign "revisionist" forces and those at home, and the exaggeration in the description of the latter. It reflects the current emphasis on "imperialist" interventionism applied ex-post facto to an earlier period.

The post-1956 reforms succeeded, to a significant degree, in further modernizing the LWP and in making the professional cadre predominantly Polish. The prestige of

the forces increased and there was a new influx of volunteers into the officer corps although, as military careers became more rewarding financially, much of the influx was motivated by opportunism. But Soviet controls over the Polish party (as well as in the armed forces) were quickly reaffirmed. The introduction of nuclear warfare strategies increased the LWP's dependence on Soviet forces, as did the beginning of the process of integration into the Warsaw Pact Joint Forces, by means of training and exercises, which began in 1960.¹²⁴ It was in this period, we are told, that "the first general principles of coalition warfare were worked out, and the problem was resolved of defence within a by then unitary system of Warsaw Pact States."¹²⁵ The reference here is to the end of this period, i.e., 1960, and the text clearly indicates that what is meant is the post-Duszynski OTK rather than the original version.

Within a few months after the October crisis, considerable pressure was exerted by Moscow on Gomulka to isolate and gradually destroy his "liberal" wing. Polish factional politics were cleverly manipulated to isolate and then to remove the more outspoken individuals, playing on Gomulka's ideological orthodoxy, personal preferences, and his desire to show loyalty to the Soviet Union. Gradually the "intellectuals" and "revisionists" were removed, with the armed forces as the prime target. Key personnel changes which facilitated restoration of Soviet control in the military were the appointment of a hardline KPP veteran, Kazimierz Witaszewski, to head the Administrative Department of the PZPR Central Committee (the department in charge of military and security personnel and policy), and a change in the top position of the WSW (military

counterintelligence). Witaszewski, a member of the pro-Soviet "Natolin" faction, was totally loyal to Moscow and the new incumbent at the WSW is said to have been a KGB agent (this apparently was unknown to Spychalski at the time.) Gradually -- and the purge extended well into the sixties -- all of the 1956 appointees were removed from top military positions as Gomulka retreated into orthodoxy and Spychalski gradually lost control over military appointments. Duszynski himself was removed in 1964 -- one observer feels that this happened against Spychalski's wishes and without the approval of the Politbureau -- and this was followed by a purge of the senior LWP cadre which was partly motivated by a strong anti-Semitic bias. The hard-line approach in Poland at this time reflected the neo-Stalinist bias of the new Soviet leadership after the
¹²⁶
ouster of Khrushchev.

The Soviet approach to the problem of control of the Polish Army changed to accommodate the new circumstances. The system of direct penetration of the security and military establishments by Soviet agents -- wearing Polish uniforms, as it were, and masquerading as Poles -- was replaced by a system of Soviet liaison officers; some attached to the MON, others to service branches and military districts, and to the security services.
¹²⁷

According to Checinski, "No chief or deputy chief in any of these services can maintain himself in office if he refuses to collaborate closely with -- meaning to subordinate himself to -- these liaison officers."¹²⁸ In an official assessment, the Spychalski period of the LWP's development is summed up as "a period of a certain weakening of the tempo of ideological work in the life of

the armed forces and efforts at revisionist penetration of
some of their parts."¹²⁹

In the end this attempt to establish national communism in Poland failed because the effort by a group of senior officers to reestablish a sovereign Polish Army and a national Polish military doctrine was not allowed to proceed. They failed because of Gomulka's orthodoxy, the party's factionalism, and early Soviet interference, as well as the introduction of Warsaw Pact integration mechanisms which are discussed in detail elsewhere.¹³⁰ The analysis above of what Spychalski and his associates tried, but failed to do, proves conclusively that, when one compares the two situations, the LWP of the 60s, 70s, and the 80s is not a viable national army, appearances and official claims to the contrary. Namely, the Polish High Command has no capability to mobilize its forces -- apart from acting jointly with "fraternal" armies -- for the defence of national territory, and it does not have operational control over the designated Polish forces placed under Warsaw Pact Joint Command, either as a cohesive whole or as viable armies within multinational formations. In fact there is no Polish High Command in the operational, as distinct from the administrative, sense. The current pattern of integration is described in the next section.

5. The LWP -- A Part of the Greater Socialist Army?
1961 to the Present

A. Cadre and Conscripts

The changeover in the senior military cadre was completed by the late 60s and early 70s; it complemented the changes in the training, socialization, and

organization of the LWP which accompanied the new Soviet policy of welding the East European Warsaw Pact armies into the Soviet Armed Forces' "broadly-defined defence posture" on the internal and the external fronts.¹³¹ General Spychalski, who became a marshal in 1963¹³² (perhaps as a consolation prize), continued to preside over military affairs until 1968, when he was shunted aside to the Chairmanship of the Council of State (the official presidency). Together with Gomulka he was swept away in the upheaval of 1970. It is indicative of the changes which took place in the armed forces in the sixties that Gomulka's downfall and the new leadership, which was heralded as "liberal" and "pragmatic," had no appreciable impact on the LWP. The only relevance, to the military, of Gomulka's and Spychalski's fall was that it put a final seal on the exit, from the LWP, of the AL generation of "intellectuals."

The new senior military cadre which has emerged differs from all of its predecessors. Most of the men now in top positions started their military careers (often as political officers) in the First Army; their formative years were under Rokossovsky, and they moved up into vacant positions as Spychalski's protégés were removed. They are rather bland professional soldiers in contrast to the Spychalski generation of "intellectuals," many of whom were quite colourful (only a few had professional training). It is a homogeneous group. They are relatively young (the average age of WRON members is 58), well-educated professionals (see Table 1) who completed their advanced training in the Soviet Union, who are Polish in terms of both their ethnic origin and career experience (although some Red Army veterans still remain)¹³³ and of eminently

"proper" social background (see Table 2). General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who became Minister of Defence in April 1968, leads the group and is its typical representative except for his social origins: his father is supposed to have been a landowner. They are a part of and identify with the political elite -- party membership in the senior cadre is 100% (see Table 3) -- but they have a non-ideological orientation.

Table 1. LWP: Officers: Education (percentage of total)

	1950 ¹	1960 ¹	1971 ¹	1982 ²
Higher	8.2	17.9	35.0	90.0
Middle and Inc. Higher	23.0	46.4	64.0	n.a.
Lower (primary)	68.8	35.7	1.0	n.a.

1. Walczuk (see endnote 100).

2. Sadykiewicz (see endnote 132).

Table 2. LWP: Officers: Social Origins
(percentage of total)

	1944(First Army) ¹	1950 ²	1970 ²
Workers	20.3	41.3	47.8
Peasants	18.4	29.0	33.1
Working Intelligenstia	40.0	15.0	14.5
Others	21.3	14.7	4.6

1. Jurek and Skrzypkowski (see endnote 9.)

2. Walczuk.

Table 3. LWP: Professional Cadre: Party Membership
(percentage of total)

	1949 ¹	1972 ²	1975 ³
Professional Cadre	n.a.	60.0	60 plus
Officers	39.5	85.0	85.0
Senior Officers (colonels and up)	n.a.	n.a.	100.0

1. Jurek and Skrzypkowski.
2. Ibid., p. 117.
3. A.D. Verbitsky.

A joke circulating in Poland illustrates the point in a take-off on Catholics who believe but do not practice: "they (military officers) practice but do not believe."¹³⁴

The Polish "national" image of the LWP (a legacy of the Spychalski era), new and attractive educational opportunities, and improved economic conditions as well as enhanced social prestige all combined to make a professional military career more attractive during the 60s and 70s. 1968 brought some setbacks: the involvement of the professional cadre in the suppression of students in Warsaw, a purge of Jewish officers,¹³⁵ and the participation of the LWP in the invasion of Czechoslovakia. But ambitious young men, their attitudes increasingly cynical, continued to apply.

In technical fields officers' training equals and perhaps surpasses that offered by civilian academic institutions. A high school diploma is required for

admission to officers' schools, the graduates of which receive a master's degree and the title of an engineer. Higher military educational institutions have the right to confer advanced degrees, including the Ph.D. A major reorganization of the system of military training of officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers took place in 1967-68. Officer training is now organized by discipline (not, as before, according to service branches) and, apart from improving the candidates' professional qualifications, the new system was designed "to raise the rank and attractiveness of officer status."¹³⁶ It seems to have at least partly succeeded in doing so.

In the late 70s the LWP had five academic-level educational institutions, 11 higher officers' schools (colleges), a military "academic company" at the Poznan Polytechnical Institute, and several scientific-research institutes¹³⁷ (see Table 4). According to a recent Western study, practical training and exercises constitute an important part of military studies, with a ratio of practical to theoretical work of about 60:40 and more emphasis given to individual training. The general curriculum in each college allots approximately 60 per cent of study time to general military and political subjects, and 40 per cent to political education.¹³⁸ An official source (1983) reported that almost 80 per cent of officers were college level graduates, and about 2,000 of them held academic degrees and titles.¹³⁹ The system is generally considered to work well and to produce a highly competent professional cadre. This unanimity of praise was broken, however, in the troublesome year of 1981, with complaints of formalism and "paper" achievements. A letter to the

editor of a military paper from a (diploma) colonel was fairly typical; the colonel complained that the military curriculum was overloaded with programmatic material, that the methodology was traditional, and that few pedagogical innovations had been introduced. He urged the abandonment of the practice of "substituting opinions for research" in favour of a new, "honest approach to research and educational work."¹⁴⁰

The academic incentives of a military career are supplemented by economic incentives. Military schools and research institutes have priority over civilian institutions in the assignment of scarce resources and imported equipment, and graduates of military schools are better off than their civilian equivalents. A defector reports that in the mid-70s the salary of a lieutenant with a master's degree in physics was 6,000 zlotys a month as compared to 2,000 for a civilian MSc, and the lieutenant was also given an apartment, an enormous advantage in a country where one can wait 20 years for an apartment.¹⁴¹ For the senior ranks tangible rewards also accompany an improvement in professional qualifications: the basic monthly salary of a colonel, for example, is automatically supplemented if he obtains a specialist diploma, and is further increased (by a substantial percentage) if he earns a Ph.D.¹⁴² Hence the reported high percentage of cadre with doctor's degrees. One should add, however, that voices sporadically appear in the military press discounting "rumours" that the professional military cadre is much better off financially than their civilian brethren.¹⁴³

Overall, the military political system and political realities have produced two distinct varieties of

Table 4. LWP: Military Academies and Colleges

Academies:	Date of est.	Location	Length of programme
<u>General Staff Academy "Karol Swierczewski" (ASG)</u> (Commissioned Officers only; receive the title "diploma" officers)	1947	Warsaw-Rembertow	3 years
<u>Military Political Academy "Feliks Dzierzynski" (WAP)</u> (Commissioned officers only)	1951	Warsaw	1 year and 3 years
<u>Military Technical Academy "Jeroslaw Debrowski" (WAT)</u>	1951	Warsaw	5 years
<u>Higher Naval School "Heroes of Westerplatte" (WSWW)</u>	1955	Gdynia	4 years (?)
<u>Military Medical Academy "General B. Szarecki" (WAM)</u>	1958	Lodz	5-6 years
 <u>Colleges:</u>			
Mechanized Troops Officers' College "T. Kosciuszko"		Wroclaw	4 years
Armoured Troops Officers' College "S. Czarniecki"		Poznan	4 years
Rocket Troops and Artillery Officers' College "J. Bea"		Torun	4 years
Anti-Aircraft Defence Officers' College "L. Kalinowski"		Koszalin	4 years
Engineer Troops Officers' College "J. Jasinski"		Wroclaw	4 years
Chemical Troops Officers' College "S. Ziaja"		Cracow	4 years
Signal Corps Officers' College "Colonel R. Kowalski, pseud. Ryszard"		Zegrze	4 years
Radiotechnical Officers' College "Capt. S. Bartosik"		Jelenia Gora	4 years
Logistics Services Officers' College "M. Buczek"		Poznan	4 years
Air Force Officers' College "J. Krasicki"		Deblin	4 years
Automotive Officers' College "Gen. A. Waszkiewicz"		Pila	4 years
Academic Company at Polytechnic Institute, attached to the Logistics Services College		Poznan	4 years

Adapted from: Krasiewicz (see endnote 46), p. 21; and Whetten and Waddell (see endnote 138).

N.B. Krasiewicz and all other Polish sources identify the Higher Naval School as an academy, whereas Whetten and Waddell identify it as a college.

Polish military officers: there is a technical specialist stream of high professional competence, and a command/political-education stream which is politically committed to the system and to the Soviet alliance. It is the latter from which the senior ranks are drawn, and conflicts between the two are frequent.¹⁴⁴ Entry into the command/political group leads to training in Soviet staff schools.

Graduates of Polish military colleges are eligible for the line command of subunits and units in the regular forces or in the internal security troops (WOW) or border guards (WOP). Graduates of the GSA and WAP are eligible for a range of line and staff positions up to and including the command of a regiment (for WAP personnel -- within the military political-education network). The promotion pattern in general -- and this includes recommendations to attend higher military schools -- depends not only on the superiors' evaluation of the candidate's professional competence, but also on a clean bill of health from security officers (WSW) and from political officers (i.e., the party). Membership in official youth organizations and/or in the party is a prerequisite. Thus, for an officer, the appearance of political loyalty to the system and to the alliance with the Soviet Union, which is observed and tested on a daily basis, is less a matter of conviction than of career survival, and is an important condition for advancement to the senior ranks.

Advancement to the general officer ranks in the LWP is predicated on training in Soviet staff schools. Recommendations for such training come from the MON Cadres Department in consultation with the WSW, GZP (Military-Political Administration) and other appropriate

departments in the PZPR Central Committee. Such recommendations have to be approved by Soviet military and security authorities; rejections are not uncommon.¹⁴⁵

... All senior officers receive advanced training in the USSR. Almost all of the most senior officers and generals serving as division commanders, military district commanders, branch chiefs, in key positions on the General Staff and in the office of the Inspector of Training and other central ministry institutions have completed the two-year operations strategy course at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy in Moscow or at other Soviet academies. The latter applies in particular to other branches such as the air force navy, logistics and the like ...
Completion of such courses is the key to assignment to higher positions in the Polish Army.¹⁴⁶

From Moscow's point of view, the carefully chosen senior Polish generals who are graduates of Soviet military schools are a substitute for the Russian personnel who ran the LWP in earlier periods.

With the imposition of martial law and the entry of the LWP directly into the political arena -- the formal lifting of martial law in 1983 did not materially change the situation, which promises to persist indefinitely -- the career and economic incentives of a military career have been reinforced by political incentives. The professional cadre has had a taste of political power which has enhanced its personal stake in the maintenance of the system.

The training of non-commissioned officers was also reorganized and greatly improved in the 60s. A warrant officer corps was established in 1967 (Poland was the first Warsaw Pact country to do so) with a network of schools, generally attached to officer schools; in the late 70s there were 17 such schools. Instruction lasts from one to three years, depending on the qualifications of the candidates. Applications are accepted from pre-conscripts, conscripts and from the ranks. In addition, there is also a network of career NCO schools, which are located together with officer and warrant officer schools: training there lasts from 6 to 12 months (except in the Navy, where it is 2 years). Conscript NCOs are trained in their first six months of service.¹⁴⁷ This emphasis on the training of NCOs, which is now common to all Warsaw Pact member countries, is based on a widespread perception of the weakness of the NCO cadre, especially when recruited from the conscript pool.

Although it is difficult to verify the information below, according to Solidarity sources there is a special forces NCO school, directly administered by the Warsaw Pact Joint Command, where elite troops are trained for special assignments. According to a man who was trained in such a school, and who participated in the suppression of the workers' strikes of 1970, the training is comparable to that given to airborne commando troops. In subsequent service trainees from this school are shifted between services as needed for special assignments. They are also used as personal guards for political leaders.¹⁴⁸

The internal security troops have their own officer schools although, as noted above, regular army officers

serve in both the WSW and WOP. The WSW has a Police Officer Advanced School in Szczecin (with a four year programme) and an Academy of Internal Affairs in Warsaw with a five year programme. The latter also trains intelligence and counterintelligence officers.¹⁴⁹ The WSW's Higher School for Firefighters in Warsaw, where cadets went on strike in December 1981, was renamed the Main School for Firefighting Services after this event,¹⁵⁰ and 60 of the original 265 students were not readmitted.

The Polish professional military cadre shares some structural characteristics with the other bloc armies which differentiate it from the pre-1939 Polish military cadre. Although the size of the armed forces is roughly comparable, the ratio of professional cadre to conscripts is much higher, and so is the ratio of officers to men, with a much higher overall number of officers (see Table 5). The high percentage of cadre is an asset in terms of the forces' professionalization and political reliability. If paramilitary forces were added to the cadre and compared to conscript manpower, the ratio of politically loyal to potentially untrustworthy elements increases further: this we have called the "ratio of distrust," which is discussed elsewhere in this study.¹⁵¹ The ratio of career cadre to conscripts fluctuates in the case of the service branches; in the infantry it is twice as high as in the prewar service, but it is four times higher for artillery and rocket troops. In some air force units the only conscripts are the soldiers who are on guard duty.¹⁵² It is also noteworthy that the officer corps is numerically dominated by the senior ranks (majors and higher).¹⁵³ The reason is, perhaps, that the junior officers of the Warsaw Pact armies seem to have become glorified non-commissioned

officers, at least in terms of the tasks they perform.

Table 5. Polish Officer Corps: 1939 and 1983:
A Comparison

	1939	1983
Size of regular forces	350,000	340,000
Ratio of cadre to conscripts	1:6	1:1.2
Ratio of officers to men	1:20	1:4.6
Number of officers	17,000	60,000
Number of colonels	438	3,500 approx.
Officers with higher education	4.8%	80%

Based on: Sadykiewicz, pp. 19-20. 1983 figures adjusted to include data from The Military Balance, 1983/84 (see Figure 3).

The principle of cadre "rotation" prevents prolonged service in any one post: in 1973 it was reported that half of the professional cadre remained in their posts for an average of 3 years, and only 20 per cent stayed on longer than 5 years. It was also emphasized that the desired pattern of rotation was to alternate "remote garrisons" with urban locations.¹⁵⁴

Professional military service is strictly voluntary, with acceptance based on "suitable moral and political qualities, occupational qualifications, and psychological and physical capability." It is performed without a fixed time limit, with the first 12 months treated as a trial period.¹⁵⁵ This description applies to all three components of the professional cadre: officers, warrant officers, and professional non-commissioned officers.

All Polish citizens who are physically and mentally fit are subject to obligatory military service: this includes men from 18 until 50 years of age (warrant officers and officers are obliged to serve until the age of 60) and women between 18 and 40 (50 in the case of cadets and officers) who have qualifications (such as medical training) which are useful in the service. The call-up is generally for the age cohorts between 18 and 24; volunteers are accepted at 17, and the call-up can be extended until the age of 28. Military service may be performed in the form of basic military service (2 years; 3 years in the navy, rocket and radio-technical troops); as military training for conscripts (in free time, in training camps and in "other types of service," to be completed in 3 years and not exceeding 60 days per year); and as military training for students. Students are obliged to attend (and pass) theoretical military courses. They take their practical training in their free time, in summer camps, and after graduation. The period of military training (as distinct from classes) can last between 3 and 12 months. The students graduate as corporal cadets, and then go for 6 months of training in officer reserve schools and 6 months of active service, taking examinations after both stages for the rank of sergeant and staff sergeant, respectively (those who fail are drafted for service in other units). A successful candidate may take officer examinations and, if successful, is commissioned. Reservists are obliged to participate in military exercises, the combined duration of which cannot exceed 24 months for officers and warrant officers, 18 months for NCOs, and 12 months for soldiers. They may also be called for temporary service for a total period not exceeding 24 months.¹⁵⁶ The divisions of the


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
ANALYSIS ESTABLISHMENT OTTAWA (ONTARIO).

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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

military-territorial administration which manages the draft correspond to the territorial-administrative divisions of the state administration. Since 1975 there have been 49 voivodship military staffs and 137 military commands (kommandaturas).

An amendment to the law on conscription of 21 November 1967, dated 28 June 1979, extended the application of service regulations. It tightened deferments by providing an allowance for the family of a sole provider instead of giving him an exemption from the draft. At the same time, however, it provided for early release (in the form of a leave during which a soldier would remain at the disposition of his unit) for "good performers," thus supplying an incentive for good behaviour. The law also fleshed out the provisions for substitute military service. One variant is for a conscript to perform his military service while working for social welfare, public utility, health service and environmental protection institutions at or near his or her place of residence. This service lasts for 24 months and conscripts may live at home or be placed in barracks. A draftee may apply for this kind of service and approval is up to the military authorities. Civil defence training is given while in the service. Another variant is to serve in special Civil Defence (OC) units, where service is combined with vocational training. This type of service is not voluntary. Draftees are billeted together, away from their area of residence, for a regular service period; they wear special uniforms and are called "junaks." According to official sources service in Civil Defence units was designed to reach young people left outside the draft who neither work nor study, for purposes of resocialization and vocational training for the needs of

the economy. Still another type of substitute service which extends the above aims provides for conscript training in civil defence which lasts for three years.¹⁵⁷ It is not clear what the difference is between the second and the third variants; both seem to involve service in forced labour battalions which, from the regime's point of view, provide a double benefit: they isolate politically and socially undesirable elements and expose them to resocialization in a militarized setting but without access to arms, and they provide free labour for the economy.

The most sweeping extension of a substitute for military service was provided by a 22 November 1983 amendment to the 1967 law on conscription. In essence, the amendment legalized the militarization of the country just in time to perpetuate the status quo while martial law was formally being lifted. Under the new amendment, conscripts can now be directed to "military formations" which are not a part of the armed forces. However, service in these formations "is equivalent to the fulfillment of the obligation of regular military service" (Art. 60a.I), and is subject to the same rules (such as obedience to orders and maintenance of military secrets) and benefits (pay, etc.). These "armed formations" are created, defined and deployed by the National Defence Committee (KOK), a new reincarnation of the WRON which has been given new and sweeping powers under the same amendment (see Section V.2 below). So far, these "military formations" include: youth labour battalions in civil defence detachments (OC); "units designed for militarization" (the meaning is not explained; possibly these are units administered by LOK -- League for the Defence of the Country, see Section III.5.C below); and "militarized units."¹⁵⁸

Overall, the new provisions make conscripts available for service in all kinds of units, from labour battalions for politically unreliable elements at one end of the spectrum, to ZOMO units and the internal security troops for choice recruits on the other. It thus allows for the utilization of conscript manpower according to what may be called a "political reliability map," an equivalent to the "ethnic security map" in the multiethnic Soviet Armed Forces. It is clearly an additional control mechanism, supporting political stability, established in response to the 1980/81 crisis. It extends further and solidifies the militarization of society introduced under martial law, and indicates a trend towards the ever greater professionalization of the regular forces, thus enhancing their political reliability. Under the new system, a very substantial portion of each call-up cohort will spend its service doing what amounts to forced labour, without access to arms. Substituting the Polish People's Republic for Aldous Huxley's "Brave New World," they would be the Gammas and the Deltas, as compared to the Betas (conscripts in regular units) and the Alphas (the professional cadre). The system is designed to preclude the recurrence of the events of August 1980 in peacetime and to assure the security of the rear, in the crucial "Polish corridor," in wartime.

B. Integrated Structures

The current period of development of the LWP, which commenced in 1960, has been officially characterized as the period which "brought closer the Polish People's Army and other armies of the Warsaw Pact," and "broadened (their) scope of collaboration." The joint exercises have been "of

special importance" in this context. The LWP has undergone "complex modernization" as rockets and electronics were introduced, and in November 1967 it adopted a "complex defence system" and "a division of forces between operational forces for external use and forces for territorial defence on the internal front."¹⁵⁹ The division is the same as that initiated in the Spychalski period, but the nature of the arrangements and their very purpose have changed radically.

The overall pattern of elaborate formal sovereign structures and alliance mechanisms is much more sophisticated than it was in the days of Stalin, but all essential channels of control over the Polish Armed Forces are safely in Soviet hands: control over policy, over personnel selection and appointments, and over operational management of forces. As noted above, a network of Soviet officers is also present, this time in Soviet uniforms as liaison staff.

There is no need to spend much time describing the political control channels which run from the LWP to Moscow; the arrangements are the same throughout the bloc and are described elsewhere in this study.¹⁶⁰ Basically, there are four main channels, three of which can bypass, if necessary, the PZPR's nerve centres (the capability to do so has been greatly enhanced under martial law). The first is the party channel, which goes through the PZPR: the military (and security) establishment is supervised by the Administrative Department of the PZPR Central Committee and this, in turn, reports to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU. There, overall supervision of bloc affairs is handled by the Department for Liaison with Ruling Parties, but it is probable that, in military

matters, the line may run directly to the Administrative Department of the CPSU.

The second is the counterintelligence/security channel. The WSW penetrates the LWP and reports to its equivalents in Moscow, and this is a direct channel which operates outside the PZPR CC Secretariat. The third channel is the Main Political Administration of the Polish Army (GZP), which reports directly to the Main Political Administration (MPA) of the Soviet Armed Forces. Technically, both political administrations are simultaneously agencies of the respective ministries of defence and departments of the respective parties' central committees, so this channel runs through both party and government structures. In practice, however, this conduit also seems to operate directly, with Warsaw being informed of rather than necessarily participating in decisions. Finally, there is the obvious link between the Polish Ministry of National Defence and the Soviet military establishment. For all practical purposes the Warsaw Pact Joint Command is a part of the latter; the Headquarters and staff are in Moscow, and all positions of command and responsibility are manned by Soviet officers. The PZPR link may be bypassed here as well. The extent to which certain channels are used, and the degree to which Warsaw is included or bypassed, depends largely on the trust and connections which the Polish political and military leaders enjoy (or lack) in Moscow.

The nomenklatura system ensures party control over appointments in all spheres of life, including the military. Key positions at each territorial-administrative level are reserved for the party's appointment, i.e., they are "within the nomenklatura" of a given territorial party

committee. All the important positions in the LWP (in the MON, General Staff, branch and district commands, general officers, etc.) are within the nomenklatura of the PZPR Politbureau and Central Committee and, in line with the standard communist operating procedure which requires approval by higher party bodies, are subject to Moscow's approval.¹⁶¹ A former Polish general, Leon Dubicki, confirms that appointments to positions above and inclusive of the rank of colonel were indeed subject to approval by the Cadres Department of the USSR Ministry of Defence.¹⁶² This was the situation prior to the announcement of martial law. Solidarity's underground press now reports, from unofficial military sources, that every military appointment down to and including battalion commanders and officers in charge of "military tasks groups" (TGOs) has to be approved by the Warsaw Pact Joint Command HQ in Moscow. The HQ apparently holds the dossiers of all Polish military officers (and probably also those of other "allied" cadre as well), which are carefully scrutinized before any appointments are made. Hence, no random appointments are possible.¹⁶³ In the case of the senior cadre, Moscow has already made a pre-selection choice by approving or rejecting candidates for advanced military studies in the USSR.

The presence of Soviet officers in the LWP is legalized through the double representation pattern within the Warsaw Pact.¹⁶⁴ The Polish representative to the Warsaw Pact Joint Command is General Eugeniusz Molczyk, a member of WRON, a deputy minister of Defence, and a deputy commander-in-chief of the Joint Forces. The Joint Command representative in Warsaw is General A.F. Shcheglov. A

system of advisers under Gen. Shcheglov penetrates the LWP structure in what appears to be a shadow command network. Soviet "liaison officers" are distributed along three main lines: technical (in specialists' positions in administration, services and the training network); political (attached to the GZP network in the service and in military districts); and security (in central agencies and attached to voivodship security units). Knowledge of the Russian language is required of Polish professional cadre from colonels up. It is also desirable at lower levels, particularly in the technical services, because technical documentation (for exercises and overall purposes) is in Russian, and so are the instructions which come with new Soviet equipment.¹⁶⁵ In addition to Soviet liaison officers, Soviet security and counterintelligence agencies also have a network of agents, who are recruited mostly from among Polish military personnel.

The 1976 amendments to the 1952 Constitution of the Polish People's Republic and particularly Art. 6(2), which places "friendship and cooperation" with the Soviet Union on a constitutional basis, has apparently served to legalize the position of Soviet officers still serving in the LWP (the PoPy), who are now officially known as "soldiers of two armies." Their number is unknown, but at least one member of WRON, Admiral Ludwik Janczyszyn, the commander of the Polish Navy, is reported to be in this category, as is General Jozef Urbanowicz, deputy minister of National Defence. This provision also applies to reserve officers; some are known to act as instructors in Clubs of Reserve Officers, one of the auxiliary organizations which conducts political and military training with youth and the reserves.¹⁶⁶

The Northern Group of Soviet Forces (NGSF), with headquarters in Legnica, in the Silesian Military District, is relatively small (40,000 men in 1983); it is composed of two armoured divisions and 350 fighter aircraft. But the NGSF constitutes the nucleus of the forces and the command structure of an operational front situated between the forward Soviet front in the GDR and the rear fronts in the Western USSR. This front (now presumably one of the newly reorganized theatres of military operation or TVD -- teatr voennogo dvizhenia) is composed of three Polish military districts (OW): the Warsaw OW, Pomeranian OW and Silesian OW; and the command of the NGSF (under Col. Gen. Y.F. Zarubin in 1982) is said to contain the skeleton of the operational command for the front in case of military action. Thus there is, in fact, a "Polish Front" which covers Polish national territory. It includes the so-called "designated" Polish forces, and perhaps some GDR and Czech forces, but they act as a supplement to Soviet forces and are under Soviet command. The stationing of Soviet troops in Poland is formally regulated by bilateral treaties, the provisions of which amount to de facto extra-territorial status for these troops.¹⁶⁷ In Poland (as in the GDR), the legal authority for stationing such troops is also based on the Potsdam Agreements.¹⁶⁸

The Polish forces are divided into operational "designated" forces for territorial defence, a division which reflects the country's geostrategic position and "coalition military doctrine." In geostrategic terms, Poland is seen as "a bridge between the first strategic strike area" (Soviet forces in the GDR) and "strike areas from the deep hinterland" (Western USSR military districts); hence the "major task is to defend

communications."¹⁶⁹ The Polish military doctrine "is the doctrine of the whole socialist camp" (i.e. Soviet military doctrine¹⁷⁰), but it "takes into account the special conditions of our country," according to the Commander of the General Staff Academy, division general B. Chocha. These conditions include "our membership in the Warsaw Pact" and "coordination of the whole of our defence effort, primarily with the USSR, but also with our nearest neighbours in the socialist community, the GDR and Czechoslovakia." Thus, "while preparing operational forces for action within the WP Joint Forces, we place special emphasis on the effectiveness of our country's territorial defence system."¹⁷¹

The external defence function of the LWP is performed by the operational forces; i.e., the forces placed directly under WP Joint Command. Their function is explained by a Polish military journal:

Our operational forces constitute an important element -- qualitatively and quantitatively -- of the Joint Forces on the external front. Their main positive attributes are their manoeuvrability, high fire power, mechanization ... armour ... artillery ... missile systems ... (they) are self-sufficient to a high degree from the point of view of material-technical and medical supplies. They maintain constant combat readiness ... (which) allows for their instant utilization for strategic operational tasks by the Joint Forces. The organizational structure of these forces and their command and supply systems are adapted to carrying out tasks within the coalitional system.¹⁷²

This means that they are detachable, as units, on instant notice, for placement in whatever operational entity the Joint Command designates.

By all accounts the "designated" forces constitute the elite of the LWP. They include two special divisions: the Paratroop (Commando) Airborne Division (Red Berets) and the Naval Amphibious Assault Division (Blue Berets), the Air Defence Corps (WOPK), the Navy, and at least some (if not all) of the 8 ground forces divisions (armour and mechanized infantry) which are maintained at a Category 1 level of combat readiness.¹⁷³ The Red Berets and the Blue Berets are the pride of the LWP; they are reported to be superbly trained and to possess a high level of esprit de corps. The first was organized by a colourful AL veteran, General Razlubirski, during the period of Spychalski's reforms; Razlubirski was shunted aside after 1960. It is informally reported that these are the only two divisions which are maintained at full combat strength, and which are earmarked for deep strike action alongside Soviet troops.

The WOPK, which in 1956-57 was meant to be an integral part of the "Polish Front" forces, was fully integrated with the Soviet fighter command of the NGSF after 1960. It consists of three fighter squadrons, and one of each is located in the three military districts, with headquarters in Silesia. An officer who served in one of these squadrons reports that for operational purposes the Polish and Russian squadrons are mixed and Russian is the language of command. The WOPK also frequently conducts exercises with GDR and Czechoslovak fighter squadrons. The WOPK commander, General Lozowicki (a WRON member), described WOPK's collaboration with other Warsaw Pact

members in 1983:

We operate in a unified air defense system of the armies of the Warsaw Pact signatory countries. We cooperate daily. Not only do we conduct joint exercises and training, but every day we regularly exchange experiences and conclusions, we jointly work out new methods of operation and new technical solutions. I would like to emphasize here the particular role of cooperation with the Soviet Army, and also the fact that we test our practical capabilities for repelling air attack weapons on Soviet proving grounds. I note also that as a result of the many years of cooperation between the soldiers of our fraternal armies, very firm personal contacts have been concluded. People know each other, they even visit one another, for whole years, entire families maintain comradely contacts.¹⁷⁴

Other items from the Polish military press indicate that this description applies to the Czechoslovak and GDR Air Forces as well as to the Soviet Air Force; an item in 1984 confirmed that Polish fighter pilots and rocket troops trained on Soviet proving grounds.¹⁷⁵ It is reported that the Corps air traffic section is manned by a Russian communications unit, with 2 Russian officers always on duty. All flight plans have to be approved in advance by this section, and cannot be unilaterally changed by Polish commanders.¹⁷⁶

The Polish naval forces, along with those of the GDR, are a part of the Soviet "Red Banner" Baltic Fleet.

Of the 8 ground forces divisions, 4 are stationed in the Silesian OW and 4 -- in the Pomeranian OW. It should be noted that no category 1 ground force units are stationed in the internal Warsaw OW. All category 1 divisions are deployed facing west. At the same time units officially designated category 1 are reported to be kept under normal strength, and do not all have the latest Soviet equipment.¹⁷⁷ Thus, in the case of rapid mobilization, only those units which have such equipment will join the Soviet forward formations, and then only as regiments (brigades at most) rather than divisions.

The "forces for internal defence" are those included in the Home Territorial Defence system (OTK), but their primary mission is not the defence of national territory (as originally planned when the OTK was created), but the maintenance of control in the strategic rear of the Soviet forces; namely, "to keep the Polish corridor open."¹⁷⁸ The OTK is operationally subordinated to the rear security command of the Pact.¹⁷⁹ According to Gen. Chocha, the Polish forces under the OTK system include: air defence units which are distinct from both WOPK and the antiaircraft defence system (the latter is presumably a part of the Soviet-directed overall antiaircraft defence system); the internal security troops (WOW); and territorial defence units, paramilitary units and civil defence detachments.¹⁸⁰ Air defence units fly older planes, and have no combat mission; they are used for transportation, training and rescue missions.¹⁸¹ The OTK is commanded by the Chief Inspector of Territorial Defence, Gen. Tadeusz Tuczapski, a member of WRON. Although Gen. Chocha does not mention the Border troops (WOP) as a part of the OTK system, it is assumed here that they are; both

WOW and WOP were transferred from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Inspectorate of Territorial Defence in 1965. OTK units also include construction troops, the so-called Engineering-Construction Battalions (BIB), and, as noted, Civil Defence (OC) detachments. Both appear to be comparable to the Soviet Armed Forces' construction battalions (stroibaty), which include the least promising conscripts (in terms of skills and/or political attributes) and are used for economic tasks, although OC units are not considered to be a part of the regular army. The work of OTK units was described in 1983 by the commander of the Silesian OW, Gen. Henryk Rapacewicz (a WRON member) as: "executing specialized tasks for ten ministries of the national economy, including tasks of extreme importance in the ministries of transportation, metallurgy and machine building";¹⁸² the latter two are undoubtedly engaged in defence production.

The internal front also includes the logistics and communications systems. There are at least six separate communications systems in Poland, according to General Dubicki: 1. the public mass communications system (which was closed down entirely on 13 December 1981, at the time of the military coup); 2. an auxiliary Polish-Soviet communications system for internal use; 3. a Polish-Soviet military communications system; 4. a Soviet military communications system which ties into system no. 3; 5. an ultra-high frequency internal government communications system; and 6. a Polish military field communications system run by signal units. Inasmuch as it can bypass Soviet advisers, the last system is the only one that can be utilized independently by the Polish military command.¹⁸³

The pattern of joint military exercises described in Volume I of this study also applies to the exercises, both multilateral and bilateral, in which Polish troops have participated. There are separate exercises for the services: the three fleets (Soviet, GDR and Polish) hold exercises together, as do the air forces of the above countries plus Czechoslovakia.¹⁸⁴ Data from Polish sources for the late 70s and early 80s indicates an increase in the bilateral exercises of units and subunits. These take place mostly in the Silesian OW with units and subunits of the NGSF, but also in the Pomeranian OW. These exercises are considered to be extremely important from the political indoctrination point of view, apart from their technical military value. Bilateral and multilateral exercises are organized not only for operational forces, but also for units of the OTK. There have been joint exercises of the supply and logistics services, designed "to raise the level of collaboration of the staffs and rear echelons of the allied armies"; of the communications services (Soviet, GDR, and Polish, in 1968); of operational and tactical liaison staff units (Soviet, GDR, and Polish)¹⁸⁵ under General Shtemenko; and of civil defence units.

The scope and forms of collaboration between the LWP and the "fraternal" armies is not exhausted by exercises and contacts among units. In addition, the command cadre and specialists participate in consultations, courses, seminars, and conferences organized by the Joint Command; various specialized conferences have been held since 1955. Conferences of the commanding cadre have been an annual event since 1963; there is collaboration in the writing of history; and the military-political administrations have sponsored various meetings involving

party, youth, and paramilitary organizations. Other forms of interaction include military competitions; exchanges of scientific experience, technology and equipment; and cultural, educational, and tourist activities.¹⁸⁶

General Jaruzelski's rhetoric reaches great heights when he addresses the subject of "fraternal" cooperation:

As Polish soldiers, we are proud that we have been able to help create Polish-Soviet friendship, and that it is based on Polish-Soviet brotherhood-in-arms forged in the fire of our common armed struggles against fascism and made eternal through commonly shed blood....We remember very well that we always could and can count on the Soviet Union's fraternal help and comprehensive cooperation ... We are developing and improving our present potential through ever-expanding cooperation with our Soviet partner, based on the principle of integrating efforts with our Soviet ally.¹⁸⁷

Making a general assessment, it is difficult to see how the Polish Armed Forces can be mobilized for any type of action without the instant knowledge of the Soviet military; least of all can they be mobilized for the defence of national territory against a "fraternal" invasion à la Czechoslovakia. Not only are the forces fragmented operationally and integrated into Soviet command structures, but they are deployed exclusively facing westward, have no radar screen against the east,¹⁸⁸ and have never trained for defensive action except in coalition warfare, and never for the defence of national boundaries. The Polish cadre is well aware of this situation, as seen in sporadic interviews by the Solidarity underground press

Fig. 1. Poland: Status of Forces, 1982

POLAND

Population: 36,500,000.

Military service: Army, internal security forces, Air Force 2 years; Navy, special services 3 years.

Total regular forces: 340,000 (190,000 conscripts).

Est NMP 1980: złoty 1,986.6 bn. 1981: 2,154.7 bn.

Est GNP range 1981: \$81.0-160.0 bn.

Def exp 1981: złoty 76.9 bn (\$5.532 bn). 1982: 174.0 bn (\$6.254 bn).

NMP growth: -12.1% (1981), -8.0% (1982).

Inflation: 35.0% (1981), 100.2% (1982).

\$1 = (1981): złoty 3.44 (off.), 13.90 (adj.). 1982: 3.44 (off.), 27.82 (adj.).

Army: 230,000 (158,000 conscripts).

3 Military Districts:

5 armd divs (all Cat. I).

8 mech divs (3 Cat. 1, 2 Cat. 2, 3 Cat. 3).

1 AB div (Cat. 1).

1 amph assault div (Cat. 1).

3 arty bdes, 1 arty regt.

3 ATK regts.

4 SSM bdes with *Scud*.

1 AD bde with SA-4, 5 AD regts with SA-6 SAM.

3,400 T-54/55, 50 T-72 MBT; 100 PT-76 lt tks; 800 OT-65/FUG, 50 BRDM-1/-2 scout cars; 800 BMP-1, 2,500 SKOT/SKOT-2AP, TOPAS APC; 1,000 100mm, 200 122mm guns; 300 152mm guns/how; 250 BM-21 122mm, 130mm, 140mm, 240mm MRL; 51 FROG-3/-5/-7, 36 *Scud B* ssm; 750 82mm, 120mm mor; 450 85mm, 100mm towed ATK guns; 73mm, 82mm, 107mm RCL; *Snapper*, AT-4 *Spigot*, *Sagger* ATGW; 750 23mm, 37mm, 57mm, 85mm and 100mm towed, 130 ZSU-23-4 SP AA guns; SA-4/-6/-9 SAM.

Navy: 22,000 (5,000 conscripts).

4 W-class subs.

1 SAM *Kotlin* destroyer with 1 x 2 SA-N-1 *Goa*.

13 *Osa-1* FAC(M) with 4 *Styx* ssm.

18 FAC(T): 8 *Pilica*, 10 *Wislak*.

8 mod *Obluze* large patrol craft.

49 MCM: 12 *Krogulec*, 11 T-43 ocean, 1 *Notec* coastal minesweepers; 25 K-8 boats.

23 *Polnocny* LCT, 4 *Marahut* LCM, 15 *Eichstaden* LCA.

4 intelligence vessels (AGI): 1 B-10, 2 mod *Moma*, 1 T-43 radar picket.

1 Naval Aviation Div (2,000); 49 combat ac:

1 attack regt: 3 sqns with 39 MiG-17.

1 recce sqn with 5 Il-28, 5 MiG-17.

1 hel regt: 2 sqns with 10 Mi-2, 20 Mi-4, 5 Mi-8.

(On order: inshore minesweepers.)

Bases: Gdynia, Hel, Swinoujcie, Kolobrzeg, Ustka

Air Force: 88,000 (27,000 conscripts); 705 combat ac, 12 armed hel.

4 air divs:

6 FGA regts: 18 sqns: 3 with 35 Su-7/-7U; 3 with 35 Su-20; 12 with 150 MiG-17.

11 AD regts: 33 sqns with some 430 MiG-17/-21/-21U.

6 recce sqns: 35 MiG-21RF, 5 Il-28, 15 LIM-6.

2 tpt regts: 9 An-2, An-12, 12 An-26, 12 Il-14.

1 comms/liaison sqn with 2 Tu-134A, 5 Yak-40 Il-18 ac; 4 Mi-8 hel.

3 hel regts with 250 Mi-1-2, 12 Mi-4, 25 Mi-8, 12 Mi-24.

300 trg ac: TS-8/-11, MiG-15/-21UTI, Su-7U.

AAM: AA-1 *Alkali*, AA-2 *Atoll*.

AD divs: 9 SAM regts: some 50 sites; 425 SA-2/-3.

RESERVES: (all services): 500,000.

Forces Abroad: Syria (UNDOF): 131.

Para-Military Forces: 85,000. Ministry of Interior border troops (20,000): 12 bdes, some 42 patrol craft incl 5 *Obluze*, 5 *Pilica*, 3 KP-131, 1 *Oksywie*, 12 *Wisłoka*, 21 K-8, 9 *Gdansk*. Internal defence troops (65,000): tks, AFV, ATK guns. Citizen's Militia 350,000. 'League for National Defence' (some 200,000 active).

with anonymous officers and in an assessment by two senior Polish officers who are now in the West.

"General Jaruzelski could have easily mobilized the society politically had he wanted to do so, but he could not have mobilized the armed forces either in an operational or a technical sense";¹⁸⁹ "Any attempt, however well camouflaged, to organize such action (defence against a Soviet invasion) would be known in Moscow within hours."¹⁹⁰ At any rate, a certain percentage of the professional cadre and riot control and internal security troops have a stake in the preservation of the status quo and can be counted on to support an invasion.

Nevertheless, and perhaps for good reasons given the inevitable interaction between society and the military and other enforcement agencies, Soviet distrust of the Poles persists, and attempts to multiply the various control mechanisms, and to establish some which bypass the Poles altogether, have continued. It is symptomatic that in the 80s the KGB was apparently recruiting war veterans who served in Poland as agents to infiltrate the country (as Russian dissidents tried to warn Solidarity),¹⁹¹ and was also collaborating with the GDR security service (the MfS) in establishing an independent network of agents in Poland.¹⁹²

C. Political Socialization and Discipline Problems

There is little need to describe here in detail the system of military-political socialization which the LWP has developed over the years, because it follows the Soviet model already described elsewhere.¹⁹³ As in the other countries of the Warsaw Pact, there is a Military Political Administration (GZP) for in-service indoctrination and a

whole array of auxiliary youth, veterans, and paramilitary organizations for pre-induction and reserve political training. The major difference is that the Polish system does not work as well as it does in the USSR: organizational structures are weaker and more diffuse; the numbers involved are relatively smaller, indifference and avoidance patterns are more pronounced; and effectiveness is lower. The content of indoctrination follows the standard general themes which are obligatory for loyal Pact members. A Polish military source reviews these themes:

Programs of teaching and education in all military schools include a broad array of themes which ensure the full identification of the students with socialism, with party ideology, with the achievements of socialism in our country in a global setting. A major emphasis is placed on the development of socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism, on awakening pride in the achievements of the socialist fatherland and in being a part of the world socialist system, and on the idea of brotherhood-in-arms with the Soviet Armed Forces and with all the armies of the Warsaw Pact.¹⁹⁴

The only theme not mentioned here, but which is nevertheless of major importance, is hatred for the "imperialist enemy," who is blamed for all of Poland's recent upheavals. These themes are disseminated in-service through the GZP network, and through the media and auxiliary organizations for pre-induction youth, the reserves, and the general public.

The real difference in comparison with the Soviet Union has been the quantity and the magnitude of the problems generated by Polish social, political and national

attitudes, to which the pitch of the socialization efforts has had to be adjusted. At times the mechanics of socialization have broken down, and subjects have been recognized which are ordinarily taboo. Taking a leaf from Soviet practice, but with unprecedented intensity, the emphasis has been on the manipulation of Polish nationalism and patriotic images (treated separately, in the section below.) Patriotic appeals are particularly important, because the message of class-based "proletarian internationalism" and "fraternal friendship" with the Soviet and other bloc armies falls on deaf ears. Talk of the Western "imperialist" enemy and its designs on People's Poland finds little credibility in light of traditional Polish ties with the United States (bolstered by numerous and active family and friendship ties with Polish Americans), and with France and Britain. The threat of German revanchism evoked a ready response in the early period but, with both Germanies incorporated into the respective regional defence systems, the image of an enemy fits the GDR more readily than it does the FRG (especially since the NVA has adopted Wehrmacht-style military uniforms). At any rate, the German danger has been laid to rest as a result of Ostpolitik. The counterproductive effects of political propaganda can be gauged by the echoes of sympathy which apparently reverberated within the Polish military for South (not North) Korea in the 1950 Korean conflict, and for the Chinese rather than the Russians in the Sino-Soviet quarrel. The latter dispute was accompanied by widespread apprehension in Poland concerning the possible deployment¹⁹⁵ of Polish forces on the Chinese-Soviet border.

The political indoctrination of Polish soldiers and

officers was the focus of Soviet and Polish party attention from the very beginning. Polish communists in the Kosciuszko Division were immediately assigned to the posts of "deputy commanders for educational work," and an official political education system was established in November 1943. In September 1944, after the LWP was created, it was transformed into the Main Political Administration (GZP). The political reliability of the armed forces was of major concern during the formative years of the LWP. So was the number and quality of political education officers, and consequently the weakness of the penetration of military units by the party and youth organizations. It was only in 1949 that PZPR and ZMP (communist youth organization) cells were officially established in the LWP and, as official Polish sources stress, the groundwork was laid for the present-day military-political education system. This political penetration was resented, and in a reaction to it in 1957 the ZMP and its cells in the LWP were abolished and the party network was weakened. But the comeback was quick. By July 1958 there was a revival of youth organizations and "Circles of Military Youth" were established in the armed forces. In the late 50s and in the 60s a number of so-called "social links" (ogniwa społeczne) were set up, also under the slogan of the "democratization of military life." The first was the Ministry's Military Council, and subsequently councils were established in military districts, services and units. Other "links" proliferated, and the leading role of the party in all of them was stressed.
¹⁹⁶

The picture which emerges from the relatively scant information in military sources in the period preceding the

1980/81 crisis is of a party embattled to preserve and expand its penetration of the forces (as demanded by Soviet military doctrine) while at the same time coping with morale and disciplinary problems and upholding the other key Soviet military principle: the one-man authority of the unit commander. The remedy obviously was "to involve in the party the men in command positions in the LWP,"¹⁹⁷ a prescription which must have been followed judging by statistics on party membership in the LWP. But the problems were not resolved because the performance by party members was clearly unequal to the task. They were criticized, for example, for formalism, for getting away with "slow motion" activities,¹⁹⁸ and for "passivity."¹⁹⁹ At the same time, however, they were also criticized for "autocratic behaviour"; the latter was apparently characteristic of secretaries of primary party organizations in the armed forces.²⁰⁰

An LWP study on the "art of command," which explored morale and discipline problems, found two prevalent types among army officers, both of which were seen as "undesirable": an "authoritarian" and an excessively "democratic" type. The latter was apparently more common; his main characteristic was that he consulted the collective too much and on matters which were not suitable for discussion. The author's prescription was for strong leaders who were capable of inspiring the men through well-run discussions. The study's other finding was that the use of punishment alone was counterproductive: punishment failed to correct negative behaviour and only maximized resentment of what the soldiers felt was bad and unfair treatment. The author's citation of soldiers' responses to a survey conducted by the study illustrates

the extent of the stress induced in the ranks by the rigours of military service. The study recommended the alternate use of the carrot and stick technique in order to better motivate the soldiers and to minimize morale and discipline problems.²⁰¹ The recommendations were apparently followed up in a new disciplinary code which the LWP adopted in October 1977. It provided for an elaborate system of rewards and punishments, the utilization of which is supposed to involve the soldier's home as well as his military environment. The man's family, as well as his workplace and social and professional organizations, are supposed to be notified of his transgressions and/or distinctions, and in the service the whole panoply of "social links" become involved: party and youth organizations, honour courts, comrade courts, soldiers' collectives, career NCO councils, etc. In the case of a transgression punishment may be deferred and/or modified if the above vouch for the delinquent and then monitor his behaviour. The system requires close collaboration between the commander and party and youth organizations, in order to instill in the ranks "a climate of social disapproval for dishonourable deeds."²⁰²

Other sources confirm the commander's propensity to impose punishment without inquiring too closely into the reasons for the disciplinary problems. Although a permit for a few days' leave is legally the soldiers' right, it has been treated as a privilege, and absence without leave seems to be a common transgression which, moreover, frequently goes unpunished. An article which deals with "difficult" soldiers quotes one, under arrest, who says that he absented himself without leave at least 20 times but was punished only a few times. The author adds that

among the soldiers under arrest whom he interviewed there were some who admitted to as many as thirty unauthorized absences, and in most cases they went unpunished. The other discipline problems mentioned most frequently were alcoholism; frequent car accidents and violations of control points on the road; a general lack of respect for superior ranks and failure to salute them in public places; being ashamed of one's uniform; slovenly appearance and habits; disregard for military prestige; unauthorized reading and smoking; etc. In general, young people were castigated for trying to avoid the draft, for "abusing national symbols" (the example given was the display of national flags during strikes), for imitating Western life-styles, and for consumerism and general ideological "lack of trustworthiness."²⁰³

A few sources, word of mouth information and the occasional biographical or fictionalized account published outside the censorship system illustrates the prevalence of a caste system in the forces which creates a wide social gap between professional soldiers and conscripts and between juniors and seniors within the conscript ranks, inclusive of extreme hazing practices. A 1976 source hints broadly at a form of institutionalized conflict between "cats" (newly drafted cohorts) and "reservists" (those who have served part of their stint) which is blamed for certain disciplinary problems.²⁰⁴ This conflict and the accompanying hazing are described in detail in the autobiographical story of a philosophy student, drafted in the 70s, who also discusses negative attitudes towards the draft and the drastic methods which conscripts resort to in order to secure an early discharge. These include self-mutilation, and prolonged simulation of madness,

psychiatric problems and false disease symptoms, with the occasional recruit going berserk or committing suicide. The cynical attitude toward military service was illustrated in the story by the advice given to the prospective recruit by a respected senior citizen, identified only as a "Historical Personnage":

Do not be too perturbed ... the army is only a caricature of the totalitarian system to which, I think, you must have become accustomed already. As you well know, the totalitarian system is based on the principle of a net which is twisted all around us. But a characteristic of any net is that it has openings in which any man of even average intelligence can build a small peaceful nest -- which I heartily hope you will be able to do.²⁰⁵

Constraints on the discussion of problems in the armed forces were loosened in 1980-1981. Officially the policy of "Renewal" was embraced by the government and the armed forces, and there were enthusiasts in the forces, particularly among junior officers, who took the promise of reforms literally. Critical voices even appeared in Zolnierz Wolnosci (although usually with corrective commentaries), and views were expressed in support of the "Renewal" pursued by the PZPR, and for its application in the LWP.²⁰⁶ There was criticism of certain "negative" phenomena in the LWP, and a military delegate to the PZPR Extraordinary Congress was quoted (but with disapproval) on the subject of "deformations" in the relations between the superior and the inferior in the armed forces, excessive "bureaucratization," formalistic behaviour bordering on

"pathologies," falsification of reports, trampling on human dignity, and assuming know-it-all postures. The "social links" were also severely criticized: there were too many of them which worked for effect only and many lacked "authenticity." ZSMP (youth organization) cells were specifically singled out for engaging in much talk and very little work, and for their bureaucratic ways. Another comment was: "already at school we learn how to overbureaucratize social activities, which fills us with enough disgust for a lifetime."²⁰⁹

But the general tone of the military press sounded a warning not to get carried away by criticism and, in the zeal of reform, throw the baby out with the bath water.²¹⁰ The official PZPR/GZP guidelines for "Renewal" in the armed forces stressed familiar tasks: strengthening the Soviet alliance; enhancement of the unity and discipline of the LWP for better defence against "demagoguery" and "infractions of party and service discipline"; the activization of "social links" and greater collegiality and personal interaction between the cadre and the ranks; and the imposition of strict limits on the abuse of national symbolism and on anti-Soviet excesses.²¹¹ There was also a plan of action to counteract the ferment and dangerous trends in the armed forces. These included a greater emphasis on the denunciation of hostility towards socialism among "agitators"; the need to anticipate events and situations in order to be prepared to combat them; and an improvement in the circulation of information within the GZP system. Specific postulates included the preparation of specific course materials on Polish history (the 1918-1976 period), "in order to correct the interpretation of several themes which have been utilized by the enemies

of socialism in the political struggle to rehabilitate right-wing forces in the interwar period, and to undermine the alliances of the Polish People's Republic."²¹² The GZP also placed a major emphasis on the need to improve and develop its system of "interpretation" of events in order to be able to cope with the "pluralism of information," the content of which "we cannot tolerate because of the threat of a possibility that enemy views may penetrate the armed forces."²¹³ One can almost pity a communist military political education system that is forced to cope with the failure of censorship and freedom of information!

The political line which characterized the main military newspaper, Zolnierz Wolnosci (ZW) in 1980-81 indicated that it represented the views of the hard-line faction in the party, and that at least a part of its editorial team must have had a direct line to Moscow. The Moscow connection was indicated by the use of terminology and concepts which were direct translations of Soviet usage but were not familiar to the rest of the Polish press, and by the targets, timing and content of attacks, which paralleled those in the Soviet press. An example of terminological usage is the word "anarchosyndicalism," as applied to Solidarity, which has no currency in the Polish language. A case illustrating the repetition and timing of Soviet "true revelations" was the description of KOR as a subversive organization founded in Switzerland in 1975, which appeared in Literaturnaia Gazeta (Moscow) but nowhere else in the Polish media.²¹⁴ Zolnierz Wolnosci's targets also paralleled targets selected by the Soviets. These included (apart from the unofficial press) the more independent among Polish official journals (such as

Polityka) and certain Polish TV programmes. Echoing the Soviet line, it also carried an open attack on the PZPR for its "ideological softness and defeatism," because of the "incorrect formulation" of the role of the party in the armed forces as contained in the theses prepared for the PZPR Extraordinary Congress. As seen in its pages, ZW's main allies were the known hard-line elements in the political spectrum: the old official trade unions; the veterans of foreign wars organized in ZBoWiD; and other communist combatant organizations.

The attacks in ZW on the more independent of the Polish media also indicated that they were widely read or listened to in the forces. For example, the same ZW actually advertised access to Polityka, Kultura (Warsaw), and Forum as a come-on to make a reserve officers' school more attractive.²¹⁵ ZW, on the other hand, was not read very widely, if at all. Complaints were voiced on its pages that soldiers seemed to be avoiding reading it, and that its correspondents were being subjected to a "silent indication that hardline views were not particularly popular, even among the officers.

With the imposition of martial law the pages of the military press have, on the whole, returned to normal, but the legacy of the crisis has survived in the tasks which are currently being pursued by the GZP. These tasks, according to the deputy chief of the GZP, General W. Honkisz, are "to protect young men from the destructive impact of anti-socialist forces and from the influence of the phenomena of social pathology ... our enemies try to reach the soldiers ..." ²¹⁸

The party and the Socialist Youth Organization (ZSMP) collaborate in the implementation of these tasks,

and the role of the ZSMP in the armed forces has been revived. Under the leadership of the party (which is the father to the ZSMP son), the ZSMP conducts three types of educational activity: the self-education movement works through newly-created "Clubs of Citizens' Thought" (Klub Mysli Obywatelskiej), which study the basics of the state and political system, the laws of social development, and economic and political problems, and "Most Recent History Circles." The polytechnical education activities concentrate on stimulating new inventions and the rationalization of technical work; the cultural-recreational sphere is designed to combine pleasure with useful instruction. Thus, for example, the ZSMP runs "Soldiers' Popular Universities of Culture" (Zolnierskie Wszechnice Kultury).²¹⁹ It also acts as a recruiting organ for party membership; in 1984 party ranks in the armed forces were said to be increasing by about 600 candidates a month. These men "are the elite; they are the leaders in the forces and in work, the experts in training, and the model soldiers and officer cadets." In the same year ZSMP membership is said to have included 53 per cent of all soldiers in basic service (conscripts) and more than 68 per cent of the officer cadets.²²⁰ So the effort is on again. How effective it has been so far will be assessed in the last section of this chapter.

In addition to in-service indoctrination by the GZP and its auxiliary organizations, Poland has the usual complement of youth, veterans and proto-military youth and "social links" organizations, which are designed to reach the pre-induction youth and to maintain a high level of indoctrination among the reserves and the population at large. Organizations listed as "preparing the population

for defence (prior to martial law) included: ZBoWiD, the League for National Defence (LOK), the Voluntary Reserves of Citizens Militia (ORMO), the Polish Red Cross, the Association of Voluntary Fire Brigade Units, the Aero Club, the Association of Ham Radio Operators, the Association of Voluntary Working Brigades, Clubs of Reserve Officers,²²¹ and various youth associations, including the Boy Scouts.

The history of Polish youth associations has been stormy. In 1973 a Federation of Socialist Associations of Polish Youth was set up in an attempt to coordinate the activities of the five official youth organizations which were active at the time. Autonomous organizations sprang up in 1980/81, but they shared the fate of all such organizations after December 13, 1981. The currently dominant organization, the ZSMP, has had its problems in working with the military (as seen above), and none have been able to duplicate the role played by the Komsomol in the Soviet Union. Although the methods used in the pre-induction training of Polish youth closely resemble those used in the Soviet Union,²²² they fall short of the Soviet model in performance.

Three other organizations which have been active in the military training and indoctrination of pre-induction youth and reserves are ZBoWiD, the Clubs of Reserve Officers, and LOK. For years ZBoWiD (the Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy) has been the fiefdom of Mieczyslaw Moczar and his Partisan faction of the PZPR, which is noted not only for its hard-line views but also for extreme chauvinism and anti-Semitism, and has served as a dispenser of benefits and privileges to likeminded people. The Clubs of Reserve Officers originated in 1956/57 as an association of officers released from the

service (most of them were of a hard-line political colouration; they included "soldiers of the two armies"), and collaborated closely with LOK's predecessor, the League of Friends of Soldiers. In the 60s and 70s their members became deeply involved as pre-induction and reserve training instructors in schools, local military commands, and LOK units, and their numbers increased. In 1973 there were approximately 1,400 reserve officer clubs, and in 1974 5,500 reserve officers were engaged as instructors (every fifth instructor was a reserve officer).²²³

LOK is a rather anemic version of the Soviet DOSAAF organization and maintains close contacts with it as well as with equivalent organizations in other socialist states, such as SVAZARM in Czechoslovakia. It is engaged in pre-induction training, civil defence training, and military sports, and it interacts closely with the Clubs of Reserve Officers, youth organizations, the Aero Club, the Ham Radio Association, and others. It also prepares technical specialists for the armed forces and the economy, assists in the selection of candidates for officer, warrant officer and NCO schools, and works closely with the reserves in maintaining their military skills and ideological education. In 1980 it claimed a membership of over 2 million people who were organized in 28,000 primary organizations and 1,760 specialized clubs (automobile, radio, rifle training, naval training and modelling).²²⁴ However, The Military Balance for 1983/84 listed only 200,000 "active members" (see Figure 3). The imposition of martial law obviously opened up new opportunities for LOK and other proto-military organizations. A 1983 interview with the head of LOK, Gen. Zygmunt Huszcza, indicated that the organization expanded its activities considerably in

the 1978-1983 period. In addition to expanding "patriotic and military education," it trained over a million drivers, 800 scuba divers, and organized about 1,600 events in the communications field, with over 25,000 participants. Every year the organization trains approximately 3,000 sailors, 1,500 motorboat drivers and teaches about 2,000 more how to swim and row. Approximately 100,000 people are instructed at polytechnic pattern shops, and numerous sharpshooters practise at numerous rifle ranges. After the imposition of martial law LOK members not only visited about 10,000 soldiers and policemen who were on duty to cheer them up with "wishes, flowers and symbolic gifts," but performed a number of other duties as well: they assisted in the implementation of WRON decisions; intensified educational work; and increased activities in LOK clubs and circles:

6,000 LOK members took part in defence and security patrols; 25,000 were on duty in civil defence units in the capacity of advisors, chiefs of service and instructors; 15,000 were on duty with ORMO (Volunteer Reserve of Citizens' Militia); within the framework of the camp operation "Summer 1982" our teams organized "defence days" in 1,200 camps; 40,000 LOK members are active in PRON (Patriotic Movement for National Renewal) cells.225

IV. THE MILITARY AND SOCIETY: 1980-81

When long-suppressed social fury erupted in the "Renewal" movement little was said about the military in the many unofficial (outside of the censorship system)

publications which began to appear after 1976. One explanation for this was offered to Kultura (Paris) by a contribution from Poland writing under the pseudonym "Socjusz":

The theme of the LWP should be handled with care ... because attitudes and moods in the LWP vary and the more one knows the less one wants to talk; sometimes because of shame ... but mostly in order to be discreet. Information about the LWP is by definition fragmentary and it smells of donos (false information purposely circulated).²²⁶

The information which did appear, some in the military and party press and some in Solidarity sources, left contradictory impressions. A reader of the military press, perusing the complaints voiced by soldiers, their families and their commanders, gained the general impression that there was a negative popular attitude towards the military, and the professional cadre in particular. These complaints were focussed on widely-circulated "myths" of privileges and perquisites enjoyed by the military, and a statement made by General Jaruzelski at the VIth Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee was representative of this trend:

Lately there have been cases of misunderstanding (by the people) of the role of the armed forces, of insinuations that the professional cadre enjoys high-level privileges, insinuations which sometimes (are) even (accompanied) by unpardonable insults.²²⁷

Similarly, a PZPR conference of the Pomeranian OW emphasized the theme of a need to strengthen the ideological-political cohesion of the armed forces "in the sharp struggle with the counter-revolutionary threat" in the light of cases of "hooligan attacks" on professional soldiers and their families which caused them "great bitterness."²²⁸ The maintenance of a perception, among the military, of a hostile public was clearly in the interest of the authorities; it isolated the soldiers from "anti-socialist" influences and maintained their reliability for an expected (as may now be surmised) intervention.

This officially projected picture clearly smelled of "donos" because the picture of popular attitudes which emerged from the unofficial media was very different. As Kultura (Paris) and many other sources reported, General Jaruzelski was enormously popular. Even the March 19, 1981 Bydgoszcz case (when Solidarity representatives, engaged in a sit-in on behalf of Rural Solidarity, were severely beaten up by the police) was generally assumed to have been a provocation staged by the hard-liners against Jaruzelski. It did not stop Solidarity from circulating posters reading: "General! The Nation and the Fatherland are waiting!", and "General! Facing lawlessness, together we form the front of social self-defence!"²²⁹ Solidarity's own newspaper (perhaps in an emotional outburst in the face of the threat of Soviet intervention), expressed its unequivocal endorsement of the Polish Army. Projecting into the future, to an ideal May 1st celebration, it said of the LWP:

They march -- the blood of our blood,
the bone of our bone, our sons -- the

army. Here there is no need for placards; we all love them because they are. Because they are of us, for us and ours. Because they are ready to defend us.²³⁰

There is bitter irony in these words in light of the events which followed, and even at the time they seemed to be exaggerated. But there was little doubt that, as a perceptive observer noted, "Poles cherish their army as an institutional expression of ongoing Polish nationalism."²³¹ This sentiment was carefully fanned by the military propaganda's emphasis on nationalism and patriotic images. The old ties between the people and the army seemed to have been rekindled and the people were again ready to support their army, providing that it would stand fast in defence of Poland's interests.

This impression was supported by opinion polls which were conducted freely in 1981. In a May 1981 poll, conducted among the general population, 89 per cent of the respondents expressed their trust in the LWP; the only institutions trusted more were the Church, with 94 per cent, and Solidarity, with 91 per cent (see Table 6). Thus the armed forces were not only the third most trusted social institution, but had a level of popular approval almost as high as Solidarity: the difference between them was all of 2 per cent! An October 1981 poll among Solidarity members showed a decline in trust in the LWP; but the figure was still very high -- 68 per cent -- considering that the respondents belonged to the forefront of the new movement. A survey conducted by the Public Opinion Research Center of Polish Radio and Television in November 1981, testing popular attitudes towards the

military task groups operating in the countryside, showed an approval rating of 91 per cent. The highest marks given to the groups were for their control over the activities of the territorial administration and their role as ombudsmen for popular grievances.
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Popular approval for the LWP did not extend, however, to Poland's great "ally," the USSR, notwithstanding the general recognition, noted earlier, that the alliance was a necessity imposed on Poland by its geographic position and by the postwar European political settlement. Writing in Polityka in November 1979, Mieczyslaw Rakowski, the PZPR's leading "liberal," warned of the open existence of "anti-Soviet attitudes":

In the realm of pedestrian stupidity, there exist wretched spokesmen for national superiority, (a perception) that derives not only from inherited theories of the "bulwark" (of Christianity), of the continuation of "Pan-dom" (the noble quality -- pankosc), and of "Europeanism," but also from the possession of modish rags. Gossip, sniping and jokes circulate ... all of which contribute to an unwise and counterproductive attitude of arrogance (towards the USSR) ... two-bit politicians and lightweights are attempting to revive the discredited anti-Soviet trend ... These efforts are hopeless and sterile
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After August 1980 the anti-Soviet attitudes were repeatedly castigated by the official media. They often painted a gloomy picture, as in the case of a warning by Stanislaw Wronski, the 1981 head of ZBoWiD, that "the activities of anti-Soviet elements" lead to "dangerous

tendencies of the gradual destruction of socialism in Poland."²³⁴ Voices were also raised decrying "improper attitudes towards the presence of Soviet forces in Poland,"²³⁵ and there were sporadic reports of cases of the "desecration" of Soviet soldiers' graves and monuments erected to commemorate Poland's "liberation" by the Red Army. Strong denunciations of anti-Soviet attitudes were made by both General Jaruzelski and General Siwicki (since 1983 Jaruzelski's replacement as minister of Defence) at the XIth Plenum (9-10 June 1981) of the Central Committee of the PZPR. Jaruzelski's statement reviewed the whole range of anti-Soviet phenomena:

We cannot tolerate and decidedly condemn the facts of anti-Soviet expression, such as grafitti and leaflets, pamphlets and posters, desecration of monuments, and finally all kinds of incidents, demands and insults directed at the soldiers of the Northern Group of Soviet Forces. Unfortunately, there are many such facts and they are on the increase. We have documented them. They are all directed against our elementary political and moral interests and awaken outrage.²³⁶

But many of the incidents which were described resulted from police provocations, which played on widespread anti-Soviet sentiments in order to create conditions of chaos and unrest which would compromise Solidarity and facilitate a crackdown. Solidarity's leadership was well aware of the problem. Not only did it warn the membership and the general public against being drawn into anti-Soviet displays, but Walesa personally

helped erase anti-Soviet slogans. The need for restraint in expressing anti-Soviet attitudes was broadly recognized and generally adhered to; however, the official press gave much play to any such incidents reported. The fear of Soviet intervention was widespread. Even in late 1981, when the fear of intervention declined, over one half of the respondents to a survey identified the Soviet Union, or "socialist states," as the main threat to Poland's independence.²³⁷

The official evidence which is available indicates that the ideas of "Renewal" (the Solidarity variety) circulated among conscripts despite attempts to isolate them, and contributed to an atmosphere of unrest. Soldiers' attitudes were the subject of vigorous and critical discussion in the military press. Its context -- an emphasis on the need to shore up the party's ideological fences -- indicated that attitudes were perceived to be a major problem. Criticism of these attitudes applied in general to all personnel in basic service, but new recruits were singled out for special concern. They were said to come from an ideologically perverted environment, and to have participated in the recent waves of strikes. Three main problem areas were stressed in this criticism of soldiers' attitudes: 1) passivity, apathy, and lack of motivation in the performance of political and military tasks; 2) susceptibility to politically harmful views and behaviour; and 3) infractions of military discipline (which were discussed above).

Passivity, apathy, etc. were criticized in conjunction with an attack on the shortcomings of political education and training methods, which were blamed for stifling initiative and enthusiasm among the soldiers

rather than stimulating them.²³⁸ At the same time soldiers were accused of "duplicity"²³⁹ because they "think one thing and do another";²⁴⁰ of false reporting dictated by the desire to let their commanders hear what they want to hear; and of a lack of interest in the traditions and high standards of their units.²⁴¹ They were said to resist submitting to military rituals and, as one source put it, they could not be forced into any kind of militancy -- in the party or in any other social organization. In other words, they resisted indoctrination and marked time until the end of their term of service. At the same time there was evidence of vigorous ferment in the ranks in support of reforms, and demands were made for concessions; the latter included calls for a reduction in the period of service, longer furloughs, shorter service hours, better conditions, etc.

Even the members of the youth organization, the ZSMP, made demands for self-government, freedom from party control, democratization, free elections, and the right to make their own decisions. Zolnierz Wolnosci complained that the times of "enforced unity" were "gone with the wind," and that the trend towards organizational autonomy was based on resentment of heavy-handed party interference in the work of the organization in the past. It was pointed out that the conflict between the ZSMP membership and the party activists was based on the fact that most party members belonged to the professional military cadre, while most ZSMP members were conscripts. Thus, if the party wanted to effectively interact with the ZSMP in the forces, it was necessary for its members to "know how to change their skin";²⁴² the implication was that they had to discharge their duty to lead the ZSMP in a more tactful

and less obvious manner.

It was also evident that there was latent resentment of political indoctrination measures. Zolnierz Wolnosci noted that there had been requests to phase out so-called "visual propaganda" work altogether, on the pretext that there was a lack of supplies and that the propaganda was counterproductive because of its obsolete and worn-out slogans.²⁴³ Concern was also expressed over the circulation of Solidarity leaflets in the forces, and political officers were told to keep supplies and duplicating equipment under strict control.²⁴⁴

Political unrest was reported in certain military districts as well as in the various services, and it affected not only conscripts but also officer cadets and some members of the professional cadre. A report on the work of a primary party organization in the Silesian OW commented on the difficulties of political work at a time (in 1981) when "people were coming to us daily with questions, problems and doubts. The conversations were honest, although the truth was not always pleasant. Discussions were difficult, and frequently we had no arguments because the facts contradicted them."²⁴⁵ The official view of the PZPR and MON emphasized the need to "close ranks," "erect ideological and moral barriers," "increase the soldiers' sensitivity to enemy activities," and consolidate the "political conditions of our ranks."²⁴⁶

A wide-ranging article discussing conditions in the three military districts had this to say about the situation in the Warsaw OW:

Even those of our compatriots who are very experienced and politically

sophisticated had trouble interpreting specific events. Thus it is obvious that this difficulty has affected the younger generation, and the soldiers among them, even more. They need intellectual help ... The life and social experience of the soldiers who came in the last call-up differs significantly from that of their senior colleagues upon entering the army. Some men from our youngest cohorts frequently participated in the strike movement, came in contact with the slogans of the "Renewal" propagated by it, and also with ideas which are contrary to the interests of the Poles; and they allow themselves to be carried away by youthful emotions.²⁴⁷

In the Navy it was reported that young people were worried about the situation in the country, and discussed the shortcomings of ideological-educational work; special attention was devoted to ideological-educational work with new arrivals. In the WOP (Border Troops) there was talk about the need to remove "random people" from the youth organization, and to intensify efforts to influence the soldiers. Cadets in the WAT (the technical academy which graduates the cream of the technical "stream" of the officer cadre) expressed support for the "Renewal" and worry concerning the situation in the country; there also was a "flood" of proposals related to the improvement of interpersonal relations, better ties with the teaching and command staff, modernization of the teaching process, and better and deeper ties with society.²⁴⁸

Other voices commented on the failures of the political education system and on the doubts which were raised even by candidates for the posts of political

officers:

In the last few years our ideological work has become more and more difficult. We were teaching theoretical Marxism-Leninism, but what we taught seemed to have less and less relevance to the problems of the practical daily life of the party and the state. This discrepancy caused internal frustrations and unease among the students who, during discussions, would frequently cite cases which contradicted the theories of socialism we were teaching them. The cadets demanded that we discuss the real issues: the Leninist party of the new type; relations between church and state; the socialist way of life; the nature of socialist humanism; anti-socialist groups in Poland; and the history of the events of 1948, 1956, 1970, and 1980 and their genesis.²⁴⁹

In a hardly subtle fashion these comments implied that Marxism-Leninism has lost all relevance to the events in Poland. This is heresy, especially when voiced by the cadets and staff of the L. Warynski political officers' training centre; the participants urged the abandonment of old formalistic training methods in favour of an unconventional style of panel discussions and seminars.

Members of the armed forces are not allowed to belong to any unions. The prohibition also applies to members of the People's Militia, but did not affect (in 1980) the civilian employees of defence industries. According to the available information there was an effort, on the part of a segment of the militia, to organize in an independent union. A committee was struck to organize the union, and its leader, Z. Zmudziak, addressed the

Solidarity Congress. But this effort was cut short, the existence of such a union was repeatedly denied by the official press, and 362 members of the militia were dismissed because of their attempt to organize.²⁵⁰

The civilian employees in the defence industries were, temporarily, more successful. There are two varieties of defence industry in Poland: the ostensibly civilian industries, which in fact produce armaments, and the openly military-industrial enterprises, which are subordinated administratively to MON. There is evidence strikes were called in both sectors of the defence industry (ZW mentions by name four which did not strike)²⁵¹ and independent unions were also formed in both of these sectors. Workers in the open military industries were forbidden to join Solidarity. Instead, they created their own Independent Self-governing Union of Military Workers (NS ZZPW). Official sources variously report that the NS ZZPW embraced either 90 per cent²⁵² or 85 per cent²⁵³ of all workers employed in the defence industry. The NS ZZPW was organized some time in October 1980: General Jaruzelski signed a "protocol" legalizing the new union on 29 October 1980.²⁵⁴ Negotiations between MON and the NS ZZPW were frequently reported, as were the various concessions gained.²⁵⁵

It appears that most workers in the ostensibly civilian branches of the defence industry (which are in fact more important because they produce heavy equipment) were organized by Solidarity. In the case of the transport enterprise "Mielec," which produces planes and land vehicles for the army, it was reported that 85 per cent of the workers there belonged to Solidarity,²⁵⁶ and it appears that most of the October 1981 wildcat strikes were

centred precisely in this type of enterprise.

There were other unions of a military or paramilitary character (some of which were created by hard-line elements to stem the tide of change), such as the Union of Former Professional Soldiers, which was ZBoWiD's ally. It was quickly registered, and at its first national conference (attended by Jaruzelski) it claimed 22,000 members and adopted resolutions unreservedly supporting the policy of the PZPR.²⁵⁷ Another ZBoWiD ally was the semi-official Grunwald Patriotic Union, which engaged in activities which were stridently anti-Semitic and nationalistic. A Union of Soldiers in Reserve was formally registered but reports of its activities were censored,²⁵⁸ which indicates that it might have had a pro-Solidarity bias.

As the fateful year of 1981 drew to a close the armed forces were obviously affected by the social turmoil all around them, while at the same time the society had created a paradigm of the armed forces which it wanted; namely, a genuine national army, the heir to all Polish national military traditions. This exercise in self-delusion generated an enormous amount of good will towards the LWP, which greatly facilitated Jaruzelski's task of preparing and then carrying out the 13 December 1981 coup.

But if it was affected by the general turmoil in society, why did the army let itself be used? Apart from the obvious constraints imposed on the LWP by the coalition warfare system, attitudes in the forces were by no means unambiguous. The elements which were most affected by the political fallout of Solidarity were the conscripts (particularly the spring 1981 cohort, which witnessed, and

frequently participated in, the birth of the movement), officer cadets, and junior officers. But it seems that there was little impact on career NCOs, and certainly none on the senior ranks; mid-career officers were a question mark, and were probably pulled in two directions. To counteract the impact of societal turmoil, the conscripts were kept in isolation both from their home environment and from the new "contaminated elements," and were subjected to concentrated indoctrination. After the spring of 1981 no new call-ups were made for a year, and the 1980-81 cohorts were kept in the service for 3 years. This was done not only to maintain the troops in their relative state of political innocence, but also to gain time to screen incoming cohorts for reliability, and thus to assure the proper placement (into, for example, the new civil defence service) of unruly elements from Solidarity's strongholds in large urban and industrial centres. The cadets and the junior cadre were undoubtedly also troublesome, but among them were many who genuinely believed that the armed forces had to move into the political arena in order to clean out the Augean stables of the Gierek era. When the coup came, many undoubtedly acted from patriotic motives, having bought the General's rhetoric of the necessity to "save the Fatherland."

But, as the "state of war" solidified and "normalization" set in, there came disillusionment: for society vis-à-vis "our army," and in the ranks for the proponents of "Renewal" and national interest.

V. THE LWP AND MARTIAL LAW: AN INTERPRETATION

1. The Coup

As 1981 drew to a close the political confrontation between the increasingly militant Solidarity movement and the increasingly recalcitrant government promised no resolution of Poland's mounting political and economic problems, while the Soviet Union was growing progressively more restless over the destabilization of the strategically vital "Polish corridor" connecting the USSR with its forward forces in East Germany. The extent of the Soviet Union's strategic concern was clearly reflected, from the very beginning, in the Polish military press. As early as October 1980, a long and forceful article in Zolnierz Wolnosci argued that the Polish *raison d'état* was "defined by the socialist system, and by the country's participation in the Warsaw Pact and the European balance of power." This imposed an obligation of internal stability, for Poland

is a permanent factor in European security and is situated in the immediate security zone of the Soviet Union ... That zone is also Poland's security zoneTwo important consequences result for Poland from that fact ...First, ... our country has allies along all of its borders ..(which).. express Poland's secure position. However, that fact and those advantages also impose duties ... they require efforts to ensure

internal stability ... Only a state that is internally ordered and not disarrayed ... can be a strong ally and can honor its allied obligations. And that is what our Allies demand of us and that is what they are interested in The Poles' national interests and the Polish raison d'état require that all conflict situations be resolved in an atmosphere of calm, prudence and responsibility for the further course of events and its consequences. As soldiers, we must show a particular sense of responsibility not only for our own affairs, but for all the people as well.²⁵⁹

It seems that this sense of a "special responsibility" which the country's strategic situation imposed on "Polish soldiers" was in the forefront of Polish military thinking from the beginning.

This argument was repeated even more forcefully by the country's two top soldiers, Generals Jaruzelski and Siwicki, at the XIth Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee (9-10 June 1981). This Plenum discussed the June 8 letter from the CPSU Central Committee, which apparently demanded that the Polish party regain control of the situation or else face the consequences. Jaruzelski's contribution was that he "shared the concern" expressed by Soviet comrades, for it was based on the currently tense international situation, in which "each point of destabilization creates a potential danger":

The place of Poland in Europe and our position in the Warsaw Pact define a very specific degree of national and international interdependence. Thus,

what is happening here, the destabilization of Poland, threatens to upset the balance in a context far broader (than the local) one. In this location in Europe one cannot remain on the sidelines.²⁶⁰

Further, Jaruzelski cryptically referred to a "very strong emphasis" in the Soviet letter -- "which is not coincidental" -- on Poland's boundaries and independence; these are "guaranteed" for a "concrete, socialist and friendly Poland"; "it is a wonder" that "so many Poles, otherwise oversensitive to the question of boundaries and independence" seem blind to this point, despite "so many explanations, so many tangible proofs ... of how vital,²⁶¹ nay, priceless Soviet collaboration is for Poland ... The implication is that the letter must have made it abundantly clear that the very existence of Poland depended upon its remaining "socialist" within the Soviet understanding of the term. This was a point that, Jaruzelski suggested, should have been obvious to anyone, but apparently was not. The warning was aimed, perhaps, as much at some of the CC members as it was at the leaders of the "Renewal." Siwicki (then the Chief of Staff) also went on record as "sharing Soviet concerns,"²⁶³ as did the Quartermaster General, General Obiedzinski, who stated that "our Soviet friends have the right to express concern with respect to the fate of socialism in Poland."²⁶⁴

Thus it seems that not only were Polish military leaders aware that the changes introduced by the emergence of Solidarity and the "Renewal" movement were not acceptable to the Soviet Union, and were prepared to intervene in order to restore the status quo, but also that

they really had no choice to do otherwise. That they presumably also had no inclination to do otherwise -- given their life histories and career patterns -- is in this context of secondary importance.

This determination to prevent the changes, introduced by Solidarity, from taking root, was shared, for reasons of self-aggrandizement as well as self-preservation, by party and state bureaucrats, the middle echelon of the "establishment" of the Polish People's Republic. These people, "a collective of hardliners, the backward, ruthless and hypocritical core of the ruling apparatus" (according to a pseudonymous correspondent, based in Poland, writing for the Paris Kultura),²⁶⁵ are the "slime" (szlam) in which the system is mired. It has been the dead weight of this group, acting in perfect concert with its counterparts in the Soviet Union and the other "fraternal" states of the socialist community which, more than anything else, stood in the path of any "Renewal," be it in its "socialist" or Solidarity version.

Apart from a few apparently genuine reformers scattered throughout the communist establishment, and the enthusiastic reform-minded grassroots (in the party as well as in the military), the record of the party/government/military leadership after the signing of the August 1980 Gdansk Agreements shows fairly conclusively that it had no intention of genuinely implementing the agreements, or of accepting, in the long run, the changes introduced by them (such as subsystem autonomy or freedom of expression) which were incompatible with the communist system. And even had the leadership entertained such heretical notions, the unequivocal Soviet reaction and the

succession of joint military exercises in and around Poland (with LWP participation) would have convinced it otherwise, for the example of Czechoslovakia was still fresh in its memory.

Thus it seems that, from the very beginning, and in close consultation with the CPSU and the WP Joint Command, the government's policy was, first, to regain control over the situation and, second, to gradually restore orthodoxy. The importance of the armed forces in this context was clear. First of all, because using the military for socialism's internal defence is an integral part of Soviet (and Polish) military doctrine;²⁶⁶ second, because of the precedent of 1944-45, when only martial law and the presence of Soviet troops ensured the survival of the communist government. One should also note that Stanislaw Kania, Gierek's replacement as first secretary, had previously been in charge of the Central Committee's Administrative Department; that is, he had the necessary military and security (and also presumably Moscow) connections. But Kania, while resisting Solidarity pressures to implement the Gdansk Agreements, seemed unable to rebuild the shattered party. This made the armed forces the sole remaining asset (apart from the police) available to prop up the hapless regime, short of inviting in the Soviet comrades. Thus, after six months of a tug-of-war between the government and Solidarity, the LWP entered the political arena with General Jaruzelski, the Minister of Defence, taking over, in February 1981, as Prime Minister. From that time on the main burden of the effort to put the Solidarity genie back into the socialist bottle has fallen on the shoulders of Wojciech Jaruzelski who, by October, also assumed the position of PZPR First Secretary.

The carefully cultivated "Jaruzelski Myth" -- the patriotic leader of the Polish national army (and a noble by birth to boot), a brilliant military professional unsullied by political dirt, a man with clean hands and austere habits amidst the Gierek bordello -- and his resulting popularity in the country has facilitated this task enormously. but a careful scrutiny of the Jaruzelski biography (see Figure 4) reveals that, personal qualities apart, his patriotic and apolitical image belies reality. He is a First Army veteran, and his basic military training (Riazan Infantry Officer School) as well as his advanced training (the Voroshilov General Staff Academy) has been in the Soviet Union. He is apparently also the graduate of the Polish General Staff Academy, according to Polish sources which always carefully exclude any mention of his stint at the Voroshilov Academy from his official biography. He participated in the 1944-45 pacification campaign, apparently in the Vistula operation. His official biography is vague on this subject; unofficial sources claim that he was a member of the KBW (internal security troops newly formed from a special military unit of the LWP). Some sources also claim that he served as a political officer; this is plausible in view of his subsequent appointment as the head of the GZP. It is also rumoured that, while engaged in the pacification campaign, he met and was noticed by the future military members of the Brezhnev faction. Whatever the truth of these rumours, his participation in the suppression of the underground meant, at the time, both a pro-communist (hence hardly "patriotic") orientation and close contacts with the security service.

Jaruzelski's career pattern indicates close collaboration with and approval by the Soviet high command. He was one of the bright young Polish officers trained for command positions under Rokossovsky (both stints in the general staff academies took place during the Rokossovsky period) and, presumably, he received his first appointment to general officer rank from Rokossovsky (although the exact date -- i.e., was it before or after October 1956 -- is unknown). In the Spychalski period he had a line command, but emerged from obscurity as the Duszynski group was being squeezed out.

In 1960, when Marshal Grechko began the reorganization of Warsaw Pact troops (and thus obviously with Moscow's approval -- or perhaps at its suggestion), Jaruzelski was appointed the head of the GZP. Politically, this is a key position which requires the trust of the party. In this case, one wonders which party, as Jaruzelski did not become a member of the PZPR CC until 1964; he also received his second star in 1960. By 1965, i.e. the year when the Duszynski purge was completed, Jaruzelski had become the chief of the LWP General Staff and deputy minister of Defence. In April 1968 (i.e., four months before the Czechoslovak invasion, and thus hardly a coincidence, because of the requisite approval of the Warsaw Pact Joint Command) Jaruzelski became Minister of National Defence and received his third star. (General Florian Siwicki, Jaruzelski's no. 2 man and presumed close friend, and a rumoured Moscow man in Poland was, incidentally, the commanding officer of the Polish contingent which participated in the invasion). As Minister of Defence Jaruzelski was directly responsible for the use of troops in the suppression of the workers'

Figure 4 General Wojciech Jaruzelski: Biography

b. Kurow (Eastern Poland), 6 July 1923, to a gentry family

1940 -- deported to the USSR

1943 -- joined "Kosciuszko" First Polish Infantry Division

1944 -- graduated from the Riazan Infantry Officer School

1944-45 -- First Polish Army: platoon commander, then chief of a regimental reconnoitring unit; battles of Pulawy, Magnuszew bridgehead, Warsaw, Pomeranian Wall, Oder and Elbe

1945-47 -- participated in the pacification of southeastern Poland; unofficial sources variously report that he served in the KBW (Internal Security Corps) and/or as a political officer, and that he met Soviet generals Ivashutin and Tsvigun, members of the future Brezhnev faction and, respectively, the chief of the GRU and the dep. chief of the KGB under Brezhnev

1945-47 -- staff positions?

1948 -- member of the PZPR

1947-56 -- line command and advanced training (Gen. Staff Academy in Warsaw and Voroshilov General Staff Academy in Moscow)

1956 -- appointment as general of brigade (brig. general); commander, 12th Motorized Infantry Division

1960 -- appointment as general of division (major gen); (Marshal Grechko takes over as C-in-C of the WP); chief of the GZP

1962 -- deputy minister of National Defence

1964 -- member CC PZPR; (purge of the Duszynski group)

1965 -- Chief of Staff, LWP

1968 -- appointment as general of arms (lt. general)

April 1968 -- Minister of National Defence; (August 1968 -- invasion of Czechoslovakia)

1970 -- cand. member, Politbureau PZPR; (the army is used for the suppression of the workers in the Baltic shipyards)

1971 -- member of PZPR Politbureau

1973 -- appointment as General of the Army; (1976 -- workers' strikes, and 1980 -- strikes; reported to say that soldiers will not shoot at workers and that the army is for a "political solution").

1981 -- February -- appointment as Prime Minister (Bydgoszcz incident follows)
October -- "election" as First Secretary, PZPR (December 2 -- raid by helicopters on the Fire Fighters School in Warsaw)
December 13 -- imposition of martial law; head of WRON

1983 -- June -- Order of Lenin on 60th birthday
July 22 -- martial law lifted
November 22 -- head of the National Defence Committee (KOK) and Commander-in-Chief; relinquishes the position of Minister of Defence (to Siwicki)

Sources: Who's Who in Poland (Warsaw: Interpress, 1982);
Le Matin, 2 January 1982;
Sovetskaia Voennaia Entsiklopedia, Vol. 8 (Moscow: Min. of Defence, 1980), pp. 673-4;
Globe and Mail, July 6, 1983;
V.G. Kulikov, ed., Akademiiia General'nogo Shtaba (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), p. 242.

strikes in the Baltic shipyards in 1970, but it is not clear whether or not the authorization to use live ammunition came from the political or from the military authorities.²⁶⁷ At any rate, it seems that he was rewarded for his services by a seat on the PZPR Politbureau (he became a candidate member in 1970 and a member in 1971) and by being awarded top general rank (he became a four-star general of the army) in 1973.

It is ironic that Jaruzelski's popularity largely rests on his alleged (and widely publicized) statement in the Politbureau, in August 1980, that Polish soldiers will not shoot at Polish workers. This statement, although now a part of the Jaruzelski myth, may be true -- reflecting a rational assessment of the impact of the repressions of 1970. Jaruzelski's impact on the course of events in 1981, after his appointment as prime minister is, in retrospect, readily discernible: a change of tactics created the impression of genuine willingness to negotiate, but this was combined with a new toughness and with systematic preparations for a coup. At least one close observer attributes this policy to "inspiration" from Moscow.²⁶⁸

The Jaruzelski government's apparent good faith concerning negotiations with Solidarity awakened hopes for a "historic compromise"; but it also served to divide the spokesmen for "Renewal" along minimalist/moderate/maximalist lines, and helped to undermine the unity of the movement and of support for it. But regardless of the approach, endless negotiations between Walesa and vice-premier Rakowski, and among the "Big Three" (Jaruzelski, Walesa and Cardinal Jozef Glemp) did not bring any results. The same applied to the question of economic reforms. There was much talk, but no new initiatives were

undertaken by the government, while Solidarity was blamed for the continuing economic deterioration. At the same time a new hard line reinstated the use of force to deal with the opposition, and there was an increase in police provocations which were designed in particular to inflame radical and impatient youth. The plea for a 90-day strike "truce," made by Jaruzelski upon his appointment as Prime Minister, was followed shortly (on 19 March) by the Bydgoszcz incident, when the militia brutally beat up Solidarity demonstrators. This was attributed at the time to PZPR hardliners who were intent on destroying Jaruzelski (an interpretation which is still widely held). But even if this interpretation is true, Jaruzelski certainly did not show any great eagerness to mollify Solidarity by punishing the perpetrators. Instead, he held to a tough stance throughout the tense confrontation, and despite the threat of a general strike which was to be announced by Solidarity on March 31st (Walesa withdrew the strike threat at the last minute on the basis of a vague but complex agreement with Rakowski which did not amount to much). All the while the Soiuz-81 WP manoeuvres were being held in and around Poland.²⁷⁰ March 31st was the last time that the threat of a general strike had total credibility.

Overall, the policy succeeded in eroding the unity of the Solidarity movement, and it undermined the determination of the people to stand fast in their support of Solidarity and the reforms. As the negotiations dragged on the differences within the movement became more and more pronounced. From the beginning it was an umbrella movement: it included trade unionists, revisionists and proponents of national sovereignty; it included workers, but also peasants, students, intellectuals, priests and

party members. Each group advocated different tactics and priorities, while the general public became confused over the issues and was growing increasingly tired of economic hardship. The young grew impatient and it became more and more difficult for Solidarity's leadership to maintain internal unity, to control Solidarity's regional organizations, and to counteract the growing radicalism of the grass roots. The people convinced themselves that the army was "theirs"; and as fear of a crackdown by the government or of a Soviet invasion receded, so did the perception of a need for unity. Instead, a feeling developed that the new freedoms were there to stay, and that the government would have to accommodate the demands of Solidarity and the Church because of their strength and mass support. So vigilance and caution declined and militancy and radical demands escalated.²⁷¹

At the same time the government commenced preparations for a military takeover, in close collaboration with Soviet military authorities within the Warsaw Pact structure.²⁷² Apart from the objective evidence (a military coup of that magnitude and effectiveness could not have been prepared overnight), most unofficial sources agree that preparations were long in the making. With the joint WP exercises as an excuse, the Polish forces were placed on combat readiness status in September 1980 and were maintained at this status through 1981; soldiers who finished their tour of duty during this period were not discharged.²⁷³ Preparations for the actual coup probably started in February-March 1981, when the training of the professional cadre began;²⁷⁴ the technical side of the coup was planned jointly by Polish

and Soviet experts.²⁷⁵ All sources agree that the first major overt step was the formation of the Military Task Groups (TGO) and their dispersal throughout the country.

The TGOs were established at the initiative of General Jaruzelski by a decree dated 23 October 1981. An official spokesman for the government justified their formation by the need for "extraordinary measures" because of a "threat to the country's internal life," for certain elements in Solidarity were trying to "overturn the socialist state." The task of the TGOs was to curtail chaos and abuses in local administration, to eliminate waste and mismanagement, and to improve the food procurement system, activities which gained them the approval and good will of the local population. At the same time, of course, their dispersal established a military control network throughout the country. The TGO groups, composed of several units containing 3 to 4 men, were led by professional officers and were composed mostly of career NCOs and warrant officers. Some conscripts who were completing their second year of service, and were therefore "uncontaminated" by Solidarity, were included in the TGOs.

In the first round, TGOs were dispersed throughout some 2,000 village parishes on October 26. They were recalled on November 20, but returned to the same localities on December 10. On November 26 the second round of TGOs was directed to urban centres, to each voivodship centre, and to 44 other towns. Specially selected groups, composed of 3 to 5 officers, were sent to key industries on November 23 and to all central and local industrial enterprises between December 8 and 11. The TGOs in cities and industrial centres were assisted by army communication,

construction and health specialists. The whole network was coordinated by regional operational groups, under a Central Operational Group reporting directly to the National Defence Committee.²⁷⁶

By December 11 the military network for the administration of the country was complete. Given the Pact integrating mechanisms discussed above, the deployment of Polish forces of this magnitude had to be known to, and approved by, the WP High Command. Moreover, in view of the strategic importance of the Polish "corridor" to the Soviet Armed Forces, it is quite likely that the initiative for a military takeover actually came from Moscow, for no alternative remained if the country was to be stabilized (on Soviet terms), short of a Soviet invasion. There is evidence of Soviet-Polish military consultations throughout 1981. General Siwicki seemed to have been the key liaison man on the Polish side. Marshal V.G. Kulikov, the Pact commander, came to Warsaw for consultations with General Jaruzelski on November 24-25, and is believed to have been present in Warsaw from December 7 through the December 13 imposition of martial law.²⁷⁷ Soviet military installations, notably the military communications network mentioned earlier, are believed to have been installed throughout Poland under the cover of the Soiuz-81 spring manoeuvres; information from various parts of the country indicated that peasants had encountered groups of Soviet soldiers beginning in the spring of 1981.²⁷⁸ It is not clear who and when decided the actual date of the coup. But seems that the decision was made at least two months in advance, and it seems to have been correlated with General Jaruzelski taking over as the PZPR's First Secretary. At least one Politbureau member, the hard-liner

Albin Siwak, was reported (by the Solidarity press) to have told a communist party meeting in Krosno, on 30 September 1981, that a Military Council for National Salvation (WRON) had been formed and that the army and the militia were ready for action, but that it would wait another two months to allow for a decline in popular support for Solidarity.²⁷⁹ Certainly there were many warnings of impending action. At the 6th PZPR CC Plenum (November 17-28) there was talk of a "direct threat to the existence of socialist Poland" and of a need to take full powers; the attack, by special units of riot police (ZOMOs) on striking cadets in the Firefighters School, on December 2, was obviously a dress rehearsal. On December 7 doctored tapes of a Solidarity meeting in Radom were released to document Solidarity's "threat." On December 10 and 12 the Soviet news agency Tass attacked "counterrevolution in Poland,"²⁸⁰ and accused Solidarity of pressing for a confrontation. Finally, the tone of the official Polish press in the last few days before December 13 grew increasingly ominous, emphasizing a deterioration of conditions in the country which could no longer be tolerated.²⁸¹ One of the better-known contributors to Polityka formulated the key message:

it is known that today one thing and only one thing matters: is it possible to take power away from the communists, even the limited (power) in the middle of the Warsaw Pact, without risking first the spilling of our brothers' blood and later maybe (spilling blood) other than Polish?²⁸²

And yet, when the coup did come, at midnight, December 12, 1981 -- and it was carried out with awesome

efficiency which paralyzed the country and all of its new autonomous social structures -- Solidarity was caught unprepared, and everyone was caught by surprise. There was no organized resistance.

An official decree of the Council of State (acting on behalf of the Sejm), dated 12 December 1981, proclaimed a "state of war" in Poland²⁸³ and authorized the imposition of martial law. The decree created a Military Council of National Salvation (Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Narodowego -- WRON) composed of 21 military officers under the command of General Jaruzelski (see Figure 5), who were to take over the administration of the country. The officers in charge of TGOs moved in to run the local and provincial administration, and in the factories designated officers became military commissars. Under martial law all enterprises were militarized and refusal to work became a military offense punishable by court martial. Whenever it was necessary to use force, as in the case of street demonstrations and disorders, and in the mines and factories where the workers declared occupational strikes, it was not the regular army which was used, but ZOMO units -- specially trained riot control squads of the Ministry of the Interior -- for which the regular army provided a backup.²⁸⁴ Thus the popular hatred invoked by the imposition of martial law and the use of force has been concentrated on the ZOMOs. Little of it touched the regular army, which continued to run the local administration and was largely restricted to patrol and border duties. There were some alleged sightings of Soviet soldiers²⁸⁵ and plenty of rumours of Soviet soldiers dressed in Polish uniforms, but they were not confirmed.

Figure 5 THE MILITARY COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL SALVATION (WRON), est. December 13, 1981

Date of Birth	Name	Function	Linkages	5.
			1. 2. 3. 4.	
*'23	Gen. of the Army Wojciech Jaruzelski	* First Secretary CC PZPR * Prime Minister * Minister of Defence	* * * #	contact with Brezhnev group, a Russian wife? Member PB PZPK
'25	Gen. of Arms Florian Siwicki	* Chief of General Staff LWP	* * *	cand. member PB PZPR; son of a SAF col.?
'22	Gen. of Arms Tadeusz Tuczapski	* Chief Inspector of Territorial Defence (incl. WOW and WOP)	* *	
'25	Gen. of Arms Eugeniusz Molczyk	* Chief Inspector of Training, dep. C-in-C WP Joint Command	* * * #	a Russian mother?
'23	Admiral Ludwik Janczyk	* C-in-C of the Navy	* *	a Soviet officer
'25	Gen. of Div. Czeslaw Kiszczak	* Minister of Internal Affairs (MSW)	* *	cand. member PB PZPR a Belorussian?
'22	Gen. of Div. Tadeusz Hupalowski	* 1st dep. Chief of Staff * Minister of Adm., Local Econ.	* *	memb. Party Control C-tee; Czech Mil. Academy '51; Ch. Polish-Libyan Fr. Soc.
'26	Gen. of Div. Czeslaw Piotrowski	* Chief of Military Research & Technology	*	partisan in WWII
'24	Gen. of Div. Jozef Baryla	* Dep. Min. of Defence * Chairman GZP	* *	
'24	Gen. of Div. Mieczyslaw Oliwa	* C-der Warsaw OW	* *	ZBOWID activist
'26	Gen. of Div. Henryk Rapacki	* C-der Silesian OW		
'32	Gen. of Div. Jozef Uzycki	* C-der Pomeranian OW		
'20	Gen. of Div. Tadeusz Krepak	* C-in-C of the Air Force		
'26	Gen. of Div. Longin Lozowicki	* C-in-C of WOPK		
'26	Gen. of Brig. Michal Janiszewski	# Chief of the Office of the C. of Min.	#	sent to forced labour in Germ., WWII
'31	Gen. of Brig. Jerzy Jarosz	# C-der Mech. Infantry Div. Warsaw		
'25	Col. Tadeusz Makarewicz	C-der of a military unit		
'27	Col. Kazimierz Garbacik	Chief, Voivodship Military Staff		
'24	Col. of Res. Roman Les	Pres. Assoc. Ret. Officers Clubs		
'43	Col. Jozef Klosinski	C-der of a military unit		
	Lt. Col. Miroslaw Hermaszewski	Cosmonaut		

* Position within the nomenklatura of the PB PZPR; # of the CC Secretariat, PZPR.

- 1. Veteran of the First Polish Army.
- 2. Participation in pacification in 1945-47.
- 3. Security or political work background.
- 4. Graduate of Soviet military academy: * Voroshilov Gen. Staff Academy.
- * with Gold medal; # other academy.
- 5. Alleged Soviet origins or connections; misc. information.

Some men and officers from Polish elite units were reported to have participated in some of the pacification actions, as in the case of the action against the Lenin Ironworks in Nowa Huta, which was apparently directed by the commander of the Red Berets Airborne Division, General Zdzalka, and included some 4,000 troops.²⁸⁶

The interpretation offered here assumes that General Jaruzelski acted in conformity with Soviet military doctrine in "defending socialism" at home, and in conformity with Soviet security interests in defending the Soviet "security zone in Europe." The official Polish military interpretation equates Polish security interests with Soviet security interests. The General's own speech to the populace, at 6 a.m. on December 13, used tear-jerking patriotic oratory, for Jaruzelski claimed that he was saving Poland from civil war. This interpretation gained wide currency in the West and even in Poland, although it was patently obvious that Solidarity did not have a single armed fighter, let alone a combat organization planning to attack the government. But the interpretation was plausible in terms of the threat of Soviet invasion. Had Poland continued to democratize (thus increasing "destabilization" in the eyes of the Soviet and Polish military leaders), the Soviet Union might have decided that it would have to intervene. Thus it is true that Jaruzelski may have saved Poland from bloodshed, a prospect that would have been as disastrous for Poland as it would have been counterproductive for the Soviet Union.

There is also the consideration, raised earlier, that, even had they wanted to, the LWP leaders were unable to mobilize the army operationally in support of the people and against the threat of a possible intervention, because

of the progress made since 1960 in integrating the East European armies into the Soviet defence system. If this is so (as the authors of this study believe), then the question of Jaruzelski's motivation -- did he act as a Polish patriot or as a Soviet proxy -- becomes academic. But the answer to this question is still interesting in view of the patriotic mantle that WRON has wrapped around itself, and in consideration of Jaruzelski's post "war" policies. A clue may, perhaps, be found in his actions in 1981. Why, if the General's motivation was high-minded patriotism, was there no effort at a genuine compromise with the "Renewal" movement in order to minimize destabilization, and why was no attempt made to extract from the Soviet Union at least as much autonomy as Gomulka was able to obtain, dealing from an equally weak -- perhaps weaker -- position, in 1956?

2. The "Normalization"

Technically the coup was a brilliant success. But the policy of "normalization," pursued by the WRON for three years now, has failed to break the stalemate between a regime based on force -- the official lifting of the state of martial law on 22 July 1983 was little more than the change of a label -- and a society which, once the shock of the coup wore off, has stubbornly proceeded to pursue its civic aims on an individual basis, and outside newly refurbished communist structures, in the many ways which are still possible under the military administration.

The use of military power was successful in achieving its short-range goal of destroying the organized pluralism which challenged the regime, but WRON still has

to rely on power as it attempts to achieve two major long-term objectives: 1. to rebuild the communist political structures which collapsed under the impact of Solidarity; and 2. to force the people into at least outward acceptance of and conformity with Soviet-style "socialism" and the "alliance" framework; i.e., to reintegrate them functionally into the WP system à la post-1968 Czechoslovakia.

Since the imposition of martial law WRON's policy has combined three separate approaches: 1. the militarization of society and the penetration, by military personnel, of the party, state, and economic structures; 2. repression and the destruction of the autonomous organizations which emerged in 1980-1981; and 3. their replacement by new reincarnations of the old transmission belts, dressed up in the borrowed and distorted symbolism of "Renewal."

The key relationship has been the one between the party and the military. In the normal communist pattern the party penetrates and scrutinizes the military via the nomenklatura system, the security apparatus, and the military-political education system. But since the imposition of martial law in Poland, and due to the corruption, incompetence and general collapse of the PZPR,²⁸⁷ it has been the military which has scrutinized and penetrated the party. Military personnel (all "good" party members to be sure), have been placed in key positions throughout the party, the government and all other structures, and are in control of the nerve centres of the nomenklatura. General Jaruzelski himself has retained supreme command and the two posts which he acquired in 1981: the leadership of the party and of the

government.

General Michal Janiszewski (a WRON member) heads the office of the Council of Ministers, which is the directing centre of the government, and General Tadeusz Dziekan heads the Cadres Department of the CC PZPR, which controls the nomenklatura. An internal decree passed by the Politbureau on 12 December 1981 gave the right to higher party committees to appoint and dismiss lower ones without the usual formalities, a move directed against the erstwhile supporters, in the party, of the so-called "horizontal" movement, i.e., democratization.²⁸⁸ Changes in the state administration and in the party apparatus have affected 2,000 and 5,000 positions, respectively, according to a colonel who is General Dziekan's deputy; in the party apparatus, which consisted of 17,166 functionaries in mid-1981, this has meant a turnover of about one-third of the total personnel.²⁸⁹

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that what happened was a military coup against an incumbent regime, as happens frequently in Africa and Latin America. It was a coup on behalf of a communist regime which was too weak to maintain power on its own, and aimed at restoring the PZPR's nominal authority in the person of a general who is now its leader by the grace, and most likely at the behest of, his military superiors in Moscow. General Jaruzelski rules in the name of the PZPR but is in fact the military governor of a rebellious, but essential, Polish "corridor." Nevertheless, the viability of his rule, for both domestic and internal audiences, depends on the projection of an image of national sovereignty and requires considerable room for manoeuvring in the formulation and execution of policies.

The discussion of army-party relations in Poland has involved considerable speculation about factional struggles in the PZPR and the various factions' linkages to Moscow. The speculation has focused on the supposed challenge to Jaruzelski and to his "moderate" and "independent" policies by the so-called hard-liners (who lost out in the succession struggle back in August 1980 and October 1981), beginning with the Bydgoszcz incident and ending with a rumoured effort to unseat Jaruzelski in December, which was forestalled by the military coup.²⁹⁰ Such speculation has been pursued by both Western²⁹⁰ and Polish²⁹¹ observers. Factional struggles are always present in communist systems, especially during periods of unrest and/or leadership transition. Polish hard-liners are undoubtedly plotting and scheming to move into positions of leadership, deplore Jaruzelski's "leniency" in the treatment of "counterrevolutionaries," and are attempting to pull strings in Moscow to unseat him.

But two considerations should be kept in mind. In the first place, factional differences concern tactics rather than strategy. The goal of all PZPR factions is the same: to maintain the communist regime in spite of its total lack of legitimacy, and to maintain a level of "stability" which is considered to be satisfactory by Moscow. Thus the relevance of these factional struggles for Polish society and its demands is, at best, marginal. Wechsler quotes Adam Michnik (one of the four KOR leaders persecuted by the Jaruzelski regime) commenting on this subject in a letter smuggled out of prison:

So Jaruzelski defends the chair coveted by, let's say, Olszowski. What have we to do with this? One should under-

stand the struggle taking place within the apparatus of power, but one should not vest the slightest hope in any of the fighting factions. Concerning Solidarity there is no difference among them. They differ only with respect to technique.²⁹²

In the second place, the Soviet military establishment is one of the power brokers in Moscow, and the High Command's judgements concerning Soviet security interests are not likely to be challenged regardless of the outcome of factional disputes. General Jaruzelski is a professional soldier and, as his career indicates, over the years he has been a trusted protégé of the SAF high command. As long as he holds the "Polish corridor" safe and sound for the SAF, a challenge by any of the Warsaw hard-liners is unlikely to succeed, unless of course the challenger is himself (or finds) a member of the military elite with equally good connections in Moscow. Although there has been some sniping at Jaruzelski's heels both in Warsaw and Moscow, he duly received the order of Lenin (for the second time) on his 60th birthday in June 1983. This is a sign, if not of approval, then at least of acceptability.

The military administration of the country is handled by senior officers who occupy many leading positions in the central and territorial agencies of the government, and by military commissars in managerial positions in the economy. The military task groups (TGOs) proved to be so effective that they have continued to function as the main instrument of military control throughout the country. In May 1982 the rural TGOs were converted into mobile units of 4 to 5 soldiers each, one

for every 5 parishes, and the urban TGOs were reduced in numbers but were reinforced by larger (15 to 20 men) control and operational groups stationed in each voivodship centre. In November 1982 all TGOs conducted inspections throughout the countryside and in all urban districts. Another such inspection took place in April 1983, and affected some 190 urban and 800 rural localities. When martial law was lifted on 22 July 1983 the TGOs returned to their original units but remained on call. In December 1983 they were sent on another tour of inspection, this time to "inspect defence preparedness in local (military) units," and to "assess the work" of various administrative bodies, particularly those dealing with "transportation, communications and services."²⁹³ The TGOs' anti-corruption work and low-key performance have established them so well in public esteem that, even in 1983, it was reported that on the whole they were still welcomed by the people.²⁹⁴

The policy towards Solidarity supporters -- which in practice meant a great majority of the population -- combined repressions and efforts at furthering the atomization of society, with the establishment of pseudo-participatory structures dressed up in "Renewal" slogans but orchestrated according to WRON's prescriptions.

Repression has been ruthless but selective; it has affected every segment of society but has been administered with sophistication. This has furthered the regime's key objectives while avoiding mass-scale Stalinist-type terror, and has earned Jaruzelski the label of a "moderate," while martial law has been described as a "self-limiting counter-revolution."²⁹⁵ It could be that the relatively modest scale of repressions has been

dictated by lurking doubts concerning the ultimate reliability of the armed forces. It could also be that selectiveness in the use of the "stick," which has been alternated with various "carrots," is believed to yield results which are as satisfactory as those produced by indiscriminate terror, but are far less counterproductive. A policy of terror can always be resorted to if present policies do not work. In many ways the WRON policy bears the stamp of the late Yuri Andropov who, as the head of the Soviet KGB, was largely responsible for eliminating the Soviet dissident movement.

The first blow, on the night of December 12/13, 1981, was the arrest and internment of Solidarity leaders throughout the country according to lists which had been prepared far in advance. Most were caught; and some, particularly workers, were treated with appalling brutality. The interdiction of all communication and all movement paralyzed the country and, at one stroke, achieved total atomization. Workers' resistance in several major factories was ruthlessly extinguished by ZOMO forces and, overnight, the people found themselves at the total mercy of the police and the army. The second step, implemented on a gradual timetable, was the purge of all respected social and community leaders, as well as managers and administrators. Editors, journalists, professors, teachers, artists, directors, managers, etc. were fired in the process of a so-called verification campaign (combined with the use of loyalty oaths) that was coordinated by General Janiszewski in the Council of Ministers. Either they signed a loyalty oath or they were dismissed (in practice, they were given a "wolf's ticket," which precluded employment in their professional field) and

reduced, in most cases, to extreme poverty.

There was an apparent randomness (a throwback to Stalin) in the application of repression and the scale of brutality, which aimed at sowing fear, insecurity, and mutual distrust. Those accused of major transgressions were often treated in a highly differentiated fashion: some were brutalized; some were released unscathed; and some were encouraged to go abroad. Victims were occasionally picked up by the militia and beaten up, sometimes to death; some Solidarity activists have been found murdered, assailants unknown.²⁹⁶

Workers have been treated more harshly than members of the intelligentsia, in an attempt to drive a wedge between these two sectors of society, and well-known dissidents in large cities have been treated more leniently than little-known activists in the provinces. The "Solzhenitsyn solution" (exile) has been tried on the KOK group (now blamed for leading the workers "astray" and for fomenting "counterrevolution"), but without success. Amnesties have been announced, but are hedged by conditions that make the beneficiaries liable to instant rearrest. The ZOMOs have been deployed to stop public demonstrations of any kind; they were reorganized into mobile regiments and their numbers were expanded.²⁹⁷

Repression was intensified in 1983/84 in response to the expansion of the underground, with the police hunting down Solidarity leaders still at large and trying to destroy underground publications. Thousands have been detained for 48-hour interrogations.²⁹⁸ But, for all this use of coercion, in some respects Poland still appears to be freer than most of its socialist brethren, including the USSR.

A propaganda campaign has been mounted by the official media to convince the people of the "folly" of the leaders of Solidarity and to break up the social alliance on which it was based. The main strategy has been to praise the sincerity of the movement's supporters and the validity of many of the slogans calling for reform and democratization, but to "expose" "counterrevolutionary" elements and the "imperialist machinations" which led the workers and the people astray. Vice-Premier Rakowski's Polityka has been particularly skilful in peddling this line. It has offered plausible, sometimes remarkably good and frank analyses of the country's problems and past trends, but invariably repeats the message that one has to accept the realities of power and that WRON is doing its best to accommodate the social postulates within them. This argument is aimed at the intelligentsia; in other media, and particularly in the military press, the message has been more crude and is increasingly more orthodox. Suspicion and distrust is being sown between workers and intellectuals; between workers and peasants; between the Church and the "radicals" (including "radical" priests); between entrepreneurs and the general public; and between the moderates and radicals within each group.

A meeting between WRON's propagandists and psychologists which was reported in the underground press offers some interesting insights into popular attitudes and the aims and tactics of the current propaganda campaign. The psychologists cautioned against showing war-time partisan and resistance movies on TV (in order to avoid the mistake made by programmers after December 1981, when an actors' and artists' boycott left them with long stretches of viewing time to be filled); and against frontal attacks

on Solidarity. Instead, they recommended criticism of aspects of Solidarity's programme (as "harmful to the national interest") and some of its leaders (as "extremists"), and the adoption and adaptation of its more attractive slogans. Youth should be offered "recreation," in order to take its mind off matters political; and normalization "achievements" should be publicized in big, highly visible "jumps" rather than incrementally. The directives given for the treatment of the LWP are revealing: the coverage of the TGOs should vary, instead of always pushing the standard formula that "things were bad, the soldiers came, and now all is well"; the general coverage of the armed forces should be carefully measured in order not to devalue its impact; and whenever the military are on the screen they should be surrounded by all the pomp and circumstance that can be mustered.
²⁹⁹

The economy has continued to limp along and the promised reforms have yet to materialize. The conditions of work in some major enterprises -- Solidarity strongholds -- are bad and sometimes dangerous; especially in the Silesian mines which are worked intensively with obsolete equipment and in long shifts. The WRON line has made it clear that popular aspirations and expectations have to be drastically reduced; an approach which is different from that taken by Gomulka and Gierek in the past. Some observers feel that the pauperization of society -- to make the people more malleable -- has been a deliberate policy, as has been the perpetuation of privileges for the ruling group and its supporters. As Jerzy Urban, the official spokesman for the government, has frankly admitted, the government will always have enough to eat.

The social and professional associations which

reclaimed their autonomy after the collapse of the transmission belts in 1980 have been gradually decertified and dismantled. Solidarity was first. Universities were shorn of their newly-won autonomy and their newly-elected authorities, as were students', artists', writers', journalists', lawyers', and all other associations. In their place both old and new versions of the transmission belts reappeared: branch trade unions and professional associations with new leaders who enjoy the support of the military authorities, and new fictional "coalitions" designed to give an illusion of participation and patriotic (with a capital P) activities. They mouth "Renewal" slogans, propagate ideas which are borrowed from Solidarity but are distorted beyond recognition, and wave the national flag. Consultative councils were created and attached to the Sejm, as advocated by Solidarity; but they are nominated rather than elected. The "Big Three" social coalition of Government, Solidarity and the Church has been converted into regional "coalitions" of "Citizens' Committees for National Salvation" (OKON) and the "Patriotic Movement for National Renewal" (PRON), which are supposed to offer the forum for a "national dialogue." Both have been penetrated and manipulated by WRON representatives and are in charge of mobilizing support behind the military government and its policies.

Last but not least, the militarization of the country has been legalized and Jaruzelski's power consolidated under a sweeping amendment to the 1967 conscription law adopted on 21 November 1983,³⁰⁰ the importance of which has been largely overlooked. The amendment converted the National Defence Committee (Komitet Obrony Kraju, KOK), which had been attached to the Council

of Ministers, into an independent body with vastly expanded powers in charge of all matters pertaining to the "defence and security of the state." According to an authoritative official source, in the new law the term "state security" is understood in its "broadest meaning," and "not just in its aspect of the protection of public law and order."³⁰¹

The scope of the amendment is indeed broad. The Committee "defines" the needs of "security and defence"; it sets the directives for their implementation: "within the overall socio-economic development of the country"; and it "coordinates the activities" of the chief, central and local organs of state administration and national economy, managers and directors of enterprises and associations, organs of self-management, cooperative boards, social organizations, and trade unions as they carry out these directives, which they are all specifically obliged to do under the provisions of the law. (Art.5.1,2, & 7-9, and Art. 13.1-5). As Zolnierz Wolnosci comments, the law is explicit on the subject of the KOK's powers:

the law unequivocally states that the execution of tasks pertaining to defence is required of all organs of state administration and heads of organizational units subordinate to them or supervised by them ... and also of state enterprises and their associations, cooperative bodies and their unions and, moreover, of the boards of social organizations and trade unions within the limits of their jurisdiction.³⁰²

The Committee can declare a "state of emergency," "martial law," "mobilization," and "state of war," and it acts as an

administrator in all matters relating to defence and security as long as any of these conditions exist (Art.5.3 & 4). In other words, the KOK can effectively assume supreme power at any time it decides to do so. Provincial defence committees were also established by the law, and their "composition, scope, principles and procedures" were defined by the KOK. Provincial committees (chaired by governors) are charged with all defence matters in the provinces "within the limits of the authority granted to them in accordance with the decisions of the National Defence Committee" (Art.14.1-7).

The chairman of the National Defence Committee "directs" its work and "issues orders on matters relating to the Committee's activities" (Art.7.2). The chairman "is appointed and removed by the Sejm" (Art.7.1), but at the same time the law specifies that "the supreme commander of the Armed Forces of the Polish People's Republic is the chairman of the National Defence Committee" (Art.8a.1), and that the supreme commander is appointed by the Council of State (the Sejm's executive committee which acts between sessions and is the formal collective head of state) "for the period of the war" (Art.11a). The chairman and the supreme commander are obviously one and the same person, a contradiction that the law does not attempt to resolve and which in fact does not matter, as neither the Sejm nor the Council of State are the seat of real power. The official commentary here is that

it appears ... that a person can be appointed at any time to perform this function (supreme commander), i.e. during peacetime, on the assumption that he will begin to perform this function only at the time that war breaks out.303

Or he can simply declare that a "state of war exists" -- as provided for by the law -- for which a convenient precedent already exists. Deputy chairmen of the KOK are appointed by the Council of State, which also determines the manner of the appointment of other members (the number has not been specified) and a secretary (Art.8-1 & 2).

The new chairman of the KOK clearly supercedes the Minister of National Defence as the head of the country's military establishment. He "determines all organizational matters of the Armed Forces, civil defence and militarized units" (Art.5.5). Also, as the supreme commander, he "defines the main directions of the development of the Armed Forces, ... appoints and dismisses the Chief of the General Staff ... and the commanders of the military districts and branches of the Armed Forces," both "at the request" of the Minister of Defence. He also "expresses an opinion on the candidate proposed" for the Minister of Defence. (Art.8a.2). This list includes all the key military positions within the PZPR Politbureau nomenklatura. The Minister of Defence is the deputy chairman of the KOK for "Armed Forces affairs and strategic defence planning." (Art.8.1). The new powers granted to the KOK under the 1983 legislation are further extended by provisions (in the same amendment) on the utilization of conscript manpower, completing the militarized framework imposed on Poland as a consequence of the 19'0-81 crisis.

To no one's surprise, General Wojciech Jaruzelski was chosen by the Sejm as the chairman of the National Defence Committee and was also duly named as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Polish People's Republic. His vacant seat as the Minister of Defence was taken over by General Florian Siwicki. The membership of

KOK was not made public; it undoubtedly includes the core membership of WRON, and may have additional members who prefer to remain in the shadows (such as General Shcheglov). Predictably, but with little relevance for historical truth, Polish national traditions have been invoked as an inspiration for the establishment of a communist military dictatorship. Zolnierz Wolnosci comments:

The establishing of the institution of supreme command over the Armed Forces ... goes back to Polish national traditions. The importance of this institution ensues from the very idea of "supreme command," which is expressed in detail in many other documents, including military rules and documents.³⁰⁴

3. The "Patriotic" Image

Appeals to internationalism have fallen on deaf ears in Poland, and Polish nationalism has been used consciously and, as we have seen, with considerable success to "sell" the armed forces to the people. Since the imposition of martial law a strenuous propaganda campaign has been initiated, using patriotic imagery to "sell" the people on the military reincarnation of the communist regime. There is a perceptive passage in an essay by a major Polish writer, Kazimierz Brandys, written in the 70s and published outside the censorship system, where he puzzles over the profusion of traditional martial symbolism in the flood of historical films and publications and reaches the conclusion that it is being manipulated for profoundly non-Polish purposes.³⁰⁵ But nationalism can be a double-edged sword. In the 70s, the manipulation of

national images had a modest success. But the explosion of free speech, which started in the late 70s outside the censorship system, released the floodgates of historical memory and reached its apogee in the Solidarity period. The battle of historiography was joined between the regime and spokesmen for Polish national thought with "revisionism" on both sides; however, the regime's task was complicated a thousandfold by the fact that once historical memory had been resurrected, it could not be easily erased. Thus the teaching of modern Polish history from the "socialist" point of view has been in the forefront of WRON's concerns, and nowhere more so than in the armed forces.

The cooptation of Polish history for the legitimization of the communist regime, and of Polish martial traditions in particular, has been of special importance to the LWP both in terms of its self-image and its image in society. As noted more than once in these pages, the "Jaruzelski the Patriot" myth has taken advantage of the Poles' predilection to follow a knight on a white horse, and of their deeply ingrained love of the uniform, and this has been used to promote an "our boys" image. Thus the emergence of Solidarity, which has been surrounded by a whole spectrum of traditional national-religious symbols, has been most frustrating for the GZP. The ire of the military has been reflected in the repeated accusations of malicious abuse of such symbols for "counterrevolutionary" purposes. Note, for example, General Jaruzelski's use of patriotic thunder against a warning strike which Solidarity called on 29 October 1981:

Our national anthem, which generations have venerated as a sacred call and a reliquary, is now becoming a tune to

which various strikes and protest actions are staged: "Poland will not perish ... (the first verse of the anthem, which is followed by: "as long as we live"). But Poland is perishing ...³⁰⁶

General Jaruzelski used the same first two lines from the anthem to conclude his 13 December 6 a.m. speech telling Poles that he had imposed martial law. This time the connotation was positive: "Poland will not perish as long as we live!" The implication was clear: we, the military, shall "protect" Poland.

Zolnierz Wolnosci complained about young people degrading national symbols, and criticized their "perverted" patriotism; "we have neglected the problem of patriotic education at school, at work ... and now we reap the fruits."³⁰⁷

The importance of national trappings for the new Polish communist army was recognized by its Soviet sponsors from the outset. General (then Colonel) Berling was asked to document the traditional usages, insignia, decorations, songs, etc. of the prewar Polish Army for adoption in the Kosciuszko Division and later by the First Army. An ex-member noted that there was

an exaggerated concern for the preservation of the Polish character of the army ... Polish traditions, forms and customs prevailing ... before the war were largely respected. Russian officers, communists and non-communists alike, observed the Catholic ritual during religious services.³⁰⁸

Catholic chaplains are still an integral part of the LWP, and mass is regularly celebrated for the soldiers.

An interview in 1983 with Rev. Dr. Col. Julian Humenski, the dean general of the LWP, superbly illustrates the "cooptation" of national traditions for the purposes of the armed forces' patriotic image. Asked about the history of the chaplaincy in the Polish Army, Rev. Rumenski responded by harking back to the chaplains who "stood by the kings and hetmans (military leaders), celebrating field masses for the army, warming the soldiers for the fight with their fiery speeches, helping the wounded and burying the dead ..." He enumerated 16th and 17th century hetmans, as well as leaders of military actions from Kosciuszko to the January 1863 Uprising (all of them anti-Russian). It seems that the organized chaplaincy of the LWP is the fourth such chaplaincy, and is a direct heir of three previous ones: the chaplaincy of the Second Republic, of the Polish Armed Forces in the West, and of the Home Army (AK). Rev. Humenski even recommended a new edition of the memoirs of AK chaplains, which had apparently appeared at the turn of 1983 and 1984. The chaplaincy of the First and Second Polish Armies included over 50 chaplains by the end of the war (1945), and they apparently returned, with their units, to assigned garrisons and took over garrison churches. Although garrison churches remain centres of religious life, there are no military parishes (as before 1939) because they were cancelled by a decision of the Holy See in April 1948. In the religious hierarchy the chaplains are subordinated to the bishop ordinaries of their area; in the military hierarchy -- to a deputy minister of national defence.³⁰⁹

National military heroes were honoured as patrons

of new units in the First and Second Polish Armies. But only a few of them came from the communist Polish pantheon; most were national heroes because they had fought the Russians. Tadeusz Kosciuszko, whose name was adopted by the First Infantry Division, was the hero of the first Polish insurrection against the Russians in 1794, as well as a hero of the American Revolution. The patron of the 3rd Infantry Division was Romuald Traugutt, the dictator of the 1863 anti-Russian uprising, and the patron of the 4th -- Jan Kiliński -- was a Warsaw shoemaker who stormed the Russian position in Warsaw in 1794. Józef Bem, the patron of the 1st Artillery Brigade, was an artillery general who fought the Russians in 1831 and later commanded the Hungarians as they resisted Russian troops intervening in the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 (the spark for the 1956 Hungarian Revolution came from demonstrations centred on the statue of General Bem in Budapest). Many other similar examples could be provided. Their anti-Russian component has been inconvenient in terms of socialist internationalism, but most of these heroes are redeemable because they are said to have been fighting for a "social" as well as for a "national" revolution, and their Russian enemies were servants of Imperial Russia.

The struggle with the AK in 1944-45 served to shift the emphasis of the indoctrination message more to the social aspect of the civil war, but national traditions in military political education were revived after 1956 and continued as a dominant theme thereafter. The importance of the image of the LWP as a national army impressed a Hungarian visitor in 1972. He noted the prestige in Poland of the military uniform (although he was told that young men on the whole preferred a civilian to a military

career), and commented, somewhat ambiguously, on the strength of military traditions in society and sensitivity in the ranks to popular approval:

The key to (the respect for the army) very likely hides in the unique historical view of the Poles. It lies especially in those deep impressions, which still manifest themselves today with surprising strength, which the Second World War had on Polish thinking. The other side of the matter is that the army itself is sensitive of its prestige. In the most various places, a recurring refrain in conversations about the events of December 1970 was that the use of army units for maintaining order did not create a gap between the army and the populace or harm the respect for the soldiers.³¹⁰

This comment reveals obvious unease within the LWP over the use of troops against the workers in 1970, but the conclusions which are drawn are not incorrect.

Certainly the value of national symbols in attracting candidates to the professional cadre and in maintaining morale and discipline was emphasized in the 70s. Commentaries on the 1977 law on military discipline illustrate their importance. The then commander of the internal security troops (WOS), General Włodzimierz Oliwa (a WRON member), emphasized the text of the law:

Military discipline is based on love of the Fatherland, faithfulness to the Nation and to the socialist system, a perception of the need to give the Polish People's Republic the best

service possible, a sense of personal responsibility in the performance of the sacred duty to defend the country, and a very special respect for and attachment to the symbols of the Polish State and its Armed Forces, particularly to the state's emblem (the eagle), the flag, the national anthem, the unit's ensign, and the battle standard.³¹¹

The symbolism of the past has been sufficiently important for the LWP to have retained the pre-1939 ranks for its general officers. The LWP is the only one of the Warsaw Pact armies (and this includes the Romanians) not to have adopted Soviet-type ranks, although the difference is only in name (see Figure 6).

A "correct" interpretation of the military historical legacy has, of course, been crucial, and never more so than in the case of recent history. An authoritative military text from the mid-70s provides several examples. With reference to the troublesome question of the anti-Nazi underground, the AK is portrayed as "standing by with arms at ease" while communist partisans were the ones to undertake all the heroic actions against the Germans; in fact, we learn that the AK started to organize partisan units only in 1944, and only because it was jealous of the exploits of the GL/AL and the Soviet partisans. The People's Guard (GL), we are told, "grew in a short time into the main force of the anti-fascist underground, and the PPR slowly became the leading element in the fight for the liberation of the Polish nation."³¹² Another favourite fiction is the portrait of Polish communists in the Soviet Union as burning patriots who

pestered the Soviet government until they were allowed to organize a Polish Army in the USSR, which then, under their command (albeit thanks entirely to invaluable Soviet help with personnel, material and equipment) liberated the Fatherland alongside the Red Army.³¹³ Favourite non-events, on the other hand, have been the Katyn massacre and the Nazi-Soviet Pact.

The most difficult incident to explain has been the inaction of the First Polish Army (as well as its Soviet allies) during the 1944 Warsaw Rising of the AK. Soviet sources maintain that the Soviet command and the command of the First Army energetically aided the uprising³¹⁴ while, at the same time, Bordzilowski repeats the standard excuse that the Soviet and Polish forces were too exhausted to proceed further.³¹⁵ The text quoted above takes a middle-of-the-road approach:

In September (1944) the units of the First Army participated in the liberation of Praga (Warsaw's suburb on the Vistula's eastern bank) and, after taking it, units of the 3rd and 2nd Infantry Divisions forced the Vistula, going to the aid of fighting Warsaw. But because of heavy Hitlerite counter-attacks and the failure of the AK command to cooperate, they had to withdraw with heavy losses.³¹⁶

General Berling's version (he was removed from command, it may be remembered, for sending the units mentioned above) is that he decided to assist the uprising in the absence of his Soviet adviser, Gen. Bewziuk, and in order to do so advanced the landing by 24 hours and sent 700 men on the

Figure 6. Polish General Officer Ranks and Equivalents

Polish Rank in Polish	transl.	Stars	Soviet & East European equivalent rank ¹	US equivalent rank
General Brygady	Brigade General	*	Maj. General	Brig. General
General Dywizji	Division General	**	Lt. General	Major General
General Broni	General of Arms	***	Col. General	Lt. General
General Armii	General of the Army	**** ²	Army General	General
Marszalek	Marshal		Marshal of (service)	
			Chief Marshal of (service)	
			Marshal of the USSR	
<u>Naval ranks:</u>				
Kontr-Admiral	Rear-Admiral	*	Kontr-Admiral	
Vice-Admiral	Vice-Admiral	**	Vice-Admiral	
Admiral	Admiral	***	Admiral	
			Admiral of the Fleet	
			Admiral of the Fleet of the USSR	

Sources: William Lewis, The Warsaw Pact: Arms, Doctrine, and Strategy (New York: McGraw Hill, 1982), pp. 430, 432, 439, 446, 450, 455, 462.
Sovetskaia Voennaia Entsiklopedia, passim.

¹All the East European WP member states, except Poland, have the same ranks as the USSR up to, and including, Army General. The GDR and Poland are the only two which have the rank of marshal, but only one level.

²In the Soviet and Bulgarian forces the insignia of this rank are: one large star accompanied by a small star in a wreath (USSR) and a large star accompanied by a small star with crossed batons (Bulgaria).

night of September 15-16.³¹⁷ A report by Colonel "Radoslaw," the AK commanding officer in Czerniakow, on the opposite side of the Vistula, basically corroborates Berling's account. He reports the landing of about 600 men of the First Army, but on September 16-17, and after trying to contact Berling, with the hope that he could evacuate his forces to the east bank, he received no response. Radoslaw also reports that the landing party was unable to hold its positions because of the heavy German fire.³¹⁸

The cult of the 1944 Uprising, which came into the open during the Solidarity period, forced an official reinterpretation of its historical significance. It is now considered to be a heroic but misguided endeavour (idealistic youth were misled by their criminal reactionary leaders), the role of the AL in it has been played up, and it has been appropriated as a part of the official heroic military heritage.

There was a veritable explosion of interest in national history in 1980-81 -- a search for the truth to correct communist distortions. Inevitably, in view of the political conditions, this revival developed distortions of its own. As one observer in Poland has reported, interest in the historical past, while widespread, was selective. The greatest emphasis was placed on the most recent period, where communist falsifications were most glaring, and on the Polish baroque, which was a period of political greatness. Thus the revival served a definite political function: to draw lessons for political behaviour in terms of the exigencies of the present-day struggle (whether or not these were in fact relevant), and to strengthen the morale of the people and justify their national aspirations.³¹⁹

One aspect of the revival has been the cult of Pilsudski -- the man who created an independent Poland and under whose leadership the Polish Army defeated the Bolsheviks in August 1920 in the celebrated "Miracle on the Vistula." Warsaw scuttlebut has it that military officers have been the most avid customers for books about Pilsudski. Another focus of the revival has been the period of the German occupation, with parallels drawn openly to 1981 martial law. The ZOMOs are openly called the Gestapo, the WRON's eagle (especially as portrayed at the top of Jaruzelski's general's hat) is being compared to the Prussian eagle used by the Nazis, and both are called "wrona," which means "crow." This derogatory term, which found wide currency under the German occupation, was found to fit Jaruzelski's eagle quite well because of the unfortunate acronym WRON(a) chosen by the junta. The formation of a Solidarity underground traces its roots directly to the AK underground, inclusive of symbols of resistance such as the V-sign and the P/W sign (Polska walczy -- Poland fights), in which the "W" has taken a shape of an anchor. The showing of WW II resistance movies by Polish TV following the imposition of martial law, which popularized some of these themes, was indeed a
320 mistake.

Official sources have grimly conceded the strength of the national historical revival. An article in 1982 in Trybuna Ludu admitted that "diversionary forces" had managed to radically change the views the Poles held of their past, and in particular popular conceptions of the history of the Second Republic (1918-1939) -- which has been "canonized," and of the history of People's Poland -- which has been "besmirched." KOR, the Committee for an

Independent Poland (KPN -- an organization dedicated to the restoration of national independence), the "Flying universities," émigrés, and so-called "experts" in Solidarity were the guilty parties, according to Trybuna Ludu, but the damage had already been done: "the historical consciousness of young people in particular has been devastated; the educational system and the authority of science have been undermined; trying to repair the damage will take much time ... effort."³²¹

WRON's response has been to mount an intensive campaign involving the historical cooptation of the Polish past, and of martial traditions in particular. The reasons for this seem to be to counteract "the damage" and to attempt to reclaim the young, to shore up the morale of the forces and their popular images as "our boys," and to confuse the general public. Some of these efforts border on the ludicrous. The Sejm has been seriously discussing a restoration of the crown on the head of the eagle, a national symbol (the crown was removed by the communists in 1944-45), in the hope, presumably, that a crowned eagle could no longer be mocked as a "crow." The honour guard at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Warsaw has been dressed up in traditional diamond-shaped military hats, so that it has a distinctly prewar air. It is a matter for quiet satisfaction in Warsaw, incidentally, that the person who lies in the Tomb is actually one of the unidentified soldiers killed during the 1920 Polish-Soviet war. Commanders who distinguished themselves in defending the country during the 1939 German invasion, such as General Kutrzeba and General Kleeberg, or the commander-in-chief of the AK, General Grot-Kowacki, who was caught and killed by the Gestapo, have now been incorporated into the LWP

pantheon. The Warsaw uprising of the AK also has been coopted, as noted above, and a lavish anniversary celebration was organized in 1983 with the participation of General Jaruzelski himself. Last but not least, the regime has decided to "take over" General Wladyslaw Sikorski, the war-time prime minister of the Polish Government-in-Exile in London. General Sikorski is portrayed as being a supporter of the Polish-Soviet alliance (he was instrumental in the rapprochement of 1941), and it is claimed that he was murdered because of this (Sikorski died in a plane crash off Gibraltar in July 1943). The Sikorski cult is seen as an antidote to the Pilsudski cult (the two were political enemies).³²² The ludicrous aspect in the case of Sikorski is that ZBoWiD, the hard-line veterans' organization, has requested the return of Sikorski's remains from England so that they can be reburied in Poland with all the pomp and circumstance accorded to a national hero. But the plan misfired, for the British refused (largely at the urging of Polish émigrés) on the grounds that the "present domestic situation in Poland"³²³ made it inadvisable.

The campaign to coopt national traditions, and thus to preempt their value for the opposition in rallying popular support, has included the symbolic acts described above (as well as building various monuments), and a strategy of celebrating anniversaries commemorating events of early as well as modern Polish history.³²⁴ This pattern closely follows traditional Polish customs but it also bears the earmarks of a similar revival of national symbolism which has taken place in the Soviet Union, and which involves the same rationale.

The most interesting aspect of the policy of the

"cooptation" of national history into the LWP military ethos, and its "socialist patriotism" theme, has been the treatment of its anti-Russian content and, consequently, its coexistence with the "socialist internationalism" theme. Having decided, apparently, that the benefits derived from patriotic indoctrination and the patriotic image of the Polish Armed Forces outweigh, by far, the costs of historical Russophobia (which, at any rate, has proved impossible to eradicate), Poland's struggle against Tsarist Russia and the Polish military ethos have been openly recognized. Even more, they have been exploited (as in the case, for example, of the use of the name of Tadeusz Kosciuszko) for the purpose of generating political loyalty and morale-building in the forces. But at the same time a distinction is sharply drawn, and repeatedly emphasized, between Tsarist Russia, which was an enemy, and the internationalist multinational Soviet Union, which is the best friend Poland ever had; and between the social oppression exported by Tsarist Russia to enslave Polish workers, peasants and all progressive leaders (such as Kosciuszko), and the benefits of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the friendship and assistance of the Soviet Union, which made possible the building of a new socialist society in Poland (and within the socialist community in general). It is the Soviet Union, allied with other socialist states within the Warsaw Pact, which guarantees the safety of each and every member country, including Poland. Therefore Soviet security (and Pact security) and Polish security are one. And the building of socialism in Poland -- which it is the duty of the LWP to defend -- can proceed only within the framework of "socialist internationalism" in all of its aspects: from

political and military to economic and cultural.

VI. THE MILITARY AND SOCIETY: 1981 TO THE PRESENT:
ATTITUDES

1. Society

The progressive steps of the "normalization" policy, such as the lifting of martial law on 22 July 1983, and the amnesty for political prisoners declared on 22 July 1984,³²⁵ seem to have done little to close the gap between society and the military government, or to ease the extreme polarization between society's "We" and the government's "They" that emerged after 13 December 1981. The credibility of the ensuing "progress" has been very limited in the popular mind. The sweeping legislation which solidified the military's grip on society has rendered the official claims of demilitarization meaningless, and there has been considerable scepticism concerning the subject of amnesties. The 1984 amnesty (as well as that of 1983) released many political prisoners, which was welcomed. But there was no admission on the part of the government that most charges were absurd,³²⁶ and experience indicated that the probability of rearrest was high (many activists released from detention earlier were rearrested on different charges), and that it was a near certainty for unrepentant activists who re-commenced their political activities after being released. There was the experience of having criminal charges substituted for political charges. Most people suspected that the amnesties were designed for Western consumption (mostly to convince the US to remove economic sanctions) rather than as a contribution to domestic reconciliation. The New

York Times' Michael Kaufman reported from Warsaw that most Poles saw the process as another turn of a circle, as the revolution of a wheel which ends where it began. The reasons for this distrust were succinctly summarized by one of the released top Solidarity leaders, Andrzej Gwiazda:

It remains absolutely impossible for the Government to gain any credibility from society. The rulers have pressing economic problems which they think they can cure with dollars they will gain from the West (in return) for the amnesty. But really nothing has changed. They have not made any political concessions and society cannot accept anything less than real political concessions.³²⁷

The reasons why economic recovery was tied to political concessions were put with equal succinctness by a factory mechanic, interviewed by Kaufman, who said that "the powers can't get the economy going unless they have the good will of the workers," which they cannot get because "they lied to us too many times"; moreover, even if the workers work harder, the economy will not improve "because of all the stupid managers who keep their positions because they are party hacks."³²⁸

The "normalization" policy, nevertheless, gained some of the regime's goals: it has prevented the re-emergence of open pluralism, it has reduced the incidence of street violence, and it has perpetuated differences among Solidarity's supporters. The debate on how best to proceed over the long haul to gain reform objectives has been reopened once again. As Kaufman reported in August 1984, "sources in touch with opposition

leaders said strategies under consideration ranged from greater support for the underground, to greater collaboration with the government-sponsored unions in hopes of co-opting them." A Catholic spokesman, on the other hand, talked of concentrating "on possible reformist improvement, greater civil liberties, an end to the 98 per cent votes of the past (elections), instead of predicated strategies on notions of total redemption -- strategies that can only fail unless miraculously the political geography changes."³²⁹ One thing was clear, however. The people were no more inclined to accept the regime in 1984 than they were in 1981, and there were no signs that an outward, at least, political conformity was emerging as was the case in post-1968 Czechoslovakia. This outward conformity, based on accommodation with the regime, has been Jaruzelski's minimal long-range goal. There were no signs that society would accept anything less than a return to the August 1980 agreements; and there were no signs that the government was willing -- or able -- to concede anything but cosmetic changes. Moreover, it was unable -- or perhaps unwilling -- to improve the economy. So the result was a stalemate.

Martial law has precluded the easy sampling of public opinion, but a few unofficial surveys which have been conducted allow for a comparison with the 1981 polls. The latter showed high social trust in the Church and Solidarity, but an erosion (between May and November) of trust in the armed forces -- which nevertheless remained absurdly high, as noted earlier -- and in the government and party (see Table 6). The delegalization of Solidarity and its destruction as an organization after martial law was declared apparently had little impact on its survival

as a movement in the perceptions of those who were interviewed, even though there was a decline in willingness to follow the directives of its underground leaders. A survey conducted by the Public Opinion Research Center of Polish Radio and TV (OBOP) in 1982 revealed that 84 percent of the respondents demanded the restoration of Solidarity.³³⁰ A secret poll conducted by representatives of Paris Match with 600 respondents in May 1983 indicated both a continued recognition of Solidarity's existence and support for it, even though it showed a predominantly passive attitude in terms of further opposition activities. It also revealed a sense of hopelessness: more than half of the respondents saw the Pope and Holy Mary as their last hope, and perceived no viable replacement for Jaruzelski. Few could think of any "friends" which Poland still had, which made for a pitiful list (see Table 7).

The Paris Match poll also showed a dramatic decrease in regard for the armed forces, not to mention the party and the government. Moreover, it provided an interesting glimpse at popular views on the country's Warsaw Pact allies. The USSR and the two other Pact members which border on Poland -- all three seen as the guarantors of Poland's "security and independence" in official rhetoric -- led the list of perceived enemies. Hungary alone made the list of perceived friends. There was no change from the 1981 perception that the greatest danger to Poland came from its "allies," as noted above. Overall the picture reflected traditional attitudes and the minimal impact of more than 30 years of incessant propaganda. It should be kept in mind, however, that neither the methodology nor the sample taken by this poll

can be reliably checked.

A more extensive survey of public opinion by a new underground organization, KOS, indicated a massive rejection of the concept of collaboration with the regime (only 5 per cent of the sample's respondents were for collaboration and 17 per cent -- for limited collaboration), and support for the reconstruction of social life in the underground (2/3rds). But it also revealed a disinclination for active struggle: most respondents were for symbolic resistance, although 30 per cent had participated in strikes and 30 per cent -- in street demonstrations. The number of respondents was 1,400. The possible bias of this sample is indicated by its composition: it was conducted in Warsaw among KOS sympathizers. 50 per cent of the sample were over 35 years of age, and the great majority had a higher or secondary education (81%) and held white collar jobs (72%).³³¹ Clearly, this was a sample of capital-based intelligentsia and it presumably included a high share of unofficial national leaders, which makes their perceptions important. It was in fact the intelligentsia which spearheaded the KOS movement. Workers' attitudes, on the other hand, can best be judged by their attitude towards underground Solidarity. The elements which still hope for a negotiated reconciliation with the regime cluster around the Church. All three are discussed below.

The KOS movement (Circles of Social Defence -- Kola Obrony Spolecznej), originated immediately after the imposition of martial law and first in a group of five, which was the founding committee. The movement is composed of a network of circles composed of 5 members; each member starts another circle of five, choosing people he or she

Table 6. Trust In Polish Institutions (% Expressing Trust)

Institution	Population (May 1981)	Solidarity Members (October 1981)
Catholic Church	94	93
Solidarity	91	95
Army	89	68
Government	69	21
Branch Unions	56	22
Militia	42	22
PZPR	32	7


Source: The Public Opinion Research Centre of Polish Radio and TV (OBOP), "Spoleczne Zaufanie do Instytucji politycznych, spolecznych i administracyjnych," Warsaw, May 1981, and the Centre for Social Research of Solidarity's Mazowsze region (OBS) "Czlonkowie zwiazku o bledach krajowych wladz zwiazku," Warsaw, November 1981. Reproduced from: David S. Mason, "Solidarity, the Regime and the Public," Soviet Studies 35 (October 1983):553-545.


AD-A151 804 WARSAW PACT: THE QUESTION OF COHESION PHASE II VOLUME 2 3/5
POLAND GERMAN DEM. (U) OPERATIONAL RESEARCH AND
ANALYSIS ESTABLISHMENT OTTAWA (ONTARIO).

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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
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Table 7. Paris Match Informal Poll, May 1983

Who Best Represents Poland?		Who is your last hope?	
The Pope	41%	The Pope	28%
The Church	21%	Holy Mary	25%
Solidarity	14%	Pres. Reagan	7%
Armed Forces	2%	Lech Walesa	6%
Government	1%	Gen. Jaruzelski	6%
PZPR	1%		
What will the Poles do in the near future?		Does society support Solidarity in conspiracy?	
Stay passive	63%	Yes	76%
Start fighting	17%	No	11%
Don't know	20%	Don't know	13%
Who would you like to replace Gen. Jaruzelski?		Does Solidarity exist for you?	
The right person does not exist	53%	Yes	80%
A real patriot	10%	No	15%
Anyone but a communist	12%	Don't know	5%
Lech Walesa	9%		
The Pope	3%		
Is Soviet intervention still possible?			
Yes	60%		
No	31%		
Don't know	8%		
Who are your worst enemies?		Who are your best friends?	
USSR	29%	France	20%
GDR	24%	Hungary	15%
Czechoslovakia	18%	No one	14%
West Germany	11%	U.S.A.	14%
Bulgaria	3%		
U.S.A.	3%		
Great Britain	1%		
Hungary	1%		

Paris Match, no. 1778, 24 June 1983, as reported by CSS
Biuletyn Informacyjny, no. 77, September 1983.

The size of the sample was 600 people. The questions were administered unofficially.

knows well and can trust. Thus the network remains anonymous, and is relatively invulnerable to penetration. The founders decided that the two most obvious options left to the Poles after the "war," confrontation and compromise, were both non-acceptable. Confrontation, because of its high costs and nonexistent chances of success; and compromise, because the regime could not be trusted to keep any promises which were made. Thus KOS chose a "Third Way": to recreate autonomous social institutions in the underground, channelling social energies outside official institutions and leaving the government to operate largely in a social vacuum. As reported by a 1982 Solidarity underground publication, the KOS movement was spreading across the country like an avalanche. Each circle was busy distributing underground literature, collecting and passing on information, and organizing social assistance and various other activities in accordance with the KOS programme.³³² By early 1984 a KOS network existed in a majority of the large cities, and in many smaller cities and towns.³³³

According to one of the founding members of KOS, its intention was to develop new forms of action which would allow society to survive as an autonomous entity, but to avoid confrontation. The joint programme was formulated by the founding committee in April and May 1982. But the circles have no hierarchy, and organize activities on their own initiative. They support and participate in all forms of resistance organized by Solidarity and other underground groups, such as the Confederation for an Independent Poland, but they maintain a separate and parallel existence. KOS sees itself as an anti-totalitarian social movement, a federation of organizations, along a broad

political spectrum, which are united by their anti-totalitarian perspective and their final aim: to unequivocally establish a democratic and independent Poland. The programme proposes a whole range of independent and constructive activities: the creation and development of an independent communications network (press and publications); the creation of independent social institutions promoting free education, culture and science outside official governmental structures; and the development of various forms of social self-help and of independent social and political organizations.

In practice, in the two and a half years of its existence KOS succeeded in carrying out many aspects of its programme. Its publishing house, Special Publications KOS (in reality a conglomerate of small print shops) has issued a variety of publications. The first and most important has been Bulletin-KOS, designed to be a programmatic journal integrating all aspects of the social resistance movement. It has included KOS and Solidarity documents, special sections on culture and science, Helsinki Watch Committee Bulletins, and the reports of correspondents from rural areas and from the armed forces. In addition, special educational publications have supported self-education circles for high school and university students and for the workers: National Education Letters (ZENy), Here and Now (Tu Teraz), and other special miscellaneous publications. In early 1984 Bulletin - KOS appeared in print runs of 6,000 to 15,000 copies, ZENy -- 5-7,000 copies, and Tu Teraz -- 3,000 copies.³³⁵ Overall, 204 underground publications appeared in Poland on a regular basis in December 1983, and a further 100 known items appeared on an irregular basis.

They ranged

from small factory bulletins with a print run of 200-500 to large weekly publications with a run of 20,000-30,000 copies and a readership two-four times and perhaps as many as ten times that number. There (were) also several literary and political magazine journals of a larger format which appeared less frequently.³³⁶

Given the usual constraints imposed on publishing activities under a communist system, one can only suppose that much -- if not most -- of the printing must be done in official print shops with the active connivance of those who run them either because they are sympathisers, or because they are bribed.

Not coincidentally, perhaps, there has been a decline in the readership of official publications. Tygodnik Powszechny (a major Catholic weekly) reported in mid-1982 that three important weeklies showed the following percentage drop in subscriptions: Polityka -- 10% (of a 396,000 print run), Perspektywy -- 14% (of a 222,000 print run), and Rzeczywistosc -- 60% (of a 140,000 print run).³³⁷ Kultura (Paris) gave the following figures for the reduction in print runs of major newspapers: Trybuna Ludu (the official organ of the PZPR), by 52,000; Gazeta Krakowska (a party organ in Cracow), by 61,000; and Zycie Literackie (an important literary journal), by 10,000.³³⁸

The maintenance of independent education and culture has been a major aim of KOS in the light of the battle for the minds of the people waged by the regime. Self-education circles for students in high schools and

universities have supplanted the pre-Solidarity "flying university"; most important, the network has been extended to provide self-education for workers and thus to maintain and further develop the intelligentsia-workers alliance which was the hallmark of the Solidarity period and which has been and remains the special target of the regime's propaganda and repressions.

An unwilling tribute to KOS's effectiveness was given by Vice-Premier Rakowski in late 1982, when he commented that "the people have retreated into themselves" and that the WRON meets with the growing indifference of society. Rakowski added that this indifference also extended towards the appeals of underground Solidarity and towards politics in general.³³⁹ The last assertion is true only for government-sponsored political activities. A Western observer has noted wide-spread participation in KOS - advocated activities:

Hundreds of underground periodicals are being published more or less regularly. Scores of new titles are added annually to the already rich library of underground books ... Living room theater, underground cabaret and unofficial art exhibits are flourishing. Tens of thousands of Poles attend unofficial adult education classes ... How many people take part regularly in such independent activity? It is impossible to say for certain, but the estimates one hears in Poland range from 200,000 to about one million... Participation in the underground frequently taps professional skills that the state does not call upon ... doctors are at work ... on an officially neglected public health

problem ... lawyers are compiling a human rights report. A group of historians is readying ... a vast history of Poland during the last 40 years ... In many ... communities, churches provide facilities for such activities.... Members of the underground ... are struggling to create an alternative culture without alternative institutions, except for the church, which they need to shelter them physically and morally.³⁴⁰

The Solidarity leaders who escaped detention on 13 December 1981 went underground, where they created a Provisional Coordinating Commission (TKK -- Tymczasowa Komisja Koordynacyjna). It took some time to create a Solidarity network in the underground; at the same time, public confidence in the union has understandably eroded. Thus, although many have heeded the TKK's calls to slow down the pace of work, to obstruct WRON policies and to come out in demonstrations on specific dates, many have shied away from open confrontation. It seems that this is less because of fear of the ever-present ZOMO, than because of a feeling that such efforts are futile. But it is obvious that Solidarity has retained strong roots among the workers, especially in its original strongholds, and it seems that its trade union character has been reasserted since many other elements which gathered under its umbrella have moved on to KOS or other organizations. It is reported in Solidarity sources and elsewhere that many workers still continue to pay Solidarity dues: an estimated million did so in 1984.³⁴¹

Social support for the non-confrontational tactics advocated by the TKK has been far broader than its worker

base, thus confirming the findings of the polls. Tactics such as passive resistance and obstructionism, working to rule, "milking" the regulations to the utmost of their absurdities, and the boycott of various WRON-sponsored activities have been widely reported. The celebrated TV boycott by actors and artists caused a reduction in the number of regular 30-minute programmes from 125 to only 30 in 1982 (i.e., by 76%).³⁴² Given the existing constraints and penalties the response, even to specific TKK appeals for action, has actually been remarkably strong. It was reported, for example, that in the last six months of 1983 there were approximately 100 strikes organized in response to Solidarity demands.³⁴³ The membership of regime-sponsored branch unions has been growing at a snail's pace despite official pressure, even though it picked up in 1983-84 in response to a belief held by some underground leaders that one way to promote the outlawed union's objectives is to penetrate the new ones. In 1984 official union membership stood at about 4 million, a far cry from Solidarity's peak figure of 10 million. Overall, one in ten of the pre-"war" Solidarity members remained active; a remarkable achievement when one considers the impact of militarization and repressions.

The TKK called for a boycott of the June 1984 elections to Regional Councils:

... elections in Poland are ... organized ... to show to what extent we as a society are enslaved and how obedient we are ... and to what extent we accept fiction and lies ... let only the true supporters of the regime go to the polls, let them elect themselves ...³⁴⁴

This call was not heeded on a mass basis. But given the circumstances (and taking into account the doubtful credibility of official statistics), a substantial number of people did abstain. Official returns indicated that 74 % of the eligible voters participated. This compares poorly with the customary 99% turnout in communist elections. We do not know how they voted. Moreover, no statistics were published for the Gdansk region, Solidarity's stronghold. In the Nowa Huta and Cracow districts the turnout was 40 to 50% and 50 to 60% respectively.³⁴⁵

The role of the Church gained new importance after the imposition of martial law. Not only is the Church the one remaining autonomous institution capable of entering into a dialogue with the government on behalf of society, but it remains a repository of society's trust. The Church has extended a protective umbrella over a whole range of welfare and social activities which are outwardly non-political but in fact serve to accommodate many popular social demands. Church centres have directed relief efforts in aid of detainees and political prisoners and their dependents, and for the sick and the infirm, and have conducted special pastoral work with the two politically most exposed groups: workers and students. Moreover, the churches have now become fora for cultural and educational activities (as per the KOS programme). A description of a Christian Cultural Week organized in Warsaw on 20-30 November 1983 is indicative:

During that period 25 meetings were held in various churches, seminaries and church museums at which nearly 50 poets and novelists ... read from their works. There were 13 performances of various sorts ... Art

exhibits featured pictures, sculpture and photographs by young Polish artists; there were more than a dozen concerts; and a number of films were shown ... Discussions were held on cultural and philosophical themes, and (two) professors delivered lectures followed by public discussion.³⁴⁶

The Primate's Social Council was established on the day martial law was imposed to advise him on social policy. The Council, on 15 April 1982, issued its Theses on Social Conciliation, which listed, as conditions for reconciliation with the regime: the reactivation of Solidarity, the release of all political prisoners and a general amnesty, the reinstatement of people purged for their political convictions, and the reinstatement of dissolved academic and professional associations. There was no response to the Theses,³⁴⁷ and the chances that they would be accepted -- except for the amnesty -- appeared as remote in 1984 as they were in 1982. Still, there was an interest on the part of the regime in maintaining a dialogue, and the Episcopate's stated willingness to pursue efforts towards a reconciliation were seemingly supported by a broad spectrum of Catholic public opinion. It was, however, at variance with the stand of the underground, and the Primate personally came under considerable criticism at home and abroad for his "conciliatory" attitudes and for his alleged failure to speak out on important issues. But Cardinal Glemp's "softness" has been more than matched by some of the more outspoken bishops, and by the strong identification of many parish priests and members of major monastic orders with Solidarity's objectives. The church pulpit has remained an

oasis of blunt talk, frequently with open political overtones, and attendance at churches has become a substitute for marches and demonstrations. In fact, a spring 1984 issue of an underground newspaper reported that the authorities handed Cardinal Glemp a list of 69 priests, including two bishops, all charged with anti-state activities, and threatened to prosecute unless the 69 ceased their political activities.³⁴⁸ But an agreement with the regime remains the goal of the Episcopate and, despite its reservations, the policy is tolerated by the underground, which sees in the Church its strongest and most indispensable ally in the struggle against totalitarianism, and for the survival of an autonomous society and the preservation of human rights and dignity.³⁴⁹ It seems that whatever the differences between Solidarity, KOS, other groupings and the Church, they concern tactics rather than strategy. There is a broad social consensus on the latter: the aim is pluralism, democracy and, ultimately, an independent Poland.

The regime's major concern has been the attitudes of the young, not the least because of their importance for the military effort. The atmosphere among teen-agers has been openly admitted to be "anti-communist" and "anti-socialist";³⁵⁰ their alienation has been expressed in their opting out of regime-sponsored organizational activities.

According to government estimates, only 30% of Poland's approximately 10,000,000 eligible young people between the ages of 16 and 28 belong to any of the regime-controlled youth groups, including the Polish Socialist Youth Union, the Polish Scouts Union

... , the Rural Youth Union ... , and the Polish Students Association ... The authorities admit that a large proportion of the younger generation express no desire to become involved in officially sponsored activities. The (party) itself can only claim 260,000 people under the age of 30 among its members -- the lowest figure in the party's history.³⁵¹

The destruction of the hopes which arose with Solidarity has been bitterly resented, as have been the repressions, the purges of teachers in the educational system, and the destruction of autonomous youth organizations. Among young people there is a perception of a wide gap between reality and government propaganda, and a rejection of whatever messages are transmitted by means of official channels.

An item in one of the official papers, describing an informal get-together between the paper's correspondent and the students of a vocational school in Wroclaw, illustrates the depth of alienation:

My discussion with these young people was very enlightening ... Because (they) have extremely strong views: on the party, on the ZSMP, on socialism, communism, our alliances, and our system in general ... I heard a lot ... But I won't repeat what I heard, because each reader can well guess, I think, what it was. I do want to say, however, how frightening is (their) ignorance of people and events about which they have such unequivocally decisive views and opinions; these are really not views and opinions but slogans -- in fact, militant slogans -- which they have absorbed.³⁵²

As the writer implies, the readers have little trouble guessing that these opinions were explicitly and unequivocally hostile.

Young people have expressed their alienation in different ways. Activists join the underground. The majority practice passive resistance, non-participation, and withdrawal into private and unofficial group pursuits. A minority "freak out" in anti-social or delinquent behaviour. The government claims that about 850,000 young people are "socially maladjusted." This estimate is inflated by including those who have been openly opposed to the government, but there have been many cases of truants from school (an estimated 18,000) and work, runaway children, juvenile delinquents, alcoholics, drug addicts,³⁵³ and members of gangs or unconventional groups.

Alcoholism has affected approximately 5 million Poles, and many of them are teenagers. In 1983 60 % of all school children under the age of 16 admitted to drinking alcohol,³⁵⁴ and the government statistical office reported that 35 % of family income in 1982 was spent on alcohol.³⁵⁵ The issue of alcoholism has had important political overtones. Alcohol is the best money-maker the government has (it is a government monopoly), and there is a widespread belief that the regime encourages the consumption of alcohol both as a source of revenue and as a means of sapping the nation's strength. It is not surprising, therefore, that the church and the underground apparently decided to join forces in calling for a non-drinking period and a boycott of the state alcohol monopoly during the late summer of 1984 (14-31 August), for patriotic and health reasons. The call by the church stressed moral and health issues. In the words of the

bishop of Siedlce: "drunkenness is one of the most dangerous threats not only to our moral existence but also to the biological life of the nation." But the call also included hints that drinking was in the interest of those who "oppressed, persecuted and exploited us at any given time." The appeal of the underground was blunt: "promotion of alcohol is a very effective method" of facilitating "a modern form of slavery"; "we can continue fighting only if we are sober, prudent and strong."³⁵⁶

Drug addiction has been increasing; in 1983 drug addicts were said to number about 120,000, most of them middle class youths.³⁵⁷ Crime rates have been growing, partly due to an increase in youth gangs, so-called "punks" and "poppers." These have been tolerated by the government. Rock music is regularly featured on broadcasts, and more than 100 punk rock bands have been allowed to perform around the country. One is reminded of the directive given to party propagandists which said that youths should be given "recreation" so that they forget politics (see above). In general, the government's response to youth problems has been the imposition of tighter controls, a grant of extensive powers to enforcement organs for "preventive and disciplinary action," and an increase in the number of state institutions dealing with delinquent youth. Militia reserve units staffed by "social activists" have been put in charge of children and young people. General Jaruzelski also promised "an offensive along the educational-upbringing fronts." The extended powers given to the militia and other enforcement agencies to deal with "socially maladjusted" youth stand ready to be used against young political dissidents; an effort has already been made

to portray the young people protesting the removal of crucifixes from a school in Mietne in 1984 as juvenile delinquents.³⁵⁸ The 1983 amendments to the draft law (discussed above) give the government new powers to "resocialize" "social misfits" as well as the vastly more numerous politically dissident youths. Problems with youth alienation promise to continue for some time to come, for the children of martial law are already deeply steeped in what government spokesmen have referred to as an "anti-socialist atmosphere." A perceptive Western observer has described the children of the early 80s:

Over the months of martial law and after, the behavior of children has registered the dashed hopes of their parents, the government curbs on society and the stress of daily life. Sometimes it seems almost as if the children were simply the nation's youngest group of dissidents.

In the playgrounds of Warsaw, kids forego cops-and-robbers for a game more tailored to the times: Solidarity vs. ZOMO ... but the play police almost always are done in ... For a change of pace, the youngsters switch to Americans vs. Russians or games of war between the Soviet Union and Poland.

The very youngest of children know that they are to respect the church and their elders. In equal measure, they often express mistrust, often contempt, for the authorities, especially the police. They seem by osmosis to scorn the Soviet Union.³⁵⁹

Not an ideal beginning for a new generation which is to build "socialism" at home and to "defend it" along with its socialist allies.

For all this intransigence of social attitudes the regime has been successful in dividing the people between the majority of Solidarity supporters and the minority which comprises the "regime": party and government functionaries, their hangers on, and the enforcement agencies, the security police, the militia and the professional military cadre. Because Poles are found on both sides of the "barricades" the issue has been confused for the many who inhabit the grey in-between area. A commentary in Polityka on the eve of the December coup (and presumably with advanced knowledge of it) touched on this dilemma. Commenting on the crowd's reaction to the storming by the ZOMO of the Firefighters' School, when calls were heard: "And are they Poles?" it stated:

Yes, of course they are Poles. And the people who gave them their orders are also, of course, Poles ... Poles in helmets and plastic face shields confronted Poles in civilian clothes; not to protect the handful who can order the militia into action, but to defend the principles of statehood ... The moment we divide into two camps ... the moment when those who are not with us are against us ... then we are doomed to a civil war ... 360

The implication is that the use of force was necessary to save the nation from fratricide. This is a standard line used by the regime, but it has an element of credibility. Because the ZOMOs are Poles, even if the crowd calls them

"Gestapo." Unlike the situation during W.W. II, it is Poles and not Germans and Russians who are the occupiers. Thus the response to the demand for an independent Poland is that there is an independent Poland, and that it is the citizens' duty to preserve and defend it. And it is not easy for people who have to cope with the immediate problems of survival to follow up with the question: "but what kind of Poland?" And it is difficult to escape the insistent drumming of "ersatz" nationalism, especially when their lives are easier and more comfortable if they believe General Jaruzelski's invocations of patriotism and national interest.

The problem was explored, with considerable bitterness, in an underground publication entitled Independence:

At present substantial segments of society are affected by confusion and uncertainty on the subject of independence ... The striving for independence equates with the desire to become a state. And the present obfuscation stems from the fact that -- in contrast to the case in the 19th century -- it cannot be said that there is no Poland. Poland, the state, does exist formally. And, in fact, it goes through all the motions normally attributed to states. It accepts and sends ambassadors; it signs treaties; it sits in international organizations (the UN). Thus, there is a play going on -- a very clever play -- the likes of which was beyond the capability of the Tsars -- which both perpetuates the hoax and fills one with admiration ... One receives a passport; it is a Polish passport ... The TV ... spouts garbage, but it is always in Polish.

There is a United States ambassador here ... because he not only recognizes this state but deems it worthy of being ... There is a soccer team which, when it plays, represents the Polish state. ... Really, it is extremely difficult to break through these layers of falsehood and to penetrate to the core of the matter, namely, that there is no such thing as the Polish state, that it simply does not exist. It is extremely difficult, but indispensable to do so.

(Because all this purely Polish symbolism) the family names, name terms, the language, all dressed up in proper state forms ... turned out to be effective. Because for the many this symbol -- the state -- even if it is bad, is still their own, and thus a higher value; and they bought it.³⁶¹

It is this symbol of the Polish state, in all of its nationalist trappings, that has been manipulated by the regime. The results have never been more effective than in the use of the army for the destruction of Solidarity, and never more visible than in the continuing persistence of popular good-will towards the soldiers. Despite the tremendous disappointment and bitterness of Solidarity supporters that the armed forces were used to crush the movement, the popular wrath has been turned squarely on the ZOMO, the militia in all its various forms, and the security troops, but not on the army. There does not seem to have been any significant erosion of positive attitudes towards the armed forces.

The evidence is contradictory. Undoubtedly the image of "our boys" has been tarnished. There is, for example, the Paris Match poll, which indicated that only

two per cent of the respondents felt that the armed forces represented Poland. Official sources have stressed the great social trust expressed in the forces in the May 1981 OBOP poll (see Table 6), but provide no specifics for the period after December 1981 beyond platitudes concerning the forces' great popularity and their daily participation in the life of the country.³⁶² Had there been other polls with equally positive results, the public would have heard about it. At the same time a usually well-informed French correspondent reports that "martial law has not succeeded in eliminating the prestige and respect which the armed forces traditionally enjoy," and that the Military Task Groups are still welcomed by the majority of the population as symbolic of uncorrupted patriotism and as protectors against abuse and exploitation by local officials; instructions by military officers are listened to and carried out with respect.³⁶³ Another French source, however, says that "officers controlling regional administrations have already succeeded in making themselves hated."³⁶⁴

In the flood of adverse information on the ZOMOs in the underground press, there is very little information on the regular army, and what there is (mostly in the form of interviews with anonymous officers), is characterized by its sympathetic treatment. Soviet infiltration and direction is condemned, but little opprobrium is attached to either the professional cadre or the soldiers. To this day the population simply refuses to believe that the "Polish Army" could be used against them. The fact that it was used is explained away by assuming that it was not the army's fault and that the military personnel did not really want to be involved.

A few voices have called for a more realistic assessment of the army's role. One, writing in Kultura (Paris), cautions the Poles not to be carried away by the myth of the uniform, and reminds them that Polish military traditions include shameful as well as glorious deeds. The same Polish Army that stood fast on the Vistula in 1920 was used to quell civil disorders in 1926 and for the "pacification" of the Ukrainians in Poland in 1930; and it marched into Czechoslovakia, in alliance with Hitler, in 1938. He notes that the demonology which has surrounded the security troops, the militia, the ZOMO and ROMO, tends to obscure the fact that they are in fact the auxiliaries, ³⁶⁵ in the totalitarian sector, of the armed forces. These views have been echoed by an émigré writer who comments that the LWP has managed to remain a focus of popular affections and to pose as a neutral symbol of national sovereignty while in fact it has provided the base of the regime's support. Blame, in the popular mind, has been assigned to the security troops; but in fact the regular military cadre and the party apparat are interchangeable.³⁶⁶ Both are a part of the "New Class," the survival of which depends on the perpetuation of the status quo, and are an integral part of the "slime" that holds the regime together.

To summarize, the situation has all the earmarks of endemic instability. The regime's base is extremely narrow, confined to its direct beneficiaries and to the enforcement apparat of which the armed forces are the key element. It thus cannot afford meaningful concessions. The population as a whole is deeply hostile to the communist system and to the Jaruzelski government even though, paradoxically, hatred does not extend to the LWP.

This hostility now manifests itself in non-confrontational ways: boycotts, passive resistance, non-participation, and concentration on activities outside official structures. Popular attitudes make economic improvement very difficult and preclude, for the time being, rapprochement à la Kadar, or even conformism à la Husak. There is agreement that direct confrontation has to be excluded. But there is no social consensus in the opposition on the best tactics to pursue during what is perceived to be a long and difficult haul. There is an underground, where the remnants of Solidarity co-exist with KOS and its "Third Way." Advocates of "organic work" cluster around the Church, which presses for a negotiated compromise. But for all its commitment to dialogue the Church has not been prepared to withdraw its demand that the government concede basic, if limited, areas of freedom to society. The gap between society and the government has been enormous notwithstanding the existence, as always, of opportunists, collaborators and compromisers; and so is the isolation of the government and of the enforcement agencies, although some of the latter is self-imposed.

2. The Soldiers

There is more than a kernel of truth in the popular perception that the soldiers are "our boys," for there is evidence that there was at least some resistance in the forces to the imposition of martial law. Moreover, and predictably, the attitudes of the conscripts in the post-martial law period appear to closely reflect general youth attitudes. But in considering the impact of these attitudes on reliability, it should be kept in mind that the soldiers in basic service are outranked as well as

the soldiers in basic service are outranked as well as outnumbered by the professional cadre (see Table 9).

The soldiers who were selected to participate in the military takeover, either as members of TGOs or for use in "pacification," belonged to cohorts which were untainted by contacts with Solidarity; they had been kept in the ranks for an additional year, thus maintaining their isolation. Nevertheless, persistent rumours circulated in the period following the coup concerning resistance by individual soldiers and the mutiny of certain units, which was followed by the arrest and execution of the guilty and a quarantine imposed on the rebellious units. None of the rumours were confirmed independently; thus this information should be treated with caution, bearing in mind the element of wishful thinking which might have coloured the perceptions of underground reports.

The rumours, some reported by more than one source, included: the mutiny of a unit in Niepolomice near Cracow, where all the officers were arrested; a fight between the regular army and the ZOMO in Bydgoszcz; the presence, in Gdansk, near the "Lenin" shipyard, of army tanks decorated with Solidarity signs and red and white carnations (they were eventually withdrawn and replaced by ZOMO); a soldier shooting an officer in a northern city on learning of the ZOMO attack on the "Wujek" mine; the arrest of officers and soldiers for refusing to obey orders (50 in Warsaw and 60 in Cracow); a major mutiny in Radom involving 2 generals, 21 officers, about 400 NCOs, and several thousand soldiers; 200 soldiers who refused to leave their barracks in Lidzbark (Warmia); 17 soldiers arrested in Kamien; leaflets circulating in Modlin (a major training center) which read: "We refuse to shoot at our fathers and

brothers"; and numerous officers turning in their party cards.³⁶⁸ Polish Radio was credited with a report of soldiers being court-martialed and shot for insubordination;³⁶⁹ the same was reported by a western correspondent who talked to a priest who buried one such soldier.³⁷⁰

Some of the resistance in the forces might have been a response to Solidarity's appeals to the soldiers, although no information is available on the dissemination of or reactions to such appeals. In the summer of 1981 a "Workers-Soldiers Commission" of the "Ursus" Combine in Warsaw issued an appeal to soldiers to set up workers-soldiers commissions (shades of the Petrograd soviets!) and to militiamen. The latter were warned that they should not allow themselves to be used against fellow Poles because of the hatred this would bring on them and their families.³⁷¹ After martial law was imposed, Zbigniew Bujak, (the chairman of Solidarity in the Warsaw "Mazowsze" region, and subsequently the chairman of the TKK) appealed to soldiers and officers of the LWP and to the militia, in a Christmas greeting, that they follow their conscience rather than orders, even if this meant the imposition of the supreme penalty.³⁷² And on 26 January 1982 the Solidarity underground published instructions for soldiers and militiamen who might be willing to collaborate with the banned union (see Figure 7).

Sullenness and apathy are said to characterize soldiers' attitudes since the imposition of martial law, and morale problems have been further augmented by information concerning Solidarity which circulates within the forces through incoming draftees and reserve call-ups.³⁷³ A lt. colonel in the air force, writing in

Figure 7. Appeal by Solidarity to Soldiers and Militiamen,
26 January 1982

1. Do not show any initiative;
2. Work slowly and delay the work of others; this may help someone to avoid arrest;
3. Warn people who are facing arrest, if you can;
4. Carry out search and control missions carelessly;
5. Discover and isolate stoolies and eager beavers;
6. Pass on the names of the people whom you know to be arrested; also, pass on any information on repression in the army or the militia. Families of repressed soldiers or militiamen will be taken care of in the same way as the families of repressed trade union activists. We shall win this "war" without the use of force if you help us.

Source: "Informacja Solidarnosc," Mazowsze region, Warsaw, No. 25, 16 February 1982, reprinted in CSS (New York), Biuletyn, no. 45, p. 4.

a military journal, has painted a devastating picture concerning the negative attitudes of soldiers in basic service. He bluntly reports that military service in general, and basic military service in particular, stand low on the scale of youth career preferences, and that basic military service is treated as "a burdensome obligation which is a barrier to meeting other, higher aspirations." The soldiers who think so seem to be in a majority. There is a group of (intellectually least promising) recruits who treat the service as a short-cut to learning a vocational skill; but because they generally end up in units where no skill training is available, they soon join the ranks of the dissatisfied as well. "It is very rare to find people who accept military service as a result of ideological-patriotic motives" or who enter the service with career expectations, for people of this orientation tend to anticipate the draft by going to technical military schools. Still another group of conscripts begins service with no predetermined attitudes.

According to the author, once in the service, negative attitudes tend to be reinforced rather than softened. Although he does not spell out the exact nature of the problem, he singles out "the human relations which prevail in a military unit" as the crucial variable in two specific aspects: in relations between "cadres and enlisted men," and in "relations among the men themselves."³⁷⁵ This and the further discussion indicate that the latter reference is to the system whereby senior soldiers haze their juniors (the problem was discussed earlier, in the section on discipline). The hazing system³⁷⁶ is a direct import from the Soviet Armed Forces. In the Polish forces it is perpetuated because the officers do

not interfere (treating it as "an aid in maintaining discipline"). Those who are abused know that complaining is futile (and may be dangerous), and expect to eventually "gain certain informal rights" once they accumulate sufficient seniority.³⁷⁷ This, as well as some other sources, seems to indicate that the social gap between the professional cadre (officers in particular) and the enlisted men is wide, a factor which is seen as a negative influence on the soldiers' morale.

Informal sources commenting on military morale tend to concentrate on political rather than social factors. The post—"war" cohorts are reported to be totally resistant to the official political line. There have been reports that conscripts have flashed the V-sign as they are sworn in, and there apparently was a case when conscripts refused to repeat the part of the pledge concerning the "alliance with the USSR"; instead, the conscripts hummed.³⁷⁸ There have also been reports that by participating directly in the administration of the country the troops have become infected by the prevalent corruption. Increasing amounts of gasoline and coal are said to have been siphoned off by soldiers in exchange for alcohol.³⁷⁹ The one bright spot in an otherwise gloomy picture was presented by a party newspaper reporting on the elite airborne "Red Berets" division. The readers were explicitly told that it did not make any difference in this division whether or not a soldier was a Solidarity member:

(as the training commences) it becomes unimportant who is from Solidarity and who is from branch or autonomous (unions). They are all soldiers who wear the same uniform and perform the same constitutional, and thus higher level duty, of defending the socialist Fatherland.³⁸⁰

This comment was written just before the imposition of martial law. After December 13, Solidarity sources reported that "informal groups" were being organized even among the "Red Berets," that there were several cases of desertion, and that two soldiers were executed for disobeying orders.³⁸¹ As noted earlier, some units of the "Red Berets" were used in the pacification of the Nowa Huta combine.

Opinion surveys are known to have been conducted among inductees following martial law, but the results are hard to come by. At the time of this writing two reports were available: one from official sources, and another via the Western media. The first concentrated exclusively on social aspects, and the second on political attitudes. The officially reported findings described the conscripts' adaptation to military service. They painted a positive picture (see Table 8), much more so than the report by the air force lt. colonel discussed above. It confirmed the practice of hazing, however, and contained some interesting points when compared to the other reports. Apparently most conscripts manage to adapt to life in the ranks within the first five months of service (basic training lasts six months and this is when the recruits are subjected to the most abuse). But the poll indicated that four per cent of the inductees found it impossible to adapt, and a further nine per cent could not cope emotionally and had to be released. When added, the figures indicate that actually one out of every seven conscripts washes out of the service -- for whatever reasons. The sections dealing with human relations showed that hazing remains a problem. The poll compared data for 1970 and 1982 and, on the face of it, showed improvement in most categories. But there were some

Table 8. Adaptation to Military Life. Survey of
Inductees: 1970-1982
(in % of total)

A group of recruits was polled at entry and systematically in the next year and a half. Their social composition: 20 % peasants; 70 % workers; 4 % intelligentsia. "N" not given.

Questions	1970		1982		
	Yes	No	Yes	No	No Opinion
Were you assigned according to interests?			80	20	
Were your civilian interests influenced?			17%	"deepened" their interests	
Were you afraid of the service? (1)	20	80	17	83	
Did you have problems adapting? Why? (2)	47		33		
discipline		54.5		13	
new setting		40.3		60	
ignorance of military rules		31.3		26	
missing home		31		16	
new environment		29.6		33	
conflict with superiors		24.3		6.3	
problems with study programme		12.1		3.3	
relations with other soldiers		7.6		23.3	
convinced cannot cope		6.7			
Are you pleased to have been called?	48.2	26	58	16	15
Did you change your views from civilian life? Why?			63	37	24
commander influence			8		
discipline			20		
training			13		
environment			20		
party or youth organization			15		
no answer			24		
Did you have conflicts in civilian life?			33	67	
Did you have conflicts in military life?			40	60	
What kind of improvements are needed:					
radical change of attitude of senior					
to junior soldiers			31.3		
improve living conditions, especially food			28.3		
more free time and more cultural events			24		
shorten the time of military service			10		
change attitudes of professional cadre, especially NCOs to soldiers			6.3		

Source: Lt. Col. (MA) Wladyslaw Pertko and Lt. Col. (res.) (MA) Jan Podowski, "Przystosowanie sie żołnierzy do warunkow służby wojskowej," Wojsko Ludowe, February 1982.

Comments in the original:

1. Most recruits seek information, but receive "deformed" information; are being frightened.
2. Most conscripts adapted by their 5th month of service; 4 % never adapted, 9 % could not cope and were released because of emotional problems.
3. This category is very important because informal relations between junior and senior soldiers are a negative variable in the process of adaptation.

interesting changes: conflicts with superiors diminished, but conflicts with other soldiers tripled; no explanations are offered. And more soldiers had problems with a "new setting" in 1982 than in 1970.

An Intelligence Digest published in the UK quoted the summary and the major findings of a survey of the political attitudes of post-"war" inductees that was apparently "leaked" to the west. They were seen as "alarming" by the Polish authorities, which seemed credible because they correlated closely with the attitudes of young people in general and reflected the socialization and disciplinary problems noted earlier.

The findings indicated that inductees were politically unreliable because their perception of Polish interests differed radically from that of the government. Thus, it was said, their reeducation was a long-term proposition and had to start with Poland's entire youth. Two major points emerged from the findings. The first was that the results showed "appalling gullibility," "astounding ignorance," and a "profound misunderstanding" of national and international affairs. "Defenceless youth" had fallen victim to Solidarity's "anti-socialist propaganda" because they rejected "their own heritage and Poland's class traditions." "Translated," this means that they were opposed to communism. The second was the totally negative attitude of the youth to the Warsaw Pact and to the Polish-Soviet alliance. They did not feel grateful to the Soviet forces for "liberating" them from fascism; in fact, they showed distinct signs of "alienation" whenever the "Soviet Army's liberation mission was discussed." They felt no sense of loyalty to the "fraternal armies" and no obligation to participate in the "internationalist duty" of

the Joint Forces of the socialist community. They could see nothing positive in the Soviet Union or in Poland's "democratic" system, showed absolutely no sense of "Polish-Soviet brotherhood," and no appreciation of "Soviet all-around assistance" to Poland.³⁸² In other words, in terms of political reliability they were a total loss.

In the light of this survey it is not surprising that the new provisions of the conscript law provide for the use of recruits for labour purposes, that measures are being taken to control and indoctrinate youth, and that the armed forces have been increasingly relying on the professional cadre as its core combat and control element (see Table 9).

The attitudes of reservists in basic service do not seem to differ much from those of recruits; if anything, these men are even more politically hostile to the regime because most of them were in fact Solidarity members. A report by one such reservist, called into service in the summer of 1982, related that most of his colleagues were workers and ex-Solidarity members, and that their unit as a whole made fun of efforts at political education: "in the first hour we demanded the resolution of various supply problems, and in the second we told the lecturer what we thought were the reasons for the crisis in Poland." They also organized "actions" designed to harass the officers. These included demands for tennis shoes and razors, mass complaints that each individual's call into service was unjustified (orders were not obeyed unless the complaints were reviewed), and reading aloud from underground publications.³⁸³ The remarkable part of this report is that a picture emerges of the apparent benevolence of the military authorities, as well as a perception that many

Table 9. Cadre/Conscript Ratio: "Ratio of Distrust," 1982 - 1984

	Regular Forces				Para-Military Forces			
	Total 1982/83	1983/84	1982/83	Army 1983/84	Navy 1982/83	1983/84	Air Force 1982/83	1983/84
Total numbers	317,000	340,000	207,000	230,000	22,000	22,000	88,000	88,000
Conscripts	187,000	190,000	154,000	158,000	6,000	5,000	27,000	27,000
% of total	59	56	74	69	27	23	31	31
Cadre	130,000	150,000	53,000	72,000	16,000	17,000	61,000	61,000
% of total	41	44	26	31	73	77	69	69
Cadre/Conscript Ratio	0.7	0.8	0.3	0.5	2.7	3.4	2.3	2.3
Ratio of Distrust I ²	1.4	1.5						
Ratio of Distrust II ³	3.02	3.07						

Based on The Military Balance 1982/83 and 1983/84

¹Total calculated by adding the Border troops (WOP) of 20,000 men, the Internal Defence Troops (WSW) of 65,000 men and the ZOMO, approx. 50,000 men. The militia, 300,000 men (excluding the ZOMO) is not included.

²Cadre plus Paramilitary Troops/Conscripts.

³Cadre plus Paramilitary Troops plus Militia/Conscripts.

officers actually sympathized with the men's viewpoint. Some officers informally indicated that their attitudes were similar, there were no punishments for any of the "actions" described above, and there was no reaction by commanders to what the report called a "clearly visible deterioration of military morale."³⁸⁴ No other reports of a similar nature are available, and thus it is difficult to estimate its credibility.

Reserve call-ups of ex-Solidarity activists have been used as a form of punishment, and conditions in these de facto penal units (confirmed by numerous reports) are very different from those described above. Solidarity sources have reported that some 8,000 people were called up from the reserve to serve in some 22 military camps, in which they were isolated both from society and from the regular troops. Among those conscripted were many ex-internees who were called in after being released; others were called up in November-December 1982 to stop them from organizing protests planned by Solidarity for December. An eyewitness reported that 600 men were conscripted from the Nowa Huta combine alone on November 10. Letters smuggled from the camps (sometimes carried and delivered by army regulars or security men) indicated that many of the "reservists" have never served before, and some of them were sick or disabled. The conditions in the camps were very difficult, in terms of the exhaustive training schedule as well as poor food and conditions; the regulars running these camps were officers and NCOs, selected individually from various units, who were told that the "reservists" were "bandits" and "criminals," and treated them accordingly.³⁸⁵ Another item of interest concerning the role of the reserves has been one indicating that some

of the non—"infected" soldiers, whose service was extended for an additional year, have apparently been used as informers after being released from service. It is reported that some were accepted as first-year students by the University of Warsaw (without any examinations), and that they have been obliged to visit the City Command of the Militia once every two weeks to "discuss" the faculty and fellow students.

Alcoholism is a major problem in the LWP, reflecting the broader social environment as well as the example of the Soviet Armed Forces, where it is endemic. Official complaints see alcoholism as a major negative factor affecting "combat readiness," "moral and political attitudes," and "military prestige"; it "undermines" military discipline, leads soldiers to commit actions detrimental to their "honour and dignity," and contributes to accidents "with arms" and "affecting communications." In 1977 a Central Commission for Anti-Alcoholic Activities in the LWP was created to coordinate the work of various in-service organizations in combatting alcoholism.³⁸⁷ But it could not have been very effective, for apparently there was an increase in cases of alcohol abuse in the LWP in 1983, especially among the soldiers in basic service. Drinking was described as a major factor contributing to crime among them: 39% of the soldiers who committed crimes did so under the influence of alcohol.³⁸⁸

The physical condition of Polish recruits appears to have declined in the seventies. In 1980 it was reported in the Silesian OW that the physical stamina of inductees was decreasing from year to year. The results of physical examinations in 1976 were an average 4.09 (the grading maximum and minimum were not given, but the top mark in

Polish schools is a "5"). But this figure declines gradually in subsequent years: to 3.77 in 1977, 3.76 in 1978, and 3.0 in 1979. It was also noted that the physical fitness of rural youths, who used to be in better physical condition than urban youths, now seems to have declined in equal measure.³⁸⁹ According to the above source this decline was the result of youthful preferences, for young men prefer "to spend time in smoky cafés rather than on the sports field"; but malnutrition and declining health standards seem to be the more likely causes. In this the LWP again shows a resemblance to its "model," the Soviet Armed Forces, where there has been a deterioration in the physical shape of the soldiers because of an overall decline in health and economic conditions.

3. Leadership and the Professional Cadre

The professional cadre is the core of the LWP and its political mainstay. It is composed of volunteers, most of whom have staked their careers and personal interests on the survival of the communist regime. In numbers the cadre almost equals the conscripts. In 1984 the career cadre constituted 44 per cent of the total military manpower and its share was on the increase. The cadre's distribution within the armed forces assured that it dominated the elite and designated units, which were directly under the Pact's (i.e. Soviet) operational command. In 1984 the professional cadre constituted 69 per cent of the personnel in the Air Force, and 77 per cent in the Navy; no breakdown was available for land forces comparing the units designated for external use and units within the OTK. But there is little doubt that the proportion of the cadre among the former has been higher than that for the land

forces as a whole (31 %) (see Table 9). First, because a large number of the military units in the OTK are construction battalions in which cadre requirements are minimal; and second, because political control over the forces designated for internal use is largely assumed by paramilitary troops. Thus it is not only the numbers of the politically more reliable professional cadre, but also their distribution within the service which serve to neutralize the effects of the basic political unreliability which has characterized the conscript manpower of the LWP, especially after the events of 1980/81. In the units with a high combat capability career soldiers outnumber the soldiers in basic service by 2 or 3 to one. In the service as a whole, professional soldiers are augmented by specially selected and trained security forces ("ratio of distrust I"). When needed (as in the case of a mutiny), these can be further reinforced by the militia ("ratio of distrust II") (see Table 9), although the reliability of the regular militia (as distinct from the ZOMO and ROMO) cannot be regarded as high if one considers the inroads made by Solidarity in 1980/81. Ultimately, Soviet reinforcements are available for the internal "defence of socialism" in the form of 40,000 troops stationed in Poland as well as troops stationed in the Western districts of the USSR and in the GDR, not to mention other "allied" forces.

The professional cadre is almost equally divided between officers and NCOs. According to a senior officer who defected to the West, the officer corps in the 70s was approximately 60,000 strong.³⁹⁰ The origins, composition, and training of the cadre were discussed earlier, when it was also noted that, beginning in the early 60s, a professional military career was made more

attractive because it offered both improved economic standing and excellent educational training. Career opportunities and material remuneration were made even more rewarding in the 70s. With the imposition of martial law the military cadre, and particularly senior officers, have moved into positions of political power, and the taste of this power has further solidified their support for the regime. Party membership among the professional cadre is pretty much universal (see Table 4); the junior members who do not belong to the party are members of the socialist youth organization instead. All available accounts agree, however, that the cadre's commitment to the system is based on pragmatic considerations -- career opportunities and various perquisites -- rather than on ideological beliefs. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Jaruzelski government has taken care to keep rewards high for its military support base.

As described by an ex-member of the PZPR Central Committee in a private conversation, the military gained unheard-of privileges with the imposition of martial law: they receive "war" salary supplements and enjoy new career opportunities as well as special privileges and assignments. Thus the officers support the continuation of the state of war (or de facto militarization regardless of whether a formal state of war continues) because of new perspectives for power and advancement that are not normally available to them.³⁹¹ In brief, the military have acquired the taste for political power. Thus "normalization," which would create opportunities for the party to establish a new base of power and consequently to regain its hegemonic position vis-à-vis the military, is not in the interests of the professional cadre.

Fortunately for them, social turmoil and deeply ingrained popular hostility to the communist regime make such a development unlikely.

The Solidarity underground reported an increase in military pay in early 1982, and special monetary rewards to officers and men, for "participation in the war." ³⁹² It should be noted, however, that the official media have repeatedly denied that the professional cadre receives any special monetary or material considerations. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the living conditions of the military cadre (as well as members of the militia and security apparat) are much better than those of their counterparts in civilian life. This includes better housing and better pay, special bonuses and access to special shops, and other forms of preferential treatment. Senior officers are entitled to all the privileges customarily associated with the "New Class." However, in Poland, as discussed above, the privileges enjoyed by the "New Class" proved to be a major irritant leading to demands for reform. Part of the appeal of the Jaruzelski regime -- in contrast to that of Gierek -- has been its supposed "austerity." So the life-style of the generals has been watched, and conspicuous consumption has been officially discouraged for the time being.

The price paid for these privileges has been isolation from the rest of the population. There is evidence that the leadership promotes this isolation, and for good reasons: to maximize the cadre's loyalty to and dependence on the system, and to cut it off from its national constituency, with all of its "corrupting" influences. The social isolation of military families is facilitated by separate housing and special shops as well

as separate recreational and vacation facilities. Their perception of a hostile environment is largely due to the military press and internal propaganda. This was true during the period preceding the "war" (as noted above), and has continued since. Zolnierz Wolnosci, for example, continues to publish emotionally charged items describing attacks on the military, threats to their families, etc.³⁹³ An anonymous LWP colonel, in an interview with Solidarnosc, specifically emphasized that it was WRON's policy to maintain a chasm between the population and the armed forces. He noted that soldiers were regaled with tales of attacks on patrols and of murders of individual soldiers; political officers frequently warned their listeners of dangers from Solidarity which allegedly threaten their families.³⁹⁴ The intensity of this isolation is confirmed by the comment of a school girl (as reported by a Western observer), who said that all the members of her class were preparing to join Solidarity when they grow up and start working, "except two girls because their fathers are in the army."³⁹⁵

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the professional cadre is either monolithic or that it uniformly and unequivocally supports the regime. What we know about its attitudes indicates that there are considerable variations in the views held by various groups within the armed forces.

Little information is available on the cadre's reactions to past events. But it is known that the cadets in the Poznan Armoured Troops Officers College were sympathetic to workers' demands in June 1975, and that units had to be imported from Silesia to suppress workers because of the unwillingness of local units to do so. One

observer reports that the trauma of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia produced mutterings among Polish officers that "had Dubcek resisted," it might have been the end of the "Soviet Empire."³⁹⁶ Many agree that Poland's assistance in enforcing Soviet hegemony in an unwilling neighbouring country engendered a sense of shame within the ranks. It is indicative that Polish military histories have little or nothing to say about this event. Also, apparently, questions were raised by certain Polish (along with Romanian and Czech officers) concerning the reorganization of the WP into a supranational organization. They favoured allowing the respective armies to develop as cohesive national armies rather than as simply an adjunct to the Soviet forces³⁹⁷ (a condition that the Romanians were able to create prior to 1968). The 1969 WP reorganization did not meet these requirements, although it did allow for some formal expression of its members' "sovereignty." Another observer indicates that while the members of the Polish military elite appear to share the view that Polish interests are best served in alliance with the Soviet Union, they may not have been adverse to a revival of the late General Duszynski's concept of the "Polish Front" (the commemorative services marking Duszynski's death in 1974 failed to include any mention of his past "disgrace").³⁹⁸

The use of troops in the suppression of striking workers in the Baltic shipyards in 1970 further contributed to the deterioration of the forces' morale. Some units dragged their feet, trying to evade orders, and others did their duty reluctantly, leaving most of the suppression to the security police. Also, there was a sense of nervousness among the cadre, which was related to the

probable impact of the 1970 intervention on the forces' morale and on their public image, as noted above.

An analysis of official and unofficial data for the years preceding 1980, and during the Solidarity period, indicate that some elements of the professional cadre proved to be more susceptible to social ferment than others. It seems that the groups most seriously affected were the cadets in military schools and junior officers, as seen in the discussion of socialization and disciplinary problems. Senior officers, on the other hand, as well as reserve officers and professional NCOs, seem to have been largely untouched by the reform movement. Retired officers (especially those eased out under the Spychalski regime) and hard-line elements among the NCOs emerge as supporters of the communist regime and military rule. The scattered information available on mid-career officers indicates divided sympathies, especially in the case of officers with a technical specialization. Not surprisingly, officers in the command-political stream tend to identify fully with the regime and the imposition of martial law. There were also elements among the officers who genuinely believed that the imposition of martial law was in the national interest and supported it for patriotic reasons. And there were many more who wanted to believe this.

There is a basic agreement in the assessment of the attitudes and reliability of the professional cadre coming from defectors and unofficial sources. Approximately half of the cadre is characterized as being "pragmatic"; interested in career pursuits and promotions and thus unwilling -- and afraid -- to "rock the boat." Of the other half, about 30 per cent are seen as patriotic and resentful of party and Soviet interference, while 20 per

cent are regarded as strongly identifying themselves with the regime and with the Soviet alliance. Among the latter, who "speak the language of Zolnierz Wolnosci,"³⁹⁹ about 10 per cent are seen as loyally pro-Soviet,⁴⁰⁰ and this group includes most of the senior cadre. But in practical terms, a majority -- assessed at about 80 per cent -- is perceived to be politically reliable.⁴⁰¹ This judgement is supported by an observer reporting from Poland for Kultura (Paris) who feels that "even the most optimistic estimates indicate that about 80 per cent of the professional cadre" are members of the core group which makes up the communist/military regime.⁴⁰² Another source characterized the professional cadre as an integral part of the "New Class" and thus ready to defend the regime to the last. But this observer also noted that the cadre was likely to split in the case of an internal conflict aided by a Soviet intervention: the senior generals and elite troops would actively collaborate with the invaders, while many junior officers, a large number of conscripts, and most OTK units would join the insurgents. The remainder would stay in their barracks.⁴⁰³

When martial law was imposed there were rumours of resistance by individual officers. A letter, allegedly written by a group of officers and dated January 1982, was circulated in Poland and abroad, although it is impossible to check its authenticity. The letter called on society to passively resist martial law and to avoid provocations (much on the same lines as the Solidarity policy directives) and gave an estimate of LWP reliability which is the exact reverse of the above estimate. It claimed that 75 to 80 per cent of military personnel were against WRON. The letter was signed, anonymously, by 5 generals,

17 colonels and 164 other officers.⁴⁰⁵ Another unverified report, which was apparently based on an internal survey conducted in the Pomeranian OW, indicated the existence of major morale problems within the cadre after 1981. It stated that new conscripts did not even try to hide their hostility towards the regime (this has also emerged from other sources), while the NCOs, overworked and underpaid, were demanding more free time and better pay and regular officers were complaining because they were disappointed with Jaruzelski's failure to curtail administrative abuse, to "clean up" the government and to improve economic conditions. Young officers, in particular, were demanding that the promised "Renewal" be implemented in the armed forces and that incompetents be removed, and there was general resentment with respect to the militia and the role it had played in the repressions.⁴⁰⁶ This and some other sources indicated that many members of the cadre would welcome the opportunity to doff their uniforms and return to civilian life if this could be done easily. One item which confirms this decline in morale is information from a Warsaw print shop, Polskie Słowo (Polish Word) that the print run of Zolnierz Wolnosci, the armed forces newspaper declined, in early 1982, from 400,000 to 180,000 copies.⁴⁰⁷

The relatively poor economic position of the NCOs (as compared to officers) has been confirmed elsewhere,⁴⁰⁸ but it has also been suggested that roughly 95 per cent of the professional NCOs are "pragmatists" who are willing to serve if appropriately rewarded.⁴⁰⁹ A considerable percentage of the cadre are said to harbour anti-Russian sentiments (approximately one-third of the officers, and one-fourth of the NCOs), and a great majority

of the cadre feels itself to be superior to the Russians, reflecting widespread social stereotypes. But a sense of cultural superiority was less pronounced among the senior ranks because of their close contacts with the senior Soviet cadre⁴¹⁰ which, by all accounts, is the impressive product of careful selection and excellent training.

When translated into a forecast of probable behaviour, all this information indicates potential differences in the conduct of the armed forces in a domestic confrontation and in an external conflict. In a domestic confrontation between the armed forces and the people, the armed forces may indeed prove to be a "slate hammer," as one perceptive Westerner observed, which may "crumble in General Jaruzelski's hand" if he "ever has to bear down hard with it."⁴¹¹ On the other hand, and despite the general signs of demoralization and erosion of morale in the LWP, it seems beyond doubt that elite units designated for external purposes would hold up well, perhaps even with distinction, in an offensive action against an external enemy. However, good performance by the rear echelons of the OTK system is doubtful. They might function adequately (although sabotage cannot be excluded) if the security police is functioning and operational linkages with the Soviet rear administration are maintained. But they would likely disintegrate (and perhaps reintegrate as insurrectionist units) if the Warsaw Pact coalition suffers reverses and/or if the regime shows signs of a collapse. In the latter case the reliability of forward units would also be questionable.

In summary, regardless of the problems which beset the Polish Armed Forces -- and these are more serious than those faced by the other Pact armies -- behaviour in

support of the regime's objectives is to be expected, and effective battleground performance cannot be excluded. As one domestic observer has remarked:

Let us remember that the psychological predisposition of the rank and file decides what an army does in the field. But the direction of its activities is decided by staffs. Let us also remember that in totalitarian systems, in particular, the arms which soldiers hold almost never turn against their political leaders. And what happens is decided by political leaders ... Something extremely unusual would have to happen to make the armed forces side with the people against their rulers. The myth of an uhlan should be cultivated in order to bring children up patriotically ... But one must not confuse uhlans and janissaries.⁴¹²

It is therefore imperative to take a final look at the leadership of the LWP which, after 1981, became the political leadership. The "Letter of the Officers of the Polish Army" cited earlier calls General Jaruzelski and his entourage of generals "pseudo-Poles."⁴¹³ The authors of this study feel that Poland's senior generals are part of a "Greater Socialist Officer Corps." For these officers ethnic origin and national labels are secondary to their identification with the Soviet-led military machine which has been fostered by their life-long training and career patterns. They are not unlike the Soviet Armed Forces' own "ethnic soldiers" who have made it to the top, except that their national base is formally much stronger and their "sovereign" prerogatives are more pronounced. Their

conditioning in everything but name has been the same as that of Soviet officers. Some of them, in fact, may be Soviet officers.

General Jaruzelski's career was described above. It shows a pattern of professional military service that, for all practical purposes, has been more Soviet than Polish. The beginnings of his professional career and his initial training, as well as advanced training, took place in the Soviet Union. His upward climb in the service began under Marshal Rokossovsky; his career took off after 1960, i.e., with the beginning of the implementation of military integration mechanisms under Marshal Grechko (see Figure 4). The generals who surround Jaruzelski in the WRON constitute the top military leadership group. The WRON includes the key military nomenklatura positions: the Minister of Defence and key central ministry positions: the chief of staff, the chief of military political education, the chief inspector of training, the chief of military research and technology, and last but not least, the chief inspector of territorial defence, i.e., the head of the OTK; it also includes the heads of all the services as well as the chiefs of the three military districts. Some of the council members have been entrusted with civilian responsibilities although, except for General Jaruzelski himself and the Minister of Internal Affairs, there does not seem to be any special "key" to the allocation of these positions. Lesser members of the WRON command unspecified military units; it also includes a representative of retired officers and, presumably a token, Poland's one and only cosmonaut (see Figure 5).

Only fragmentary biographical information was available from open sources. But the career patterns of

the five most important generals after Jaruzelski followed that of their leader (all five are three-star generals except for Kiszczak, who is a maj. gen. but is also a Politbureau candidate member). They are all First Army veterans or ex-partisans, and graduates of Soviet military schools. Their early training and selection was in the Rokossovsky period (i.e., under Soviet command by Soviet instructors), and their promotions started after 1960. Most WRON members belong to the same age group; all but three were born in the 1920s. The average age of WRON members is 58; that of the "Big Six" is 60. Nine out of 21 members are known to have attended Soviet military academies, but it is likely that most attended such academies, particularly those of general officer rank. Of the nine, six are graduates of the Voroshilov General Staff Academy; four are gold medallists. The two who do not have a gold medal are, paradoxically, the two leaders: Jaruzelski and Siwicki. It is interesting to note that attendance at Soviet staff schools is only mentioned in the biographies of two generals (Siwicki and Hupalowski); perhaps advanced training in the Soviet Union is not necessarily seen as a political asset for public consumption.⁴¹⁴

At least one member of the WRON, Admiral Janczyszyn, was reported to be a "soldier of two armies," i.e., a Soviet officer. It is not clear whether this requires double citizenship or whether no Polish citizenship is required.⁴¹⁵ Two other recent and well-known examples of Soviet officers in the Polish Armed Forces are General Jozef Urbanowicz (who is the Deputy Minister of Defence for General Matters but is not a WRON member), and General Jerzy Bordzilowski, now retired, who

was the LWP Chief of Staff under Rokossovsky and Spychalski. After retirement General Bordzilowski apparently returned to the Soviet Union. He was listed, at a ceremony in the Pomeranian OW in 1975, as a member of the ⁴¹⁶ Soviet delegation which was attending this event.

For obvious reasons such a double status is not advertised, and it is entirely possible that other members of the WRON may also be in this category. Generals Siwicki and Kiszcak are the most likely candidates. General Siwicki's career has duplicated that of General Jaruzelski so closely that he may be regarded as either Jaruzelski's alter ego or his "guardian angel." He is also reported to be a Soviet liaison man; it is known that he joined the First Army in 1943 after previously serving in the Red Army. ⁴¹⁷ General Kiszcak's official biography is very scanty; he is said to have participated in the partisan movement in World War II (with Soviet partisans?) and to have served "many years in military counterintelligence." ⁴¹⁸ His service must have commenced in the early period and continued under Rokossovsky; it is known that during this period the military intelligence branch, the infamous Informacja Wojskowa, was run by Soviet counterintelligence officers. It is probably not a coincidence that General Siwicki, who was the Chief of Staff in 1981 but replaced Jaruzelski as Minister of Defence in November 1983, and General Kiszcak, who is the Minister of the Interior, are the only two members of the WRON (apart from Jaruzelski) with a seat in the PZPR Politbureau (as candidate members).

All of the incumbents of the WRON achieved their present positions after General Jaruzelski became the Minister of Defence in 1968; this gives the Polish military

elite a high degree of political cohesion and establishes a special relationship between them and General Jaruzelski. Although the career indebtedness of most of the WRON members to General Jaruzelski seems obvious, there is a group of eight generals whose initial advancement was parallel to that of Jaruzelski and who received their first star in the late 50s or in the 60s, before 1968.⁴¹⁹ This group includes four of the top five members (the exception is Kiszczak), and this is also the group which, perhaps coincidentally, includes most of those who hold positions involving direct contact with the Soviet military: they include commanders of the Air Force and the Navy, the Chief of the OTK, the Chief Inspector of Training (Molczyk), who is also the official representative of the LWP in the Joint Command of the Warsaw Pact, and the commander of the Silesian OW. The remaining 7 generals were all promoted to the rank of general officer under Jaruzelski's incumbency,⁴²⁰ and may perhaps be considered to be "Jaruzelski's people" more than the first group. However, the information which is available is too fragmentary to allow one to trace personal linkages and patronage patterns both within the LWP top command and in contacts with the Soviet high command.

The membership of the WRON does not include all the important members of the Polish military high command. Some rather important generals seem to have been omitted, and the nature of the "key" for inclusion, especially in the case of members below the general officer rank, is not clear. An alternate list of top positions in the LWP is available, for example, in an anniversary (1978) issue of Przeglad Wojskowy Historyczny. The list was headed by General Jaruzelski (who had the largest photograph), but

the seven generals who followed were led by Jozef Urbanowicz and included General Sawczuk (then the head of the GZP), General Obiedzinski (Chief Quartermaster), and General Nowak (Chief Inspector of Technology) in addition to Generals Siwicki, Tuczapski and Molczyk.⁴²¹

Overall, in the case of the senior Polish military cadre the professional training and career pattern is either identical with or parallel to that pursued by Soviet officers, and all of its members have, over the years, developed a network of personal connections with their counterparts and colleagues in the Soviet Armed Forces and, to a lesser extent, with their colleagues in other WP armies. They share the characteristics of the Soviet officer "caste" in their social behaviour and in relations with the lower ranks. They were not involved in the nationalist currents of the late fifties and early sixties and, indeed, owe their promotion to the purge of nationalist elements. Brought forward into positions of political power in order to stop the unprecedented mass movement for reform, the Polish generals are obviously interested in maintaining (and maximizing) their power, and are skillfully manipulating national symbols for this purpose. But they cannot challenge the coalition system of which they are a part because their survival depends on the survival, in a broader context, of the socialist community and, in a narrower context, of a "socialist" Poland. They thus have a vital stake in preserving and defending both.

Poland being Poland, the emergence of a "Wallenrod"⁴²² can never be excluded. But the above group seems very unlikely to harbour such a figure, and General Jaruzelski is an unlikely candidate. Among Poland's senior generals, none seems to have the "flair"

displayed by some of Spychalski's generals. They all seem to share three dominant characteristics: they are career-minded; they are members of a political elite skilled in infighting for survival; and they are professional soldiers with the ingrained habit of subordinating themselves to superiors within a military system which transcends the national Polish state. It should not be overlooked that within the Joint WP Command system even the highest-ranking Pole -- such as a marshal -- stills finds himself outranked by at least two higher-level Soviet commanders (see Figure 6). Their careers and their fate are linked to this system. It appears that the senior Polish military cadre is not only fully integrated into the socialist coalition system in a functional sense, but that it has also been integrated in an attitudinal (cognitive) sense.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

In the final analysis the Polish People's Army is not a continuation of the Polish Armed Forces of the Second Republic and its direct successors during World War II, the Home Army and the Polish Army in the West. Rather, the LWP is the product of a historical discontinuity imposed on Poland by Soviet power. It was conceived and developed as an extension of the Soviet Armed Forces, and from the outset it was a political as well as a military instrument. It nurtured the nucleus of a future Polish communist leadership. Under Soviet tutelage, and with Soviet assistance, it was the main instrument in the consolidation of communist power in Poland. It has been the main instrument in the maintenance of communist power in Poland.

And under the Soviet-style military coalition system, it has become an extension of the Soviet Armed Forces for the performance of the double duty envisaged by Soviet (and under the coalition system also Polish) military doctrine -- the "defence of socialism" against internal and external enemies. The regime's nationalist rhetoric notwithstanding, in the perceptions of the Polish people the "defence of socialism" has not been synonymous with the defence of Poland's national interests.

So far the duty of the internal "defence of socialism" has been paramount. It should be remembered that, contrary to prevalent perceptions, the 1981 imposition of martial law was not an original development. There are direct precedents in the history of People's Poland, although the 1982 military takeover was the most extensive. Martial law was imposed in several provinces during the civil war of 1945-47. Troops were used to suppress the June 1956 workers' riots in Poznan, and the 1970 workers' strikes in the Baltic shipyards. General Jaruzelski's justification for the use of the troops in 1970 emphasized the forces' political role as a mainstay of the regime:

Do you want an army that would take over power for itself, that would change the authorities as in Latin America or Africa? ... that would not follow this or that decision of the legally elected leadership and would abolish this leadership? No! Our Polish soldiers will always defend the people's power, whatever may be, and will always defend the party.⁴²³

Even when, one might add, or especially when the party is unable to maintain itself because it totally lacks a

popular base of support.

It should also be remembered that, thanks to the military integration policies introduced by Moscow in 1960 (after the scare of 1956 and the Romanian withdrawal of 1958), the military has proved to be a more reliable instrument of Soviet control than the party which: first, has always had a propensity to do "its own thing"; secondly, has proved susceptible to revisionism; and, thirdly, has on occasion collapsed. Thus, although Bonapartism is condemned in communist theory and practice, in the case of Poland it was not only allowed but was instigated and supported by Moscow because it was the proverbial "lesser evil."

This having been said, the question of the political reliability of the Polish military leadership can never be satisfactorily resolved from Moscow's point of view. For Poland's national interests conflict with the national interests of the Soviet Union, and anyone placed in a position of leadership in Poland eventually tends to identify with the interests of the country. This has been demonstrated by the perceptions and policies of Polish communist leaders in the past. In the case of the Jaruzelski regime, and in the context of the 80s, the problem has seemingly been minimized as a result of the life-long habits of military discipline of the leaders. But it has been complicated by the use of nationalist symbolism which appeals to the military psyche, by the bankruptcy of Marxism-Leninism as a belief system, and by the spurious character of so-called "internationalist brotherhood." During the Gomulka period ideological commitment was still a major factor, but for the military cadre of the 70s and 80s (and for party functionaries as

well) ideological appeals are no longer operational. The substitute has been power and its perks, and ultimately the question of survival. The appeal of "socialist internationalism" has also worn off, especially as a result of daily contacts with Soviet representatives, military and civilian, for whom Soviet national interests are paramount. This is made very clear to "allied" personnel, at times brutally so.

Moreover, the Polish generals preside over a schizophrenic army. Its conscript base is rooted in a society which is totally, openly and unequivocally hostile to the communist regime and to Soviet tutelage. As we have seen, most recruits do not even try to hide these attitudes. And although the majority of the professional cadre has been coopted into the ruling "New Class," elements of it remain susceptible to social pressures and popular perceptions, especially as one approaches the base of the military hierarchy.

Thus, in practice, the reliability of the LWP has been secured by a series of mechanisms which have been extensively discussed in this study:

1. The attitudinal and functional integration of LWP senior cadre into the Soviet military coalition system;
2. The functional integration and professional competence of the career military cadre, and the stake its members have acquired in the preservation of the communist system in Poland and the maintenance of its alliance system;
3. The operational disposition of the Polish Armed Forces: their division into elite operational units designated for the external front within the WP coalition system, and units for the internal front within the

territorial defence system (OTK);

4. The overlapping of the internal and external operational disposition mechanisms: the LWP units designated for external use have been placed under Joint Warsaw Pact forward operational command, while the OTK system is integrated into the Joint WP Rear Security Command;

5. LWP cadre/conscript internal placement and distribution: both elements are deployed according to a "political reliability map";

6. The maintenance of parallel and substantial paramilitary forces;

7. The cooptation and manipulation of Polish national and martial symbolism.

These mechanisms have proved effective so far -- much beyond popular expectations -- for the purposes of the maintenance of the regime on the internal front. They also give every promise of working in the case of an external conflict rebus sic stantibus. To paraphrase an earlier quote: the direction of the armed forces and their activities are decided by their leaders and planned by their staffs, and circumstances must be truly exceptional for the ranks to move against their officers. But the key condition of the mechanisms' effectiveness has been and remains the stability of the power of the Soviet Union, which is ultimately guaranteed by the strength, stability and effectiveness of the Soviet Armed Forces. Should this be affected for whatever reasons, integrative mechanisms would cease to work, the basis for the loyalty of the cadre would be shaken, and national Polish interests and popular attitudes would reassert their dominant influence on the behaviour of the Polish soldiers.

ENDNOTES

- 1 The total area of Poland in 1939 was 389,720 square km.; in 1945 it was 312,677 square km. Norman Davies, God's Playground: A History of Poland, Vol. II (1795 to the Present) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), p. 489.
- 2 Ibid., pp. 562-567 and passim.
- 3 Ibid., p. 406.
- 4 Quoted in ibid., p. xviii.
- 5 Quoted in ibid., p. 479.
- 6 Stefan Kieniewicz, "Nineteenth Century Uprisings an Organic Work," a paper read at the conference CONTEMPORARY POLAND IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, May 23, 1984, p. 9. The Polish authorities refused Professor Kieniewicz permission to attend the conference.
- 8 Davies, God's Playground, Vol. II, p. 272.
- 9 Marian Jurek and Edward Skrzypkowski, Tarcza Pokoju: XX-lecie Ukladu Warszawskiego (Warsaw: MON, 1975), pp. 302-303.
- 10 Davies, God's Playground, Vol. II, p. 437.
- 11 See Zbrodnia Katynska w swietle dokumentow (London: "Gryf," 1948). The vanished officers were located in three POW camps: in Kozielsk (4,500); Starobielsk (3,920); and Ostaszkow (6,500). Most of the Kozielsk prisoners were found in the Katyn graves (4,250). The fate of the others is still unknown. After the restoration of relations between the Polish London Government and Moscow in 1941, the Kremlin's response to inquiries about the prisoners was that they had all been released; after the Katyn discovery, however, the line was changed, and the Germans were accused of the murder. Rumours heard by other captives indicate that the Ostaszkow contingent was placed on barges which were sunk in the White Sea. A recent discovery may help to determine what happened to the Starobielsk prisoners. In 1977 Polish personnel working on the Orenburg ("Friendship") Pipeline in the

the Ukraine near Starobielsk were told by local peasants that a nearby huge depression in the ground contained the bodies of Polish officers who were killed by the NKVD in the spring of 1940. The Poles were able to take pictures of the depression and of the camp nearby. These were reproduced and, along with the history of the event, were circulated in Poland in the unofficial publication Polskie Porozumienie Niepodleglosciowe, no. 37, January 1980 (seen by this author in Canada). The whole issue of the vanished Polish officers and of the Katyn massacre is never mentioned in official Soviet or Polish publications, but it is still a burning issue for Poles at home and abroad.

- 12 Marceli Nowotko, Pawel Finder and Boleslaw Molojec, members of the so-called "Initiative Group." Nowotko was the party's first secretary until December 1942, when he was murdered by Molojec's brother for being, allegedly, an agent of the Gestapo. Finder succeeded Nowotko, but was killed by the Gestapo in November 1943. His successor was Wladyslaw Gomulka. See Antoni Polonsky and Boleslaw Drukier, The Beginnings of Communist Rule in Poland (London, Boston and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), passim.
- 13 Documents indicate that the Home National Council (KRN), a pseudo-parliamentary body designed as the nucleus of a future communist Polish Government, was established by the PPR on 1 January 1944 without consultation with Moscow and, in fact, as a rival to the ZPP. Its popular base was extremely narrow as, in addition to the PPR, it included only an extreme left splinter group of the socialist party and a few other rump leftist groups. Its first chairman nevertheless was Boleslaw Bierut (parachuted into Poland in the spring of 1943), an experienced Comintern agent and a Soviet citizen; it was the KRN which was eventually chosen by Stalin to become, in fact, the nucleus of the new Polish government. See Polonsky and Drukier, The Beginnings of Communist Rule in Poland, passim, and the discussion in Section III.1 below.
- 14 For details and documentation see Stefan Korbonksi, The Polish Underground State: A Guide to the Underground, 1939 - 1945. (New York: East European Quarterly and Columbia University Press, 1978), Ch. 16. Mr. Korbonksi was the head of the Directorate of

Civil Struggle (KWC), and the last Delegate. It is significant that the Polish version of the book has been reprinted four times since 1980 by the unofficial press in Poland. After 1945 Mr. Korbonski was one of the leaders of the opposition PSL party and a deputy to the Sejm, and he fled Poland in 1947 to escape arrest. His memoirs of the period are entitled Warsaw in Chains (London: Allen & Unwin and McMillan, 1959). Other sources on the underground include Davies, God's Playground, Vol. II and Polonsky and Drukier, The Beginnings of Communist Rule in Poland.

- 15 The Polish Socialist Party (PPS), the Peasant Party (SL), the National Party (SN), the Labour Party (SP), each with three members, and the Democratic Union (composed of the Democratic Party -- SD; Union for the Reconstruction of the Republic -- SOR; Organization for an Independent Poland -- OPN) with three members; plus representatives of the Pilsudski (sanacja) bloc and the autonomous National Party from the western regions. Korbonski, The Polish Underground State, Ch. 13.
- 16 Korbonski, The Polish Underground State, passim, and Davies, God's Playground, Vol. II, Ch. 20.
- 17 Davies, God's Playground, Vol. II, pp. 464-466. Polonsky and Drukier give different estimates: AK -- 250,000 to 350,000, and AL -- 20,000 to 60,000 (p. 140). Jurek and Skrzypkowski (Tarcza Pokoju) claim 50,000 to 60,000 people were involved in the AL in 1944 (p. 309).
- 18 Korbonski, The Polish Underground State, Chapters 21 and 22. See also T. Bor-Komorowski, The Secret Army (New York: Macmillan, 1951), pp. 173-198. General Bor-Komorowski was C-in-C of the AK from July 1943 until the AK command surrendered to the Germans in Warsaw on 5 October 1944.
- 19 Ibid.
- 20 Documents in Polonsky and Drukier, The Beginnings of Communist Rule in Poland (pp. 19-23, 50) show that the ZPP, together with a delegation of the KRN which was in Moscow at the time, planned to establish a KRN Delegatura, but they were personally overruled by Stalin.

- 21 Davies, God's Playground, Vol. II, pp. 549, 557.
- 22 Ibid., p. 558.
- 23 Korbonski, The Polish Underground State, Ch. 26.
- 24 Davies, God's Playground, Vol. II, p. 561.
- 25 Polonsky and Drukier, The Beginnings of Communist Rule in Poland, p. 106.
- 26 The Ministry of Public Security, 7 May 1947. Cited in Korbonski, The Polish Underground State, p. 245. On LWP desertions see Section III.1.A below.
- 27 Based on Korbonski, The Polish Underground State, Chapters 26 and 27. See also Korbonski, Warsaw in Chains, S. Mikolajczyk, The Pattern of Soviet Domination (London: Samson, Low, Marston & Col Ltd., 1948), and A. Bliss-Lane, I Saw Poland Betrayed, (Boston and Los Angeles: the American Library, 1965).
- 28 See Davies, God's Playground, Vol. I, Ch. 7.
- 29 Ibid., Ch. 18.
- 30 Stefan Nowak, "Values and Attitudes of the Polish People," Scientific American 245 (July 1981): 45-53.
- 31 Ibid., p. 45.
- 32 Ibid., p. 47.
- 33 Ibid., p. 50.
- 34 Ibid., p. 49.
- 35 Ibid., pp. 49-50.
- 36 "Szlachcic na zagrodzie rowny wojewodzie." The wojewoda, the chief of a palatinate, was an ex-officio member of the Senate.
- 37 Jan Szczepanski, Polish Society (New York: Random House, 1970). The kissing of ladies' hands, as well as various customary forms of address, are the outward forms of these survivals. See The New York Times, 23 June 1984, p. 2.

- 38 Nowak, "Values and Attitudes," p. 52.
- 39 Ibid.
- 40 Ibid., p. 51.
- 41 Tymoteusz Klempski, "Pomiedzy euforia a zgroza," Kultura (Paris), Jan.-Feb. 1981, p. 71.
- 42 The history of these events is sufficiently well known not to be included here.
- 43 Nowak, "Values and Attitudes," p. 53. My italics.
- 44 The best description of the Bydgoszcz crisis as a turning point is in Lawrence Wechsler, The Passion of Poland: From Solidarity Through the State of War: The Complete New Yorker Reports on Poland (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), pp. 140-142.
- 45 K. Dziewanowski, "Nie za pozno, nie za wczesnie," Solidarnosc, 3 April 1981, p. 4.
- 46 The main sources used in this section are: Jurek and Skrzypkowski, Tarcza Pokoju; Davies, God's Playground, Vol. II; Polonsky and Drukier, The Beginnings of Communist Rule in Poland; Gen. of Arms (ret.) Jerzy Bordzilowski, "Rola Armii Radzieckiej w tworzeniu ludowego Wojska Polskiego i w wyzwoleniu Polski," Wojskowy Przeglad Historyczny (LWP 35th Anniversary issue) No. 3, 1978, pp. 31-42; I. Semiriaga, A.V. Antosiak, P.M. Derevianko, Zarozhdenie narodnykh stran-uchastnits Varshavskogo Dogovora, 1941-1949 (Moscow: Nauka, 1975); Klemens Nussbaum, "Jews in the Polish Army in the USSR, 1943-44," Soviet Jewish Affairs No. 3 (1972); Prof. Dr. Boleslaw Krasiewicz, "Problemy rozwoju szkolnictwa wojskowego w latach 1943-1978," Wojskowy Przeglad Historyczny No. 3, 1978; Michael Checinski, "Ludowe Wojsko Polskie przed i po marcu 1968," Zeszyty Historyczne (Paris), Vol. 44, pp. 14, 31; Michael Checinski, The Postwar Development of the Polish Armed Forces, Sept. 1979, Rand Internal Note; A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean and Alex Alexiev, East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier, Rand Corporation Report R-24177/1-AF/FF, Santa Monica, Calif., December 1980; and Jozef Jaklicz, "Armia," Kultura (Paris), II-gi numer krajowy, 1952. No effort is made here at comprehensive coverage.

- 47 Krasiewicz, "Problemy rozwoju," p. 104. The characterization in brackets has been added.
- 48 In March 1944, the 1st Corps numbered 43,498 men (4,554 officers, 8,398 NCOs, 1,277 warrant officers, and 29,269 soldiers). Berling continued as the commander of the First Army. His two deputies were Gen. Karol Swierczewski (a Soviet officer and a veteran of the Spanish Civil War) and, for political education, Col. Aleksander Zawadzki, a Polish communist and ZPP member. In late 1944 Berling was replaced as the commander of the First Army by Gen. Stanislaw Poplawski, another Soviet officer. See Jurek and Skrzypkowski, Tarcza Pokoju, pp. 312-313.
- 49 Jurek and Skrzypkowski, Tarcza Pokoju, pp. 313-315. Only 185,000 of the 400,000 were at the front. The figures for January 1945 were 150,000 at the front and 289,272 total. The low share in the total of the combat contingent was probably due to organizational and training problems and problems with political reliability (see below).
- 50 Jurek and Skrzypkowski, Tarcza Pokoju, p. 314.
- 51 Bordzilowski, "Rola Armii Radzieckiej," p. 35.
- 52 Ibid., p. 36. The corps' link in the command structure was missing. The First Army had 5 divisions rather than 3 corps; infantry divisions had higher complements of men (like Soviet Guards' divisions). Also, the contingents of artillery and engineers (per division) were larger, and the First Army had its own air force.
- 53 Bordzilowski, "Rola Armii Radzieckiej," pp. 38, 40.
- 54 S. Shtemenko, General'nyi shtab v gody voiny (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968), cited in Nussbaum, "Jews in the Polish Army," p. 99.
- 55 See Ch. 4 of Vol. I of this study.
- 56 Bordzilowski, "Rola Armii Radzieckiej," p. 37.
- 57 19,679 according to Polonsky and Drukier, op. cit., p. 12, and Jurek and Skrzypkowski, op. cit., p. 317; 16,396 according to fn. 12 of Krasiewicz, op. cit.. Perhaps the latter figure discounted those who stayed

on in the LWP. Polonsky and Drukier (p. 12) give the following data on the rank breakdown of Soviet officers in the Polish Army:

Seconded in:	Total	Generals	Colonels	Cols.	Majors	Lt.
May 1943-						
March 1944	1,465	6	17	54	113	
April-July 1944	3,221	4	49	99	285	
by July 1945	19,679	36	na	na	na	

- 58 Semiriaga et al., op. cit., p. 134.
- 59 Over 900 according to Semiriaga, and 2,000 according to fn. 12 of Krasiewicz, op. cit.
- 60 The July 1943 figure is from Semiriaga et al., p. 107; the others are from Polonsky and Drukier, pp. 12 and 56.
- 61 Semiriaga et al., op. cit., pp. 103, 105.
- 62 A.A. Epishev, Partiia i Armiia, 2nd enlarged ed. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1980), p. 230. The same order applied to Czech and Slovak partisans in the western regions of the USSR, who were dropped into Czechoslovakia.
- 63 Nussbaum, op. cit., p. 101.
- 64 Ibid.
- 65 Ibid., p. 100 and passim.
- 66 Davies, op. cit., p. 471.
- 67 Semiriaga et al., op. cit., p. 120.
- 68 Ibid., p. 121, citing the Archives of the Soviet Ministry of Defence, f. 236, op. 41792, d. 2, 1 244, 1266.
- 69 Ibid., and Polonsky and Drukier, op. cit., passim.
- 70 Polonsky and Drukier, op. cit., pp. 11-23 and passim. It is interesting to note that one such appeal to Dimitrov took place in March 1944, i.e., after the official dissolution of the Comintern (p. 15).

- 72 Michael Checinski, Poland: Communism, Nationalism, Anti-Semitism (New York: Karz-Cohl Publishing, 1982).
- 73 Polonsky and Drukier, op. cit., Documents section, passim.
- 74 Ibid., pp. 113, 118 and passim.
- 75 Here, in an embryo (but for the absence of an autonomous power base for the Polish party), was a replay of the 1943-44 controversy between Josip Broz-Tito of Yugoslavia, and Stalin.
- 76 See the minutes of the debate at the 21-22 May 1945 Plenum of the PPR Central Committee, in Polonsky and Drukier, op. cit., Document no. 75, pp. 424-444.
- 77 Ibid., p. 440. Italics mine.
- 78 Ibid., p. 426.
- 79 Ibid., pp. 430, 440.
- 80 Ibid., passim.
- 81 Ibid., Documents no. 48 (pp. 297-299) and no. 51 (pp. 306-352).
- 82 Nussbaum, op. cit., p. 98.
- 83 Wladyslaw Sokorski, credited with the authorship of Thesis no. 1, was dismissed from the army and "sent to work on the railroads." Gen. Berling backtracked, but his participation, when added to his other sins (his action in Warsaw, and his advocacy of "purely" Polish, i.e. without Soviets, military units) led to his removal from any position of power. Hilary Minc, who later became the Polish economic tsar, subjected himself to "self-criticism" which was apparently accepted. See Polansky and Drukier, op. cit., pp. 60, 356 and 455.
- 84 Polonsky and Drukier, op. cit., p. 63. The veto was reported to the PPR Politbureau by Bierut on 14 December 1944 (Document no. 69, p. 394).
- 85 According to Semirriage et al., "On 13 November 1944 the Soviet General Staff decided to stop the formation of the Third Polish Army because of a shortage of officers" (p. 125). Italics mine.

- 86 Polonsky and Drukier, op. cit., p. 33.
- 87 Ibid., p. 56. A later estimate gives the proportion of ex-AK officers among the LWP professional cadre in 1948 as 8%. See Maria Trulejska, Sprawa Polska, cited in ibid., fn. 95, p. 135 and p. 343.
- 88 Ibid., Document no. 65, p. 378.
- 89 Ibid., minutes of PPR Politbureau meeting, 31 October 1944, p. 361.
- 90 Ibid.. In the case of the 31st Infantry Regiment, 667 men deserted, and 180 remained loyal. Stalin's reaction was reported by Bierut at the PPR CC meeting on 22 October 1944. See Document no. 56, p. 356.
- 91 Bordzilowski, op. cit., p. 41.
- 92 Ibid., pp. 61-62 and Document no. 75, 20-21 May, pp. 430 and 438. Spychalski and Kowalski were both purged in 1948 along with Gomulka.
- 93 Nussbaum, op. cit., p. 98. Smersh ("Death to spies") was the Soviet military counterintelligence apparat.
- 94 Jurek and Skrzypkowski, op. cit., p. 318.
- 95 Polonsky and Drukier, op. cit., p. 106.
- 96 Jurek and Skrzypkowski, op. cit., p. 318.
- 97 Ibid.
- 98 Eugeniusz Hinterhoft, "Armia Rokossowskiego," Kultura (Paris) no. 7-8, July 1956, pp. 149-156.
- 99 Michael Checinski, The Postwar Development of the Polish Armed Forces, p. 4.
- 100 Eugeniusz Walczuk, "Oficerowie," Polityka, 29 April 1972, pp. 1, 4-8.
- 101 Hinterhoft, "Armia Rokossowskiego."
- 102 Karel Kaplan, Rada vzajemne hospodarske pomoci 1949-56 (unpublished manuscript), reference from Radoslav Selucky.

- 103 Michael Checinski, "Poland's Military Burden," Problems of Communism 32 (May-June 1983), pp. 31-44.
- 104 Davies, God's Playground, Vol. II, pp. 574-75.
- 105 Replacing Rola-Zymierski, who was subsequently arrested.
- 106 See Piotr Wozniak, Zapluty Karzel Reakcji: Wspomnienia AK-owca z Wiezien w PRL (Paris: Editions "Spotkania," 1982), pp. 97-99. General Tatar was a deputy commander-in-chief (for Home Affairs) of the Polish Armed Forces in London. He returned to Poland after 1945. Other officers included senior command personnel from the General Staff, Air Force, Navy and Artillery.
- 107 Jaklicz, "Armia," p. 73.
- 108 Hinterhoft, "Armia Rokossowskiego."
- 109 Jurek and Skrzypkowski, op. cit., p. 321.
- 110 Ibid., p. 320; Hinterhoft, op. cit.; and Davies, God's Playground, Vol. II, pp. 578-79.
- 111 Jurek and Skrzypkowski, op. cit., p. 320, and Checinski, "Poland's Military Burden," passim.
- 112 The troops used in the suppression were from the Fourth Armour Army Corps (from Silesia) and the Tenth Armour Division from Wroclaw. Cadets from the Armour Officer School in Golecin helped the protestors. See Jan de Weydenthal, "Martial Law in Poland," unpublished manuscript.
- 113 Davies, God's Playground, Vol. II, p. 584.
- 114 Checinski, "Ludowe Wojsko Polskie," pp. 16-17. General Kokoszyn may not have been the best choice for the MSW. He was not regarded as particularly bright; moreover, he was a 1940 graduate of the Aleksandrov NKVD college (p. 17).
- 115 Checinski, "Poland's Military Burden," p. 37, Table 3.
- 116 See Vol. I of this study, Ch. 4.

- 117 See Vol. I of this study, Chapters 7 and 8.
- 118 M. Anusiewicz and I. Ruszkiewicz, Tarcza Socjalistycznej Ojczyzny (Warsaw: MON, 1979), p. 292.
- 119 Checinski, The Postwar Development of the Polish Armed Forces.
- 120 Anusiewicz and Ruszkiewicz, op. cit., p. 292.
- 121 Checinski, The Postwar Development of the Polish Armed Forces, pp. 15-16.
- 122 Stalin's favourite expression re the establishment of communism in Poland was that it was like "trying to put a saddle on a cow" (as quoted by Davies, in God's Playground, Vol. II, passim).
- 123 Anusiewicz and Ruszkiewicz, op. cit., pp. 291-220. Italics mine. The phrase "broadly-defined defence posture" is a code word for the fragmentation of national units and their reintegration along service lines under overall Soviet command.
- 124 See Vol. I of this study, Ch. 8.
- 125 Jurek and Skrzypkowski, op. cit., p. 321. Italics mine.
- 126 Checinski, "Ludowe Wojsko Polskie," pp. 18-23. Anti-Semitism, which became increasingly visible at the time, and culminated in the events of 1968, was largely the function of the growing power of Mieczyslaw Moczar, a leading AL commander who became the Minister of the Interior (MSW) in 1964, was the chairman of an organization of ex-combatants (ZBoWiD), a CC secretary, a leader of the "Partisans" (a right-wing nationalist faction in the PZPR), and a man whose long career apparently gave him excellent connections with the Soviet security establishment.
- 127 Checinski, "Ludowe Wojsko Polskie," p. 21.
- 128 Ibid.
- 129 Jurek and Skrzypkowski, op. cit., p. 321.

- 130 See below and Vol. I of this study.
- 131 See Christopher D. Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact (New York: Praeger, 1981), and Vol. I of this study.
- 132 In socialist Poland the first marshal was Michal "Rola" Zymierski, who was arrested during the AL purge in 1952. The second marshal was Konstantin Rokossovsky. Spychalski was the third -- and so far the last. In his declining years Spychalski, an architect by training, was the butt of jokes in the officer corps because of his ignorance concerning professional military affairs and his senility. See Michael Sadykiewicz, "Jaruzelski's War," Survey 26 (Summer 1982).
- 133 For example, Gen. Jozef Urbanowicz, who is a Pole from Latvia. For some other examples see Section VI.3 below.
- 134 Sadykiewicz, op. cit., p. 20.
- 135 Checinski, Poland: Communism, Nationalism, Anti-Semitism.
- 136 Krasiewicz, op. cit., p. 121.
- 137 Ibid., p. 120.
- 138 Lawrence L. Whetten and James L. Waddell, "Military Education in the Polish Armed Forces," RUSI Journal for Defence Studies 125 (September 1980), passim.
- 139 Gen. Jozef Kaminski, "Army of the People Serving the People," Rzeczpospolita, 11 October 1983, translated in JPRS 84931, 13 December 1983, p. 69.
- 140 Col. F. Czerwinski, "Alarm dla Pedagogow," Zolnierz Wolnosci, 21-22 February 1981, pp. 6-7.
- 141 This author's interview with Henryk Bilski, an ex-captain of the Polish Air Force who is now in the West, Munich, November 1982.
- 142 Whetten and Waddell, op. cit., p. 54.
- 143 See, for example, the letter written by 2nd Lt. Morawiec in Zolnierz Wolnosci, 27-28 December 1980, p. 3.

- 144 Bilski interview.
- 145 This author's interview with Leon Dubicki, a retired LWP general who defected to the West in August 1981. The interview took place in Hamburg in November 1983. Also, the Bilski interview and Whetten and Waddell, op. cit.
- 146 Whetten and Waddell, op. cit., p. 55. Italics mine. Also see below, Section VI.3. However, it is not true, as Whetten and Waddell note, that, except for Gen. Urbanowicz, "there are no officers in the Polish army at present who have gained their initial degree from officers' schools outside Poland." Generals Jaruzelski and Siwicki are graduates of the Riazan Infantry School, and Generals Hupalowski and Kiszczak may also have had their initial training in Soviet schools -- their biographies are not explicit. Kiszczak (who is rumoured to be a Belorussian), in particular, spent "many years," according to official data, "in military counterintelligence," in the days when it was an agency of Smersh. Admiral Janczyszyn is reported to be a Soviet officer.
- 147 Whetten and Waddell, op. cit., and Krasiewicz, op. cit.
- 148 Glos, 13 December 1982. The school may be involved with training special designation Soviet forces (spetsnaznachenie).
- 149 Whetten and Waddell, op. cit., pp. 51-57.
- 150 Trybuna Ludu, 20 January 1982, p. 2.
- 151 See Vol. I of this study, Ch. 11.
- 152 Interviews with Dubicki and Bilski.
- 153 Sadykiewicz, op. cit.
- 154 Interview with the commander of the Pomeranian Military District, Gen. W. Baranski, in Wojsko Ludowe, No. 7, 1973.
- 155 See the outline of military service regulations published in Zolnierz Wolnosci, 6 November 1983, translated in JPRS (EPS), 84-020, 6 February 1984.

- 156 Ibid. and Julius Mrosik, "People's Republic of Poland," in Rudolf Woller, ed., Warsaw Pact Reserve Systems: A White Paper (Munich: Bernard and Graefe Verlag, 1978).
- 157 Ibid. and the Law on Conscription, 28 June 1979.
- 158 Amended Law on Universal Defence Obligation, Dziennik Ustaw, No. 61, 22 November 1983, pp. 805-808, translated in JPRS (EPS), 84-016, 3 February 1984.
- 159 Jurek and Skrzypkowski, op. cit., p. 322.
- 160 See Vol. I of this study, Chapters 3 and 11.
- 161 The system applies to the 5 "loyal" bloc countries, but not to Romania. For a discussion of this point see Vol. I of this study, Ch. 11. The list of the PZPR PB nomenklatura is included on pp. 319-321.
- 162 Interview with Gen. Dubicki.
- 163 Interview with a LWP colonel published in Solidarnosc Walczaca (Lodz), 29 April 1982, reprinted in Zeszyty Historyczne (Paris) No. 61, 1982.
- 164 See Vol. I of this study, Ch. 7.
- 165 Dubicki interview.
- 166 Mrosik, op. cit..
- 167 See Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe, Ch. 3.
- 168 Jurek and Skrzypkowski, op. cit., pp. 153-154. This source emphasizes that it is not regulated by the WP agreement.
- 169 Gen. of the Army Jozef Kaminski, "Ludowe Wojsko Polskie Waznym Ogniwem Paktu Warszawskiego," Wojskowy Przeglad Historyczny No. 3, 1978, p. 18.
- 170 See Vol. I of this study, Ch. 4.
- 171 Interview with Gen. Chocha, Polityka, 5 May 1973, p. 15.
- 172 Kaminski, op. cit., p. 18. Italics mine.
- 173 The Military Balance, 1983-84.

- 174 Zolnierz Polski, 11 Sept. 1983, p. 3, translated in JPRS 84754, 15 Nov. 1983, p. 47.
- 175 Trybuna Ludu, 3 July 1984, p. 2.
- 176 Interview with Capt. Bilski, who served in the headquarters of the Silesian air squadron as a meteorological officer.
- 177 The Military Balance, 1983-84.
- 178 Dubicki interview.
- 179 Kaminski, op. cit., p. 19.
- 180 Interview with Gen. Chocha, Polityka, p. 15.
- 181 Bilski interview.
- 182 Zolnierz Wolnosci, 19 June 1983, pp. 1, 5.
- 183 Dubicki interview.
- 184 Kaminski, op. cit., pp. 26-28. It is interesting to note that in the "Sever" (July 1968) fleet exercises Admiral Gorshkov's Polish deputy was none other than Admiral Studzinski, commander of the Polish Navy in Rokossovsky's days (p. 27). Air defence exercises included units of the internal as well as external forces: WOPK units, anti-aircraft units, and radio-technical communications and other units under Soviet Air Marshal Batitskii (p. 28).
- 185 Kaminski, op. cit., p. 29.
- 186 Ibid., passim; see also Jurek and Skrzypkowski, op. cit. For a detailed discussion of collaboration mechanisms, inclusive of the MPA, see Vol. I of this study, Chapters 7 and 8, and Jones, op. cit. A specific example of the Polish-Soviet joint writing of military history, and of running a multilateral field newspaper during the "Shield-78" manoeuvres, is described in Vol. I of this study, Ch. 9, pp. 286-290.
- 187 Speaking at a Polish-Soviet friendship rally, to the 10th Sudeten Armoured Division, Opole, on 17 Sept. 1976, on the occasion of a visit by the Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal D.F. Ustinov. Zolnierz Wolnosci, 18-19 Sept. 1976, translated in JPRS 68088, 19 Oct. 1976. Italics mine.

- 188 In the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war the Bureau of Studies in the General Staff (then headed by the purged Gen. Duszynski), analyzed the engagement, and discovered that the Soviet radar system used by the Egyptians did not protect the rear, which enabled the Israeli air attack to sneak in undetected from the West. Because the same radar screen is used in Poland and is directed westward, 3 Polish air force generals apparently demanded that a radar screen protecting the rear also be set up. They were demoted (information from Tadeusz Szafar).
- 189 Dubicki interview.
- 190 Sadykiewicz, op. cit., p. 22.
- 191 The warning, apparently passed on to Solidarity in 1980, was printed in a 1981 issue of the Russian samizdat publication Informatsionnyi Biuletien (of the Free Interprofessional Association of Workers -- SMOT), No. 25, reprinted in Arkhiv Samizdata, 4711, 12/81 (see Radio Liberty Bulletin 419/82).
- 192 As reported in Die Welt, 11 July 1983, p. 8, translated in FBIS-EEU, 12 July 1983, p. E1.
- 193 See Vol. I of this study, Ch. 9, and the chapter in (Vol. III) dealing with the USSR. A detailed description of in-service socialization in Poland is available in the chapter by L. Revesz in P. Gosztony, ed., Zur Geschichte der Europäischen Volksarmeen (Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Hohwacht Verlag, 1976). On pre-induction and reserve training, see L. Revesz, Militärische Ausbildung in Osteuropa (Bern: Verlag SOI, 1975). See also Julius Mrosik, op. cit.
- 194 Krasiewicz, op. cit., p. 121.
- 195 Michael Checinski, personal information.
- 196 Jurek and Skrzypkowski, op. cit., passim, and Anusiewicz and Ruszkiewicz, op. cit., passim. "Social links" have included the following: Career NCO Councils; comrades' courts; Councils of Conscript NCOs; Councils of Warrant Officers; Units of Social Control (Zespol Kontroli Społecznej); Organization of Military Families (ORW); honours courts; etc. See Zolnierz Wolnosci, 24 February 1981, 1 April 1981, and passim.

- 197 Stanislaw Kwiatkowski, Kultura Dowodzenia w Wojsku (Warsaw: MON, 1979), p. 54.
- 198 Interview with the deputy chief of the GZP, Gen. H. Koczara, in Wojsko Ludowe, No. 11, 1974.
- 199 Col. A. Monastyrska, "Refleksje o partyjnej aktywnosci," Zolnierz Wolnosci, 6 May 1981.
- 200 Kwiatkowski, op. cit., p. 96. On the stressful environment see Antoni Pawlak, "Ksiazeczka Wojskowa," ZAPIS 9 (London: Index On Censorship, June 1979).
- 201 Ibid., passim.
- 202 Interview with Gen. W. Oliwa, WOW commander, in Trybuna Ludu, 15 November 1977. See also Zolnierz Wolnosci (hereinafter ZW), 2-3 July 1977.
- 203 Lt. Col. Ignacy Olszewski, "A Permit," Wojsko Ludowe No. 2, 1974, pp. 59-61; Lt. K. Zielinski, "The Undisciplined," Wojsko Ludowe No. 11, 1976, pp. 44-48; ZW No. 82, 1981, p. 3 and No. 139, 1981, p. 3; and passim.
- 204 Zielinski, op. cit., p. 47.
- 205 Pawlak, op. cit., p. 42.
- 206 ZW, 18 February 1981, and 3 March 1981.
- 207 Interview with a delegate in ZW, 11-12 July 1981; discussion of the work of the "links" in ZW, 1 April 1981; and an article on the "links" in ZW, 24 February 1981.
- 208 ZW, 27-28 December 1980, 16 December 1980, 26 February 1981.
- 209 ZW, 19 February 1981.
- 210 ZW, 3-4 January 1981, 3 March 1981, 31 March 1981.
- 211 Resolutions of the conference electing delegates to the PZPR Congress in the Silesian OW (Generals Molczyk and Koczara attending), in ZW, 19 June 1981. Italics mine.

- 212 A review of the official position of the GZP in preparation for the PZPR Congress. See ZW, 13 July 1981, p. 5. Italics mine. The reference here is undoubtedly to the revival of interest in Jozef Pilsudski among the junior officer cadre, as reported by the underground press (see below, Section VI), as well as to the history of World War II discussed above in Section II.2.
- 213 ZW, 13 July 1981.
- 214 ZW, No. 73, 1981, p. 2, and Literaturnaia gazeta, Nos. 6 and 13, May 1981.
- 215 ZW, No. 141, 1981.
- 216 ZW, No. 248, 1980.
- 217 ZW, No. 105, 1981.
- 218 Interview with Gen. Honkisz in Zolnierz Polski, 18 March 1984.
- 219 Ibid.
- 220 ZW, 12 March 1984, as reported by Gen. Honkisz.
- 221 Mrosik, op. cit.
- 222 Ibid. See also the chapter on the Soviet Union in Vol. III of this study.
- 223 Ibid.
- 224 Ibid. and Vatslav Jagas (Waclaw Jagas), "Patrioticheskia organizatsii pol'skogo naroda," pp. 86-100, in A.V. Ostrovskii, ed., V edinom stroiu (Moscow: DOSAAF, 1981). Division general Jagas is the chairman of the Main Adminsitration of LOK.
- 225 ZW, 21 October 1983.
- 226 Socjusz, "Spolka Scylla i Charybda," Kultura (Paris), Jan.-Feb. 1981, p. 87.
- 227 Nowe Drogi, No. 10-11, 1980, p. 148.
- 228 ZW, No. 141, 1981, p. 2.

- 228 ZW, No. 141, 1981, p. 2.
- 229 A.M. Lipiec, "Praworzadnosc i Bezprawie," Kultura (Paris), May 1981, p. 101.
- 230 Solidarnosc, No. 5, 1981, p. 3. Italics mine.
- 231 Aleksander Smolar, quoted by Wechsler, op. cit., p. 144.
- 232 Reported in Polityka, 12 December 1981, p. 2.
- 233 Mieczyslaw Rakowski, "Orientacja Glowna," Polityka, 10 Nov. 1979.
- 234 Nowe Drogi, No. 1-2, Jan. 1981, pp. 380-81.
- 235 "Z Kraju," Polityka, 30 May 1981, p. 2.
- 236 Nowe Drogi, No. 7, 1981, p. 136.
- 237 36% identified the USSR, 20.2 % "the socialist states," and 10.8 % the government or other "internal forces." Polacy '81 (Warsaw, Polish Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, typescript). The survey was conducted in November 1981 and the results were not published before December 13. Quoted by David S. Mason, "Solidarity, the Regime and the Public," Soviet Studies 35(October 1983):538.
- 238 ZW, No. 4, 1981, p. 3.
- 239 ZW, No. 79, 1981, p. 4.
- 240 Wojsko Ludowe, No. 9, pp. 46-53.
- 241 Ibid., pp. 68-72.
- 242 ZW, 4 March 1981.
- 243 ZW, No. 12, 1981, p. 3.
- 244 ZW, No. 137, 1981.
- 245 ZW, 3 March 1981.
- 246 Report from a plenary meeting of the PZPR, central institutions of MON and GZP, ZW, 19 February 1981.

- 247 "Party in Action," reprinted from Wojsko Ludowe, in ZW, 26 February 1981.
- 248 "Mlodziez wojskowa aktywnie wlacza sie w nurt socjalistycznej odnowy kraju," ZW, 4 March 1981, p. 5.
- 249 Lt. Col. E. Olszewski, "Doskonalimy system ksztalcenia ideologicznego," ZW, 5 May 1981, p. 4.
- 250 Polityka, 8 July 1981; Trybuna Ludu, 30 Sept. 1981, 5 Oct. 1981, 7 Oct. 1981; Kultura (Paris), September 1981, p. 101.
- 251 ZW, No. 74, 1981, p. 2.
- 252 ZW, No. 72, 1981, p. 5.
- 253 Trybuna Ludu, 14 June 1981, p. 6.
- 254 ZW, No. 252, 1980, pp. 1-2, and No. 1, 2 Jan. 1981, p. 5.
- 255 ZW, No. 75, 1981, p. 7; No. 248, 1980, p. 3; No. 252, 1980, p. 2; No. 1, 1981, p. 5.
- 256 Polityka, No. , 1981.
- 257 Trybuna Ludu, 15 June 1981.
- 258 "Z nowej ksiegi zapisow Glognego Urzedu Kontroli Prasy, Publikacji i Widowisk," Dokumenty, Kultura (Paris), No. 7-8, 1981, p. 223.
- 259 Col. Prof. Marian Leczyk and Col. Docent Mieczyslaw Jaworski, "Elementary Truth," ZW, 27 Oct. 1980, translated in FBIS-EEU, 13 Nov. 1980, pp. G1-G4 (italicized passages published in boldface).
- 260 Nowe Drogi, No. 7, 1981. Italics mine. The CC Plenum reaffirmed the Kania-Jaruzelski leadership; supporters included all the "comrades in uniform" (Eric Bourne in The Christian Science Monitor, 12 June 1981, p. 12).
- 261 Nowe Drogi, No. 7, 1981.
- 263 Ibid.
- 264 ZW 12 June 1981, p. 3.

- 265 Tymoteusz Klempski, "Widziane z Bliska," Kultura (Paris), Jan.-Feb. 1983, p. 11.
- 266 See Vol. I of this study, Ch. 4, p. 68.
- 267 General Baryla, who was then C-in-C of the Pomeranian OW, and Admiral Janczyszyn, the naval commander in Gdynia, were in charge of land forces and naval units, respectively. Both are WRON members. In an interview with historian Wieslawa Kwiatkowska, concerning the events of 1970, Adm. Janczyszyn said that in 1970 he coordinated his actions directly with General Jaruzelski, as the Minister of National Defence (as did General Baryla), but he assigned the responsibility for the use of live ammunition by the troops to the political centre (Zenon Kliszko, Loga-Sowinski and Kociolek), who were directly in contact with First Secretary Gomulka. Janczyszyn disclaimed any knowledge of brutality or use of firearms by the troops in Gdynia. "Simple logic indicates that the fact of the use of firearms must have been a political provocation, as a result of which the political team was changed" (the reference is to the fall of Gomulka). Janczyszyn said he knew nothing about it and was waiting for the report of the investigating commission (which was then conducting an investigation) to find out what really happened. He hinted, however, that Szlachcic (Moczar's man and subsequently a CC Secretary under Gierek) played at that time a "curious role" in Gdynia. Source: A letter by Wieslawa Kwiatkowska to Admiral Ludwik Janczyszyn, with an attached resume of the interview, asking for a validation of the resume, dated 30 October 1981; #OPS-Z. Sekcja Historyczna. The document was made available to me by Roman Laba. The truthfulness of Janczyszyn's statements has to be weighed in the context of the time (1981) when the interview was conducted.
- 268 Gen. Dubicki ascribes the policy to Yuri Andropov personally (Dubicki interview).
- 269 Apparently the military warehouses were bursting with food supplies which, if released, would have helped to relieve the shortages. Solidarity press information, passim.
- 270 See Wechsler, op. cit., pp. 140-141 and A.M. Lipiec, "Praworzednosc i Bezprawie," Kultura (Paris), July-Aug. 1981, pp. 101-102.

- 271 For an unusually perceptive report on this development see Wechsler, op. cit., passim.
- 272 For the Soviet role in the preparation of the coup and a review of Polish-Soviet contacts in 1981 see Bruce Porter, "The USSR and Poland on the Road to Martial Law," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 4/82, 30 Dec. 1981.
- 273 Interviews with Bilski and Dubicki.
- 274 An interview with an officer, a reprint from the underground bulletin "W okopach" (Warsaw), in CSS/Bulletin No. 54 (New York), 18 April 1982, p. 5.
- 275 Interview with a LWP colonel published in Solidarnosc Walczaca (Lodz), 29 April 1982, reprinted in Zeszyty Historyczne (Paris) No. 61, 1982.
- 276 Radio Free Europe Situation Report (SR) 18, 31 December 1983, pp. 8-9. Also, ZW, 24 Nov. 1981, No. 269 and Trybuna Ludu, 5 Nov. 1981 and 18 November 1981. At the time the National Defence Committee (KOK) was attached to the Council of Ministers under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister.
- 277 Porter, op. cit.
- 278 Solidarity reports, passim.
- 279 As related by Wechsler, op. cit., pp. 142-143. The reason for the delay given by Siwak supports the interpretation of government policy presented above.
- 280 Porter, op. cit.
- 281 ZW and Polityka, December 11 and 12, 1981, passim.
- 282 Daniel Passent, "Pan Sekretarz," Polityka, 12 Dec. 1981, p. 16. The italicized text was printed in bloc letters.
- 283 The Polish Constitution does not have a provision for declaring a state of emergency, only a "state of war." The invocation of the "state of war" formed the basis for the popular perception that Jaruzelski declared war on Polish society, and gave rise to the universal usage of the term "war" to denote the martial law period, as in the phrases: "before the war" or "after the war," with December 13 as the watershed between "before" and "after".

- 284 The ZOMO, which in 1981 numbered between 25,000 and 30,000 men, were established in the 60s (some sources say in 1973, by the ex-premier Piotr Jaroszewicz, a 1st Army veteran and political officer). These Motorized Special Militia Units are trained specifically for riot and crowd control (combining military and police training). Their members are barracked, subjected to intense political indoctrination, and are available for use at a moment's notice. They are volunteers -- recruited from among the professional military cadre, militia and conscripts (since the martial law, selected conscripts are assigned to the ZOMO). According to official sources only one in four applicants have been accepted because of educational standards (a secondary education is required), health standards and political reliability. Unofficial sources insist that the ZOMO include criminals whose sentences are reduced when they volunteer, and that ZOMO pay and privileges are several times better than those available to ordinary soldiers. Both of these points are denied in official sources and are blamed on RFE propaganda. So are the persistent rumours that ZOMO members are drugged when sent into action. Not all ZOMO members are issued arms and live ammunition. Their standard weapons are shields and bats, riot control gas devices and water cannons; but tanks, arms and live ammunition have been used in breaking resistance in mines and factories. See Trybuna Ludu, 27 December 1982; Kontakt (Paris), May 1982, p. 66; CSS (New York), Biuletyn Informacyjny, No. 68, 23 Nov. 1982, p. 30; Solidarnosc -- Tygodnik Mazowsze, 13 March 1982, No. 6; and Solidarity sources, passim.
- 285 Arrivals in the West reported seeing Soviet tanks and cars deployed around Wroclaw (CSS, Biuletyn Informacyjny, No. 7, 29 Dec. 1981). Soviet trucks with soldiers were seen on the road from Warsaw to Gdansk on 13 December (CSS, Biuletyn Informacyjny, 23 Dec. 1981).
- 286 Kontakt (Paris), March-April 1983, p. 23.
- 287 Between July 1 and Sept. 30, 1981, 380,500 members were expelled from the PZPR and 288,800 members left the party (for a total loss of 669,300 members); 33,000 were admitted. Polityka, 12 Dec. 1981.

- 288 T. Szafar, "The Party and the Army," Harvard International Review 4 (Feb. 1982).
- 289 Jan de Weydenthal, "Martial Law in Poland," unpublished paper.
- 290 Richard Spielman, "Crisis in Poland," Foreign Policy, No. 49 (Winter 1982-83):20-36; Charles Gati, "Poland's Jaruzelski is not the Kremlin's Stooge," The Washington Post (Outlook section), 5 June 1983.
- 291 Jadwiga Staniszakis, "Stan wojenny w Polsce i jego dynamika," Part II, Kontakt (Paris), Nos. 3 and 4 (March-April 1983); and anonymous contributions to Biuletyn Małopolski, No. 4, 1982, reprinted in Kontakt, No. 2 (June 1982).
- 292 Quoted in Wechsler, op. cit., p. 200.
- 293 Radio Free Europe Research, (RFER) SR/18 (Poland) 31 Dec. 1983.
- 294 Le Figaro, 8 December 1983, p. 4.
- 295 Wechsler, op. cit., p. 98.
- 296 As in the celebrated case of 18-year-old Grzegorz Przemyk, the son of the poet and Solidarity activist Barbara Sadowska, who was picked up on the street by the militia for no reason and beaten so severely that he died of his injuries two days later.
- 297 The new mobile regiments (pulki manewrowe) are composed of the ZOMO, the newly-created ROMO (Reserve Units of Citizen's Militia, who are recruited from among the reserves who served in internal security troops, border guards, special guard units, etc.), and the old ORMO (volunteer militia reserves which have not been particularly effective). The ZOMO is divided into operational and tactical units. The tactical units are small volunteer platoons attached to mobile regiments in each voivodship centre. Unlike the regular ZOMO they have arms and ammunition and their task is to break through first resistance, then withdraw behind the regular ZOMO and shoot over their heads. Members are generally below 30, and many are non-uniformed. Such a unit was apparently used in the Bydgoszcz incident. Kontakt (Paris), Nos. 3 & 4 (March-April 1983), pp. 22-23.

- 298 CSS Report (New York), No. 23, 20 April 1984.
- 299 KOS Bulletin, No. 12, 27 July 1982, reprinted in Kontakt (Paris), No. 7 (November 1982), pp. 23-25.
- 300 Dziennik Ustaw, No. 61, 22 November 1983, pp. 805-808, translated in JPRS-EPS, 84-016, 3 Feb. 1984, pp. 132-140. See also RFER, SR/17 (Poland), 27 Nov. 1983.
- 301 ZW, 19 Dec. 1983, p. 3, translated in JPRS-EPS, 84-016, 3 Feb. 1984, pp. 140-144.
- 302 Ibid., p. 144.
- 303 Ibid., p. 143.
- 304 Ibid., p. 142.
- 305 Quoted in Vol. I of this study, Ch. 7, pp. 280-81.
- 306 Zycie Warszawy, 29 Oct. 1981, p. 3.
- 307 ZW, 19 Feb. 1981.
- 308 Nussbaum, op. cit., p. 102.
- 309 Kierunki, 23 Oct. 1983, translated in JPRS 94031, 13 December 1983, pp. 94-97.
- 310 Istvan Kormendy, Magyarorszag (Budapest), 12 Nov. 1972, p. 8, translated in JPRS 57548, 17 Nov. 1972, p. 4. Italics mine.
- 311 Trybuna Ludu, 15 Nov. 1977. See also ZW, 2-3 July 1977.
- 312 Jurek and Skrzypkowski, op. cit., pp. 305-308. Soviet sources actually credit Soviet officers with the formation of the Polish underground (Semiriaga et al., op. cit., p. 103).
- 313 Jurek and Skrzypkowski, op. cit., pp. 322-313.
- 314 Semiriaga et al., op. cit., p. 118.
- 315 Bordzilowski, op. cit., p. 39.

- 317 Polonsky and Drukier, op. cit., p. 61.
- 318 "Meldunki Plk. Radoslawa," Zeszyty Historyczne (Paris), No. 63 (1983). Radoslaw describes the unit as mixed Polish-Russian, and disappointing in terms of combat performance.
- 319 Tymoteusz Klempski, "Polakow z Historia Kłopoty," Zeszyty Historyczne, No. 53 (1980).
- 320 Wechsler, op. cit., pp. 97-207 passim.
- 321 J. Kraszewski, "Legendy, mity i rzeczywistość," Trybuna Ludu, 7-8 August 1982.
- 322 Wechsler, op. cit., passim; Kontakt, No. 2 (Feb. 1983), pp. 6-8; and other sources. It is amusing to note that in 1981 ZW published a letter to the editor in which Waclaw Kalita criticized the "fuss" being made by Solidarity over Gen. Sikorski, who "fought with the USSR" and evacuated the Polish Army under Gen. Sikorski from the USSR at the time of the Stalingrad battle, when "every soldier there was worth his weight in gold." See ZW, 11-12 July 1981, p. 8.
- 323 RFER, SR/10 (Poland), 5 July 1983.
- 324 See Stefan Malski, "The Polish Government's Policy of Symbolic Politics," RFER, RAD BR/232 (Poland), 29 Sept. 1983.
- 325 The regime relies heavily on its own symbolism. 22 July (a national holiday) is the date of the establishment in 1944 of the PRWN (the Polish Committee of National Liberation). See section II.2 above.
- 326 Adam Michnik, one of the four KOR leaders whose trial was terminated by the 1984 amnesty, had to be carried out of jail, because he refused to acknowledge that he was guilty of any crime and demanded either a trial or full exoneration.
- 327 Michael T. Kaufman, "Poland is Turning the Wheel Without Turning the Corner," New York Times, 5 August 1984.
- 328 Ibid.
- 329 Ibid.

- 330 Reported by CSS (New York), 27 August 1982, Biuletyn Informacyjny, No. 65. The result was so unwelcome that vice-premier Rakowski allegedly ordered a new poll by "reliable" pollsters from the Party's Institute of Marxism-Leninism.
- 331 CSS (New York), June 1983, Biuletyn Informacyjny, No. 74, p. 19.
- 332 Informacja Solidarnosc, Region Mazowsze (Warsaw), No. 23, 9 February 1982.
- 333 "Wywiad z KOS'em," Kultura (Paris), Jan.-Feb. 1984, p. 93.
- 334 Ibid., passim.
- 335 Ibid., p. 93.
- 336 CSS (New York), "Partial List of Uncensored Periodicals Printed Underground in the Polish People's Republic as of December 1983," 1 March 1984.
- 337 Tygodnik Powszechny, 22 August 1982, p. 1.
- 338 Kultura (Paris), July-August 1982, p. 130.
- 339 Interview with M. Rakowski in Trybuna Ludu, 21-22 August 1982.
- 340 Aryeh Neier, "The Other Poland," New York Times, 10 May 1984, p. A31.
- 341 Ibid.
- 342 Kontakt (Paris), May 1983, p. 83.
- 343 CSS (New York), Reports, 20 April 1984, Issue no. 23, p. 24. On the TKK Solidarity boycott resolution of 22 January 1983, see Kontakt, February 1983, pp. 1-5.
- 344 I am indebted for this information to Jolanta Strzelecka, who compiled the statistics.
- 345 A citation from the TKK appeal of 9 February 1984, CSS (New York Reports, 10 April 1984, p. 23).
- 346 RFER, SR/18 (Poland), 31 December 1983, p. 15.
- 347 Ibid.

- 348 The list included bishops Kraszewski and Tokarczuk, 8 Jesuits, 6 Dominicans and, among the parish priests, fathers Jankowski (Walesa's parish priest), Popieluszko (Warsaw) and Nowak (Ursus Combine). Father Nowak was transferred by the Primate to a rural parish despite the open protests of his parishioners.
- 349 "Wywiad z KOS'em," op. cit.
- 350 As formulated by the ZSMP chairman at a March 1984 PZPR national conference. Quoted in "Poland's Alienated Youth," RFER, SR/7 (Poland), 7 April 1984, p. 13.
- 351 Ibid., p. 14.
- 352 Krzysztof Debek, "Szkoła na Wewnętrznej Emigracji," Sprawy i Ludzie, 1 March 1984.
- 353 RFER, SR/7 (Poland), 7 April 1984, p. 15.
- 354 Ibid.
- 355 CSS (New York), Biuletyn Informacyjny, No. 74, June 1983, p. 26. Consumption of alcohol increased from 1.5 litres per person per year (1945) to 8.4 litres in 1980, i.e., over 5 times.
- 356 M. Kaufman, "Church and Union Urge Poles to Shun Vodka," New York Times, 2 August 1984.
- 357 D.K. Willis, "The Global Fight Against Drugs," Christian Science Monitor, 15 December 1983.
- 358 A TV crew which came to film protesters planted empty vodka bottles in classrooms and ransacked dormitories which were then filmed to show that the protesters were actually juvenile delinquents. RFER, SR/7 (Poland), 7 April 1984, pp. 16-18.
- 359 Victoria Pope, "The Children, Too, Reflect the Strains of Poland's Ordeal," Wall Street Journal, 5 April 1983.
- 360 A.K. Wroblewski, Polityka, 12 December 1981.
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- 366 Tadeusz Szafar, "The Party and the Army," Harvard International Review 4 (Feb. 1982).
- 368 "W okopach," Feb. 1982, reprinted in CSS (New York), Bulletin No. 54, 18 April 1982; CSS (New York), Biuletyn Informacyjny NSZZ Solidarnosc, Region Mazowsze, Warsaw, 28 Dec. 1981; Ibid., 8 Jan. 1982, "Solidarity Information Bulletin," No. 6; Ibid., 4 Feb. 1982, Biuletyn Informacyjny, No. 31; Ibid., 23 December 1981, Biuletyn Informacyjny; Centre for social Research and Information, Bureau, Mazowsze Solidarity Chapter, News of the Day, 17 Dec. 1981.
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- 370 "Freeman Report," CNN, 1 January 1982, 22:00, interview with Anthony Collings, CNN's correspondent in Poland.
- 371 CSS (New York), Biuletyn Informacyjny, No. 66, 1 Oct. 1982, reprinted from "Z dnia na dzien" (Warsaw), No. 75.
- 372 As reprinted by ibid. from the Solidarnosc Bulletin, Mazowsze region.
- 373 Interview with a LWP colonel in Solidarnosc Walczaca, No. 17, 29 April 1982, reprinted in Zeszyty Historyczne, No. 61, 1982. See also Section III.5.C above.

- 374 Lt. Col. Jozef Pawlowski, "Causes Underlying the Formation of Negative Attitudes in Relations Among Soldiers in Basic Military Service," Przeglad Wojsk Lotniczych i Wojsk Obrony Powietrznej Kraju, Nov. 1983, pp. 58-131.
- 375 Ibid.
- 376 See the chapter on the USSR in Vol. III of this report.
- 377 Pawlowski, op. cit.
- 378 Kontakt (Paris), Sept.-Oct. 1982, p. 22.
- 379 Le Matin, 3 Feb. 1982, translated in FBIS-EEU, 11 Feb. 1982, pp. G21-22.
- 380 S. Reperowicz, "Division Arrives from the Air," Trybuna Ludu, 17 Aug. 1981. Italics in the original. The division is referred to as the "Pomeranian Airborne Division" and also as the "red berets." All other sources indicate that the "red berets" are the Cracow Airborne Division, while the Pomeranian division is an amphibious division and wears blue berets (?)
- 381 Biuletyn Informacyjny, RKW Solidarnosc Malopolska, No. 9, 22 Feb. 1982 (reprinted in CSS Reports -- New York). This time the reference was clearly to the Cracow-based airborne division.
- 382 Intelligence Digest, Weekly Review, 13 October 1982.
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- 387 A. Brzezinski and M. Cieciera, "Prawne aspekty dzialalnosci przeciw alkoholowej," Wojsko Ludowe, January 1979, pp. 48-52.

- 388 Report by General Albin Zyro, GZP deputy chief, at a meeting of the Central Commission for Anti-Alcoholic Activities.
- 389 W. Piekarski, "Trzeba zakasac rekawy," ZW, 30 Dec. 1980, p. 6.
- 390 Sadykiewicz, op. cit. See Table 5.
- 391 Private conversation in 1982 during a visit to the West.
- 392 Tygodnik Wojenny, No. 5, 28 Jan. 1982 (Solidarity publication, Mazowsze region).
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- 395 Pope, op. cit.
- 396 Checinski, The Postwar Development of the Polish Armed Forces, p. 29.
- 397 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
- 398 A. Ross Johnson et al., op. cit., p. 66.
- 399 Dubicki interview; an officer from WAT (the Military Technical Academy) interviewed by Slowo (Warsaw), 7 April 1982, as reported in CSS (New York) on the basis of "Solidarnosc Walczaca," No. 17, 29 April 1982.
- 400 Officer from WAT, op. cit.
- 401 Dubicki interview.
- 402 Ibid.
- 403 Klempski, "Widziane z Bliska."
- 404 M. Sadykiewicz, "Sily Zbrojne PRL," manuscript, to be published by Kultura (Paris).

- 405 "List oficerow Wojska Polskiego," reprinted by Tygodnik Polskie Wiadomosci (Vienna), 8 August 1982.
- 406 "Krecia Robot," Tygodnik Polskie Wiadomosci, 1 August 1982.
- 407 "Informacja Solidarnosci," region Mazowsze (Warsaw), No. 38, 2 April 1982.
- 408 Bilski interview.
- 409 Dubicki interview.
- 410 Ibid.
- 411 Wechsler, op. cit., pp. 98-99.
- 412 Klempski, op. cit., p. 13 (free translation by TRH).
- 413 "List Oficerow . . . ," op. cit.
- 414 The information here comes from Soviet sources such as V.G. Kulikov, ed., Akademiiia General'nogo Shtaba (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), pp. 242, 271-272, 268-269.
- 415 Colonel Sadykiewicz's CV, attached to "Sily Zbrojne PRL," op. cit., indicates that he joined the Kosciuszko Division as a 2nd Lt. in 1943 (he was a sergeant in the SAF), and that he remained a Soviet citizen until 1950. Between 1943 and 1950 all his promotions (from 2nd Lt. to Lt. Col.) in the Polish Army automatically applied to his standing in the Soviet Army. Sadykiewicz graduated from the Voroshilov Academy in 1957.
- 416 This was a ceremony awarding Marshal Rokossovsky' name to a formation. Bordzilowski was listed by his Soviet rank, Col. Gen., and not by his Polish rank of General of Arms. See ZW, 6 May 1975, translated in JPRS 65867, 27 May 1975.
- 417 General Siwicki's biography is very interesting. The official version says he was born in Luck (prewar E. Poland), the son of a cadre NCO in the Polish Army. Other sources (The Economist), suggest that he was the son of a Soviet staff colonel who was seconded to the Kosciuszko Division. According to official data Siwicki graduated from the Riazan Infantry School, and from the Voroshilov General Staff Academy in 1956, had

participated in the pacification campaign, and subsequently worked in the Ministry of Defence under Rokossovsky and was given line commands (an exact duplicate of Jaruzelski's career). In 1961-63 Siwicki served as the Polish military, air and naval attache in Peking. This is an interesting divergence from the pattern in view of the dates: i.e., after the Sino-Soviet quarrel and at a time when Soviet attachés were not welcome there. From 1963 to 1968 Siwicki was the chief of staff of the Silesian OW and from 1968 to 1971 he was the district's commander (the Silesian OW is the most important military district, because Soviet forces are stationed there). In his capacity as the district's commander Siwicki commanded the Polish contingent in the WP invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. In 1971-73 he was First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, and in 1973-83, Chief of Staff and Deputy Minister of National Defence. He is reported to have been the liaison man between the LWP and the Soviet military in the preparation of the December 13, 1981 coup. Who's Who in Poland (Warsaw: Interpress, 1982), p. 780; RFER, SR/17 (Poland), 27 Nov. 1983, pp. 12-13; Porter, op. cit.; Foreign Report (The Economist), No. 1711, 14 Jan. 1982, p. 2; and Zycie Warszawy, 29 Nov. 1981. In Nov. 1983 Gen. Siwicki replaced Gen. Jaruzelski as the Minister of National Defence.

418

Who's Who In Poland, op. cit., p. 350. According to this source General Kiszcak was born in Roczyny (Eastern Poland?) and joined the LWP in 1945. He was the chief of Military Intelligence and deputy chief of the General Staff in 1972-79, and the chief of Military Policy in the Ministry of Defence in 1979-81. He became deputy minister of Internal Affairs in July 1981, and Minister of Int. Affairs in August 1981. He was a member of the Polish Workers Party (PPR) in 1945-1948, and has been a member of the PZPR since 1948. He became a candidate member of the CC PZPR in 1980, a full member in 1981, and a candidate member of the Politbureau in 1981. The Economist's Foreign Tuczapski in 1957, Krepki in 1961, Molczyk in 1968, Rapacewicz in 1968, Janczyszyn in 1960 and Oliwa in 1963. Dates are not available for the first promotions of Generals Siwicki and Hupalowski, but they must have been promoted to general officer rank before 1968, for Siwicki became the commander of the Silesian OW in 1968, and Hupalowski was the head of the OTK from 1965 to 1968. General Jaruzelski received his first star in 1956. All of the above received their second and/or their third stars after 1968. Who's Who, op. cit.

- 419 The rank of general of brigade was bestowed on Tuczapski in 1957, Krepiski in 1961, Molczyk in 1968, Rapacewicz in 1968, Janczyszyn in 1960 and Oliwa in 1963. Dates are not available for the first promotions of Generals Siwicki and Hupalowski, but they must have been promoted to general officer rank before 1968, for Siwicki became the commander of the Silesian OW in 1968, and Hupalowski was the head of the OTK from 1965 to 1968. General Jaruzelski received his first star in 1956. All of the above received their second and/or their third stars after 1968. Who's Who, op. cit.
- 420 The rank of general of brigade was bestowed on Lozowicki in 1970, Baryla in 1970, Kiszcza in 1973, Uzycki in 1974, Janiszewski in 1976 and Jarosz in 1978. No date is available for General Piotrowski, who is an engineer, but his career pattern indicates a relatively late promotion. Who's Who, op. cit.
- 421 Kaminski, "Ludowe Wojsko . . . ,"op. cit., pp. 9-30.
- 422 The hero of an epic poem by Adam Mickiewicz who became the leader of the Knights of the Cross (Krzyzacy, Poland's sworn enemies from the 13th through the 16th centuries) in order to destroy them.
- 423 Cited in de Weydenthal, op. cit., from the tape of a speech in Szczecin on 24 January 1971, published in E. Wacowska, ed., Rewolta Szczecinska i jej znaczenie (Paris, 1971).

CHAPTER 2

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Ivan Sylvain

Introduction

The National People's Army (NVA) has received more attention than any other non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Force (NSPF). This is not surprising. Assignment to the "first strategic echelon" in cooperation with the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG), and the potential spectre of Red Prussian militarism against the backdrop of a divided Germany and an isolated Berlin, give it intrinsic interest and importance. Of particular concern to this study is the progressively important role that the NVA and supporting paramilitary units play in securing the authority of the Socialist Unity Party (SED).

Whetten states the problem exactly: "The NVA is a highly trained, well-equipped army without a nation." The SED, for its part, "remains synthetic, hypersensitive to criticism, and an effective practitioner of 'Abgrenzung,' or demarcation of issues with the West." It must be added that the SED is also an effective authoritarian 'gatekeeper' concerning issues in the East. It has not been able to achieve any degree of real legitimacy with the East German population and instead relies on "organization, socialization, indoctrination, coercion, incentives and ideology."¹

As the SED has turned more toward the NVA as the "school of the nation," the armed forces and security apparati have been rewarded with increased official recognition and status in society. In fact, the SED may be seeking to model society on military relationships, which represent a perfected form of ordered hierarchical control if not participation based upon legitimate acceptance.

Questions directly concerning the NVA have focused on reliability in supporting the regime and in combat. Combat reliability

studies concentrate first on potential adversaries in the West and secondarily in the bloc or elsewhere. The NVA is, of course, the most highly integrated of all non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces. So much so that, in a very real sense, it is not an "army" if by that is understood a force capable of undertaking independent action and sustaining coordinated combat by all units. It is therefore necessary to consider NVA reliability in the context of the Soviet factor, in terms of technical and political control and cooperation. To treat the NVA either as divorced from the GDR "nation," or from the Warsaw Pact and the GSFG in particular, is to set out false premises and to colour results accordingly.

It has proven more tempting to make the former error rather than the latter. Studies which concentrate on the NVA out of its societal context often conclude that it possesses greater military morale and effectiveness than those that do relate it to "nation building." This study will proceed through stages that begin with the SED's authority building efforts. This will establish the NVA's "pride of place," in order to proceed with an examination of the forces themselves from the bottom of the rank structure upwards. A discussion of the technical and political integration of the NVA with the GSFG will follow, and will lead to the concluding observations.

Before proceeding with such a "subjective" analysis, the following "objective factors" generally characterize the NVA. Including all arms, there are 167,000 men in the NVA, which gives a participation rate of only slightly less than 1% of the total population.² This represents a lower participation rate than for other Warsaw Pact members. Although the GDR is third in population, the armed forces of the GDR are next to last in terms of the number of men under arms and, together with Hungary, have the smallest number of divisions.³ This apparent imbalance is in large part produced by maintaining 70,200 men in extremely well-armed paramilitary forces, which include border guards (46,500) and security troops (Ministry of State Security (MfS) Wachregiment) 6,200; police security troops (17,500).⁴

If the career cadre in the regular forces is combined with these paramilitary troops then the resulting "ratio of distrust" with respect to the 92,000 conscripts in the NVA is 1.6, the highest in the Warsaw Pact.⁵ Estimates of the total number of officers, NCOs and enlisted men in the NVA vary, but the leadership cadre is unusually large, as in other Warsaw Pact forces. Anywhere between 15% and 19% of NVA members may be officers. Overall there may be one NCO or officer for every two enlisted men.⁶ Neither the "ratio of distrust" nor the ratio of command cadre to enlisted men give an "objective" picture of confidence in the average NVA trooper.

Nevertheless, the NVA is the first NSPF to receive new, or relatively new, Soviet weapons. Its equipment appears to be well maintained, and its standards of training and combat readiness are considered good.⁷ Here "subjective" factors intervene. A Western observer who feels that the NVA is the "most trust-worthy" NSPF notes that from the Soviet point of view it remains the "least trusted of the military forces in East Europe."⁸

Social Setting: Power and Authority in the GDR

The hypersensitivity of the SED is justified. Despite the more than twenty years that have elapsed since the Berlin Wall forced the East German population to reach some accommodation with the communist state, the popular legitimacy of the SED remains problematical, to say the least.

To some extent an accommodation has emerged, but without a positive emotional association with the GDR.⁹ Rather, faced with the realization that there was no practical alternative, the population determined to make the best of it in the best German tradition. Some distinctively East German pride in having succeeded despite the system imposed by the SED has resulted. This decidedly "cold-blooded" accommodation is based first and foremost on the so-called East German economic miracle, which has given the country the highest standard of living in Eastern Europe.¹⁰

The East Germans, however, do not look to the East for their standards of achievement but rather to their co-nationals in the West. There is a continuing popular association with being German,¹¹ notwithstanding a sense of envy and some disappointment that the West Germans do not seem to be particularly interested in reunification.¹² This sense of an overarching German identity is reinforced by the fact that the FRG media reach approximately 80% of the GDR population.¹³ The SED also reluctantly contributes to this continuing identification. Its often strident pursuit of 'Abgrenzung,' which is accompanied by the maintenance of inter-German links in trade in order to support the relative prosperity entailed in the so-called economic miracle, are clearly schizophrenic. They demonstrate the continuing problems involved with the creation of a viable, independent society.

The SED has always been preoccupied with establishing the GDR's legitimacy and identity, not just within its own borders but in the world at large. The 'Ostpolitik' initiated by the West Germans gave the SED the opportunity to pursue international recognition and differentiation from the FRG on a different footing. To be sure, former SED leader Ulbricht vigorously opposed it on traditional grounds. His successor, Erich Honecker, proved more "tractable," and developed a new compensatory formula. 'Abgrenzung' was the intimate, perhaps necessary and inevitable, companion of 'Ostpolitik,' and was symbolized by the argument that the GDR was a new "state of developed socialism." According to this concept a new socialist national entity had been created, and there was no such thing as one German nation. Indeed, in keeping with 'Abgrenzung' the SED purged the word "German" from the GDR's constitution and national anthem.¹⁴

Parallel with these developments, the SED has been advocating close integration within the Soviet-led bloc through the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) as well as the Warsaw Pact. The GDR has, in effect, become the East European champion of bloc integration, as long as the inter-German link remains sacrosanct. As this champion, it is a resolute defender of orthodoxy. The NVA has played an important

and publicly visible role not only in Warsaw Pact manoeuvres and in military integration, but also, beginning in 1971, in Third World "diplomatic offensives" supporting "wars of national liberation" and "socialist internationalism."¹⁵

Equipped with 'Abgrenzung,' the SED was able to view the culmination of 'Ostpolitik,' with the signing of the inter-German treaty in 1972, and its ratification by the FRG in 1973, as the coming of age of the GDR in its own right. For a brief period this was accompanied by an officially sanctioned show of confidence. Whether this was designed to impress foreign audiences with superficial legitimacy in order to speed recognition is open to question, but several interesting initiatives were undertaken. 'Abgrenzung' notwithstanding, much greater personal contact between visiting West Germans and East Germans was permitted and greater access to Western consumer goods in 'Intershops' was provided to East Germans as long as they had the hard currency to pay for them.¹⁶ While there were various moves to increase indoctrination and new programmes in military and civilian defence were set up, there were also expressions of self-confidence in the East German military press. In 1973, NVA political organs apparently went so far as to "ask" conscripts not to listen to the FRG media, which was in keeping with Honecker's decision to permit certain ideological debates to take place and to generally loosen cultural strictures.¹⁷

The signs of self-confidence during this 1973/74 "watershed" were so extensive as to suggest they were not simply the product of efforts to accelerate international recognition. Five years later, however, the weakness of the SED's position was apparent. Renewed interest and respect for West Germany had resulted from increased contacts and access to consumer goods in the 'Intershops,' and with this came some envy, bitterness,¹⁸ and a desire, once again, to "vote with one's feet."¹⁹ The relaxation of ideological control was also accompanied by the emergence of critical, neo-Marxist intellectuals who proposed leftist "alternatives" to SED state communism. As early as 1976, the SED began exiling, or permitting the self-exile of, these

intellectual dissidents.²⁰ The SED was facing rising crime rates among those in the 14-25 age bracket, which included precisely those GDR citizens who had grown up knowing no other system,²¹ and in late 1977 youth riots which were anti-Soviet in content took place after a rock concert in East Berlin.²² By 1978, some 200,000 GDR citizens had applied to emigrate, and the SED began to systematically reimpose "some of the harshest measures taken against its people of any Pact government."²³ Again in 1978, the GDR found itself in debt and gradually more subject to the world-wide economic recession and energy crisis.²⁴

SED Social Strategy

The SED's response to these increasing problems has been without exception one of reliance on traditional communist-model, authoritarian institution building. Such an approach is particularly interesting in that the effective economic point of accommodation between the regime and its people has been under direct challenge. The accumulation of various internal and external factors, not the least of which has been the requirement to subsidize Jaruzelski's efforts to recall Poland from the brink,²⁵ has led to a sudden drop in East Germany's precious standard of living. Although discontent with compensation and access to goods, including isolated consumer demonstrations, predate the Polish crisis,²⁶ economic problems have become worse²⁷ and the need to "regenerate consensus" has become apparent.²⁸

It would be more correct to say that it has become necessary to reassert authority and control. Three parallel strategies seem to have emerged since 1978 to achieve this goal. The first is to rediscover the German, and more specifically Prussian, nation and increasingly to claim "credit" for the current embodiment of any "progressive" national traditions. Second, there has been a recentralization of the economic system and a greater emphasis on military spending. Third, there is an increased emphasis on the institutional militarization of society, with

the population being forced to participate more frequently and intensively in paramilitary activities and organizations.

1. Reassessment of German/Prussian History

The first of these strategies represents a partial recognition of the continuing popular identification with "Germania" and a retreat from the description of the GDR as a new society in which the word "German" ostensibly need not be mentioned or apply. Thus, current SED usage refers to the "socialist state of the German nation." To be sure, however, the emphasis is on seeking only the "progressive roots" of this nation.

The onset of the historical campaign may have been marked by the resurrection of Frederick the Great in 1979. The official treatment of Prussia's great ruler represents precisely what the SED wishes to associate with "progress." Frederick II's rehabilitation was based on his establishment of a correct form of political administration, i.e., one that was hierarchical and unitary.²⁹ His military record, to the contrary, is still highly criticized for having served only "dynastic interests."³⁰ In 1981, his martial statue on horseback was returned to its place of honour in East Berlin after almost thirty years of "exile" in Potsdam.³¹ The historical campaign has also included such unlikely candidates for "socialist" emulation as Martin Luther, whom Engels condemned as the "servant of princes," and Richard Wagner, long associated with the roots of National Socialism.³² Most recently, former Chancellor Bismark has been added to the list, because of his sense of "realism" in foreign policy; interestingly, in support of balance in Europe, of course, including friendship with Russia.³³

There appears to be no limit to the historical scope of the current drive. The very beginnings of Germany as an ethnic entity have been declared a proper subject for scrutiny -- a far cry from purging the word "German" from the constitution.³⁴ For example, military historians now praise the "German" victory over Roman Legions in the

Teutoburger Wald. The campaign also praises "timeless" military virtues such as heroism, gallantry and self-sacrifice in their own right.³⁵

Reopening the Pandora's box of German/Prussian military history, however, is under close control. Whenever possible an old, renewed tradition is blended with modern concerns and "proletarian internationalism." Thus, the Prussian "great tattoo," as resurrected in 1981, contains new elements in praise of being a soldier for "peace and socialism," and the label "Red Prussia" is avoided or denounced.³⁶ "Timeless virtues" are usually personified by Soviet examples.³⁷

This first strategy, then, constitutes an appeal to emotional ties to "Germania" and Prussia in order to attempt to legitimize the central authority or today's East German regime within the constraints of Soviet Communism and "proletarian internationalism." It also shows an emphasis on more ascriptive, i.e. less materialistic, values through a stress on "timeless" virtues. The centralizing, authoritarian theme is carried over into the second strategy.

2. Economic Centralization and Military Industrial Concentration

Despite the fact that the so-called East German economic miracle was produced, at least in part, by the "New Economic System" -- a decentralized reform which gave some authority to industrial managers -- the SED has decided that solutions to current problems lie in a return to administrative central planning. Consequently, the relative autonomy formerly granted to industrial enterprises and combines is being rolled back to the State Planning Commission.³⁸ This change is being accomplished in the name of continuity with efficiency. Investment in technology and "robotics" is to be relied upon to produce intensive industrial development as a substitute for systematic change.³⁹

Coupled with this recentralization has been increased preferential treatment for military economic planning priorities. Prior to rolling back limited enterprise authority in 1979, the NVA was

officially granted priority over any domestic competitors for supplies and services.⁴⁰ The military sector has also taken an increasingly greater share of state investment. Despite economic hardships, military spending continues to increase at the rate of 8% per annum.⁴¹ This results, perhaps in large part, from meeting increased CMEA/WP requirements⁴² and growing support for NVA cooperation with the Third World. It may be that NVA - Third World cooperation forms part of an integrated GDR trade strategy to expand markets for its machinery and obtain raw materials on more favourable terms; the classic trade pattern of developed economies but with an unusual twist.⁴³

The NVA's increased economic importance and priority status has been accompanied by growing military and security apparati representation on the SED Central Committee, and by the decreasing influence of technocrats and pragmatists. In fact, "it is surprising that so few Central Committee members are directly involved in the process of industry, agriculture and trade" since the 10th SED party Congress.⁴⁴ The Honecker leadership's preference for party functionaries and military or paramilitary party members may explain, in part, the lack of innovative solutions to current economic difficulties.


The economic and social importance of the NVA officer corps is not limited, however, to narrow military-related sectors or representation in the highest decision-making bodies of the party. Besides occupying numerous directly related paramilitary positions, general rank officers are deputies in the Ministries of Foreign Trade, Construction and Transportation, the State Planning Commission and the General State Procuracy. In addition, a military officer is the state secretary of the Main Administration of the Council of Ministers.⁴⁵ Those of lower rank, such as retired field grade political officers, are likely to find a place in a parallel economic or party position. This is such a common practice that a former NVA member likened the officer corps to old Prussia's non commissioned officers, "who served as policemen, village teachers, or in the administration."⁴⁶


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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

Strategies one and two, then, combine an increased subjective emphasis on "progressive" Germany/Prussia, the content of which stresses central authority and traditional military values, with an objective emphasis on the centralisation of economic planning and the concentration of priority and authority for military spending. The third strategy consistently carries over this combination.

3. Paramilitary Indoctrination & Services

By 1978 the GDR already had in place a system of extensive paramilitary indoctrination and participation which was typical of the Warsaw Pact. Notwithstanding the less than average size of the NVA, in 1975 4.5 million East Germans were involved in some form of paramilitary-related activity.⁴⁷ Indoctrination began at a pre-school age⁴⁸ and continued throughout military service. Particular emphasis was placed on preliminary training for the age group soon to be subject to conscription. By 1976 the Society for Sport and Technology (GST) claimed to have given some form of paramilitary training to 90% of those aged 16-19.⁴⁹

Apparently this was insufficient, and in 1978 military education was made obligatory for grades 9 and 10 as part of the school curriculum.⁵⁰ In 1981, military indoctrination officially became part of the pre-school curriculum, and grade 11 paramilitary training was made compulsory.⁵¹ Finally, a new Military Service Law was proclaimed in 1982 which for the first time legally provided for paramilitary training in the schools under the aegis of the GST.⁵²

To some degree this imposition of obligatory requirements represents conformity to already long-established Soviet norms, which makes it intrinsically beneficial to the SED's foreign policy. The real importance of the Law lies in its specification of new conditions of service. First, contrary to some expectations, it did not extend the 18-month period of active service.⁵³ Rather, it stresses that reservists will be recalled for extended periods of training, over a

longer period of liability, in the case of both enlisted men and officers. Anyone who does not serve for over a year on active duty is subject to a total of 36 months of active reserve service.⁵⁴ In addition, limitations on employment specialities for women in the NVA under conditions of national mobilization or a state of alert have been removed.⁵⁵ These changes have been justified by reference to the declining population of conscription-age males in the GDR,⁵⁶ and also by the need to keep up with technological requirements, since it is felt that those with industrial experience can more readily manage sophisticated weapons.⁵⁷ On both grounds it is likely, according to official sources, that conscription may occur at a later age.⁵⁸

The GDR's population is declining, but the extension of reserve training does more than meet its declared goals. It also forces increased acceptance of participation in indoctrination and discipline; i.e., it forces overt accommodation over a longer period of time. Increased reserve training is supplemented by the requirement that everyone participate in civil defence activities, which were placed under the aegis of the Ministry of Defence in 1978, and reinforced in 1980.⁵⁹ The GST, which is subordinated to the Ministry, has been expanding its activities to include increased responsibilities for both civil defence and reserve training preparation.⁶⁰

It is curious that the Warsaw Pact country with the lowest active military participation rate and a high demand for trained manpower in industry should have the highest overall paramilitary participation rate in the bloc, not counting reservists, prior to the new Service Law.⁶¹ Since the GDR's economic growth depends more on increased productivity than that of any other CMEA member,⁶² it is interesting to note that the SED is willing to encourage interruptions in the workplace as a result of the increased average age and participation rates of those citizens who are involved in paramilitary activities.

Social Setting: The Population and the NVA

The probable success of this three-pronged SED strategy (first, "subjectively" to appeal to Germania/Prussia traditions; second, "objectively" to centralize authority and increase military power; and third, "objectively" to force a popular accommodation with the demands of paramilitary participation) cannot be assessed since much of the strategy is new and it is still unfolding. The perceived need for such a strategy, however, can be assessed in terms of popular attitudes toward military service and the NVA in particular. This consideration will lead to the two immediate issues which illustrate popular attitudes toward the GDR, its political system and the military: the "Peace Movement" and Poland.

On the face of it, the rump of old Prussia (with Saxony) that now comprises the GDR would seem to be ideally suited to the forging of a new national identity based on paramilitary authoritarian traditions. Uniquely (in Europe), old Prussia had combined the following: a perception of being the true soul of "Germania"; the high social status and prestige of a military caste that had been a model for society at large; and the traditions of sheer military efficiency (Blood) and discipline (Iron). All this had been grounded in the German, but typically Prussian, respect for authority. The attitude "Service is Service" expresses this respect and even deference. As a final element, Soviet-style mass organizations and indoctrination bear more than a passing resemblance to similar features of German National Socialism.

"Objectively" and "subjectively," every state effort is made to ensure that the NVA has a valued social status for both conscripted service and a professional career. Objectively, the GST helps to impart the necessary technical skills to those who will be called up. Enterprises and local party and state trade union (FDGB) branches encourage participation of members in paramilitary activities, and keep in contact with workers on active service.⁶³ It is made clear that failure to fulfill one's military duties jeopardizes or simply destroys one's civilian career opportunities.⁶⁴ If a university position is

being sought, it may be necessary to have volunteered for three years,
or short term "professional" service.⁶⁵

Every effort is made to make this voluntary service or an NVA career attractive in material terms. Pay rates, for example, were increased at the same time that the new Military Service Law was introduced.⁶⁶ In addition, NVA personnel receive special consideration for accommodation, goods and services.⁶⁷ Through transferable educational and technical certificates, the NVA offers an avenue for upward mobility. Particular attention is devoted to enhancing the prestige of the officer corps. This was punctuated by the creation of the rank of "Marshal" in 1982, again in conjunction with the Military Service Law.⁶⁸

"Subjectively," there is a massive effort to depict the NVA as a heroic defender of peace and socialism, and the Soviet Union as its invincible ally and source of all progressive forces and inspiration. The content of paramilitary education stresses a friend-enemy dichotomy which justifies continued military preparedness and ideological rigidity. It seeks, ultimately, to create militant class solidarity and proletarian internationalism. These themes are carried over into political indoctrination in the NVA, and are consistent throughout with the foreign policy of the SED.

It is stridently claimed that NATO and the FRG are aggressive imperialist class enemies that wish to invade and crush the GDR and are only deterred by the combined strength of the Warsaw Pact forces. Defining West Germany in this way has always been problematical and 'Ostpolitik' made this even more so. Whereas once West Germany was derided as "revanchist," now "imperialist" must do. In fact, with renewed emphasis on "Germania" has come the claim that, if anything, the GDR would wish to see its co-nationals liberated, but that anyone taking up arms against socialism automatically becomes an enemy who must be resolutely hated.⁶⁹ Currently it is claimed that the aggressive designs of NATO are demonstrated by the increased arms expenditures of its member states, and that a new offensive against peace and socialism is

under way. According to this perception, the FRG takes part in the campaign by remaining the USA's strongest ally in Europe.⁷⁰

Has this made a military career valid and popular? It is true that the state has progressively rewarded the NVA, and particularly its officers, while increasing their technical skills and education. Ex-NVA officers interviewed in a recent survey of defectors indicated that they felt there was sufficient social status accorded to the officer corps.⁷¹ Conscription, on the other hand, seems to have long been regarded as an unfortunate career interruption and time simply lost, which nevertheless must be borne with overt compliance in order not to prejudice civilian job opportunities.⁷² This leaves career NCOs in an ill-defined middle position. Doubt has been expressed concerning their quality in the East German press itself.⁷³

Allusions to overall popular perceptions of the NVA are rare. It must be remembered that the NVA, per se, is the "newest" army in the Pact and it was impossible to take it seriously until after the Berlin Wall was built. The 1960s and 1970s saw a rise in technical requirements and specialization, and this was coupled with a gradual increase in the quantity and quality of armaments.⁷⁴ The Soviets have also given more public attention to the NVA, as one of its foremost assets. It could be argued, then, that perhaps like the GDR itself, the NVA has only recently come of age and has only now earned the right to be considered worthy of social approbation.

There is good reason to doubt that the NVA has received the popular support the party has sought to build for it. It is very clear that this applies as far as East German youth are concerned, but less so for their elders. First, the NVA, privileges aside, is not the place to maximize hard currency earnings which can be used in the 'Intershops.'⁷⁵ Second, notwithstanding the recently accelerated rediscovery of "progressive" Germany, strict adherence to "proletarian internationalism" has meant close identification with the Soviets and historic Russian enemies without sufficient compensatory recognition of German accomplishments, independence and sovereignty. This has meant that

there are conspicuous gaps in the development of a military historical tradition, such as the late 19th century wars which led to a United Germany as well as the campaigns of Frederick the Great. The NVA's own history also fails to provide ideals worthy of emulation. It is a curious fact, for example, that despite the all-encompassing stress on "proletarian internationalism," participation in the 1968 Czechoslovak invasion is not singled out, or enumerated in official NVA chronologies of "progressive" events.⁷⁶ Instead, 1968 is cryptically referred to as the year when the GDR fulfilled its duty as a fully accepted member of the Warsaw Pact.

These superficial indicators of problems with the "objective" and "subjective" attractiveness of the GDR military are borne out by continuing difficulties in recruiting career NCOs and officers. The 1980 RAND study on the Northern Tier of the Warsaw Pact argues that these problems became evident in the early 1970s. The SED response has been to encourage more vigorous and earlier commitments to a military career. The study mentions a special attempt to attract to the officer corps "the sons of class conscious workers, of Party and State functionaries... and of professional soldiers."⁷⁷ Ten years of effort have not reversed the unpopularity of military careers, however, and concern continues to be expressed about the need to enhance active recruitment.⁷⁸

Just how serious the problem is cannot be judged accurately, but occasional glimpses appear. For example, a GST basic unit for apprentices at the Leipzig Railway maintenance yard has received high praise for enticing 50% of those involved in paramilitary training at the factory school to opt for a professional NVA career.⁷⁹ In a society where all official success indicators are measured in fulfillment and over-fulfillment of plan targets, praise for a 50% enlistment rate is singular to say the least. It is also interesting that the subject population was apprenticing for relatively low status work. One West German author reports that on the scale of youth career preferences, being a career officer is on a par with being an agricultural worker or

an industrial salesman,⁸⁰ hardly a prestigious rung on the social ladder.

The 1978 imposition of mandatory training was, in part, designed to address this problem. It was aimed at precisely the age group designated as appropriate for choosing a military career. Despite the fact that a person in grade 9 might only be fifteen, it was officially asserted that "very simply" this is the time when careers are generally chosen in the GDR.⁸² In grades 8 to 10 the FDJ directly contributes to GST activities by helping to organize so-called "Hans Beimler" competitions. The FDJ particularly seeks to involve youth in "candidate collectives for military careers," in order to implement the decision to join the professional military.

In the FDJ/GST programme, the former has had primary responsibility for ideological indoctrination and contribution to recruitment.⁸³ The FDJ's ideological role and enlistment activities seem to be under critical review, however, and are being seconded, or challenged, by the GST with its expanded mandate.⁸⁴ For its part, the GST is trying to improve the viability of particular military skills; especially those with career connotations, such as flying, parachuting and telecommunications, and those requiring a career or long-term enlistment.⁸⁵ FDG/GST activities are also supported in the classroom by imposing quota targets on school teachers for NVA career recruitment.⁸⁶

Of course, increased paramilitary indoctrination requirements are not addressed solely to alleviating what must be concluded to be long-standing difficulties with recruiting professional cadre. They are also directed at improving the general acceptance of and performance in conscript service of the "soldier of peace and socialism" and raising the level of "socialist consciousness." The authorities are sceptical of youth's value orientations, and fearful of their criminal and violent potential, as demonstrated in 1977. Particularly when violence may be increasingly seen "as a legitimate means of solving conflict" within the GDR, increasingly demanding indoctrination may be needed for social control.⁸⁷ To the degree that spontaneous or unsolicited social

consciousness is exhibited,⁸⁸ it often takes independent and unauthorized directions. Since 1978, forced accommodation through obligatory indoctrination is in part designed to confront this, and simply to "get the kids off the street."⁸⁹

This program has yet to provide any of the results hoped for, however. Students do not take the "teaching plan" seriously, especially where political topics are concerned. As part of this rejection, state-preferred career patterns generally are not those popular with youth. Traditional values which do not serve the SED programme are still carried over from the older generation, and consumer-oriented desires still predominate. One traditional value which has not carried over is the high place of honour accorded the military. Young women, and even former friends, shun men in uniform. To be sure, students of both sexes go through the obligatory motions, but relegate them to a special, isolated place in their consciousness.⁹⁰ At the same time: youth crime continues to be high; alcohol abuse is growing⁹¹; attraction to "punk" rock-and-roll remains; Western decadence is viewed favourably; and an inclination to "civil disobedience" has emerged.⁹²

Of course, none of this is welcomed by the SED. Of these factors, potential violence and "civil disobedience" are of the most immediate concern and of direct bearing on military participation in society. Of the two, however, violence remains the least prominent. "Civil disobedience" is also relatively rare, but of a piece with a general tendency to seek alternatives to SED-dictated "real existing socialism." Some "civil disobedience" is relatively innocuous, such as the demand that an abandoned railway station, scheduled for demolition, be instead converted into a youth centre.⁹³

Current Issues

A. Peace

Much civil disobedience is directed at the paramilitary system itself. In this, youth is not entirely isolated, and in particular has

been supported, in a decentralized fashion, by the Lutheran Church in the GDR and by a few activists of the older generation. In fact, the SED is facing the most overt "Peace Movement" in the entire Soviet bloc. The "Movement" does not appear to be closely coordinated in any way, and seems to appeal to various audiences. It has been composed of sundry responses to leading "issues": direct reaction to increasing paramilitary indoctrination; advocacy of "alternative service" (including conscientious objection and renewed interest in the NVA construction corps); and peace and disarmament "protests."

The origins of this "Movement" are as unclear as its amorphous nature would indicate. In 1972, the Lutheran Church Synod of Königswalde established a 'Peace Seminar' with the participation of former construction troops and other interested persons -- all told only 25 individuals took part. By 1982, 400 persons were attending this Seminar. This is still a small number, but participation is discouraged through official harassment and infrequent arrests. Although small in numbers, the Seminar has served as a model for others.⁹⁴ This model had little influence until the late 1970s, when the extension of required paramilitary training helped to focus public attention on the Seminar.⁹⁵

Compulsory indoctrination for grades 9 and 10 was actively resisted, led by the Lutheran Church in the GDR.⁹⁶ The resistance itself was, by and large, spontaneous and youth-oriented.⁹⁷ The same youth spontaneity and resultant elusiveness characterize the strength of the "Peace Movement" today. At the time, the 1978 reaction prodded very few Western observers to forecast the origins of the current phenomenon.

The attractiveness of peace-oriented issues grew, however, and matured by supporting the 1981/82 campaign for alternative service, which was led by Lutheran clergymen but was not fully supported by the central church administration. The campaign adopted as its emblem and slogan "Swords into Ploughshares," symbolized by the statue bearing that legend donated by the Soviet Union to the United Nations Building in New York. The campaign proceeded in a decentralized manner, moving from one city synod to another. It culminated in the "Berlin Appeal" of Pastor

R. Eppelmann.

By the time the campaign reached Berlin the SED was thoroughly alarmed. In November 1981 the Soviet-derived emblem was already under critical official scrutiny, and the church prevented its proscription only through negotiation. In January 1982 the state finally directed that teachers and security forces order students to remove it. When knowledge of the "Berlin Appeal" reached a wide Western audience in February 1982, police began rounding up and detaining anyone wearing the emblem -- it had apparently spread beyond the "young Christian" population. Central Lutheran Church authorities appealed to Pastor Eppelmann to cease collecting signatures. Once "Swords into Ploughshares" was banned, young pacifists simply adopted a new emblem and slogan.⁹⁸

The numerical strength of this branch of the "Peace Movement" is unclear. In October 1981 the campaign for alternative service conducted in Saxony produced 808 appeals bearing over 2,000 signatures. This was the original locale of the campaign.⁹⁹ Its crowning achievement may have been the peace demonstration held in Dresden, in February 1982, during the annual commemoration of the devastating bombing of that city in WW II. Five thousand young people showed up even though the police had done their best to isolate the city, especially from anyone wearing the Soviet-derived emblem. This "event" had received no official publicity. Rather, news of it was spread entirely by "Buschfunk," or underground "radio."¹⁰⁰

In February 1983 the state organized an official "counter" demonstration with, it was claimed, as many as 100,000 participants, while the Dresden event drew only 2,000.¹⁰¹ Participation in state-led "peace must be defended -- peace must be armed" activities are often less than enthusiastic, however, and official persecution of "Movement" leaders and participants continues. A young person's participation in non-officially sanctioned "Peace" activities can even, on occasion, damage or ruin his/her parent's career.¹⁰² The SED's paramilitary programmes are, in fact, aimed at directly combatting this current

popular mood among youth, and not just at promoting "good citizenship" in general.¹⁰³

It is, nevertheless, true that the SED must remain committed to the parallel Soviet-led "Peace Campaign," and is, in a sense, caught in a fundamental dilemma. It cannot simply lead an open, widespread attack on peace initiatives when it is involved in one itself. The "Movement's" alternative service campaign capitalizes on this tension by stressing loyalty to the GDR and service to the state -- but only peaceful service. Trumpeting Soviet military might has not helped the SED's plausibility as a "peacemaker," and knowledge of the officially praised West German popular peace movement has backlashed. Moreover, the state is constrained in its ability to control the Lutheran Church by: the decentralized nature of the protest; trying to harness its peace initiatives where it can; and the unique requirement to coordinate, or be seen to cooperate, with it during the "Luther year."¹⁰⁴

It would seem that as long as "Peace" remains a Soviet-promoted international issue the "Movement" will remain viable, as long as it continues to stay elusive and decentralized. For its part, the SED is increasing the punitive response to anti-social elements, and has begun to exile prominent peace protestors -- having already tried the alternative of restricting their internal movement.¹⁰⁵ It would also seem that the SED will remain firmly mired in countervailing pressures to push "peace" in one direction and militarization in the other. Recently, for example, West German members of the Bundestag representing the Green Party, including the leader, Petra Kelly, were manhandled by police in East Berlin and detained for four hours after unfurling the no longer acceptable Soviet-based slogan, "Swords into Ploughshares."¹⁰⁶

B. Poland

The possibility of contamination from abroad affects the GDR's "Eastern front" as well. It would be difficult to conceive of a more difficult concatenation of prevailing issues in neighbouring countries

than the one the SED has been facing for the last few years. On the one hand, there is the "Peace" issue, and its tendency to rebound unpredictably. On the other, Poland's "Solidarity" crisis and subsequent martial law aroused all the SED's fears of Eastern European liberalization, and what that might bring. The Party's thoroughgoing conservative and authoritarian approach to socio-economic issues in recent years owes much to 'Abgrenzung' practiced toward Poland to the East, as well as the FRG to the West.

As in the case of the Czechoslovak reforms of 1968, the GDR has followed the hardest possible line toward 'Solidarity' and has advocated the most severe "solutions"; perhaps more so than the Soviets themselves. When bloc leaders met to discuss the Polish situation in December 1980, only the GDR delegation included military personnel. It was reportedly the only national representation to advocate armed intervention.¹⁰⁷ GDR border controls had already been reimposed on Polish travel, reversing the ease of access granted in the early 1970s. Throughout 1981, until the declaration of martial law in December, the SED railed against counter-revolutionary elements in Poland, and Western imperialist interference and manipulation of events.¹⁰⁸

The party was, of course, concerned lest the "Polish bacillus" spread westward. 'Solidarity' sympathies did, in fact, trigger a rash of politically-motivated resignations from the FDGB and a few from the SED itself. A few "agitators" were arrested.¹⁰⁹ These seem to have been isolated events, however. With the exception of the younger generation, little general popular sympathy for the 'Solidarity' movement has been evident. Rather, having gained some measure of material comfort by making the system "work" through hard effort, the majority felt their limited prosperity threatened by the Polish events. The SED was able, for example, to exploit lingering resentment of Polish visitor who were supposedly stripping GDR stores of consumer goods and weakening the GDR currency by converting the "worthless" Polish currency in order to make these purchases. Long-standing national prejudices and stereotypes supported this reaction, showing the hollowness of "proletarian internationalism."¹¹⁰

The most serious indication of the SED's aggressive reaction to the Polish situation was the series of military preparations begun in September 1981. This included extraordinary callups of reservists and workers' militia (paramilitary 'Kampfgruppe') and mobilization of railway resources to move troops rapidly. Much of this was accomplished in a clandestine fashion, and many of the reservists were reportedly called up as cadre for "new" NVA divisions which do not exist on the standard Order-of-Battle. A series of manoeuvres and a cancellation of NVA leaves were included, and persisted into early 1982.¹¹¹ Perhaps partially to allay Polish military suspicion, fear or anger at such moves, simultaneous publicity was given to GDR-Polish military cooperation during late 1981.¹¹²

It should be noted that this partial mobilization did not create widespread resistance. It does, however, seem to have contributed to what may have been an East German "war scare," and may have added impetus to "Peace Movement" initiatives which were occurring and growing in popularity at the same time. There is no "objective" proof that this is the case, but the superficial correlation is suggestive. Certainly the regime is on the alert for such a link, as was demonstrated when two young peace activists were arrested upon returning from a visit to Poland.¹¹³ It may be that one East German woman's reaction to the economic sacrifices required as a result of GDR support for Polish martial law is typical of the older generation's view of the situation. "I would have given ten times as much if I could have saved my son, who is just doing his service in the NVA, from having to go to Poland."¹¹⁴

Conscription and Non-Career Military Service

A. The Alternatives

All of the foregoing paints a picture of less than ideal societal conditions to support the morale of a general service army. On the one hand, the regime is isolated from its citizens and attempts to force their accommodation to its standards. On the other, the more it

forces them to do so, the more overt compliance as well as defiance it creates, and the less its ideological message is taken to heart.

Through a mixture of persuasion and coercion, a male citizen of the GDR can expect to receive paramilitary training and indoctrination from kindergarten until he is 50, and be required to serve in some related capacity from his 18th birthday on. Even though his 18 month service requirement may be comparatively short, he will know that to really get ahead, three year short service careers are necessary. Moreover, it is increasingly likely that he will be recalled more often for longer periods of reserve training. Finally, he can also be expected to be pressured by party functionaries at his work place to put even more time into paramilitary training by becoming a member of a 'Kampfgruppe.'¹¹⁵

Female citizens are increasingly being required to personally participate in the system as well, but so far in a different manner. Changes to the 1982 Service Law notwithstanding, their role continues to be one of supporting and encouraging the male participant. It is difficult to determine whether this simply represents specialization of increasingly rare labour resources, or an attempt to enlist active social support for NVA service. For the latter, it should be noted that GST sources describe the role of women as helping and encouraging their brothers, friends and loved ones to be better soldiers.¹¹⁶ There will be no women's officer corps, according to current planning.¹¹⁷ Their role in the NVA seems to be designed largely for various traditional support functions.¹¹⁸

The SED seems to be attacking the long-standing social stigma attached to dating a man in uniform in the GDR through institution building.¹¹⁹ As elsewhere, this has created resistance. Several hundred women sent an open letter of protest to Honecker in December 1982 in reaction to the new Service Law. It received immediate resonance from a prominent woman Green activist in West Germany.¹²⁰

Actual resistance to serving in the NVA may not be widespread, despite the popularity of the "Peace Movement," but it may be growing.

To be sure, there are few available alternatives. Simply refusing to serve at all entails imprisonment from 18 months to 4 years. This is not always implemented, however, according to one conscientious objector who served a prison term in 1978. The same, admittedly less than disinterested, source has also claimed that since the 1982 Service Law was proclaimed, approximately 10,000 men have refused to serve with weapons.¹²¹ If true, this is sufficient to be of real concern.

The new Service Law has eliminated the previous recognition of the principle of conscientious objection, which was unique in the bloc. The one place to meet "military" obligations without weapons has been and remains service in the construction troops. These 'Bausoldaten' are few in number, however, and the state has never encouraged such service, or even publicized its existence. The state also tries to prevent construction troop contact with regular military units, and to be in the construction troops means losing the chance for an advanced education.¹²² The 10,000 figure claimed above may, in fact, refer to the "several thousand" now attempting to become construction troops. The actual number of these 'Bausoldaten' at any one time seems to vary from as many as 2-3 thousand in the early to mid 1970s, to approximately 500. The latter figure seems to be more typical. It is therefore significant that despite all officially imposed difficulties the number of construction troops increased to a total of 1,300 by early 1983. Conscientious objectors who refuse any other military service have been jailed. At times, however, some conscripts are released and sent to the construction troop units after the initial arrest.¹²³

B. Induction

This still leaves the much greater majority of young men who serve their time in the NVA. As an indication of the at least superficial conformity of this group, 80% of those serving who are between 18 and 25 years of age are members of the FDJ.¹²⁴ In order to enter the NVA, a young man will face an induction exam given once a year in the spring. Induction notices are given approximately two weeks in advance of being mustered in, which occurs twice yearly in the spring

and fall. The "exams," or reviews, are conducted by commissions, which in addition to military officers also include representatives from "mass organizations," the state and economic enterprises. The process involves both a medical examination and an interview to determine fitness for particular NVA specialities. The potential inductee must bring GST certificates, etc., to show that he has met paramilitary training requirements. Based on the result of this examination, the person will receive a tentative speciality, always dependent on military requirements at the time.¹²⁵

With the increasing length of time between reaching 18 and actually being inducted, it is becoming likely that a potential conscript will receive an induction review, perhaps every two years. If for some reason an individual is designated unfit, a later induction date will be chosen up to the age of 26. If not conscripted at that time, the individual would face a total of 36 months of active reserve service. If a medical reason has led to the delay, the induction commissions are authorized to require the person to undergo treatment.¹²⁶

This system of pre-induction examination and review has been carried over into callups for the reserves; officially because it has been found to be "necessary and expedient." Review may occur as soon as three years after separation from active duty.¹²⁷ While this is consistent with the goal of relying more heavily on reservists, due to manpower shortages, it is also consistent with utilizing the induction system as yet another social control mechanism.

Overt conformity with such a well-developed paramilitary, induction and reserve system is practically unavoidable, unless one chooses the dangerous "conscientious objector" route. Yet, one careful observer of the GDR military scene has recently said that the system of "state militarism" is simply "not taken seriously by many conscripts." J. Nawrocki goes on to speculate that the later callup for active duty and the emphasis on reservists is, in part, not designed to alleviate manpower problems, but rather to exploit the political reliability of

the "older generation."¹²⁸

Increased emphasis on those in their mid-twenties and up may already be in evidence. Defence Minister Hoffmann was quoted in Neues Deutschland, in June 1982, as having said that 40% of those currently performing basic service were married, most often with wives who worked and had one or two children.¹²⁹

The NVA continued to proceed with an increased callup of reservists in 1982. During September and October, reservists were called up for 6 months of service, and later in November and December, for 4 months.¹³⁰ Unlike the turnout of 1981, this does not appear to be linked to the Polish situation. As for the "reliability" of these "older" men, however, a small number of protesters has refused to comply with the reserve callup. At least one, still relatively young at 21, has been arrested and tried, ¹³¹ in camera, by a military court.

The lack of zeal shown by conscripts and low career cadre enlistment rates are not new; only growing activism for peace is. Equally important, the relatively greater political reliability of older men may depend on their having a "stake" in the system. They would not wish to jeopardize support for their wives and children or the beginning of an established civilian career.¹³²

Provided that a conscript does not choose to spend 18 months in the border troops, which carries with it some subsequent civilian benefits in order to appear more attractive,¹³³ the individual will either serve in the army, the air force or the navy. The latter two services require two years of active duty. If the conscript is ambitious for certain subsequent civilian schooling or careers, especially medical, teaching or university generally, he will likely actually serve three years as a short-service NCO.¹³⁴ The chances that an individual will be able to serve in the military unit or force of his choice are not good, however. According to a survey of conscript preference conducted in 1970, which does not seem likely to have changed considerably, 68% of the respondents preferred service in only five out of ten times that number of categories: 18% navy; 15% air force; 13%

tanks; 12% technical skills; and 10% Border Troops. The infantry, which makes up the bulk of manpower requirements, was significantly under-represented.¹³⁵

Upon entering the service, the conscript will possess a variety of preparatory military skills. Some of these, however, such as learning how to drive an automobile or sail, albeit under GST auspices, would not be considered strictly military in a comparative context. They represent access to restricted activities readily available in a developed Western society. Nevertheless, there will be some degree of familiarity with weapons, tactics and NVA personnel themselves. Ostensibly, GSFG troops may have also put in an appearance. The average conscript should have received several hours of Russian instruction, for example, three hours per week in grade 9.¹³⁶ He will, most importantly, have learned to play the game, to parrot ideological indoctrination and conform to certain norms and standards.

As virtually anywhere, once actually in the armed forces the conscript faces a degree of social control which he simply has never experienced before -- even in such an authoritarian state as the GDR. He will be allowed no private radios or tape recorders, but will have a barracks radio, which is permanently tuned to an approved station. Any personal camera is confiscated and deposited with superiors.¹³⁷ He will always have to wear his uniform, even when on leave.¹³⁸ He will face an entire battery of standards which he must meet, some of which are set quite high in order that he be faced with taking responsibility not only "for his own life," but also for various minutiae.¹³⁹ Four hours of political training are also required,¹⁴⁰ which, together with various other duties may actually amount to 20% of all training and service time.¹⁴¹ Overall, the schedule of activity is a very heavy one, and what free time remains will simply be treated as "the conduct of service by other means," to paraphrase Clausewitz in the words of one NVA serviceman.¹⁴²

The official 18 month term of service is divided into three trimesters, beginning with four weeks of intensive basic training in specialized units. Thereafter, the conscript proceeds directly to his

regular unit. Once there, training proceeds in a repetitive annual cycle. Individual specialization increases after the first year so that those who are finishing their service can be replaced. A great deal of emphasis is placed on maintenance and administrative matters. Combat training occurs at night (one-third to one-half) of the time, and combined arms manoeuvres are stressed. Most often, the largest manoeuvre formation is the regiment, with the exception of the annual large scale WP exercises. A great deal of political training and learning of regulations must perforce be conducted during "free time," because there is insufficient time in the regular programme and standards are not relaxed.¹⁴³

In order to implement this programme, the NVA imposes a rigorous system of discipline, and a typical WP system of dual control. The discipline is, however, not as severe as that of the former Wehrmacht or of today's Soviet Army. It is nevertheless more strenuous than in Western armies, in particular the Bundeswehr. While "Kadaver gehorsam" is hardly the result, it is certainly authoritarian.

If the entire programme of paramilitary indoctrination had been successful, the soldier's obligations would supposedly be understood as being fundamentally of a "class character," and he would truly be a loyal soldier of socialism. Over and over again, the NVA intones that proper class-consciousness and commensurate hatred of the imperialist enemy are required to produce good morale, and to prepare the soldier for necessary sacrifices. Mere technical competence is never considered sufficient. Class-consciousness in disciplinary terms is defined primarily as understanding the army-soldier relationship as one of "command and obedience."¹⁴⁴ One of the NVA's most frequently heard mottos is "Don't Discuss" it, just do it,¹⁴⁵ an approach which closely follows Soviet practice.

Consistent with this approach, punctilious attention is paid to the indicators of a "crack" unit on the parade ground and during inspection, taut bedsheets, clean well-ordered lockers, etc.¹⁴⁶ One British officer observer posted in the GDR became an "amateur

"enthusiast" of the NVA, and was particularly impressed by well-kept barracks and guard kiosks as superficial indicators of good order. He also favourably noted that the NVA regularly repainted its vehicles in combat camouflage to match the change of seasons. The GSFG did not.¹⁴⁷

Party and unacknowledged control mechanisms second this traditional military discipline. Units are given political as well as technical ratings.¹⁴⁸ There are: a) separate party secretary channels of communication within military units, and the political officer has the right to appeal to his superior should he be in conflict with the unit commander's judgment; b) party region, security section chiefs have the right to control officers and soldiers in barracks, and report to the SED Control Committee without reference to the NVA command structure; c) the MfS has its own "Administration 2000" liaison officers, in NVA uniform, down to the battalion level who execute MfS orders; d) the MfS has hidden informers in all units preparing written reports on all ranks.¹⁴⁹

Should the system of discipline break down, various punishments are imposed as in any army, with some "socialist" adaptions. First, disciplinary infractions are reported within a day to the MfS. Punishments do not include monetary fines, but can include punishment by unit for an individual's infraction.¹⁵⁰ The total number of those actually incarcerated does not seem to be particularly large. Approximately 1,200 soldiers are imprisoned in four different hard-labour detention camps. Of these, however, 33% have been sentenced for political offences, whereas the national average is only 10%.¹⁵¹ Recent "innovations" in the military penal system may be more indicative of general disciplinary problems. The 1982 Service Law reintroduced the earlier Wehrmacht system of duty in penal units, for periods of up to three months. This is to be imposed for repeated, stubborn violations of military discipline. Perhaps more interestingly, any time lost from normal duties, because of time spent in one of these units or in detention, is added to the overall period of service. A soldier will not be released from active duty until he has completed his obligatory length of service performing normal duties.¹⁵²

By far the most common disciplinary problem, however, seems to be alcohol abuse and resulting "excesses." This is hardly unknown in any army, of course, and may even be a normal "externality cost" born of keeping men under a high degree of tension, isolated from their home community.¹⁵³ The East German community at large, for that matter, is also experiencing rising alcohol-related problems.¹⁵⁴ Nevertheless, at times NVA soldiers and sailors have shown remarkable ingenuity in finding ways to drink, such as consuming compass fluid.¹⁵⁵

The military's response to drunkenness, which sometimes reaches surprisingly high levels given the little "free time" available, apparently varies from unit to unit and place to place. Commanders have been cautioned to point out to malefactors that drunkenness endangers one's comrades by decreasing responsibility and ability to react, rather than simply imposing the maximum penalty.¹⁵⁶ Officers, however, do not like to call attention to the degree of alcohol abuse in their units, if they can help it, and in barracks the odd drink-inspired curse directed at the NVA and the SED might simply be ignored.¹⁵⁷ If a drunk soldier is found by military police in a public place, on the other hand, disciplinary action is likely to be immediate and severe.¹⁵⁸ More infrequently, collective derelictions will be considered in the context of unit performance and cohesion.

From the NVA's and SED's point of view, however, the greatest problem with the system of discipline is the general, long-standing failure of the troops to take political indoctrination seriously, much less to heart. If the NVA 'politorgane' insist on taking up "free time" with their lectures then fine, the troops will simply treat them as a rest period. Where they participate, it is either by rote or by asking embarrassingly direct questions.

Because the NVA insists on treating the "socialist," prescribed leadership style and unit morale basis as the only correct motivating factors for performance, the forces are by their own standards seriously deficient. What has followed is a never-ending call for improving ideological awareness, training and motivation. Because of the current

stress on NATO arms modernization programmes, the tone of this indoctrination is, if anything, at an above-average pitch. The "Peace Movement," of course, is not directly referred to in NVA publications. The need to strengthen the role of the party was the second most frequent theme in articles in Volksarmee in 1981.¹⁵⁹

Nevertheless, it cannot be said that no sense of identification or solidarity has emerged. H.J. Rautenberg, who has intensively studied NVA troop morale, based largely on a nine-year survey of Armeerundschau, argues strongly that this "solidarity" is very much a horizontal phenomenon; a sense of identifying with the privations of those in the same unit at the same rank. It does not extend to the officers, or necessarily the NCOs, "up there."¹⁶⁰ There is also some indication that cooperative undertakings in small "combat collectives" create a sense of being "in the same boat," even where other ranks may be involved, such as in tank troops. This seems to be especially the case, however, where the unit is very small and the cadre (NCO/officer) ratio to trooper is virtually one-to-one, such as in a tank crew. The higher the number of party members involved, the more this becomes the case.¹⁶¹

This conforms to the Western notion of stressing face-to-face cooperative problem-solving in order to build morale, and past historical examples of close supervision and elite orientation in small, ideologically motivated combat groups. Once such supervision is removed or cooperation with "out-groups" is required, however, the NVA system does not seem to work nearly as well. Troops are inclined to idleness and even defiance of NCOs when officers are not present, while, of course, trying to demonstrate "activity."¹⁶² In 1974 an NVA survey of an unrepresentative sample of 90 soldiers showed that only slightly more than one-half claimed that their combat group, etc. was a "socialist collective" in the ideal sense. Sixty percent added that, while not "perfect," there was at least no open confrontation in their group, but almost one-third claimed that there was.¹⁶³

Notwithstanding these qualifications, the NVA's performance indicators are consistently impressive in terms of achieving technical

skill levels. In 1981, for example: 318,000 individual and 87,300 collective "top achiever" awards; 114,000 rifleman ribbons; 253,000 "classification badges"; and 400,000 badges for "good knowledge" were authorized.¹⁶⁴ In other words, everyone "achieved" something, usually more than once. There is some question concerning the honest administration of the standards for achievement, however, such as designating sharpshooters to fire for the entire unit's qualification.¹⁶⁵ In addition, some campaigns for efficiency relate to less than immediate "combat" skills; for example, saving energy and materials, the fifth most often mentioned theme in Volksarmee during 1981.¹⁶⁶ Demonstrating "activity" while avoiding rigorous training apparently becomes progressively easier to do after surviving the first six months of service. Moreover, the requirement to continually train new recruits means repetitive yearly training.¹⁶⁷

Despite impressive indicators, the NVA itself is calling for improved training standards, especially to better simulate combat conditions and to improve unit cohesion and discipline.¹⁶⁸ The combination of these factors was the most frequently mentioned theme in Volksarmee in 1981, as might be expected in a "crisis" year. There may, in fact, be real grounds for doubting the state of training and discipline. In the mid-1970s, a rumour circulated and was oft-quoted, that "numerous unpublished accidents in tank units" were occurring. More seriously, troop riots were also said to occur.¹⁶⁹ Such events as fighting between conscripts and cadre and cases of officers actually being beaten in barracks seem to be current phenomena, although of indeterminant frequency.¹⁷⁰ According to one source, the Soviets have warned the NVA/SED that they are becoming concerned with this turn of events.¹⁷¹ If genuine, these problems may help to explain the new changes to the military penal system.

Actual and potential discipline problems should be qualified by unit type, however. Where the unit is small, the cadre/conscript ratio is high, and party members predominate, morale and order may be commensurately higher. This would also apply more to those units most

closely integrated with Soviet units. The air force, for example, has a high percentage of officers who are often combatants, and it is well integrated (discussed below).¹⁷² Second, tank regiments or divisions will likely display a higher standard of discipline and motivation. The NVA navy, on the other hand, despite subordination to the 'Red Banner Fleet' and exact adherence to Soviet technical standards, represents something of an enigma. It apparently enjoys considerable independence because of its specialized role,¹⁷³ and this may not be conducive to social control. Certain ships have reportedly had to contend with potentially mutinous crews,¹⁷⁴ and poor "personal performance" achievements have been scored.¹⁷⁵ Defectors have specifically complained of a lack of responsibility and paper performance in the navy.¹⁷⁶ Given conscript preference for the navy, and its removal from the GDR "front," it may represent the favoured "way out" while still allowing for overt compliance with the system. This leaves the motorized rifle troops, whose units include the majority of potential combatants. Among these troops, discipline and morale problems, particularly in combat units, are on the average at their worst.¹⁷⁷

Discipline and esprit de corps can be further qualified by unit status as well as type. The entire NVA is assigned to the "first strategic echelon," but, in fact, 10 to 12 regiments of various types are developed as an elite.¹⁷⁸ It is these units that most likely receive honourable mention and publicity in the East German military press, and they should prove to be more reliable.¹⁷⁹

NCOs

On the whole, then, there is reason to be less than sure of the morale of conscripts, but they can be relied upon not to jeopardize their civilian careers and to conform, if not with a will, to technical requirements. As was often stated when the new Service Law came into effect, technical requirements continue to increase with more sophisticated weapons, and there is, therefore, more need for skilled specialists. Such specialists could and should be part of a

professional NCO cadre, but the NVA has had a great deal of difficulty with NCOs. Approximately 20% of the NVA is comprised of NCOs (18% in the army, 25% in the air force and 30% in the navy).¹⁸⁰ It may be, however, that a great many of these are short-service soldiers who do not exceed the rank of corporal. These corporals are hardly more than conscripts with greater civilian ambitions in many respects, and, particularly in the air force and navy, they serve only one year more than ordinary airmen and sailors. As with officers, being an NCO carries with it transferable speciality equivalents in civilian life, and preferential hiring.¹⁸¹

Forster argues that it was not until 1965 that the NVA recognized the need to place more stress on a professional NCO cadre; a strong break with the honourable and successful German military traditions of the past. The NVA has since followed Soviet initiatives in creating what amounts to a "warrant officer" (Fähnrich/Ensign) class in order to make such service more attractive. Some effort is made to stream candidates for either NCO or Fähnrich beginning in the 9th grade, as with officers. In 1979, additional rank differentials were added to the Fähnrich category.¹⁸² In 1982, an official cadet rank was added, access to the senior ranks ("Stabsoberfähnrich") was eased, by delegating more promotion authority to individual commanders.¹⁸³ NCO/Fähnrich training heavily stresses technical requirements and is conducted in eight different schools, one each for the air force, navy, border troops and technical subjects, and four for the army.¹⁸⁴

Heavy stress on technical specialization and political indoctrination; or "social sciences," which takes up 45-50% and 20% of training time in these schools,¹⁸⁵ respectively, leaves much to be desired in terms of teaching leadership skills. Yearly examination on political topics do not help increase these skills, and sensitivity and over-reaction to disciplinary infractions can often be the result.¹⁸⁶

The NCO's role in reinforcing discipline and ideological commitment is exemplified by a recent naval decision to make corporals individually responsible for conscripts reaching and, of course,

surpassing their "personal achievement pledges."¹⁸⁷ There has also been a move to improve upon the ideological abilities of NCO specialists. In 1982, the technical academy added a "military technical propaganda" department.¹⁸⁸ The disciplinary role is also reflected in the military justice system. Sixty-five to seventy per cent of all military jurors in 1973 were NCOs; only 10 to 15% were ordinary soldiers.¹⁸⁹

By and large, however, little special attention has been comparatively devoted to critical examination of the NCO cadre. They are often referred to in the same breath with officers, as when referring to the need to increase the quality of political work. At times they are condemned unspecifically, as when referring to the poor quality of "instructors" in general.¹⁹⁰ When the non-career cadre is involved, as may be the case with naval corporals, quite direct criticism may result; but this appears to be the exception.¹⁹¹ Perhaps the most revealing indication of the condition of the NCO cadre comes from such examples as the temporary closing of three NCO schools during the partial mobilization in late 1981.¹⁹² There may simply be a chronic shortage of qualified cadre.

Officer Corps

In contrast to the lack of research on the enlisted ranks, and most particularly the NCOs, there have been several studies of the NVA officer corps. The most recent of these, which has benefited from access to a West German survey of defectors and its own interview programme with ex-NVA officers, is the RAND study of the Northern Tier of the Warsaw Pact, published in 1980. The NVA chapter by Robert Dean aptly deals with the central, long-standing issue concerning the officer corps. It carefully examines military professionalism versus party control and concludes that while there is some strain between the two, fundamental antagonism does not describe the relationship, especially insofar as line versus political officers are concerned. His conclusion is similar to that of D. Herspring's seminal work on this subject, with the caveat that there is a tendency to drift toward reliance on

technical expertise rather than political exhortation and prescriptions in order to get the job done, especially in lower-level units.¹⁹³

This is an important observation, but there is no need to once again examine the theme of party loyalty in the NVA officer corps. The officer corps is loyal, and party membership is simply a 'sine qua non' for an officer's career. The officers are one of "them up there," and they have accepted the measure of success defined for them in GDR society by the SED. If this does not mean that they are then apparatchiks, similar "red" versus "expert" strains apply to other professions. It is their professional expertise, not just as technicians but as leaders, that is of interest here; to be sure, as it is influenced by the party's views of correct performance of duty. It is here where unusual "red"/"expert" strains may exist. If there is an aspect of loyalty which requires further examination, it is "proletarian internationalism" in the service of the GSFG.

A. Training

It should be stressed that NVA career officers are very much a self-selecting unrepresentative sample, given popular attitudes concerning military life in the GDR today. Nevertheless, it is quite true that the professional development of these officers has been steadily improved over the years. Ever since 1971, officer training schools have had a minimum three year programme, four for air force and navy career specialists, granting technical college equivalent diplomas. Some officers, however, are not commissioned directly into the reserves after completing civilian degrees, having already served as three-year, short-service soldiers.¹⁹⁴ By 1981, Defence Minister Hoffmann could claim that 92.7% of all NVA officers either had "academic training, graduated from an officers or engineering college, or had completed a military or civilian technical school."¹⁹⁵

Senior staff training occurs at the Friedrich Engels or Rosa Luxembourg academies, the latter for political specialists. It is only at this level that courses are tailored to conceptual specialities, such

as "operations and tactics." Basic-level officer training is geared to functional specialities such as military engineer or pilot, and stresses technical skills commensurate with such positions.¹⁹⁶

Recently the officer basic career training system has undergone another upgrading, and a college has been added for military medicine.¹⁹⁷ As of 1983, all military colleges have been given a four year curriculum, offering every graduate the equivalent of an economics or engineering academic degree. Certain unspecified "difficulties" despite "all the success" of the military colleges have been offered as the reason for this change. They may be inferred from the order of priorities addressed by the new curriculum. According to official sources, "the following necessities arise out of the current situation": improve ideological training, so that officers view "their personal engagement in terms of the military necessity of the class struggle"; make clear the functional distinctions between general/basic and specialized training; increase the independence and self-reliance of the student; and raise the level of difficulty of training to reflect the reality of active duty.¹⁹⁸

Read critically, such a litany of "necessity" can be taken to represent problems precisely with maintaining the "red" versus "expert" balance, on one hand, while showing some concern with the quality of leadership and expert qualifications on the other. The course outline based on these "necessities" is apparently ordered by: 1) military pedagogy/psychology; 2) basic military and physical development/training; 3) engineering; 4) mathematics and natural sciences; 5) foreign languages. Twenty to forty-five per cent of the time spent will fall in the second category, however, while 20% will be devoted to the first. Depending on the candidate's speciality, the remainder of the time will be spread over the other three subject areas.¹⁹⁹

It is not readily apparent how much actual change in emphasis this represents. A review of articles which appeared in Militärtechnik between 1977-1982, describing 21 functional sections of the officer academies, indicated that heretofore, technical training dominated the

curriculum. Interestingly enough, it seems that leadership skills were stressed primarily in rifle and tank company commander courses, where such traditional military abilities might be most immediately necessary.²⁰⁰ Even in these cases, however, the distinction made between military psychology/pedagogy and absorbing the official line on class-based discipline and morale seems blurred, and this seems to be a common phenomenon.²⁰¹

B. Leadership Style and Demands

Of course, officially there should be no need for the distinction noted above, since the one is supposedly the fundamental support of the other. When it is admitted that preparedness varies from unit to unit, this is explained by the different leadership qualities of their commanders. The advice given for determining the decisive moment and being able to raise "the fighting spirit of the troops" is to ensure that "the main link in the chain" is strong; i.e., foster greater party activity.²⁰² In other words, problem units and/or commanders only require greater ideological motivation. Such advice may also appear on the curriculum for more senior officers at the Friedrich Engels Academy.²⁰³

As Dean pointed out when discussing the challenge of professionalism in the NVA, officers remain sceptical concerning this ideologically unassailable advice. It should be emphasized that junior officers, in particular, have very heavy demands placed upon them to achieve a multitude of performance indicators while maintaining morale, discipline and correct ideological compliance. This is to some degree produced by performing traditional NCO functions. To be sure, political officers can help with political and morale-related factors, but they can also be a hindrance and an implicit challenge to the commander's authority.²⁰⁴

In order to increase performance, the "tone" of command is altered opportunistically on occasion, or an officer may actually seek to improve the ongoing collective basis of unit morale through

non-standard means. Very little freedom of manoeuvre may be allowed, however. These pressures and tactical adjustments can lead to cynicism among both officers and men. This in turn can result in a demonstrated tendency toward paper performance, planned "surprise" exercises and buck-passing to avoid command responsibility.²⁰⁵

Currently, it is officially admitted that discipline problems and subjective factors of morale are of enhanced, particular importance. At the same time, the need to rely on "combat collectives," rapid and effective communication, and ready ability and willingness to take over command responsibility, are considered major requirements for an effective, modern NVA. Some discussion of these factors is linked directly to the need to motivate young conscripts, whose enhanced knowledge, it is cautioned, should not be assumed to equal correct motivation and whose desire for "concrete" facts is acknowledged as placing high demands on all leadership cadres. In other words, the conscript is a product of societal modernization where both ascriptive values or status and an authoritarian leadership style, based on such traditional values, are questionably efficacious. Especially when the replacibility of leadership cadre in combat conditions is envisioned, officers are openly sceptical that such an ideal is attainable. "Training" would require three years, at a minimum, for the necessary skills to be available to make this possible.²⁰⁶

Not surprisingly, given the current level of command difficulty arising out of cross-cutting tensions from competing professional, political and societal (i.e. low status and conscript values and aims) factors, junior officers are having difficulty coping. They have been singled out for criticism by no less a personage than the Minister of Defence.²⁰⁷

C. Careers

Perhaps because of the above-mentioned problems, the dropout rate among NVA junior officers may be high, especially as their diplomas are portable. Moreover, should they wish to persevere with a career,

they may find difficulty finding room at the top. There is some evidence of clogging, of a "bulge" in field grade ranks that is difficult to enter and pass through, although it has been claimed that no battalion commander is currently older than 35 and no regimental commander is older than 42.²⁰⁸ Between 1962 and 1964, when new technical requirements were being introduced, failure to meet standards resulted in many officers being forced out. Nevertheless, by 1973 or 1974 a retirement programme was needed in order to move officers with seniority rapidly to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, and subsequently into retirement and the reserves.²⁰⁹ This may have produced a short-term fix, but it is interesting to note that in 1981, while Hoffmann admitted that the officer corps of 1956 was too young at an average age of 27.7 years, he simply ignored mentioning a current figure.²¹⁰ The standard service period for officers has been fixed at 25 years. This may, however, be extended to the age of 65. The Soviet authorities are not so generous and require mandatory retirement for company grade officers at 40 years of age, field grade officers at 45 and on up to Colonel Generals at 60. A maximum ten year extension (at five year intervals) is available.²¹¹

Career promotion clogging may reflect a structural problem, unique to a satellite army of the NVA type. First, recall that the NVA feels it necessary to keep a remarkably high cadre to conscript ratio. Second, there is a heavy reliance or dependence on officers rather than NCOs. Third, the high ratio is in part the result of maintaining a duplicate political command hierarchy. These factors should create room. For example, political officer specialization occurs after acquiring command or service experience. An officer can choose, or be chosen, to move into similar rank structures in the 'politorgane' if there is no room in a military speciality. Fourth, high-ranking officers are scattered in the state administration. Finally, officer specialities are generally made transferable to the civilian sector, which promotes retirement. Why then the "bulge"?

The NVA's high degree of integration in the WP as an alliance

army may explain a good deal of this. There is no command unit greater than the division. What would elsewhere require a number of levels and a general staff performing a variety of functions, is in the GDR accomplished through the Ministry of National Defence, which employs 3,200 individuals of all ranks. It doubles as a "command and administrative authority." Eighty Soviet staff officers directly contribute to NVA planning, logistics, standardization and exercises undertaken at the Ministry of Defence. They are led by a major general.²¹² Subordination of the NVA navy, at least ostensibly, to the 'Red Banner Fleet,' and Soviet control of wartime logistics,²¹³ reinforces the picture of (if not a vacuum) a certain lack of capacity, carrying with it a decreased need for military specialists. Whether or not WP joint planning participation entirely makes up for, or otherwise sufficiently occupies, normal national army higher command roles, is at least problematical.²¹⁴

D. Russian Language/Soviet Contact

This introduces the final element necessary for a successful career -- demonstrated ability to work "in Russian" in cooperation with the GSFG. As noted above, the average East German student will receive compulsory Russian instruction as part of the regular curriculum. In basic officer school, a cadet will receive considerably more Russian training and specialize in the required military vocabulary. The intensity with which this language training is carried out, however, seems to vary. Descriptions of various specializations in officer training schools often make only cursory reference to "foreign language" learning, and sometimes stress instead technical guidance from and close social cooperation with Soviet comrades.²¹⁵ Of the schools, the air force and naval academies would seem to place the greatest emphasis both on language training and on contact with Soviet personnel. For both, however, English language training is also part of the curriculum.²¹⁶ Of the two schools, the air force academy would seem to stress Russian the most intensively. Even locker designations appear in Russian, and

upon graduation the new officer must have passed an exam for language knowledge at the "la" level.²¹⁷ Other descriptions are silent about required skill levels.

Not to be outdone, the ground forces school proudly points out that its Russian language programme is supported with over twenty special materials, now in a well-developed third generation, for which the faculty received the "Friedrich Engels Prize" in 1976.²¹⁸ Nevertheless, one reason officially cited for increasing the period of initial army officer training to four years was precisely to improve on Russian language skills. Student officers are now required to be able to answer questions in Russian concerning: biographical details; WP leadership; the structure of the NVA; and various geo-topographical altitudes, directions etc. Some specialities require further knowledge, such as being able to spot for artillery. There seems to be a great deal of uncertainty, however, concerning the value which Russian has for actually leading troops, and difficulty in establishing standards for how much actual command of the language is needed on a daily basis. In fact, the faculty is seeking aid from serving officers to determine how often they meet members of the Soviet forces and have to use Russian as the communication medium. This speaks of far more than just poorly developed standards. At a minimum, a total of approximately, and generously, 4,000 pages of specialist training material developed for the ground forces school over ten years of effort is not particularly impressive.²¹⁹

Russian language instruction at the Friedrich Engels Academy is of a more command-oriented nature. Here officers in their early thirties can expect to be gradually introduced to Russian with increasing usage up to the point where they have "... to deal with entire exercise elements in Russian as required by a situation imposed upon a combined staff of the allied forces." As of 1976, final exams in one subject are conducted in Russian. Apart from these "imposed" military requirements, students are abjured not to look on themselves (just) as officers, but as "political functionaries who must be masters

of the military profession" and to learn the language of their friends "as a matter of conviction and personal attitude."²²⁰

In order to help implement WP integration, the Academy maintains liaison with 14 Soviet military teaching institutions and other East European academies, in particular the Soviet V.I. Lenin and M.V. Frunze higher officer schools.²²¹

The "personal" level is best reflected by NVA training at these Soviet institutions. One in every four instructors at the Friedrich Engels school has attended a Soviet military academy. The NVA air force officer school claims one in five of its instructors has attended such academics, and the faculties of various other schools are also careful to point out similar examples of Soviet training.²²² In fact, attending a Soviet academy is practically essential if one wishes to attain a high rank. By 1969, over 100 general officers and admirals had attended the Soviet General Staff academy; by 1981 this figure was 175. Overall, 1,000 officers had Soviet training in 1975, and this number increased to a total of 2,500 serving or active officers in 1981. Using Forster's rather optimistic estimates of total officer cadre (26,000) as a yardstick, this means that 9.4% of NVA officers have attended some Soviet military academy, whereas approximately 86% of all generals and admirals have graduated from the General Staff college alone.²²³

While it is clear that the overall number of officers with Soviet training has expanded more rapidly than the number of generals graduating from the Staff college, a one in ten ratio, given the career implications for advancement, is still small enough. This is especially so because the Soviets exercise a unique degree of control over promotion in the NVA, where they apparently decide which colonels are to be promoted to general, rather than simply approving national appointments as elsewhere in the WP.²²⁴ Above the divisional level, where Soviet coordination becomes a pervasive requirement, close "fraternal ties" must be particularly significant. Even below this level, however, procedures and equipment must be standardized to work with the GSFG and fit Soviet models. In fact, some officers may attend

Soviet academies when only of senior lieutenant rank.²²⁵ Accommodation to these models must be an important technical as well as political requirement for promotion.

E. The Character of the Officer Corps

Whether this leaves room for any sanctioned, creative military thinking, much less rewards it, is open to question. Dean argues that there is some recognition of "East German military character," and primarily supports this with sources which refer to "appropriate aspects of German military history."²²⁶ To be sure, there is the drive to winkle out and claim all "progressive" German history, but here too the effort is heavily influenced by the requirement to promote "proletarian internationalism." If this has any actual effect on strategic or tactical thinking in the NVA, it is very difficult to demonstrate. On occasions when "independent thinking" occurs, it runs the danger of taking on tones of national, doctrinal criticism of Soviet models, which is, indeed, based on German notions of correct military procedure and efficiency.²²⁷ Perhaps an indicator of this is that because of continued access to Western material on WW II Rommel, who of course never fought on the Eastern Front in either World War, is an unofficial hero in the NVA.²²⁸

What does the combination of party loyalty, technical competence, professional leadership challenges, career frustrations and Soviet tutelage denote for an assessment of the NVA officer corps? Dean cites the results of a West German survey of 800 defectors who left between 1967 and 1972. It found that 95% of the officers "fully identified" with the regime...²²⁹ A remarkable figure on the face of it. The defectors interviewed by Dean, and discussed by Rautenberg, confirm this tendency. Rautenberg adds that most defectors cited the heavy duties they were required to carry out as their primary motivation for leaving; a complaint seconded by junior officers who quit the NVA for civilian life in the GDR.²³⁰ To the extent that officers were politically dissatisfied, it was with the Czechoslovak reaction to them

as neo-Nazis, as well as with "surprising" Soviet orders for unexpected actions.²³¹ That is to say, they had created a self-image of "brotherhood in arms" which did not include colonial status, and they considered Czechoslovak opinion to be no more "informed" than that of their own citizens.

If defectors felt this way, how much more loyal and distinguished by a closed set of norms and perceptions is the serving officer corps? It can be arguably put that the majority not only "know" they are loyal, but like the former Imperial German officer corp, they "know" what is best and how to go about it. Because the SED and GSFG will insist that things be done a certain way, the officers are fundamentally frustrated. They are indeed "true to the regime," but only wish the regime would allow them to get on with it. They nevertheless recognize the challenge of deviant conscript opinion to the system, and therefore to themselves. Eventually, in order to rise to the top, system conformity and protection will necessarily predominate. Cognitive dissonance theory argues that the officers will, in fact, internalize and wholly accept this role. The defectors Dean interviewed felt that the NVA would fight "looking at the system as a whole"; that the nationality of the West German enemy made no difference in combat; and that "when the commander stands behind me I have to shoot."²³²

GSFG

Standing behind, beside and around the NVA in the first strategic echelon is the GSFG, whose forces greatly outnumber and are much better equipped than the NVA. The East German soldier must swear "at all times" to remain "side by side" with the Soviet socialist allied armies.²³³ The entire NVA remains subordinated to the WP in peacetime and the NVA navy, as above, to the Soviet Red Banner Fleet in the Baltic. Moreover, the GSFG has the least restrictive of all status of forces agreements in the bloc, and it includes the unique provision that its commander can decide on his own authority to declare a state of emergency.²³⁴

Besides a common set of equipment (albeit older and somewhat less-sophisticated in the case of the NVA) and training standards, cooperation is stressed in a variety of ways. Annual plans for cooperation and training requirements are produced jointly, and common manoeuvres are practiced during a yearly "combat cooperation week." These include various military competitions, and common use of facilities. They also specifically include close military political agency cooperation and the active exchange of delegations. The "neighbouring regiment" concept is always alluded to and emphasized. This cooperation extends to carefully organized social meetings of various units, and includes having "neighbouring regiment" wallposters and reading rooms. GSFG personnel also meet with the FDJ: it was claimed that during the 1976 "combat cooperation week" 700,000 young GDR citizens participated in such meetings.²³⁵

The actual extent of military coordination evident in this cooperation is not immediately apparent and is difficult to establish with any accuracy. Apparently some 400 units of varying type and size enjoy a "neighbourly" relationship, which, it has been claimed, extends to the company level.²³⁶ It has been further claimed that some units or groups train joint tank crews, and this may extend to air defence systems as well.²³⁷ For example, both Soviet and East German air force officers are on duty in at least some control towers.²³⁸ Various air force units are "twinned" with GSFG units, and not surprisingly, air space control for Polish, Czechoslovak as well as East German air crews is closely coordinated with the Soviet authorities.²³⁹

With the exception of close air force coordination, however, cooperation at the small unit level seems infrequent and uncommon. Mixed tank crews appear at yearly WP manoeuvres and may include other Pact armed forces. They seldom appear at other times. The stress on cooperation falls mainly on communication personnel and officers, not on the common soldier whose knowledge of Russian is only "efficient" -- i.e., they recognize simple commands.²⁴⁰ Basically, the regiment remains the focal point of "interaction."

The actual interaction of GSFG and NVA troops seems to be constrained, even deliberately and officially so. Although in many cases the "regiment next door" is a literal reality, separated by only a chain link fence, random unsupervised meetings are frowned upon. They can lead to a black market in Soviet watches and cameras in exchange for East German items to be used as trade goods for "beer money."²⁴¹ GSFG soldiers' contacts with the East German population are even further constrained. Soviet conscripts, in particular, are deliberately isolated as much as possible. Aside from being present in military convoy traffic jams in garrison cities, they are rarely if ever seen. They are never let out alone; only officers are.²⁴² Although local East Germans are now allowed to shop in the GSFG garrison, career soldier stores,²⁴³ this seems to be a privilege which is seldom used, and is not to be compared favourably with access to the 'Intershops.'

Officially sponsored contacts between the NVA and GSFG can also pose problems. It can lead to Soviet realization that the East Germans simply have it much better, and this creates discipline problems for the GSFG.²⁴⁴ According to a recent Soviet defector's account, conscripts were flown in and out of the GDR in close quarantine, were never informed of the East German airfield, and moved about in-country in the dead of night. These extraordinary measures were not justified by pointing to NATO machinations, but were supposedly implemented because the East Germans were not to be trusted and sabotage was feared if the railway was used. The defector also complained of privation. His political officer blamed the lack of supplies on the East Germans, saying that "The Germans have once again not delivered."²⁴⁵ Interestingly, NVA privations are blamed on the West Germans and NATO.²⁴⁶

For the East German soldiers' part, there seems to be a general realization that they do, in fact, have it better than the GSFG. Their pay and accommodations are better, and they are not subjected to the same degree of isolation and at times ferocious discipline. Furthermore, alcoholism, although a recognized NVA problem, does not

seem to be nearly as widespread as in the GSFG, and the same is true of individual disciplinary problems.²⁴⁷ At every point, of course, the NVA is taught to slavishly copy Soviet doctrine and to consider the Soviet Army as "unconquerable." The image of a tough, brawling Soviet guardsman may be deliberately cultivated to support this. Certainly, the NVA is schooled to look up to the GSFG for all advice.²⁴⁸ Picture after picture shows a Soviet soldier "explaining" something to an East German trooper or officer. In fact, however, training standards in the GSFG may have been slipping of late, causing the Soviet Krasnaia Zvezda to criticize its NCOs and officers for negligence.²⁴⁹ This is hardly the sort of thing to maintain the Soviet image among its allies, who themselves may achieve better training standards.

There is reason to doubt, then, the glowing official picture of daily NVA - GSFG cooperation. Clearly, however, planned joint meetings and exercises do occur, and, in particular, training and performance goals are standardized. If there are vague Russian language standards and official contact is limited, who then seems to bear the burden for these joint plans and most often coordinates planning with Soviet comrades? As noted above, the GDR Ministry of Defence contains a large Soviet officer contingent, and its duties include joint planning. The plans themselves have evolved over the years since they first appeared in 1964. The 1978 "brothers in arms" order included yearly joint workplans, and this was reinforced by the signing of an agreement to deepen joint planning for the 1980/81 period.²⁵⁰ Signing such agreements may now be an annual phenomenon.²⁵¹ Both the 1980/81 and 1982/83 plans were signed by the respective NVA and GSFG senior political officers. It would seem that this emphasis on the role of the political officer in planning and cooperation, and on commensurately political tasks, is carried over throughout the cooperative process. Thus military cooperation may be less effective than political cooperation, which is designed to ensure ideological conformity and loyalty to the WP in general and the GSFG in particular.²⁵²

If there is close political officer cooperation, however, this still leaves open the amount and quality of general officer contacts. As noted above, the army officer school is experiencing trouble determining what level of Russian language might be useful on a daily basis. Even in the relatively well-integrated air force, encouraging the further acquisition of Russian in order to create "open and honest" relationships between "fraternal" officers has been advocated.²⁵³ As noted above, training in Soviet academies, which would at least solve language problems, does not seem to be as widespread as might otherwise be assumed. On occasion, the experience, although vital to career aspirations, can also be disillusioning, for the Soviet authorities have allowed Internal Warsaw Pact, East European rivalries (e.g., Polish-German) to carry on, and discourage curiosity concerning delicate Soviet matters.²⁵⁴ Finally, the general tenor of contacts with the GSFG often reflects Soviet supervision and tutelage, especially at higher levels where a "brother" officer is always present. On manoeuvres, the presence of "shadow" Soviet officers spreads downward and outward. In addition to the GSFG officer cadre, the KGB surrounds the NVA with informants²⁵⁵ and uses the MfS as a branch plant. Of course, the KGB also maintains meticulous surveillance of Soviet troops in the GDR.²⁵⁶

Thus it would not seem that, common standards aside, the NVA - GSFG relationship overall could be characterized as one of trust, much less intimacy. It may even be one of mutual as well as Soviet mistrust for all but demonstrably loyal officers and NCOs.²⁵⁷ Against this less than comradely background, what uses are envisioned for the NVA by the Soviets? For all its technical expertise, the NVA is still less well-equipped, and in the case of the navy requests for certain types of equipment -- such as submarines -- have been turned down.²⁵⁸ To be sure, newer weapons are continuously, if gradually, introduced, but it is not always clear in what numbers or how often they are actually put to use in training. Saving fuel may, at times, be a more important goal than mechanical familiarity. In wartime, of course, the Soviet military will take over NVA logistics.²⁵⁹ The NVA logistical system only exists

at the divisional level and below. Soviet control mechanisms would seem to extend only to the regimental level. Given the lack of real contacts and the limited use of Russian, it is highly doubtful that the NVA could be readily utilized in cooperation with Soviet forces in smaller "packages."²⁶⁰ There is no observer who believes that the NVA would fight as a "national" army, and there is no evidence of any kind to suggest this.

Just how NVA units would be integrated can only be inferred by combining these factors with observation of joint manoeuvres and behaviour in conflict. The only relevant example of "combat performance," however, occurred in 1968. Current combat experience in the Third World is not characteristic of military confrontations in Europe. In 1968, elements from two NVA divisions (one motorized and one armoured) participated in the invasion of Czechoslovakia under Soviet command. The troops were well isolated from outside contact beforehand, and there is no indication that they were informed that they would actually "go in" -- although once the operation was under way, word certainly spread quickly to both East German and Czechoslovakian civilian border populations. On the way into Czechoslovakia, all NVA units were either "sandwiched" between or closely flanked by GSFG formations. Despite the lack of opposition and the NVA officer defector view that the troops remained reliable, their performance was not particularly impressive. Their presence was largely symbolic; the NVA spent most of its time sequestered in forests well out of sight of civilians. Nevertheless, according to Forster, the rapid erosion of morale contributed to quick withdrawal. "Fresh" Soviet troops replaced the NVA contingents. The common explanation for early NVA withdrawal is Czechoslovak reaction to "neo-Nazi" participation in the invasion. For their part, NVA troopers were told they had been invited to come.²⁶¹

The use of manoeuvres to mask surprise attacks and lack of candour with troops continue to be common Soviet and NVA practices, as does the characteristic deployment by regiments. The NVA does at times manoeuvre divisions, but the annual training cycle does not stress this.

During exercises, NVA units often serve as the hypothetical "enemy" of Soviet units, and "side by side" fighting may be the exception.²⁶² While in a recent manoeuvre NVA units may have been allowed to exercise some independence as the "aggressor" force, it still appears to be the case that a flank will not be allocated to the East Germans, who will remain closely supervised by the Soviets. Mobilization of "new" skeleton units in 1981 is an intriguing phenomenon. It may indicate increased depth for NVA formations, but initial public reports were few, and even if they are accurate, they are too incomplete to allow one to form a judgment.

Considerable progress, of course, has been made in improving the quality of NVA training, equipment and coordination with the GSEG since 1968, as demonstrated during manoeuvres. The NVA has also taken on an increasingly visible military role in the Third World -- which may improve its self-image and give it some experience under fire.²⁶³ None of this, however, translates into a fundamental alteration of the quality of NVA - GSFG cooperation, or belief that military experience is viewed positively in the rank and file. The pattern of subordination and mistrust has remained. The following combination of factors is relevant to producing a comprehensive assessment of possible Soviet deployment of the NVA in Europe:

- 1) past Soviet practice in the use of "national formations";
- 2) less sophisticated equipment in the NVA;
- 3) lack of depth in NVA formations, which must rely on Soviet supplies;
- 4) the quality of cooperation between the NVA and GSFG;
- 5) the pattern of NVA deployment;
- 6) close Soviet supervision.

Taken together, these suggest the radical observation that the NVA's place in the "first strategic echelon" is in the very front line, as "cannon fodder." It would be manoeuvred to the front, if this is at all

possible, before the troops have had a chance to take this in. The majority of NVA troops will fight or stay in place because they fear the certainty of Soviet security and military retaliation for failure more than the uncertainty of a fire fight with "enemies of the people." If these "enemies" are traditional ones, however, there may be greater willingness to fight quite apart from the stimulus of control and exhortation, as indicated by the popular East German reaction to "Solidarity" in Poland.

Conclusion

The NVA is the only viable offensive military weapon of the state, and plays an increasingly greater role in providing domestic support for the SED. This domestic role is becoming a "school of the nation," but departs from the Prussian model by adopting an increasingly Soviet style. Military-style discipline and authority are becoming the models for forced social accommodation. The three SED strategies for the 1980s: German/Prussian historical rediscovery; centralized planning and military status and priority; and paramilitary indoctrination and participation, will reflect this. This institution building is contributing to increasingly active non-violent resistance. A social revolution, however, does not seem imminent. Declining respect for authority and passive (sometimes alcohol-fuelled) withdrawal is present and increasing, but "getting by" remains the dominant social force. Overt compliance and accommodation continue to predominate. If the very recent upturn in the GDR's economic prospects can maintain the fundamental materialistic accommodation supporting the regime, current protests may be overtly defused.

The SED's institution-building strategy is facing a far more serious challenge, however, if it actually hopes to achieve a degree of popular legitimacy, much less a militant class consciousness. By its own definition of what morale should be based upon, the NVA is a reflection of the general failure to create this consciousness. Conscripts will most often be ordered about and will maintain their

equipment, but will not extend themselves more than they are forced to. The NCO cadre is not sufficiently active or effectiveto "lubricate" the joint in the NVA between conscripts and officers. Instead there is the political administration which, at least on occasion, makes matters worse. The officer corps is relatively technically expert, but that expertise may be limited or frustrated, when it comes to leadership skills. The officer corps may, in fact, generally stress machines more than men.²⁶⁴ Officer frustration will extend to coping with heavy command pressures without generous career prospects.

Proletarian internationalism has similarly not been accepted. Close cooperation with the GSFG is more apparent than real, and where real it is more political than military in nature. Political exhortations to look up to the Soviets and develop comradely relationships aside, military coordination is ensured through close control and the exercise of tutelage. The career cadre is, nevertheless, loyal, even if the conscripts are not, and is so dependent upon the Soviets for its own career prospects that over time senior officers and NCOs may come to believe that proletarian internationalism exists -- and may colour their perceptions accordingly. It would be inadvisable, however, to underestimate the demonstrated ability of East Europeans to overtly comply while internally holding quite disparate beliefs. The career cadre's loyalty must be tempered by the effects of opportunism and necessity which support it. In a bureaucracy completely carried through, success is measured in hierarchical advancement and exercise of command. Nevertheless, the East German military hierarchy remains subordinate and is subject to external commands which are often carried out in an exacting manner. This fundamental second-class status must rankle.

Serious inadequacies, then, exist with respect to NVA morale. While they most directly affect the conscript and short-service soldier, they are present in varying degrees in the career cadre as well and most apparently in the junior grades. Where as party-defined loyalty in the cadre is relatively genuine, the requirements for effective leadership

in reality create a morale problem of their own, through a lack of mutually accepted beliefs between cadre and conscript.

Virtually every possible avenue of institutional response to inadequacies in the NVA is being explored to improve the situation. This is clearly demonstrated by: increased paramilitary training; managing social control through the induction system and reliance on reservists; new, more onerous disciplinary strictures; calls for and efforts to improve training of conscripts and cadre; and never-ending calls for ideological improvement. Such a widespread and pervasive effort must mean that the problems in the NVA are quite serious, unless one simply adopts the apocalyptic view that the GDR is being mobilized for a general war. The alternative is implausible. It must be remembered that from the Soviet point of view, the East Germans are simply being made to conform. To overcome internal resistance to this conformity has meant searching for a "reason" to increase military preparedness.

These energetic efforts are primarily internal to the GDR, but their external dimension is clearly consistent with the SED's foreign, and most especially bloc, policies. They are however, costly. Just as the external and internal dimensions are interdependent, so too are the social, political and economic factors which set the context for assessing NVA morale. The SED strategy of internal forced accommodation is politically unpopular and military priorities are economically expensive. Economic costs are further exacerbated by such matters as supporting Januzelski in Poland. Coupled with making viable an internal, retrogressive economic "reform," the SED has had to confront reality in order to shore up the single lasting point of accommodation with the East German people. This confrontation has seen: the maintenance of 'Intershops' over Soviet objections; the reappearance of economic technicians in the Central Committee; and a warming trend in inter-German relations which has brought an increased flow of hard currency credits through the special linkage for trade and investment.

Are these departures representative of a potential conflict

with the consistency of the SED's internal and external policies, as media discussion of friendlier inter-German relations seems to be suggesting? I think not. Uncertainty over leadership in Moscow and the clear connection of the present German rapprochement, and its cyclical nature, to the continued viability of NVA-related strategies, argue that speculation concerning GDR-Soviet foreign policy strains is idle. "Viceroy" Abrassimov is gone, but fundamental change is not evident.

The NVA and related paramilitary programmes, then, are the keystone of SED internal and external policies; internally as the "school for social control" and externally as a vehicle for supporting traditional communist bloc integration and "proletarian internationalism." Politically, the party must be well-satisfied with the complementarity of these policies and their demonstrable value to the Soviet authorities. Even more so, because the economic costs of the strategies pursued paradoxically allow for a degree of flexibility with respect to reaching intra- and inter-German accommodation.

In strictly military terms, however, the SED should be less sanguine. With the possible exception of elite regiments, the majority of the army may be less than reliable. Reliability based on unit type, rather than status, would seem to follow in descending order from: the air force; tank crews or units; the navy; and the mechanized infantry. On average, if the NVA can be manoeuvred into combat quickly without giving the troops time to reflect upon, much less "discuss," what they are about, they may well fight. Against NATO, however, continued combat effectiveness will depend to a high degree on pervasive application of social control and the viable threat of "discipline of the pistol." This would be a high-risk application of force. The NVA shows all the symptoms of a gradually growing "Schwejkism." Unsupervised, especially if under pressure and on the Western front, it might simply melt away.

ENDNOTES

- 1 L. Whetten, "The Warsaw Pact as an Instrument of Inducing Political and Military Integration and Interdependency," in A.I. Broodhurst, ed., The Future of European Alliance Systems: NATO and the Warsaw Pact (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), p. 243.
- 2 The Military Balance, 1981-82, p. 19.
- 3 T. O. Cason, "The Warsaw Pact Today: The East European Military Forces," in R.E. Clawson and L.S. Kaplan, eds., The Warsaw Pact: Political Purpose and Military Means (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1982), p. 149.
- 4 The Military Balance, 1981-82, p. 19.
- 5 Calculated from ibid.
- 6 For the high estimate, based apparently on calculations of strike forces in 1974, see H.J. Rautenberg, "Zum inneren Gefüge der NVA," in J. Hacker et al., Die Nationale Volksarmee der DDR im Rahmen des Warschauer Paktes (München: Bernard and Gräfe Verlag, 1980), p. 70. For a lower estimate, based on total numbers in the army and navy greater than those in The Military Balance 1981-82, but lower for the air force, see T.M. Forster, The East German Army: Second in the Warsaw Pact (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1980) pp. 119-121. There may, then, have been some decrease. It is not impossible that cadre enlistments have not been able to keep up with a gradual increase in NVA strength over time.
- 7 This is a very widely held assessment. E.g., see Cason, op. cit., p. 151; S. Tiedtke, "East European Alliance Policy and Military Detente," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, 1/1979, pp. 101, 102; Department of the Army, Area Handbook for East Germany (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 279-291; D. Chaplin, "The East German Army: Training in Realism and Endurance," RUSI Journal, Vol. 118, December 1973, p. 58; S. Bowers, "Concepts of East German Defence Doctrine," Army Quarterly and Defence Digest, October 1978, p. 423; and P. Vigor, "Some Doubts and Difficulties Confronting a Would-be Soviet Attacker," RUSI Journal, Vol. 125, June 1980, p. 37.
- 8 C. Donnelly, quoted in Cason, op. cit., p. 152.
- 9 G. Schweigler, National Consciousness in Divided Germany (Beverly Hills: SAGE Publishers, 1975), pp. 36, 42, 110, 125, 126; and J. Starrels, "Nationalism in the German Democratic Republic," Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, Vol. 2, No. 1, Fall 1974, p. 33. They argue cautiously, and see no emotional, positive association with the state.

- 10 W. Treharne-Jones, "If the Wall Came Tumbling Down: The East Germans and Their State," Round Table, Vol. 66, 1976, pp. 291, 293; M. Croan, "Regime, Society and Nation: The GDR after Thirty Years," East Central Europe, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1979, p. 148. P. Ludz, "The SED's Concept of Nation: Deviations and Political Meanings," Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, Vol. 4, 2, Spring 1977, p. 208 and H. Zimmerman, "The GDR in the 1970s," Problems of Communism, March/April 1978, p. 19.
- 11 P. Ludz, "Public Attitudes and Survey Research in East Europe and the Soviet Union: The German Democratic Republic," Research Report R-18-79 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. International Communication Agency, July 30, 1979), p. 6-55. A sample interview of people aged 16-25 years, conducted in 1970-71, revealed that 75% considered themselves to be German rather than GDR citizens.
- 12 Treharne-Jones, op. cit., p. 296; and Schweigler, op. cit., p. 278.
- 13 R. Hutchings, "The GDR Since 1949," RAD Background Report/225, RFE Research, Vol. 4, No. 42, 16 October 1979.
- 14 Ludz, "The SED's Concept of Nation: Deviations and Political Meanings," op. cit., pp. 208, 210, 211, and Croan, op. cit., p. 137.
- 15 Forster, op. cit.
- 16 D. Childs, The GDR: Moscow's German Ally (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), pp. 145-147.
- 17 S. Bowers, "East German National Consciousness: Domestic and Foreign Policy Considerations," East European Quarterly, Summer 1979, p. 162.
- 18 Childs, op. cit., p. 146 and G. Schöpflin, "Shortages and Go Slows as East Europe Feels the Economic Pinch," Annual of Power and Conflict, 1979/80, p. 103.
- 19 "Dissent in the GDR," RAD Background Report/226, Vol. 4, No. 43, 17 October 1979, RFE/RL Research, p. 6. 80,000 have emigrated legally and some 120,000 more requested visas according to official admission. The 200,000 figure from Whetten is closer to the truth.
- 20 Childs, op. cit., pp. 223, 224.
- 21 M. McCauley, "East Germany: The Dilemmas of Division," Conflict Studies, June 1980, p. 15.
- 22 K. Ehring and M. Dallwitz, Schwerter zu Pflugscharen: Friedensbewegung in der DDR (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag GmbH, 1982), p. 92, and W. Volkmer, "East Germany: Critical Voices," Survey, Summer 1977/78, p. 208.

- 23 Whetten, op. cit.
- 24 Childs, op. cit., p. 149.
- 25 Childs, op. cit., p. 144.
- 26 Schöpflin, op. cit., pp. 100-101.
- 27 Hamburg Bild, 20 Nov. 1982, translated in JPRS, DW230757, 23 Nov. 1982, pp. E8-E9. There seems to be some immediate redress in the GDR's international balance of payments, however.
- 28 P. Benetazzo, "East Germany Rehabilitates Old Heroes," Christian Science Monitor, 14 April 1983, p. 1.
- 29 W. Rehm, "Die Nationale Volksarmee und Potsdam," Europäische Wehrkunde, XXVIII, Dec. 1979, p. 628.
- 30 "Das Preussen Bild der DDR im Wandel," Die DDR - Realitäten, Argumente (Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Verlag Neue Gesellschaft GmbH, 1981), p. 37; see also pp. 33-38 for a full discussion.
- 31 U. Rühmland, "Die Traditionen in den Armeen des Warschauer Pakts," Europäische Wehrkunde, XXXI, May 1982, p. 220.
- 32 Benetazzo, op. cit., p. 1; and H.-U. Kerster, "An der Elbe scheiden sich die Friedensgeister; Eine Revolte der DDR Jugend gibt es nicht," General Anzeiger, February 26, 1982, p. 13.
- 33 "The Educators' Cadre of the GDR is Permitted to Cite Bismarck," Frankfurt Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 December 1983, translated in JPRS-EPS, 10 February 1984, pp. 14-15.
- 34 W. Schmidt, "Nationalgeschichte der DDR und das territorialstaatliche historische Erbe," Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, May 1981, pp. 399-404.
- 35 Rühmland, op. cit., p. 218.
- 36 K.-H. Audersch "Grosser Zapfenstreich der NVA in neuer Form," Neues Deutschland, February 21, 22, p. 8; and J. Rühle, "Preussen Schwarzweiss und Rot," Deutschland Archiv, September 1981, pp. 904, 906. This re-emphasis on German/Prussian military history has its anomalies even by the standards of "dialectical interpretation." For example, the short-lived Bavarian Red Army which formed part of the acceptable tradition as late as 1973 was omitted in 1977/78, even though its general's name is still carried by an NVA NCO school. Rühmland, op. cit., p. 219.

- 37 "Traditionspflege," Europäische Wehrkunde, XXX, March 1981, p. 136, and Rühmland, op. cit., p. 218.
- 38 "Die Macht der Zentralorgane wächst," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 27, 1982, p. 3.
- 39 U. Ziegler, "X. Parteitag der SED," DDR Report, V. 14, #6, 1981, p. 338 and H. Lades, "Nachlese zum X. SED Parteitag," Deutsche Studien, March 1981, pp. 1-6. Western economists have, to say the least, been sceptical of the viability of these substitutes for intensive phase reforms.
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- 41 "Höhere Verteidigungsausgaben," Europäische Wehrkunde, XXX, March 1981, p. 136; & Die Welt, 27 Aug. 1982, p. 4, translated in FBIS-EEU, 28 July 1982, p. E2.
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- 43 I am grateful to Axel Dorscht for this observation, based on the peripatetic behaviour of Hoffmann and other senior NVA officers, and parallel trade protocols with countries visited or where NVA support exists. See "4000 Bürger aus befreiten Staaten erhalten Ausbildung," Neues Deutschland, August 4, 1981; "Hoffmann in Indien," Bonner Rundschau, Jan. 19, 1982, p. 2; "Handelsprotokol 1982 mit Indien Unterzeichnet," Neues Deutschland, December 5, 1981; "Aktuelle Umschau," Europäische Wehrkunde, XXX, October 1981, p. 470. "Regierungsabkommen mit Kampuchea," Neues Deutschland, August 14, 1981; "Protokoll zur Kooperation DDR - Nigeria," Neues Deutschland, March 2, 1981. Some of this may be related to the rising energy costs of supplies obtained from the GDR's main "ally," the Soviet Union; Childs, op. cit., p. 149.
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- 49 McCauley, Marxism . . ., op. cit., Bowers; "Concepts . . .," p. 425; and RAD, "Dissent . . .," op. cit., p. 7.
- 50 Ibid.
- 51 "Neue Anweisung zur vormilitärische Ausbildung," Europäische Wehrkunde, XXXI, February 1982, p. 86; "Militärische Vorschulausbildung," Europäische Wehrkunde, XXX, May 1981, p. 232.
- 52 "DDR Wehrpflicht auch für Frauen," General Anzeiger, March 26, 1982, p. 1; "Military Service Law," Neues Deutschland, translated in FBIS -EEU, 27128 March 1982, pp. 9, 10, paragraphs 5 (2) and (3).
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- 54 "Army Reservists Military Training Explained," National Zeitung, 16 Sept. 1982, translated in FBIS - EEU, 21 Sept. 1982, p. E7.
- 55 "DDR: Wehrpflicht . . .," op. cit., and "Military Service Law," paragraph 3, (E) (5).
- 56 "Defence Official on New Military Service Law," East Berlin Domestic Service, 1400 GMT, 31 Mar. 1982, translated in FBIS - EEU, 2 Apr. 1982, pp. E4, E5; "All Around the Army," East Berlin Domestic Service, 0600 GMT, 12 May 1982, translated in FBIS -EEU, 13 May 1982, p. E4.
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- 58 Ibid.; "Defence Official . . .," op. cit.
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- 62 M. Ihme, "Wissenschaftliche und technische Zusammenarbeit der Mitglieder-länder des RGW fordert die Steigerung der Arbeitsproduktivität," Sozialistische Arbeitswissenschaft, May/June 1981, pp. 169-175.

- 63 "Defence Minister Addresses GST Congress," Neues Deutschland 26/27 June 1982, p. 3, translated in FBIS - EEU, 7 Jul. 1982, p. E2.
- 64 R. Geyer et al., Streitkräfte in geteilten Deutschland (München: Kopernikus Verlag, 1976), pp. 78, 79; M. McCauley, Marxism - Leninism ..., op. cit., p. 193. For a general review of East German consumerism see Ludz, "Public ...," op. cit., passim; and "Apprentices, Military Service Regulations Reported," Frankfurter Allgemeine, 15 Dec. 1982, p. E9.
- 65 Childs, op. cit., p. 176. This is all the more significant since the SED is restricting university posts in favour of increasing reliance on technical education, "Universitäten Hoch- und Fachschulen in der DDR," Die DDR - Realitäten, Argumente (Bonn: Friedrich - Ebert - Stiftung, Verlag Neue Gesellschaft GmbH, 1980), pp. 10, 11; McCauley, "East German ...," op. cit., p. 15; and H. Zimmerman, op. cit., p. 19.
- 66 "Berichte: Die Rechtsentwicklung in der DDR," Recht in Ost und West, July 15, 1982, p. 173.
- 67 "Aktuelle Umschau," Europäische Wehrkunde, XXXI, May 1982, p. 228; G. Neugebauer, "25 Jahre Nationale Volksarmee," Deutschland Archiv, March 1981, p. 273; Wehrtechnik, Sept. 1981, translated in JPRS 79705, 22 Dec. 1981, p. 37; W. Otto, "Entwicklung und Aufgaben des Hochschulwesens der Nationalen Volksarmee," Militärwesen, April 1981, pp. 10-15; "Professional NCO Careers Outlined," Armee Rundschau, in German, #3, 1976, pp. 61-68, translated in JPRS 67213, 28 April 1976, p. 10; and Herspring in L. Letgers, ed., The German Democratic Republic: A Developed Socialist Society (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 202-204.
- 68 "DDR führt den Marschall ein," Frankfurter Rundschau, April 15, 1982, p. 1. For a discussion of the comparative status in forms of monthly pay rates, see Johnson et al., op. cit., p. 105; and Neugebauer, op. cit., p. 271.
- 69 Virtually every source discusses this, but see also: Geyer et al., op. cit., pp. 78-82; W. Rehm, "Wehrmoral und 'Soldatenethos' in der DDR," Europäische Wehrkunde, XXVI, Vol. 26, 6, 1977, pp. 298-301; P. Jungermann, Die Wehrideologie der SED und das Leitbild der Nationalen Volksarmee von sozialistischen Deutschen Soldaten (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1973); G.-D. Feddern, "Das Konfliktbild des Soldaten der Nationalen Volksarmee," Beiträge zur Konflikt Forschung 4/71, pp. 187-226; J.K. Klein and A.S. Sholtow, "Die Herausbildung der Weltanschauung beim Verteidiger des sozialistischen Vaterlandes," Beiträge zur Konflikt Forschung, 21/73, pp. 103-146; E. Opitz, "Die politisch-ideologische Erziehung in der Nationalen Volksarmee der DDR," Beiträge zur Konflikt Forschung, 2/79, pp. 89-106; W. Rehm, "Wehrmoral und Soldatenethos in der DDR," Europäische Wehrkunde, XXXVI, Vol. 26, No. 6, 1977, pp. 298-301. "Die nationale Volksarmee und Helsinki," Europäische Wehrkunde, XXV, 1976, pp. 187-189; "Militärschöffe der DDR --

ein ideologischer Auftrag," Europäische Wehrkunde, XXV, 1976, pp. 514-515.

70 T. Tobias and W. Roschlau, "Grundzüge der BDR -- Militärpolitik und die Rolle der Bundeswehr in der NATO am Beginn der 80er Jahre," Militärwesen, 7/81, pp. 73-80; W. Wünsche, "Soldaten sein für Frieden und Freiheit," Volksarmee, 7/81, p. 3; "Ansprache des Ministers für Nationale Verteidigung, Armeegeneral Heinz Hoffmann, auf der Festveranstaltung zum 25. Jahrestag der Nationale Volksarmee, am 27 February, 1981," Volksarmee 10/81, p. 4, among many other examples, especially "Entspannung trotz Hochrüstung?" Volksarmee, 4/1981, p. 7, which attempts to refute NATO claims that it needs to redress the balance following Soviet arms acquisitions. See "Political Education Themes: USSR."

71 Johnson et al., op. cit.

72 Geyer op. cit., p. 78; and McCauley, Marxism ..., op. cit., p. 121.

73 Bowers, "Concepts ...," op. cit., p. 426. For the importance of NCOs to German Army cohesion in the past see K. Lang, Military Institutions and the Sociology of War (Beverly Hills: SAGE Publishers, 1972) p. 79.

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77 Johnson et al., op. cit., pp. 102, 103; their information is based on interviews or articles originating in the early to mid 1970s.

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- 83 Oschlies, op. cit., pp. 484-486; and Forster, op. cit., pp. 52-54.
- 84 Goos and Siegel, op. cit.; Büro des Zentralrats der FDJ, "Die Aufgaben der FDJ bei der weiteren Stärkung der sozialistischen Landesverteidigung: Beschluss vom 18.1.1980 Auszüge," Junge Generation, June 1981, pp. 79, 80; "SED startet neue Wehrkampagne unter der Jugend," Die Welt, February 23, 1982.
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- 98 Ibid., pp. 192-204 for the development of the "Movement"; K. -H. Baum, "DDR -- Kirche stellt Frage nach neuen Sicherheitssystemen: Bischof Krusche erläutert Gespräche der Protestanten mit der Staatsführung -- von der Abschreckung abstand nehmen," Frankfurter Rundschau, February 2, 1982, p. 2; "DDR -- Bischof berichtet von Belastung im Verhältnis zum Staat" Frankfurter Rundschau, April 19, 1982, p. 1; Frankfurter Rundschau, January 19, 1982, p. 2.; "Die Synode wirbt in Ost-Berlin weiter für einen sozialen Friedensdienst," Frankfurter Rundschau, January 14, 1982, p. 4., and "Young Pacifists Circulate New Peace Badge," Der Spiegel, 1 Nov. 1982, translated in FBIS - EEU, Nov. 8, 1982, p. 2. There are over 7 million Lutherans in the GDR.
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- 107 F. Oldenburg, "Die DDR und die polnische Krise," Osteuropa, 12/1982, p. 1007.
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- and "DDR Armee steht weiter unter Alarm, Urlaubssperre," Berliner Morgenpost, January 5, 1982; "Kampfgruppen des Arbeiterklasse der DDR wurden verstärkt," Der Tagesspiegel, August 1, 1981.
- 112 "Aktuelle Umschau," Europäische Wehrkunde, XXX, October 1981, p. 470; _____, XXX, November 1981, p. 515.
- 113 Nawrocki "A Turn Away ...," op. cit., p. E7.
- 114 Interview with Die Zeit correspondent Marlies Menge, posted in East Berlin, report of an acquaintance's statement telecast on "Verbesserte Beziehungen DDR - Polen," "Kennzeichen D," Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen, Jan. 21, 1982. How serious the threat of Soviet - bloc intervention was cannot be readily assessed. I cannot, however, resist mentioning an example of the kind of rumour which was current. According to "reliable" sources in Washington D.C., a secret protocol had been agreed upon by the GDR/USSR which would cede a portion of Western Poland to the GDR as compensation for the projected sacrifices required if Poland were invaded. The newly "recognized" German territory would include a large portion of the Silesian coal basin, and would be (re)populated by Soviet, ethnic Germans, not GDR citizens "Westteil Polens an SED-Staat," Allgemeine Zeitung (Mainz), February 25, 1982. This is really "too good" to be true, and was not picked up by the media at large. Quite frankly, I believe this to be an example of someone's "disinformation."
- 115 "Kampfgruppe," ... op. cit., and D. Wagner, "Organisation, Auftrag und militärischer Stellenwert den Kampfgruppen der Arbeiterklasse in der DDR," Europäische Wehrkunde, July 1981, p. 318.
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- 117 "Aktuelle Umschau," Europäische Wehrkunde, January 1982, p. 34.
- 118 "Ihr wichtigster Befehl zu jeder Zeit: den Frieden zuverlässig schützen," Tribüne, November 5, 1982, interview with NVA Personnel Chief Lt.-Gen. H. Ludwig.
- 119 McCauley, Marxism ..., op. cit., p. 193; J. Nawrocki, Bewaffnete Organe in der DDR (Berlin: Verlag Gebr. Holzapfel, 1979), p. 74.
- 120 Der Spiegel, 6 Dec. 1982, p. 117, and "Women Against Conscription, Petition Honecker," Hamburg DPA, 0950 GMT, 6 Dec. 1982, translated in FBIS - EEU, 7 Dec. 1982, p. E3.
- 121 Ehring and Dallwitz, op. cit., p. 140; only 70 cases were pending in early 1983, however. Der Spiegel, "Objectors to Serve Under Arms," 3 Jan. 1983, p. 16, translated in FBIS - EEU, 5 Jan. 1983, p. E3.

- 122 Ibid., pp. 136, 137; Nawrocki, Bewaffnete ..., op. cit., pp. 94, 95; "Wehrpflicht, Wehrrecht und Kriegsdienstverweigerung in beiden deutschen Staaten," Die DDR -- Realitäten und Argumente (Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Verlag Neue Gesellschaft GmbH, 1980) p. 18.
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- 124 Wehrpflicht, op. cit., p. 18.
- 125 Forster, op. cit., pp. 254, 255; H. Ohl, "Invitation to Muster," Armeerundschau, March 1974, pp. 10-15, translated in JPRS 62045, 21 May 1974, p. 40.
- 126 "All Around the Army," 12 May 1982, op. cit.; and "Military Experts Explain Military Service Law," East Berlin Domestic Service 1300 GMT, 7 Sept. 1982, translated in FBIS - EEU, 9 Sept. 1982, pp. E4 - E6.
- 127 "Military Experts ...," op. cit., p. E6.
- 128 Nawrocki, "A Turn Away ...," op. cit., p. E9.
- 129 "Defence Minister ...," op. cit., p. E5.
- 130 G. Kondeck, "Increased Call-Up of Reservists," Die Welt, 11/12 Dec. 1982, p. 3, translated in FBIS - EEU, 14 Dec. 1982, p. E1.
- 131 Hamburg DPA, 1846 GMT 20 Aug. 1982, translated in FBIS - EEU, 24 Aug. 1982, p. E5; and "Increasing Objections of GDR Reservists Reported," Die Welt, 25 Aug. 1982, p. 1, translated in FBIS - EEU, 27 Aug. 1982, p. 4. Forty-two refusal cases were reported for this early 1982 callup, as opposed to only 30 estimated cases for all of 1981. While the larger number is interesting, the numbers are small in any case.
- 132 Ironically, the activities of children can have the reverse effect. Recently an NVA air force major with twenty years of service was demoted to lieutenant because his daughter escaped with his grandson to Italy. "DDR Major degradiert, Grund die Flucht der Tochter," Berliner Morgenpost, October 1, 1981.
- 133 Bowers, "Concepts ...," op. cit., p. 428; Bowers, "East Germany ...," op. cit., pp. 154, 155; and Nawrocki, Bewaffnete ..., op. cit., p. 59.
- 134 Childs, op. cit., p. 281; U. Rühmland, "Organisation und Ausrüstung der Streitkräfte der DDR im Vergleich zu den übrigen WP-Staaten," in Die

- Nationale Volksarmee der DDR in Rahmen des Warschauer Pakts (München: Bernard and Graefe Verlag, 1980), p. 127.
- 135 Rautenberg, op. cit., p. 82.
- 136 Childs, op. cit., p. 172.
- 137 Nawrocki, Bewaffnete ..., op. cit., pp. 71, 80.
- 138 Rautenberg, op. cit., p. 91.
- 139 Ibid., p. 87 (for example, timing the donning of a gas mask).
- 140 Forster, op. cit., p. 233.
- 141 Rautenberg, op. cit., p. 82.
- 142 W. Rehm, "Zum Inneren Gefüge der Nationalen Volksarmee," Europäische Wehrkunde, XXX, August 1981, p. 364.
- 143 Forster, op. cit., pp. 254-256; and W.J. Lewis, The Warsaw Pact: Arms, Doctrine and Strategy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), pp. 175, 177.
- 144 E.g., H.J. Scharat, "Zu einigen theoretischweltanschaulichen Aspekten der Beziehungen und der Diziplin in unseren Streitkräften," Militärwesen, 3/1981, pp. 27, 32.
- 145 Rautenberg, op. cit., p. 62.
- 146 Rehm, "Zum Inneren ...," op. cit., p. 362; Nawrocki, Bewaffnete ..., op. cit., p. 73.
- 147 R. L. Giles, "Die NVA aus der Sicht eines britischen Offiziers," in Die Nationale ..., op. cit., pp. 154, 155.
- 148 Herspring in Letgers, op. cit., p. 212; and Bowers, "Concepts ...," op. cit., p. 432.
- 149 Johnson et. al., op. cit., pp. 90-96.
- 150 Nawrocki, Bewaffnete ..., op. cit., pp. 41, 42; and Rautenberg, op. cit., pp. 78-80.
- 151 "1200 NVA Soldaten sind in Strafarbeitslager," Deutsche Tagespost, March 5, 1981. Two camps are known to contain 526 prisoners, 43% of whom are incarcerated for their political views.

- 152 H. Jökel, "Disziplinarbefugnisse erweitert," Ausbilder, 9/1982, and "Penal Companies Reportedly Introduced in GDR Army," General Anzeiger, 16 Nov. 1982, p. 3, translated in FBIS - EEU, 18 Nov. 1982, p. E10.
- 153 Childs, op. cit., p. 278, takes a very balanced off-hand view of the problem. Nawrocki, Bewaffnete ..., op. cit., pp. 41, 42, 77, takes it rather more seriously, as do NVA sources such as K. -J. Blanke, "Es beginnt mit des eigenen Konsequenz," Ausbilder, 9/1982.
- 154 "Jeder zehnte Unfall in der DDR durch Alkoholgebrauch," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 12, 1981, p. 10.
- 155 Rautenberg, op. cit., p. 66.
- 156 Blank, op. cit..
- 157 Childs, op. cit., p. 279; Nawrocki, Bewaffnete ..., op. cit., p. 77.
- 158 Rautenberg, op. cit..
- 159 There is virtually unanimous agreement on this point from all observers. To cite only recent examples, see Rehm, "Zum Innere ...," op. cit., pp. 361-363; "DDR Schwierigkeiten mit dem Marxismus-Leninismus," Europäische Wehrkunde, XXX, June 1981, p. 280; "Aktuelle Umschau," _____, XXX, January 1982, p. 34; K. Freudenreich, "Die politische Schulung und die bewusste Tat," Volksarmee, #26, 1981, p. 3; F. -W. Völkel, "Auftrag und Zündstoff," _____, # 30/1981, p. 4; F. Haneis, "Je komplizierter die Gefechtsaufgabe, desto intesiver die politischer Arbeit," Militärwesen, 7/1981, pp. 16-22; B. Schepler and U. Kuhla, "Breshnews Schrift "Wiedergeburt" für die Führungstätigkeit Nutzen," _____, 6/1981, pp. 93-97; D. Hillebrenner, E. Schmidt and H. Bernhard, "Die Vorzüge des Sozialismus in den Streitkräften voll nutzen," _____, 4/1981, pp. 3-9; D. Käsler, "Die Beziehungen zwischen den Arbeitsgruppen im Führungsorgan des Truppenteils (1)," _____, 2/1981, pp. 63-68; H. Hoffmann, "Für hohe Effektivität der Führung und Erziehung," _____, 1/1981, pp. 3-10.
- 160 Rautenberg, op. cit., pp. 64-65.
- 161 Nawrocki, Bewaffnete ..., op. cit., p. 76.
- 162 Ibid., pp. 72, 73; Rautenberg, op. cit., p. 88.
- 163 Rautenberg, op. cit., p. 89.
- 164 "Aktuelle Umschau," Europäische Wehrkunde, XXX, August 1981, p. 371.
- 165 Rautenberg, op. cit., pp. 88, 89 and Rehm, "Zum Inneren ...," op. cit., p. 364.

- 166 See Volksarmee, No. 23, 1981, pp. 3, 11; and No. 26, 1981, p. 5.
- 167 Nawrocki, Bewaffnete ..., op. cit., p. 75; "I lost My Illusions," Der Spiegel, 21 Feb. 1977, pp. 38-52, translated in JPRS 68866, 1 Apr. 1977, pp. 48-54.
- 168 "Kriegsnahe Ausbildung," Europäische Wehrkunde, XXX, June 1981, p. 280; M. Hansdorf, "Stressbewältigung und allseitige Vorbereitung auf das Gefecht," Militärwesen, 6/1981, pp. 32-37; B. Leistner, "Die Disziplin ist die 'Mutter des Sieges'," Volksarmee, 4/1981, p. 3.
- 169 See Bowers, "Concepts ...," op. cit., p. 426; most recently referred to in Childs, op. cit., p. 282, using Der Spiegel (1977) as his source.
- 170 Specialist interview in West Germany.
- 171 Nawrocki, "A Turn Away ...," op. cit., p. E9.
- 172 Forster, op. cit., p. 119, estimates 22% -- the highest in the NVA.
- 173 Lewis, op. cit., p. 168.
- 174 Rautenberg, op. cit., p. 64.
- 175 Völkel, op. cit.
- 176 J. Lolland, ed., Zu Befehl Genosse Unterleutnant: Authentische Berichte aus den Alltag der Nationalen Volksarmee (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1971), pp. 37, 38, 72, 177, 186-188.
- 177 Rautenberg, op. cit., p. 74.
- 178 Comments by J. Kuppe, Gesamtdeutsche Institut, at the Conference on the Warsaw Pact and the Question of Cohesion, Wilson Center of the Smithsonian Institute, May 18 & 19, 1984.
- 179 It may be useful to record the number of times a particular unit is cited for awards and for participation in coordinated training with the GSFG, such as the "Hans Beimler Regiment" -- mentioned three times on one page in G. Jökel, T. Nelles, and K.-U. Kübke, "The Development of Combat Cooperation Between the GDR NVA and the Soviet Army During the 1970s," Voenno - Istoricheskii Zhurnal, July 1978, pp. 65-71, translated in JPRS 72066, 18 October 1978, p. 47. Even here, reference to tank units or regiments predominates (pp. 46, 47).
- 180 Forster, op. cit., pp. 119-121 and Johnson et al., op. cit., p. 102.

- 181 A. Lauterboch, "Service Periods, Age Limits, and Availability of Extended Term and Professional Soldiers in the NVA," Truppenpraxis, June 1983, pp. 403-405, translated in JPRS 83918, 18 July 1983, pp. 8, 9.
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- 186 Rautenberg, op. cit., p. 69.
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- 188 "Aktuelle Umschau," Europäische Wehrkunde, February 1982, p. 81. A similar department already existed at the 'Max Matern' Academy. See Militärtechnik, 6/1978, p. 284.
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- 195 H. Hoffmann, "The National People's Army (NVA): A Modern Socialist Defence Force," Einheit, February 1981, pp. 141-148, translated in JPRS 77866, 17 April 1981, p. 31.
- 196 Forster, op. cit., pp. 267-247; Johnson, et al., op. cit., p. 107.
- 197 "Aktuelle Umschau," Europäische Wehrkunde, XXXI, January 1982, p. 34.
- 198 W. Otto, "Entwicklung und Aufgaben des Hochschulwesens der Nationalen Volksarmee," Militärwesen, April 1981, pp. 10-15.
- 199 Tribüne, op. cit., and Wehrtechnik, September 1981, p. 93, translated in JPRS 79705, December 1981, p. 37.

- 200 "Offiziershochschule der Landstreitkräfte 'Ernst Thälmann': Sektion mot-Schützenkommandeure," Militärtechnik, 4/1977, pp. 149, 151; and E. Steinmeyer, "Offiziershochschule des Lanstreitkräfte 'Ernst Thälmann': Sektion Panzerkommandeure," _____, 6/1977, p. 244.
- 201 Ibid., and see also, "Offiziershochschule der Volksmarine 'Karl Liebknecht': Sektion Seeoffiziere," Militärtechnik, 5/1982, p. 231; "Offiziershochschule der Luftstreitkräfte/Luftverteidigung 'Fritz Mehring': Sektion Allgemeine Grundlagenausbildung," _____, 1/1982, pp. 5, 6; "Sektion Militärisches Transport - und Nachrichtenwesen an der Hochschule für Verkehrswesen 'Friedrich List', _____, 1/1980, pp. 6, 7; "Offiziershochschule der Landstreitkräfte 'Ernst Thälmann': Sektion Allgemeine Grundlagen," _____, 2/1979, p. 60. This last entry is somewhat less ideological in tone, but see also "Offiziershochschule der Landstreitkräfte 'Ernst Thälmann': Sektion Gesellschafts Wissenschaften", _____, 6/1978, pp. 285, 286.
- 202 Schepler and Kuhla, op. cit.
- 203 Hillebrenner, Schmidt and Bernhard. All are faculty members of the Academy, op. cit., pp. 3-9.
- 204 Rehm, "Zum Inneren . . .," op. cit., p. 363; Johnson, et al., op. cit., pp. 105-114.
- 205 Ibid., pp. 363, 364; and Lolland, op. cit., pp. 38, 72, 177, 186-188.
- 206 Ibid.; "Das Gefecht bedingt Ersetzbarkeit," Europäische Wehrkunde, April 1981, pp. 181, 182; "Zur wachsenden Bedeutung der militärischen Kollektive bei der Erziehung von Disziplinverletzern und Straftätern," Militärwesen, 1/1981, pp. 97-99; S. Glaser, "Einige Probleme der truppengeschichtlichen Arbeit und der Traditionserziehung," Militärwesen, 1/1981, p. 25; and especially D. Käsler, "Die Beziehungen zwischen den Arbeitsgruppen im Führungsorgan des Truppenteils (1)," Militärwesen, 1/1981, pp. 63-68, which attempts to paint an ideal picture of combat group coordination through correct class consciousness.
- 207 Quoted in ibid., p. 363.
- 208 Lauterbach, op. cit., pp. 7, 11. He believes that no promotion bottlenecks exist in the NVA. The weight of the evidence seems to confirm Dean's analysis below, however.
- 209 Johnson et at., op. cit., pp. 102, 106.
- 210 Lauterbach, op. cit., pp. 11, 12.
- 211 Hoffmann, "The NVA . . .," op. cit..

- 212 Johnson et al., op. cit., pp. 83, 84.
- 213 Lewis, op. cit., pp. 166, 168, 179.
- 214 Johnson et al., op. cit., p. 83, indicates that a fairly large contingent of NVA officers are seconded to WP staff.
- 215 For example, Hartmann, "Offiziershochschule der Lanstreitkräfte 'Ernst Thälmann': Sektion chemische Dienste," Militärtechnik, 10/1977, p. 438 versus p. 439; "Offiziershochschule der Landstreitkräfte 'Ernst Thälmann': Sektion Raketentruppen und Artillerie," _____, 12/1977, p. 532; "Sektion Militärische Transport," op. cit., p. 7.
- 216 "Schiffsmachinenoffiziere," op. cit., p. 294; Offiziershochschule der Volksmarine 'Karl Liebknecht', " Militärtechnik, 3/1982, pp. 117, 118.
- 217 "Offiziershochschule ... 'Fritz Mehring': Sektion Allgemeine Grundlagenausbildung," op. cit., p. 7; and "Radio Describes Army Officer's Training," East Berlin Domestic Service at 1515 GMT on 17 May 1982, translated in FBIS - EEU, 20 May 1982, p. E7. For a more general overview of the development of Russian language training for the NVA and Border Troops see, E. Schulze, "Wissenschaftliche Arbeit zur effektiven und rationellen Gestaltung der Russischaus- und -weiterbildung," Militärwesen, 5/1984, pp. 22-27.
- 218 "Offiziershochschule ... 'Ernst Thälmann': Sektion Allgemeine Grundlage," op. cit., p. 62.
- 219 "Die Umsetzung von Anforderungen der Truppenpraxis in der Russischausbildung an der Offiziershochschule 'Ernst Thälmann'," Militärwesen, 3/1981, pp. 99-102.
- 220 D. Jammer "On the Daily Life of Student Officers: A Visit to the Friedrich Engels Military Academy in Dresden," Neues Deutschland, 30/31 December 1978, p. 11, translated in JPRS 73331, 10 February 1979, p. 51.
- 221 Ibid.
- 222 Ibid.; H. Süss, "Offiziershochschule der Luftstreitkräfte/Luftverteidigung 'Fritz Mehring,'" Militärtechnik, 4/1980, p. 173; and A. Harder "Offiziershochschule der Landstreitkräfte 'Ernst Thälmann': Sektion Pionierwesen." Militärtechnik, 2/1978, p. 63. The last also names one in four examples.
- 223 Forster, op. cit., pp. 81, 121; Hoffmann "The NVA ..." op. cit., p. 32; the approximate total of 204 general officers is based on official West German estimates.
- 224 Specialist interview in West Germany.

- 225 See, for example, the instructor cited in A. Harder, op. cit.
- 226 Johnson et al., op. cit., pp. 87, 88.
- 227 Herspring in Letgers, op. cit., p. 200; W. Rehm, "Jagdflieger der DDR -- Ein Roman der Nationalen Volksarmee," Europäische Wehrkunde, XXVII, September 1978, pp. 461-464; Lolland, op. cit., pp. 33-34; M. Czimas, Der Warschauer Pakt, (Bern: Verlag SOI, 1972), p. 79. Apparently, the defeat of Soviet clients by Israel in 1967 particularly confirmed some East German suspicions concerning the Soviet doctrine's effectiveness. One NVA author (in Czimas) directly associated doctrinal differences with a separate road to socialism in November 1968.
- 228 Rautenberg, op. cit., p. 92.
- 229 Johnson et al., op. cit., p. 119.
- 230 Ibid., p. 118; and Rautenberg, op. cit., p. 72.
- 231 Ibid., pp. 118, 133.
- 232 Ibid., pp. 118, 133.
- 233 Forster, op. cit., p. 276.
- 234 Johnson et al., op. cit., p. 82.
- 235 Jökel, Nelles and Kübke, op. cit., pp. 44-51; Nawrocki, Bewaffnete ..., "op. cit.", p. 190.
- 236 Bowers, "Concepts ...," op. cit., p. 424; and J. Hacker, "Zwanzig Jahre Warschauer Pakt," Osteuropa, 5/1975, p. 315.
- 237 Ibid., p. 47, and specialist interview in West Germany.
- 238 G. Milde, op. cit., pp. 82, 83.
- 239 Ibid., p. 82. Johnson et al., op. cit., pp. 88, 89; and V. Rebuhn, "Waffenbrüderschaftsbeziehungen zielstrebig für die internationale Erziehung der Armeangehörigen nutzen!," Militärwesen, 2/1981, pp. 96-98.
- 240 Johnson et al., op. cit., p. 84 (footnote) and Jökel, Nelles and Kübke, op. cit., pp. 47 and 50; and specialist interview in West Germany.
- 241 Nawrocki, Bewaffnete ..., op. cit., p. 191.
- 242 Ibid., pp. 58, 191.
- 243 U. Rühmland, "Die Gruppe der Sowjetischen Streitkräfte in Deutschland," ASMZ, July/August 1982, p. 395.

- 244 Johnson, et al., op. cit., pp. 84, 123, 124. This is an instance where footnotes are more informative than text, and indicate high-placed NVA concern for the problem. See also "Die DDR -- auf Ewig mit der Sowjetunion verbunden?" Die DDR -- Realitäten, Argumenten (Bonn: Friedrich - Ebert - Stiftung, Verlag Neue Gesellschaft GmbH, 1978), p. 26.
- 245 W. Kahl, "Überläufer: In der DDR darben die Sowjetsoldaten," Die Welt, December 14, 1982, p. 4.
- 246 K.-G. Schirrmeister, "Zum Konfliktbild des NVA Soldaten," in Die National Volksarmee der DDR im Rahmen ..., op. cit., p. 228.
- 247 "Die DDR auf Ewig ...," op. cit.; Nawrocki, Bewaffnete ..., pp. 58, 191; Rautenberg, op. cit., p. 91.
- 248 For just a few examples, see Jokel, Nelles and Kübke, op. cit., *passim*; "Soviet Model for Red Army," IWE Tagesdienst, Bonn, 19 December 1973, p. 1, translated in JPRS 61120, 1 Feb. 1974, p. 22; "Joint USSR - GDR Military Training Evaluated," Volksarmee, interview excerpts, J. Goldbach, Chief Neubrandenburg Service Region, May 1973, p. 1, translated in JPRS 59227, 7 June 1973, pp. 2, 3; and Vereint Unbesiegbar (East Berlin: Militärverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1976) pp. 41, 63, 216, 221.
- 249 "Sowjet Soldaten getadelt," Der Spiegel, January 1982, p. 17.
- 250 K.W. Fricke, "Okkupanten oder Waffenbrüder?," Deutschland Archiv, March 1982, pp. 275, 276.
- 251 "National People's Army and GSSD Consolidate Proven Comradeship-in-Arms: Cooperation for Training Year 1982/83 Agreed Upon," Neues Deutschland, 16 Dec. 1982, p. 2, translated in FBIS - EEU, 22 Dec. 1982, p. E6.
- 252 See "Aktuelle Umschau," Europäische Wehrkunde, XXX, January 1981, p. 36, and July 1981, p. 324; E. Gensler, "Ergebnisse und Erfahrungen bei der Festigung der Waffenbrüderschaftsbeziehungen zwischen den LSK/LV der NVA und den Luftstreitkräften der GSSD," Militärwesen, 5/1981, pp. 89-92; Rebuhn, op. cit.; G. Forster, "Geimeinsam mit sowjetischen Freunden Prüfstand für Geschosswerfer entwickelt," Militärtechnik, 5/1979, p. 235; and C.D. Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy in the Warsaw Pact, (N.Y.: Praeger Publishers, 1981), pp. 180, 181; and specialist interview in West Germany.
- 253 Rebuhn, op. cit..
- 254 Lolland, op. cit., pp. 168, 169.
- 255 Ibid., pp. 85, 160-164. Specialist interviews in West Germany; interview

with Reiner Paul Fuller, former MfS agent operating in FRG, ZDF - Magazine, October 21, 1981; K. Leissler, "How Moscow is Spying in the GDR: A High KGB Officer Fled and is Now Revealing Secret Service Practices of the East," Die Welt, 27 Dec. 1975, p. 3, translated in JPRS 66774, 11 Feb. 1976, pp. 8-11; The KGB maintains its largest establishment outside the USSR in the GDR. See K.W. Fricke, Die Staatssicherheit DDR (Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, Berend von Nottbeck, 1981), pp. 43-45.

- 256 Fricke, Die Staatssicherheit ..., op. cit., pp. 43, 44; and Leissler, op. cit., p. 9.
- 257 Specialist interviews in West Germany.
- 258 "Volksmarine ohne U-Boote," Europäische Wehrkunde, XXX, May 1981, p. 233.
- 259 Nawrocki, Bewaffnete ..., op. cit., pp. 84-86; and Rautenberg, op. cit., p. 81.
- 260 Johnson et al., op. cit., pp. 86, 88, and specialist interviews in West Germany.
- 261 Johnson et al., op. cit., p. 81; Forster, op. cit., pp. 92, 93; Nawrocki, Bewaffnete ..., op. cit., p. 57; Childs, op. cit., p. 292; Ehring and Dallwitz, op. cit., p. 96; and specialist interview in West Germany.
- 262 Nawrocki, Bewaffnete ..., op. cit., p. 189; and see also Forster, op. cit., p. 87, where an NVA Major General was placed in command of "Blue" troops on manoeuvre in 1969 -- two Soviet units (a guards motorized division and an air corps) were under his command, however.
- 263 Forster, op. cit., pp. 98-102; Childs, op. cit., pp. 290, 291, argues that the NVA's activities abroad are viewed sceptically at home, even on occasion with revulsion. He also says that careful screening, leaving families at home and offers of rapid advancement on return to the GDR have been needed to decrease the risk of desertion, despite the remoteness of Third World locales. One East German merchant vessel captain did jump ship in 1980.
- 264 Schepler and Kuhla, op. cit..

Chapter 3

ROMANIA

Christopher D. Jones

The question of Romania's reliability as a Warsaw Pact ally of the USSR is mainly a question of whether Romania participates in the bilateral mechanisms which link the components of the Soviet Armed Forces to the corresponding components of the other five East European members of the Warsaw Pact. Unlike the loyal East European members of the Warsaw Pact, Romania has raised four major barriers to close bilateral relations between the armed forces of the USSR and the Romanian military:

- 1) A set of treaty obligations which free Romania of the commitments required of each of the other five East European members of the Warsaw Pact;
- 2) A set of arms control and security proposals advanced by Bucharest which seek to minimize the possibility of an East-West conflict in the Balkans;
- 3) A distinct national military doctrine which makes no provision for coalition warfare or the conduct of actions outside the national territory;
- 4) Disengagement from Warsaw Pact programmes designed to facilitate coalition warfare: joint military exercises, common policies in weapons procurement, the training of senior East European commanders in Soviet military academies, and the conduct of joint military-political activities designed to generate alliance cohesion.

Romania regularly participates in all the multilateral activities of the Warsaw Pact which formally

recognize the sovereignty and equality of each member state. President Nicolae Ceausescu has in fact demonstrated enthusiasm for the further development of such multilateral fora within the Warsaw Pact, particularly when they are complemented by corresponding activities conducted outside the alliance.¹ But Ceausescu's enthusiasm for multilateral contacts among Warsaw Pact members does not extend to bilateral military relations with the Soviet Union in the four areas cited above.

Romania's Treaty Obligations to the USSR

The current 20-year Soviet-Romanian Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was signed in 1970, after a two-year period during which no treaty was in force following the expiration in 1968 of the previous treaty. The 1970 treaty does not require either Romania or the USSR to respond to an armed attack on one signatory as an armed attack on the other. In the event of an attack, each signatory is obligated only to consult with the other about possible assistance. Such possibilities include military assistance, but there is no strict requirement of military aid. The USSR's treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany and Czechoslovakia and, in a slightly different form, with Poland, unconditionally state that each signatory will regard an armed attack on one as an attack on the other. These treaties require immediate military assistance. The text of the relevant articles of the Soviet treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany and Czechoslovakia reads as follows:

In the event that one of the High Contracting Parties is subjected to an armed attack on the part of any state or group of states, the

other Contracting Party, considering this an attack on itself, will immediately give the other Party all possible aid, including military aid, and will also render support with all means at its disposal, for the purpose of realizing the right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.²

These treaties unequivocally state that an armed attack on one will require immediate military assistance from the other. The justification for this assistance is Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The 1965 Soviet treaty with Poland establishes an equivalent set of mutual obligations, although this treaty is unique in that it specifically refers to an attack by West Germany or any state allied with West Germany.³

Article 8 of the Soviet-Romanian Treaty sets out a different set of mutual obligations. This article does not pledge either side to the principle that an attack on one is an attack on the other. The article states that in the event of an attack on one signatory, the second will decide if the interests of its own self-defence require military assistance for the repulsion of the attack on the first signatory. This provision allows for the possibility that the Romanians may conclude: 1) that an attack on the Soviet Union may not constitute a threat to Romania and 2) that the Soviet Army may have the wherewithal to repulse an armed attack without any military assistance from Bucharest. Article 8 reads,

In the event that one of the High Contracting Parties is subjected to an armed attack by any state or group of states then the other

Party, for the realization of its inalienable right to individual or collective self-defence, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, will immediately render the first Party all-round aid with all means which it has at its disposal, including military, which are necessary for the repulsion of the armed attack.⁴

The right of Romania to decide what aid is necessary in the event of an attack on the Soviet Union is further underscored by the preamble to the Soviet-Romanian Treaty of 1970, which specifies that the signatories will "observe the obligations stipulated in the Warsaw Treaty ... which was concluded in response to the threat from NATO."⁵ (Other Soviet-East European bilateral treaties, such as the 1970 USSR-Czechoslovak treaty, refer in their preambles to "obligations deriving from the Warsaw Treaty" and do not limit the obligations of the treaty partners to threats from NATO.)⁶

The obligations stipulated in the Warsaw Treaty of May 14, 1955 do not require that each signatory respond to an attack on another signatory as an attack on itself. Article Four of the Warsaw Treaty permits each state to decide if such an attack constitutes a threat to its own self-defence. This article requires only consultations over military aid if one of the signatories is attacked. Article Four reads,

In the event of armed attack in Europe on one or more of the Parties to the Treaty by any state or group of states, each of the Parties to the Treaty, in the exercise of its right to individual or collective self-defense in

accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, shall immediately, either individually or in agreement with other Parties to the Treaty, come to the assistance of the state or states attacked with all such means as it deems necessary, including armed force.

The Parties to the Treaty shall immediately consult concerning the necessary measures to be taken by them jointly in order to restore and maintain international peace and security.⁷

The Romanian constitution of 1964 stipulates that only Romanian state bodies can send the Romanian armed forces to war; Romanian officials have frequently emphasized the exclusive right of Romanian constitutional organs to determine whether Romania's treaty obligations require Romania to come to the military assistance of its allies.⁸ In a discussion of Romania's treaty obligations to her allies published by the Romanian Defence Ministry, Colonel Traian Grozea pointed out that Romania's treaties require only that Romania entertain requests for military assistance from her allies. He noted that Romania reserves for its constitutional bodies the right to decide on committing Romanian troops to battle:

A characteristic, fundamental trait of the treaties concluded between Romania and other socialist countries is the fact that they provide respect for national independence and sovereignty.

Military assistance will be granted only at the request of the state which is the victim of imperialist aggression, and the

forms and volume of such assistance are established between the legal leaderships.⁹

Ceausescu made one of his occasional statements about the limited nature of Romania's treaty obligations to her allies when he addressed a special session of the Romanian Central Committee in November of 1978. Ceausescu had just returned from an acrimonious session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee where he had refused to sign a joint statement on the Middle East and had refused to endorse an alliance-wide programme of raising military expenditures.¹⁰

In his speech Ceausescu also reiterated, albeit somewhat nervously, that Romania maintained the best of relations with many NATO states, particularly those in the Balkan area:

In the case of an aggression in Europe against a member country of the Warsaw Pact, we will fulfill our obligations taken under the Pact and also under the bilateral pacts of mutual assistance, according to the respective provisions. (emphasis added)

Naturally, we declare and will do everything for the military pacts -- both NATO and the Warsaw Pact -- to be abolished as soon as possible since we are firmly convinced that it is not military pacts that ensure independence, sovereignty and peace, but, on the contrary, they only maintain a state of tension ...

But, why not say it, our relations with all the neighboring countries, with the states in this part of Europe are very good ... countries like Greece and Turkey are not concerned with intensifying the armament build up So why should we choose such a course?¹¹

Romanian Proposals for European Security

In addition to his statements that Romania's treaty obligations do not necessarily require the Romanian Army to fight alongside the Soviet Union against NATO Ceausescu has advanced, outside the Warsaw Pact framework, three sets of proposals on European security. The implementation of these proposals would minimize the possibilities of East-West conflict in the Balkans and undermine the justifications for the Romanian Armed Forces to prepare for military actions in alliance with the Soviet Union.

1) In proposals going back to the late 1950s, Bucharest has called for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans. The most recent such appeal was the November 1982 joint declaration issued by Ceausescu and Premier Andreas Papandreou of Greece, which called for a conference on the denuclearization of the Balkan region.¹² The proposal clearly envisions the withdrawal of American nuclear forces from Greece and Turkey; it is not clear whether the proposal would place restrictions on Soviet nuclear forces in the Black Sea. It is clear, however, that the Romanians are seeking to dissolve the bloc structures of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact in this region by establishing a non-nuclear group consisting of two NATO members (Greece and Turkey), two Warsaw Pact states

(Bulgaria and Romania), and two non-aligned communist states (Yugoslavia and Albania).¹³ Such an agreement would partially eliminate the rationale for the military presence of both the United States and the Soviet Union in the Balkans. The Romanians have added to this proposal an additional plan for a European treaty which prevents the use or threatened use of force by a nuclear power against non-nuclear powers.¹⁴

2) The Romanians have also proposed, since the early 1970s, a series of "confidence-building measures" to place limitations on military manoeuvres. Such limitations would restrict the capabilities of the US and the USSR to project conventional military power into the Balkans. These proposals include limits on the number and size of military manoeuvres; prohibition of multinational manoeuvres near state borders; advance notice of military manoeuvres near state borders; and creation of 15-20 kilometre-wide demilitarized zones along national borders.¹⁵ Romania has sought to place such restrictions on military exercises by holding an all-European security conference that would avoid the bloc-to-bloc approach to confidence-building measures favored by the Soviet Union, such as the Vienna talks on force reductions in central Europe.¹⁶

3) Since 1964¹⁷ the Romanians have proposed the mutual dissolution of both the Warsaw Pact and NATO, as provided for in the Warsaw Treaty of 1955.¹⁸ At the 1966 session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee Ceausescu formally proposed to his allies that they disband their alliance system simultaneously with the disbanding of NATO.¹⁹ The Romanians have subsequently proposed a number of practical steps in this direction: prohibition

of additional "foreign" military bases in Europe (a proposal that would prevent the re-establishment of Soviet garrisons in Bulgaria and Romania); and a 10-15 percent reduction in the garrisons of all foreign military bases in Europe, to be followed by the gradual withdrawal of all troops.²⁰ The Romanians have also shown a strong interest in reducing the size of the Soviet garrison in Hungary.²¹ In the spring of 1978 the Romanians proposed a mutual freeze on defence spending by NATO and the Warsaw Pact²² and in 1982 Romania unilaterally adopted a freeze²³ on the size of the Romanian military budget.

The Political Consultative Committee (PCC) of the Warsaw Pact, and the Warsaw Pact Committee of Foreign Ministers (CFM) as well, have sooner or later endorsed the arms control and security proposals first advanced by Bucharest, although often with some significant modifications, particularly concerning the kinds of limits to be placed on military exercises. The PCC and CFM have yet, however, to echo Ceausescu's position on the deployment of Soviet and American intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe. Ceausescu has for all practical purposes endorsed the "zero option" proposed by President Reagan.²⁴

The Soviets may have agreed to support Romanian arms control initiatives for several reasons: 1) the compatibility of many of these proposals with Soviet interests; 2) the possibility that the Soviets believe that the only audience that pays serious attention to Ceausescu's security proposals is the domestic Romanian audience; 3) a desire to obscure the significance of Romania's proposals by formally endorsing them and then pursuing a bloc-to-bloc policy that simply ignores those

portions of Warsaw Pact documents which have been issued to camouflage the independent position of the Romanians.

Few Western analysts, let alone Western foreign ministries, have explored the differences on security issues between Romania and its Warsaw Pact allies. There may be a precedent for such disinterest: NATO states chose to ignore the proposals advanced by the Polish Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki, in 1957 and 1958. Rapacki called for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in central Europe and limited withdrawals of Soviet and American troops from the region. The Soviets did not disassociate themselves from the Rapacki Plan, and the West, in particular the United States, treated the Polish proposals as Soviet proposals. Rapacki did not present his programme through the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee but rather at the UN, in a manner similar to Romania's preference for non-bloc fora such as the CSCE conferences in Helsinki, Belgrade and Madrid. The conventional wisdom remains that Moscow approved of the Rapacki Plan and in fact thought so little of the Warsaw Pact as a forum that it also approved of the presentation of the Rapacki Plan at the UN.²⁵

Regardless of the reasons for the lack of Western interest in Romanian suggestions for military disengagement in the Balkans, the proposals advanced by Bucharest seek to undermine the military-political basis for collaboration between the Soviet and Romanian armies.

Romania's Military Doctrine

Western discussions of the Romanian doctrine of "War of the Entire People" generally describe this defence system as a plan for a war of "territorial defence."²⁶ In practice, the Romanian defence system defends neither the

territory nor the people of Romania but the Ceausescu leadership against any rival group championed by the Soviet Army. The strategic objective of Romanian doctrine is to pre-empt any "request" for Soviet military assistance from within Romania. According to Colonel Stanciulescu, the objective of the probable enemy is "establishing a new administration on the occupied territory and forming a puppet government with whose help it 'legalizes' the aggression and seeks to justify the character of the war unleashed by presenting it as an action 'in support' of a so-called 'legal government'.²⁷" The Ceausescu regime has warned its population that any such action is illegal and illegitimate. The 1972 Law on National Defence states,

It is forbidden to accept or recognize any action of any foreign state or any situation regardless of its nature, including the general capitulation and occupation of the national territory, which, in times of peace or war, would infringe upon the national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Socialist Republic of Romania or which would in any way weaken its defense capacity.

Any such act of accepting or recognition is null and void as being contrary to the state regime and to the supreme interests of our socialist state.²⁸

Neither the Romanian defence law of 1972 nor the official discussion of Romania's military doctrine makes any mention of Romania's military allies or of plans for cooperation with Romania's allies on either Romanian or

foreign soil. The official formulation is that Romania will rely entirely on its own forces for the defence of national territory. These forces are quite unlike the forces of other Warsaw Pact states: they consist of the regular armed forces and several different types of paramilitary forces. Although Romanian spokesmen do not say so directly, the essence of their declaratory doctrine is not military victory but instead maintaining a high level of bloodshed between an occupation army and the Romanian population. Romanian military theorists evidently expect that sustained violence will have four consequences that will ultimately result in political victory for the resistance forces: 1) extensive civilian casualties will deprive the occupation regime of political legitimacy; 2) such casualties will stimulate popular determination to resist; 3) continued violence between paramilitary forces and occupation troops will ultimately demoralize enemy soldiers; 4) long-term resistance will generate international pressure for a withdrawal of the occupation forces.

In trying to make a case for the practicability of Romanian resistance to occupation, Romanian officers emphasize that mere enunciation of the principles of a "people's war" is not enough to defeat the enemy. Colonel Arsintescu cautions that many wars of national liberation have been lost because the defenders lacked the necessary training, equipment, and logistical support.²⁹ Romanian officers claim that their country has the economic base, military forces, and command structure to sustain a "War of the Entire People." The State Planning Committee maintains an on-going programme for the continuation of civil and military production during the first year of occupation by

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a foreign power.

The regular and paramilitary forces of the Romanian national defence system are under the control of the State Defence Council. Its chairman is the President of the Republic in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the national armed forces. The other members of the Council are the General Secretary of the Romanian Central Committee, the Minister of Defence, the Chief of Staff of the Patriotic Guards (the largest of the paramilitary forces), the Minister of the Interior, the Secretary of the Higher Political Council of the Armed Forces, the Chairman of the State Planning Commission and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Two members of the Ceausescu family hold three of the eight offices represented. Nicolae Ceausescu, General Secretary of the Romanian Party, and President of the Republic, also serves as Chairman of the State Defence Council. His brother, Lieutenant General Ilie Ceausescu, is Secretary of the Higher Political Council. Another brother, also named Nicolae, has been named a lieutenant general in the security forces.
³¹

Under the Defence Council are 15 corresponding regional defence councils. The city of Bucharest, equivalent to a region, has four sub-councils under its main defence council. Each of the 15 regional councils consists of the regional commander of the regular armed forces, the chief of staff of the regional Patriotic Guard, and the heads of the local party, government and economic organizations. The chairman of each local defence council is the head of the corresponding party organization. According to Romanian doctrine, the regular and paramilitary forces of the country can be assigned either to the national or regional defence councils, depending on

the necessities of military action.³²

The principal components of the national defence system are the regular armed forces and the Patriotic Guards. The armed forces consist of the Ground Forces, the Air Force, the Air Defence Troops and the Navy. The Ground Forces have 140,000 personnel of which 95,000 are conscripts serving 18-month enlistment terms. The reserves total some 300,000.³³ The principal components of the ground forces are eight mechanized infantry divisions and three brigades of the Mountain Corps. The infantry is trained to use light-weight anti-tank weapons and to operate in every region of the country, either in small independent units or in larger formations.³⁴ The mission of infantry units is to surprise and attack enemy forces superior in numbers and equipment.³⁵ The Mountain Corps, an elite force whose members wear distinctive uniforms, are trained for survival in wilderness conditions and for night combat operations. They are equipped with light-weight artillery pieces of Yugoslav manufacture,³⁶ specially designed for use on mountainous terrain. The mission of the Mountain Corps is "firm maintenance of natural strongholds in the mountain regions." According to Romanian doctrine, these strongholds must be held "at all costs."³⁷ The Carpathian mountains, which make up about 30 per cent of the land area of Romania, serve as the base of operations for all the ground forces.³⁸ In addition, two tank divisions, as well as special anti-tank and artillery forces,³⁹ have the mission of slowing the advance of enemy tanks. Engineering troops have the mission of demolition and camouflage.⁴⁰

Both the Air Force and the Air Defence Troops share the mission of defence against enemy aircraft, although the

air force has the additional missions of reconnaissance and transport as well.⁴¹ The Romanians have assigned their navy two missions: that of mining the coastal areas of the Black Sea and that of keeping the Danube open for river convoys⁴² evidently headed for Yugoslavia. An additional function of the regular armed forces is to provide military training to the rest of the population through service in the armed forces as conscripts, through the armed forces reserves and through the paramilitary forces commanded by regular army officers.⁴³

The most important of the paramilitary organizations is the Patriotic Guard, which numbers about 900,000 in peacetime⁴⁴ although this organization is to become even larger in wartime. The Patriotic Guard consists of men aged 21-60 and women aged 21-55 who "volunteer" for service. Detachments of the Patriotic Guards are formed at the larger industrial enterprises and public institutions. Each village, town and city also fields its own formations of Patriotic Guards. These formations have full-time staffs at each of their administrative levels. The members of the Patriotic Guards train for action in platoons, companies, and battalions in the use of submachine guns, mortars, demolition devices, anti-tank weapons, anti-aircraft weapons and flamethrowers. Detachments of the Patriotic Guards are also trained for signal, reconnaissance, transport and medical missions. During wartime, members of the Patriotic Guards are expected to perform their normal civilian economic functions to the extent possible, but are also to be available for combat duty in regions outside their own locality.⁴⁵

Additional paramilitary formations in the Romanian

defence system include the Youth Defence Training Formations, which consist of youths aged 16 to 20 who drill under the command of noncommissioned reserve officers for service in both the regular armed forces and the Patriotic Guards. In the event of war, the Youth Formations are to function as auxiliaries to the Patriotic Guard.⁴⁶ The Romanians have also developed organizations of frontier guards, fire-fighting units, civil defence units, and a medical corps.⁴⁷ The 20,000 troops of the Ministry of the Interior have the special mission of assassinating both enemy commanders and native collaborators. The forces of the Ministry of the Interior are also responsible for providing security for the national political leadership as well as the personnel of the local defence councils.⁴⁸

According to Romanian public media the annual training and exercise programmes of the Romanian Armed Forces are devoted mainly to working out the coordination of actions among the components of the regular armed forces and the components of the paramilitary forces. The Romanian leadership has occasionally acknowledged the great difficulties in achieving high levels of combat readiness and coordination among forces so disparate in composition, equipment, and training.⁴⁹ But both Ceausescu and his current defence minister, General Constantin Olteanu, have publicly committed themselves to improving the training and interaction of regular and paramilitary forces during the course of the present five-year plan for improving combat readiness.⁵⁰ Ceausescu has also stated publicly that he will not allow his troops to engage in joint military exercises with other Warsaw Pact armies on either Romanian soil or abroad.⁵¹ Although Ceausescu has expressed his willingness to train his troops for cooperation with other

Warsaw Pact armies, the only exercises and manoeuvres his forces practice are exercises designed to prepare regular and paramilitary forces for the conduct of a "War of the Entire People."

The Romanian View of a Future War

According to Romanian doctrine, the country faces the prospect that an enemy force enjoying overwhelming superiority in troops and equipment will seize the country's principal administrative, economic and communications centres and will also cut off access to the outside world via the Black Sea and the Danube River. The enemy will seal off Romania's land borders and will attack the Carpathian strongholds of the Mountain Corps and Ground Forces.⁵² It is hard to imagine that the Romanians believe that NATO forces could attempt the actions which Bucharest expects from its unidentified probable enemy.

The primary objective of Romania's regular armed forces during the first 48 hours of the war is to slow the enemy advance enough so that the Patriotic Guard can mobilize. If the Guard is successfully mobilized, the Romanians hope that the war will enter a phase of protracted national resistance to enemy occupation. The objective of the resistance, according to Colonel Cernat, is not military victory but political stalemate. What the Romanian strategy aims at is "prevention of the aggressor's attempt to set up a puppet regime."⁵³ Cernat writes that pursuit of this objective has four elements:

1) Prevention of attempts "to colonize with foreign populations." NATO would be hard-pressed to conduct such a policy, although it would not be difficult for the USSR to bring in "Romanians" from the Moldavian

Soviet Socialist Republic or Hungarians into the predominantly Hungarian region of Transylvania;

2) Defence of the population against repressive measures by the occupation regime;

3) Prevention of attempts by the aggressor to mobilize the national labour force for the occupation regime and simultaneously to deport skilled labourers to deprive the resistance of critical personnel;

4) Protection of economic facilities necessary for the supply of the resistance forces.⁵⁴

Romanian defence officials estimate that to occupy Romania an aggressor would have to field from 700,000 to 1,000,000 troops. Colonel Cernat concludes that a force of this size "is difficult to maintain over a long period even for big powers."⁵⁵ According to Colonel Grozea, the Romanian defence ministry can mobilize from 23 to 32 per cent of the country's population, that is, from 4,680,000 to 6,245,000 personnel. He concludes, "... despite the difference in technical equipment that might exist between them and the aggressive army, such a number of defenders would be a powerful force, capable of successfully defending the country."⁵⁶

The Romanians plan to conduct a prolonged resistance movement through both armed and unarmed actions. The unarmed actions consist of: 1) "disobedience" to the occupation authorities; 2) "protests" -- organized public actions directed against specific measures introduced by the occupation authorities; 3) "demonstrations" -- in favor of certain political objectives such as the release of prisoners; 4) "strikes" -- to prevent the use of economic facilities by the occupation government.

The Romanians hope to bring about the dispersal of

the enemy forces so that the country would be divided into small occupation zones and small "free zones." The tactics designed to force such dispersion are 1) the "ambush" of small enemy units; 2) "incursions" against command and control centres; 3) "raids" against economic and transport facilities; 4) "harassment" -- terrorist acts against enemy personnel.⁵⁷

It remains to be seen whether the Romanian nation is in fact prepared to make the colossal sacrifices necessary to fight a war in defence of the Ceausescu regime. Neither Ceausescu nor his supporters are anxious for a definitive answer to this question: the primary purpose of the official doctrine is deterrence of overt military threats by the USSR and cultivation of domestic support for the regime on the basis of its nationalist pose as the defender of Romania's sovereignty. The requirements for deterrence are considerably lower than those for victory. Deterrence is a matter of promising enough bloodshed to delegitimize a regime installed by the Soviet Army. Victory would require an intense and enduring commitment from the Romanian population to the preservation of the Ceausescu regime. The credibility of the Romanian national defence system ultimately rests as much on the state of political support for the Ceausescu regime as on the structure of the national defence system. Colonel Stanculescu acknowledges that "the role of morale is the major problem of the resistance movement."⁵⁸

Nicolae Ceausescu, a former chief of the political administration of the Romanian Armed Forces, has sponsored a vigorous and extensive program to indoctrinate the general population and the personnel of both the regular and paramilitary forces in a national tradition of military

resistance to foreign domination. The Centre for Studies and Research in Military History and Theory, formerly under the direction of Ilie Ceausescu, has produced an arsenal of texts for indoctrination.⁵⁹ Ilie Ceausescu has recently assumed direct responsibility for political indoctrination as Secretary of the Higher Political Council of the Armed Forces.⁶⁰

In recent years, particularly in connection with his 65th birthday, Nicolae Ceausescu, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, has declared himself a retroactive military hero, suitable for heroic appearances in paintings and literary works.⁶¹ However, a number of Western observers caution that the domestic legitimacy of the Ceausescu regime is in permanent question in Romania, especially as the economic difficulties of the 1980s continue to depress living standards.⁶² Ivan Volgyes suggests that the Romanian officer corps itself may be restive because of Ceausescu's current freeze on military expenditures, his extensive use of conscript forces on civilian construction projects and his emphasis on the role of paramilitary forces in the national defence system.⁶³

For NATO, the primary significance of Romania's military doctrine is that it has ruled out the active preparation of Romanian military forces to participate in a coalition war alongside the Soviet Army. In an address to Romanian military personnel in early March 1983, President Ceausescu emphasized that it was extremely unlikely that the Romanian Army would find itself in combat against NATO:

We must always bear in mind that, generally speaking, we do not intend to act in the territory of other countries. Our army and

country have no military plans against other peoples. Therefore, any fight that may come about will be conducted for the defence of our fatherland.

We may have to cross our borders only under the conditions of pursuit of an aggressor or when obligations devolving from our military alliances so require, or under conditions of repelling an imperialist aggression.⁶⁴

The southern flank of NATO is more secure as a result of Romania's adoption of its doctrine of territorial defence, even if in practice this doctrine is a plan for the defence of the Ceausescu regime.

The Nature of Romania's Participation in Joint Alliance Activities

Romania's treaty obligations, security proposals and doctrinal formulations all testify to Romania's desire to disengage itself from bilateral ties with the Soviet Armed Forces. The demonstration of Romania's disengagement from such ties is in the nature of Romania's participation in the joint activities of the Warsaw Pact. For the loyal East European members of the Warsaw Pact, the critical mechanisms of bilateral integration with the Soviet Army are: 1) joint military exercises and training programmes; 2) coordinated programmes for the production and acquisition of common armaments and equipment; 3) synchronized systems of officer education in which Soviet military academies serve as the gateways to the top commands of Eastern Europe; 4) alliance-wide programmes of political indoctrination carried out by allied political

administrations for the cultivation of reliability among the different national components of the Warsaw Pact forces.

Romania observes the protocol of joint participation in each of these four areas. But in each instance of formal participation in alliance activities the Romanians have demonstrated an effective policy of avoiding bilateral collaboration with the Soviet Union. Romania's success in minimizing such contacts is primarily due to the absence of a Soviet military garrison in Romania. Ceausescu's predecessor, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, succeeded in bringing about the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1958. Just how Dej achieved this withdrawal is still somewhat unclear, but it appears that he was able to argue, perhaps with Chinese support, that the signing of the Austrian State Treaty removed the legal basis for stationing Soviet troops in Romania and that the events of 1956 in Poland and Hungary indicated that Soviet forces should be kept out of public view in East Europe. Whatever the explanation, the absence of a Soviet garrison in Romania has been a critical prerequisite for avoiding bilateral military exercises with the Soviet Army -- the single most important mechanism of military-political integration in the Warsaw Pact.

Romania and Joint Warsaw Pact Military Exercises

Romania's carefully limited participation in the joint exercises and joint training programmes of the Warsaw Pact testifies to two objectives: 1) preventing the return of Soviet troops to Romania, even for brief periods of manoeuvres; 2) minimizing the bilateral contacts of formations of Soviet and Romanian combat troops. Western observers, however, have sometimes taken the participation

of Romanian staff officers in some multilateral military exercises to represent de facto Romanian participation in the system of Warsaw Pact joint manoeuvres.

In a June 1983 interview with a Swedish newspaper, Ceausescu carefully pointed out the fine distinctions observed by the Romanian defence ministry concerning its participation in joint exercises and its participation in synchronized training programmes:

... Romania believes that in the current international conditions military manoeuvres are not necessary, even for the purpose of military training.

On the contrary, we believe that manoeuvres constitute, in the final analysis, a display of force that cannot in any way contribute to the policy of détente, of bolstering confidence, and of cooperation.

That is why we decided not to permit (WTO) manoeuvres (in Romania) -- I am of course referring to troop manoeuvres -- nor to send Romanian troops to manoeuvres on the territory of other states.

We are in favour of other forms of cooperation and joint training with our allies, and we participate in such forms of training exercises.

However, I repeat, we believe that, particularly in the current circumstances, there should be no military manoeuvres on the territory of other states65

In a speech several months earlier, Ceausescu also indicated that the synchronization of some aspects of troop training would be sufficient demonstration of Romania's commitment to the alliance. The participation of Romanian combat troops in "joint manoeuvres" would remain confined to joint manoeuvres with Romanian paramilitary forces:

.... We must continue to develop cooperation between military units, Patriotic Guards and Paramilitary Youth Formations; we should pay greater attention to the military training of the Patriotic Guards and the Paramilitary Youth and should further develop joint training actions. We must increasingly strengthen the Army's cooperation with the military units of the Ministry of the Interior

At the same time, in the entire activity of combat training, we must work to strengthen cooperation with the armies of the Warsaw Pact member countries and organize joint training and instruction actions, in the spirit of our party's decisions, so as always to be ready, in case of need, to fulfill our obligations within the Warsaw Pact.⁶⁶

A previous section of this study argued that Romania's obligations within the Warsaw Pact consisted of the obligation to consult over possible military aid. It is not clear when Bucharest first decided that it could meet its alliance obligations by substituting participation in joint exercises with the conduct of synchronized but independent training actions by the Romanian Armed Forces. The available evidence indicates that from 1962 to 1964,

the last years of Gheorghiu-Dej's rule, the Romanians did participate in Warsaw Pact exercises on the same basis as other East European states: Romania hosted alliance exercises on its own soil and sent combat troops for manoeuvres on the territory of other Warsaw Pact members.

In the period after 1964 the evidence becomes highly ambiguous as to whether Romania has sent combat troops to joint manoeuvres outside Romania. There is no evidence of any joint Warsaw Pact troop manoeuvres in Romania after 1963. A Soviet volume on the Warsaw Pact edited by its current commander, V.G. Kulikov, reports the participation in the 1967 Rhodope exercises in Bulgaria of "troops and naval forces" of Bulgaria, the USSR and Romania.⁶⁷ However, neither this text nor any other East-bloc account of the exercise indicates the nature of Romania's participation. A fairly extensive Soviet-Bulgarian discussion of this exercise managed to omit any details of the nature of Romania's participation, although it did itemize the details of Soviet-Bulgarian interaction in the exercise.⁶⁸ Without providing any details, a Yugoslav publication claims that Romanian "units" participated in the Rhodope exercise and that Romanian units also participated in the 1969 Pliska exercises in Bulgaria.⁶⁹⁷⁰

The Kulikov text describes the 1969 Pliska exercises as involving only "operational staffs" of the Ground Forces, Navies and Anti-Aircraft Troops of Bulgaria, the USSR and Romania.⁷¹ This volume adds another 1969 exercise involving Romania -- a ground forces exercise of troops from the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania on "Soviet territory."⁷² According to the Yugoslav

publication cited above, the Romanians sent a divisional staff, some signals troops, engineering troops and some armoured forces as well to the Brotherhood-in-Arms exercise in East Germany in 1970.⁷³ Soviet and East European coverage of these manoeuvres did not specifically report the participation of Romanian combat troops, although the Soviet Army newspaper mentioned that a Romanian contingent had marched in the parade,⁷⁴ and that a multilingual newspaper published during the course of the exercises⁷⁵ appeared in a Romanian-language edition.

There is no evidence that Romania participated in any way in Warsaw Pact exercises from the 1970 Brotherhood-in-Arms exercises to the 1979 Shield Exercises in Hungary. Soviet sources reported that Romanian participation in the Shield-79 exercises was limited to "staffs" of the Romanian ground forces, although the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia⁷⁶ and Hungary sent both staffs and troops.

In 1980 the East Germans hosted a large multilateral exercise, Brotherhood-in-Arms. According to the Yugoslav press agency, the Romanians sent only "staffs"⁷⁷ and no combat troops. The largest "Southern Tier" exercises ever held took place in Bulgaria in September 1982. These manoeuvres, Shield-82, involved over 60,000 troops from Bulgaria, the USSR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the GDR. But Romania, the largest of the "Southern Tier" states, did not send any troops. The Yugoslav press agency reported that the Romanians had specifically told the Yugoslavs that Bucharest's participation was limited to "staffs." This report also claimed that the Romanians had not sent troops to any Warsaw Pact manoeuvres since 1968.⁷⁸ The Romanian staff officers received a Romanian-language edition of the joint exercise newspaper,⁷⁹ and the Romanian defence minister

attended the manoeuvres.⁸⁰ But evidently there were not enough Romanians present to march in the parade at the conclusion of the exercises: the Bulgarian Army newspaper reported in some detail on the allied contingents marching in the parade, but did not mention any Romanians.⁸¹

Romania has participated in a series of Warsaw Pact staff exercises, all but one of which were trilateral Romanian-Bulgarian-Soviet staff exercises. These were: the spring 1969 Pliska exercise in Bulgaria of the "operational staffs" of the ground forces, navies and anti-aircraft troops of these three states;⁸² a spring 1972 exercise of unspecified staffs of the same three states;⁸³ a February 1972 "command staff map exercise" in Romania of Bulgarian, Soviet and Romanian staffs drawn from national ground forces, navies, air forces and anti-aircraft troops;⁸⁴ a February 1974 "command staff map exercise" in Romania, evidently involving only Soviet and Romanian staffs;⁸⁵ and a spring 1978 exercise, also in Romania, of the "operational staffs of Bulgaria, Romania and the USSR."⁸⁶ In June 1974 the Romanians also participated in an exercise of rear services staffs conducted jointly on Romanian and Bulgarian soil with the participation of Soviet, Bulgarian and Romanian officers.⁸⁷ In addition, Romania participated in a June 1970 exercise of all Warsaw Pact anti-aircraft troops⁸⁸ and an April 1972 naval exercise in the Black Sea involving the Soviet, Bulgarian and Romanian navies.⁸⁹

The periodic staff exercises with the USSR and Bulgaria maintain a residual Romanian capability for participation in a coalition war with the other members of the Southern Tier. But given the lack of Romanian participation in joint Warsaw Pact troop exercises, such as the Shield-82 manoeuvres in Bulgaria, the conduct of joint

staff activities may in fact be more exercises in alliance protocol than exercises in coalition warfare. By not permitting Warsaw Pact troops to manoeuvre on Romanian soil since the early 1960s, Bucharest has deprived its armed forces of the optimum opportunities to work out the complexities of allied interaction. The evidence on the participation of Romanian troops in Warsaw Pact exercises outside Romania ranges from the non-existent to the ambiguous. If Romania ever does go to war on the side of the Soviet Army, its troops will lack the regular training in coalition warfare acquired by the Warsaw Pact armies that have loyally sent their forces to allied manoeuvres over the years. The drills in the conduct of the "War of the Entire People" practiced annually in Romania should prove of little value to Romanian troops engaged in an offensive campaign against NATO.

Romanian Military Production and Weapons Acquisitions

Romania has developed a programme for weapons production and acquisition unique among the East European members of the Warsaw Pact. During the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s the Romanians, like the other East European communist regimes, relied entirely on the USSR for armaments. The Romanians virtually dismantled their prewar armament industries, which had produced both tanks and aircraft. But since the mid-1960s the Romanians have systematically tried to develop an indigenous defence industry. The official goal of Romanian armament production policy is to maximize national self-sufficiency by 1) domestic production of "low-tech" combat equipment for the armed forces; 2) gradual development of a national industrial capacity for major combat weapons -- tanks, armoured personnel carriers, ships and aircraft;

3) production under licenses from non-Soviet manufacturers of "high-tech" aircraft, naval and other armaments, or co-production of such items with non-Warsaw Pact states. The unofficial goal of these programmes is quite clear: to reduce Romania's dependence on the USSR for military equipment.

In May 1967 Nicolae Ceausescu publicly declared that Romanian industry should assume the responsibility of providing most of the weapons necessary for Romania's defence, and in April 1968 the Central Committee formally adopted a resolution calling for steady increases in the proportion of domestically-produced weapons in the Romanian arsenal. The 1968 resolution specified that Romania should rely on foreign producers only for those weapons currently beyond the technological capacity of Romanian industry.⁹⁰ Following this decision, Romania expanded the number of its military R & D institutes.⁹¹

According to Aurel Braun, a Canadian scholar, the Romanians claimed in 1976 that domestic producers were supplying 66 per cent of all of Romania's defence needs.⁹² This domestic production consisted of automatic rifles and some other small arms, ammunition, some artillery pieces, mine-laying equipment, naval river vessels, pontoon bridges, transport vehicles and tractors.⁹³ A French publication reported in 1977 that the Romanians claimed that "three-quarters" of the requirements of their ground forces were supplied by domestic manufacturers.⁹⁴ By 1982, according to the yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the Romanians had produced more than 100 main battle tanks, evidently modelled in the Soviet T-55 but also incorporating the side panels of the British Chieftain tank.⁹⁵ Other sources identify this weapon as the M-1977 tank.⁹⁶ In addition,


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the Romanians have begun production of their own armoured personnel carrier, although this, too, is evidently based on a Soviet design.

Since 1973 Romania has been producing, under license from China, Shanghai fast-attack patrol boats and in addition has acquired Chinese military hydrofoil craft. The Romanians continue to purchase surface-to-surface missiles from the USSR, and Soviet surface-to-air missiles, but they produce their own short-range missiles as well.

The most dramatic departure from Warsaw Pact weapons acquisition policies has been Romanian production of aircraft under license to British and French companies. The largest of these projects is the production of a jet transport plane, the Rombac 111, which the Romanians assemble in Romania from components made by British Aerospace and outfit with Rolls Royce jet engines. According to Aviation Week and Space Technology, the Romanians expect that assembly of this plane will establish the basis for an indigenous capacity for the manufacture of sophisticated aircraft.

The Romanians have also produced, under license from Aerospatiale, a French firm, about 300 Alouette military helicopters and about 100 Puma military helicopters. The Romanians use both types for their own military, but also manufacture them for Aerospatiale, which sells them on the international market. The Romanians have also produced, under license to Pilatus Britten-Norman, some 300 BN-2 Islander medium-sized passenger craft for sale by the British firm.

Romania joined Yugoslavia in a joint R & D project which has finally resulted in the production of an attack/interceptor jet aircraft known in the Romanian Air

Force as the IAR.93, and as the Eagle in the Yugoslav military. Romania currently has about 50 of these planes, which consist of components produced either in Romania or Yugoslavia and use Rolls Royce engines manufactured in Romania under license.¹⁰⁶ The combat radius of 162 nautical miles confines the plane to the immediate vicinity of its home bases. According to Alex Alexiev, Romania has also concluded a number of agreements with West German firms for the production of civil aircraft.¹⁰⁷

The Romanians do produce a Soviet plane under license, the Yak-52 trainer, but apparently the Romanians export this plane to the USSR and perhaps other Warsaw Pact members as well. They have not introduced the Yak-52 into the Romanian air force but instead manufacture a trainer of Romanian design.¹⁰⁸

These developments account for recent claims by Ceausescu that his defence industries can produce "the most modern combat equipment."¹⁰⁹ Romania's defence minister, Constantin Olteanu, declared in late 1982, ".... we have created our own supply base for meeting defence requirements, which has permitted the army to round out its supplies and other high-quality technical means; this in turn raised the firing power of all arms and increased their degree of operability and mobility."¹¹⁰

However, current Romanian arms production policy is also subject to a freeze on military spending at the 1982 level through the end of 1985. This freeze probably reflects the severe economic difficulties Romania is facing, particularly in regard to repayment of its loans from Western banks,¹¹¹ rather than a reversal of Romania's commitment to develop its domestic armaments industry. During the early 1970s, when the inflow of Western capital far exceeded Romanian debt service costs, the rate of

increase in defence spending was about 20 per cent a year.¹¹² Of the Warsaw Pact members Romania currently devotes the lowest percentage of gross national product to military spending -- about two per cent.¹¹³ In his survey of the Southern Tier, Ivan Volgyes produces statistics showing that current per capita military expenditure in Romania is less than half that in Bulgaria.¹¹⁴ Romania's present economic difficulties may also account for an increased emphasis on the previous Romanian policy of using military conscripts for civilian construction projects. At the present time Romanian military personnel are labouring on irrigation, canal, coal mining and agricultural projects.¹¹⁵

In Western statistical inventories, such as The Military Balance, Soviet weapons continue to appear as the major components of the Romanian arsenal, in particular some 1600 T-54/T-55 tanks and some MIG-21 Soviet fighter aircraft.¹¹⁶ In assessing the significance of the large numbers of Soviet tanks and aircraft in the Romanian arsenal several considerations should be taken into account. One is that Yugoslavia has a substantial number of Soviet weapons in use, although Belgrade maintains its own domestic armaments industry.¹¹⁷ Another is that Romania and Yugoslavia jointly manufacture spare parts for the Soviet weapons in their national arsenals.¹¹⁸ John Erikson adds that the Romanians obtain spare parts for many of their Soviet-produced weapons from Israel's stocks of captured Soviet equipment.¹¹⁹

In a survey of the production of Romanian military equipment under a license to non-Warsaw Pact concerns, Paul Gafton of Radio Free Europe concluded that the weapons produced by the Romanians are "10 to 20 years behind the times."¹²⁰ If this assessment is correct, Romania prefers

obsolete Romanian weapons to state-of-the-art Soviet technology. Such obsolescence would clearly be a liability in the conduct of a war against NATO; it might not be such a liability in the conduct of the "War of the Entire People" envisaged by Romanian military theories. Thomas Cason of the US Defence Department reached the following conclusion in a recent analysis of the military technology of this East European member of the Warsaw Pact:

Romania has the oldest and poorest equipment of any East European state and it is not maintained at high standards or at a high level of combat readiness

But, apparently, Romanian military forces have been able to adapt effectively to their single mission -- the defense of Romania. The existing equipment is better suited to defense than to offense
....121

The most significant aspect of the Romanian attempt to achieve a high degree of self-sufficiency in military armament is not the question of the success or failure of this attempt but rather the fact that the Romanian weapons acquisition programme stands in such marked contrast to the policies of the other East European members of the Warsaw Pact. Bulgaria and Hungary, two other members of the Southern Tier, produce only components for Warsaw Pact combat equipment. East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia produce not only components but ships, tanks, armoured personnel carriers and even some aircraft. However, the defence industries of the Northern Tier have confined themselves to a limited assortment of weapons and equipment distributed throughout the Pact. Marshal

Kulikov, Commander of the Warsaw Pact, explains the logic behind specialized national armaments production in the loyal members of the Warsaw Pact: "Broad development of state specialization and cooperation in the area of the defence industry establishes the possibility for each country to produce independently certain types of defence production and to acquire the remainder from other countries."¹²²

Unlike the loyal members of the Warsaw Pact, Romania attempts to supply most of her military equipment from her own defence industries. When Bucharest concedes the necessity of an international division of labour for the production of high-technology armaments, it divides this labour with the defence industries of Yugoslavia, China, France and Britain. Although Romania does maintain some Soviet weapons in its forces, Bucharest is gradually acquiring an arsenal that is increasingly unsuitable for integration with the arsenals of Romania's Warsaw Pact allies.

The Withdrawal of the Romanian Officer Corps from Soviet Military Academies

Virtually every Soviet survey of the principal institutions of the Warsaw Pact stresses the importance of mid-career Soviet military academies in training East European captains and majors for high-ranking command positions in the national armies of the Warsaw Pact.¹²³ A recent Soviet article on mechanisms of cooperation in the Warsaw Pact noted that in the case of Bulgaria, a Southern Tier ally of Romania, "... several thousand Bulgarian military personnel have either attended Soviet military academies or special short courses in the USSR."¹²⁴ Although these sources frequently point out the large

numbers of alumni of Soviet military academies in the individual armies of East Europe, these same sources invariably avoid the question of whether Romanian officers currently attend Soviet military academies.¹²⁵ Soviet and Romanian sources indicate that Romanian officers first enrolled in Soviet military academies in the 1949-1950 academic year,¹²⁶ but the available evidence suggests that sometime around 1961, when the Romanian Ministry of Defence reorganized the curricula at Romanian military schools,¹²⁷ Romanian officers ceased attending Soviet military academies.

In its annual coverage of the graduation ceremonies of Soviet military academies in the period from 1960 to 1983 Krasnaia Zvezda has regularly reported on the graduation of officers from Warsaw Pact states and other socialist states as well. To date, the Soviet Army newspaper has reported the graduation of Romanian officers only once -- in the 1965 class of the Zhukovskii Military Air Engineering Academy.¹²⁸ The officers of the fraternal armies appear to deliver the valedictory address in a fairly regular rotation, but Krasnaia Zvezda has never reported such an address by a Romanian officer. At the 1983 graduation ceremonies, Major Santiesteban Pupo Nelson of the Cuban Army spoke on behalf of the officers of the fraternal armies. This officer, who attended the Frunze Military Academy, declared that upon completion of their studies the officers of the fraternal countries "will with even greater energy fulfill our internationalist duty in the cause of the joint defence of the socialist gains of our countries."¹²⁹ Romanian officers have taken pains to declare that the sole responsibility for the defence of socialist gains in Romania rests with the Romanian Armed Forces.¹³⁰

The pinnacle of the Soviet military-education system is the Voroshilov General Staff Academy, an institution which prepares Warsaw Pact colonels and generals for the highest commands in East Europe. A Soviet history of the Voroshilov Academy, published in 1976, names Voroshilov alumni as defence ministers, chiefs of general staff, chiefs of main political administrations and other high-ranking officers in the armies of each of the East European Warsaw Pact members and in the armies of Mongolia, Cuba and Viet Nam. But this volume did not name a single Romanian alumnus in any post.¹³¹ This same volume noted the remarks of the Bulgarian ambassador to the USSR when he decorated the Voroshilov Academy for its services to the Bulgarian Armed Forces: "the training of almost the entire leading staff of the Bulgarian People's Army has taken place in this most authoritative educational institution."¹³²

Rather than send its prospective commanders to the Voroshilov General Staff Academy or to any of the 16 mid-career military academies of the USSR, the Romanians educate all their mid-career and senior officers in the General Military Academy in Bucharest. The General Military Academy trains mid-career officers no older than 35, with a minimum rank of major, for command posts on the general staff, in service branches and in the political organs. The course for combined-arms commanders is two years in length and courses for officers in engineering specialties last from three to five years.¹³⁴ This institution also offers separate post-graduate courses and a four-year doctoral programme in military science.¹³⁵

In the 1961 reorganization of the Romanian military-educational system the Romanians merged their officer candidate schools into one institution, the Nicolae

Balescu Military College. But in the 1970s the Romanians reverted to the Warsaw Pact pattern of maintaining a series of separate officer candidate schools. The Balescu College became an officer candidate school for the infantry and air force, separate schools were created for air defence officers and naval officers, and a separate school for both armour forces and technical services was established.¹³⁶

In a 1968 graduation speech to the General Military Academy President Ceausescu explained why Romania chooses to decline the hospitality offered by Soviet military academies to East European military officers: "We proceed from the idea that the responsibility and obligation for the endowment, education and instruction of each national army belongs -- and cannot but belong -- to the Party and government of the respective country"¹³⁷ The rationale for the education of Romanian officers only in Romanian military institutions is both political and military. The political purpose is to deny the Soviet Defence Ministry the opportunity to compete with the Romanian defence ministry for the loyalties of Romanian officers. The military justification for a separate Romanian educational system is that the military doctrine taught in Soviet academies is largely irrelevant to the requirement of Romania's doctrine of "War of the Entire People." This doctrine calls for the training of officers in the conduct of small-scale independent actions often involving the engagement of paramilitary auxiliaries as well as regular armed forces. For the loyal East European defence ministries which accept Soviet concepts of coalition warfare, the education of national military officers in Soviet academies is appropriate for both military and political reasons. An East German professor of military science was undoubtedly correct in his

justification for the education of East German officers in Soviet military academies:

The education of the officers, generals and admirals of the German Democratic Republic in Soviet military academies permits the National People's Army to successfully fulfill its tasks in the framework of the Warsaw Pact on the basis of the latest achievements of Marxist-Leninist military thought and Soviet military art.138

By the same logic, the absence of Romanian military officers in Soviet military academies makes it difficult for the Romanian officer corps to carry out any joint missions in the framework of the Warsaw Pact.

The Disengagement of Romanian Political Officers from the Warsaw Pact

The Warsaw Pact programme most directly concerned with the political reliability of the East European armies is the programme for the coordination of political indoctrination among allied military personnel. There are three requirements for the conduct of such activities: 1) Corresponding bureaucratic structures of the political administrations of the Warsaw Pact. In the loyal armies of the Warsaw Pact, these structures are modelled on the Main Political Administration (MPA) of the Soviet Armed Forces. 2) Common military-political axioms which provide the basis for common programmes in political education. These axioms call for the joint defence of socialism in a socialist coalition threatened by an opposing "imperialist" coalition. 3) Regular opportunities for the conduct and organization of joint political activities. These consist

of contacts between the Soviet garrisons stationed in East Europe and their hosts, similar contacts between Soviet and East European military districts, and contacts of the fraternal allies during joint military exercises. By failing to meet these requirements for the synchronization of political education, Romania has left its troops politically unprepared for coalition war.

The disengagement of Romanian political agencies from Warsaw Pact programmes of ideological indoctrination goes back to the reorganization of the Romanian party apparatus in the military, which took place in the late 1950s and early 1960s. During the same period, the Soviet MPA underwent a major reorganization of its own activities, and according to a Soviet study one of the reasons for these programmatic changes in the late 1950s was the need to prepare Soviet soldiers for participation in joint political activities with East European military personnel. In a discussion of the changes introduced during the period from 1958 to 1961 this study declares:

One of the central tasks of political and military education was the strengthening of combat cooperation of Soviet soldiers with the troops of the fraternal armies of the socialist countries.

One of the expressions of the strengthening of the combat cooperation of the armies of the socialist countries was the coordination of party-political work and of the organization of party-political work during the course of joint exercises in the framework of the Warsaw Pact.¹⁴⁰

In an article published just prior to the first major multilateral exercise, the "Buria" manoeuvres of 1961, the Soviet commander of the Warsaw Pact noted that the Soviet Force Groups in Germany, Poland, and Hungary already participated in a wide variety of joint political activities with East European soldiers: evening programmes of combat friendship; meetings of allied soldiers who had won national training competitions; joint visits of Warsaw Pact personnel to local industries and collective farms; meetings of Warsaw Pact soldiers with veterans of military and political struggles against the Nazis; joint ceremonies marking national holidays; joint concerts and theatrical shows; and joint sports competitions. Marshal Grechko added that the military councils of the Soviet force groups in Europe regularly discussed "questions of internationalist training."¹⁴¹

Beginning in 1959 the Romanians began replacing the political "sections" and "departments" in Romanian military-education institutions, in certain service branches and in the central bureaux of the Romanian defence ministry with party committees.¹⁴² These changes eliminated administrative analogues to the corresponding agencies of the Soviet MPA. At the same time, local party agencies extended their administrative competence into the party committees of the adjoining military garrisons.¹⁴³ This process reached its culmination in 1964, when the Romanians formally abolished the Romanian MPA and replaced it with a system of party committees directed by the Higher Political Council of the Armed Forces.¹⁴⁴ At every level of the system of party committees, the party committees report not only to the Higher Political Council but to corresponding civilian party organizations. At the present time, this system corresponds to the overlapping civilian

and military structures for the conduct of a "War of the Entire People."¹⁴⁵ As a result of these changes, a Soviet specialist on the Romanian Army noted, in a 1970 article, "... the structure of the (Romanian) political organs is different from the structure of the party-political apparatus in the armed forces of the other countries of the Warsaw Pact, although their functions are one and the same."¹⁴⁶ However, the structure of the political apparatus in the Romanian military is very similar to that in the Yugoslav Armed Forces.

The different structure of the Romanian political organs is complemented by a different set of military-political axioms used in the indoctrination of armed forces personnel. The political administrations of the Warsaw Pact conduct synchronized programmes and joint measures in political indoctrination on three basic themes: 1) socialist patriotism, defined as loyalty to the party and state leadership of each national army; 2) socialist internationalism, defined as brotherhood-in-arms with the Soviet Army; 3) hatred for the forces of imperialism and reaction, defined as the United States and its NATO allies.¹⁴⁷ These programmes are based on the military-political axioms of Soviet doctrine, which identify the future war as a coalition war between the united forces of imperialism and the united forces of socialism. In a study titled Ideological Struggle in Military Questions General A.A. Epishev, Soviet Ambassador to Romania from 1955 to 1961 and Chief of the Soviet Main Political Administration, observes, "The military doctrines of the socialist confederation proceed from the fact that it is possible to prevent the outbreak of a new world war only by the joint efforts of the fraternal socialist countries."¹⁴⁸

Romania's military doctrine proceeds from a completely different premise: national defence of national territory by national means. According to Romanian sources, political indoctrination by military officers is devoted entirely towards preparation of military and civilian personnel for the ordeal of a "War of the Entire People."¹⁴⁹

Romanian political officers have at their disposal an arsenal of historical works which purport to demonstrate that Ceausescu's defence doctrine can be traced back to the first century before Christ and on through medieval Romanian princes such as Vlad the Impaler to "bourgeois" political leaders of the 19th century and the period between the two world wars. In these histories the Romanian Communist Party appears as the heir of a nationalist tradition of resistance to foreign dominations rather than as an ally of the Soviet Union in coalition wars.¹⁵⁰

The thrust of political indoctrination in the Romanian Armed Forces appears to confirm the declaration in Marshal Kulikov's text on the Warsaw Pact, which states, "... the Maoist preaching of 'reliance on one's own forces' is intended to disrupt ... the unity and solidarity of the socialist countries."¹⁵¹ Should the political agencies of the Soviet and Romanian militaries ever attempt to synchronize political indoctrination they would find that their ideological texts are mutually exclusive. There is little likelihood, however, that Soviet and Romanian troops will be exposed to such contradictions. The opportunity for the conduct of joint political exercises on Romanian soil disappeared with the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1958. The refusal of Bucharest to send troops to Warsaw Pact exercises abroad has eliminated the other opportunity

for such joint political activities. The political officers of the Romanian Armed Forces do engage in exchanges of delegations with the Soviet MPA and also attend Warsaw Pact conferences on military-political questions. But there is no evidence that they have returned from such meetings with any intention of preparing Romanian military personnel for coalition warfare.

Exception or the Rule: Romania and the Communist Alternatives to the Warsaw Pact

Bucharest has avoided close bilateral military ties with the Soviet Armed Forces through its special treaty relationship with the USSR, its active pursuit of European and Balkan security arrangements outside the bloc structure, its independent national military doctrine and its disengagement from joint alliance activities in the areas of military exercises, armament production, officer education and political indoctrination. But although Romania's military policies are unique in the Warsaw Pact they are by no means unique among the communist states of southeast Europe.

Albania, a member of the Warsaw Pact from 1955 to 1968, has also deployed a territorial defence system and has gone even further than Romania in raising barriers to bilateral contacts between the Albanian and Soviet militaries. Yugoslavia, which cut its military ties to the USSR in 1948, has deployed a "people's war" defence system and has advanced security proposals very similar to those of Romania. Like Romania, Yugoslavia has stocked some Soviet weapons in its arsenal, although Belgrade has also relied for armaments on domestic producers, on coproduction with Romania and on purchase of non-Warsaw Pact military equipment.

Many analysts believe that the origins of the current Romanian defence system go back only to 1968 or 1969.¹⁵² Romanian military historians, led by Major General Ilie Ceausescu, have placed the intellectual origins of Romania's military doctrine in the late 1940s,¹⁵³ just prior to the final consolidation of power by the Romanian Communist Party. General Ceausescu has also dated the establishment of the precursor of the Patriotic Guards at 1956-1957.¹⁵⁴ If this argument is historically correct, then the doctrinal conceptions and paramilitary formations of the current Romanian defence system emerged almost simultaneously with comparable developments in Yugoslavia. If this history is contrived, then it at least demonstrates the desire of the Ceausescu leadership to portray the "War of the Entire People" as an authentic national concept, rather than a doctrinal import from Yugoslavia.

From the perspective of the USSR, as hegemon of the socialist military coalition established in 1955, since the late 1950s there have been two competing national defence programmes among the Communist states of southeast Europe: 1) the Bulgarian-Hungarian pattern of close bilateral relations with the Soviet Armed Forces within the framework of the Warsaw Pact; and 2) the Yugoslav-Albanian pattern of reliance on one's own forces and de facto identification of the Soviet Army as the most probable enemy. Despite Romania's observance of the protocol of alliance membership, in practice its military policies have been much closer to the Yugoslav-Albanian pattern than to the Bulgarian-Hungarian pattern.

In a recent study of Yugoslavia's relations with the USSR Pedro Ramet observed that Belgrade has preserved its independence by playing off the US and USSR against

each other. He noted the observation of a Yugoslav foreign minister that "' ... as Yugoslavs, we need the Americans to protect us from the Russians. As Communists, we need the Russians to protect us from the Americans.'"¹⁵⁵ A Romanian foreign minister could easily adapt this observation to describe Bucharest's policies.

Ceausescu has defined the objective of Romanian security policy as neither offence nor defence but non-alignment. Despite the rhetoric of 'reliance on one's own forces', Romania's security ultimately rests on mutual deterrence between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. If deterrence fails, it is unlikely that the Romanian Armed Forces will prove reliable either as an ally or adversary of the USSR.

ENDNOTES

¹ President Nicolae Ceausescu observed a 1983 meeting of Romanian military officers,

Generally speaking, as I have often stated in the past, regardless of whether or not the Warsaw Pact exists -- and we hope soon to reach a situation where both NATO and the Warsaw Pact are abolished -- we must never forget that we will always have to cooperate with the armies of the neighboring socialist countries.

At the same time we will continue to develop friendly relations with armies of all socialist countries and other friendly countries.

See "Ceausescu Speech to Army Aktiv Meeting," translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service--Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU), March 8, 1983, p. H-6.

In an elaboration on this policy, Colonel Traian Grozea notes, "Romania respects the obligations it has assumed within the framework of its alliance; it develops military collaboration with all armies of the fraternal socialist states. As pointed out by President Nicolae Ceausescu, President of the Socialist Republic of Romania and Supreme Commander of Romania's armed forces, 'in view of the contemporary international situation, we believe that relations of collaboration have to be developed between the socialist countries belonging to the Warsaw Treaty, between the armies of the states concerned, proceeding from the need to strengthen each national army, the defense and fighting capacity of each people. At the same time we have to intensify the struggle for the abolition of military blocs and it is necessary to still further strengthen the political side of the Warsaw Treaty in order to accentuate the course of détente and collaboration in Europe and throughout the world.' In keeping with this political orientation, Romania's army has developed and is developing links of collaboration

with the armies of the Warsaw Treaty member countries, with the armies of all the socialist countries on the basis of reciprocal esteem and respect, of friendship, in a fraternal spirit. Collaboration in the framework of the Warsaw Treaty and in the setting of the bilateral agreements signed by Romania, which also comprise clauses on assistance if one of the signatory sides is the object of aggression, and the relations between the armies of the states participating in the Treaty, between all the armies of the socialist countries can only be healthy if they rest on the principles that have to exist in the relations between the socialist states Comradely collaboration with the fraternal socialist armies is part of the policy of internationalist solidarity promoted by the Romanian Communist Party. The Romanian Army participates in various joint activities as agreed upon, in the exchanges of experience carried out in several spheres between the socialist armies, in the actions designed to lead to the improvement and modernization of the processes of instruction and education, in the specialized consultations and in symposia and conferences; it carries out exchanges of military delegations, has artistic, cultural and sports links, exchanges military publications etc." See Colonel Traian Grozea, "The Socio-Political Foundations of National Defense," in Col. Iulian Cernat et al., eds., National Defense: The Romanian Vies (Bucharest: Military Publishing House, 1967) (English edition), pp. 70-72.

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These texts are in the following volumes of the ongoing Soviet serial Sbornik deistvuiushchikh dogovorov, soglashenii i konventsii zakliuchennykh SSSR s inostrannymi gosudarstvami (Moscow: Izdatel'sto inostrannykh del SSSR). See Volume 25 for the Soviet-Bulgarian Treaty, Article 7, and the Soviet-Hungarian Treaty, Article 7. See Volume 26 for the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty, Article 10; see Volume 31 for the Soviet-East German Treaty, Article 8. For another translation of Article 10 of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty see Robin A. Remington, The Warsaw Pact (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1971), p. 234: "In the event that one of the High Contracting Parties is subjected to an armed attack by any state or group of states, the other Contracting Party, regarding this as an attack on itself, will immediately give the first party all possible

assistance, including military aid, and will also give it support with all means at its disposal, by way of implementing the right to individual or collective self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter."

3 Sbornik, Volume 24, Article 6 of the Soviet-Polish Treaty states, "The High Contracting Parties will jointly take all measures they deem necessary for the purpose of eliminating the threat of aggression from the West German forces of militarism and revenge or any other state which has entered into alliance with them." Article 7 states, "In the event that one of the High Contracting Parties is subjected to an armed attack on the part of any state or group of states, as specified by Article Six, then the other High Contracting Party, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, will immediately give all possible aid, including military aid, and also render support with all means at its disposal."

4 Sbornik, Vol. 15, Article Eight of the Soviet-Romanian Treaty. See also the text of Article Eight in Remington, ed., The Warsaw Pact, p. 244, for a slightly different translation: "Should one of the High Contracting Parties be subjected to an armed attack by some state or group of states, the other party, by way of exercising its inalienable right of individual or collective self-defense, and in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, will immediately render it all-round assistance with all the means at its disposal, including the armed force necessary to repel the armed attack."

5 See the preamble in Sbornik, Vol. 26. See a different translation in Remington, The Warsaw Pact, p. 343, which pledges the signatories "to observe the commitments envisaged in the Warsaw Treaty ... which was concluded in response to the NATO threat ..."

6 See Sbornik, Vol. 26 for the 1970 Treaty with Czechoslovakia, Vol. 31 for the preamble to the treaty with Poland. The 1967 treaties with Bulgaria and Hungary refer to "obligations stipulated in the Warsaw Treaty" (Vol. 25). See also Remington's translation of the preamble to the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of 1970, in Warsaw Pact, p. 232. According to this translation, the Preamble pledges the

"strictly to observe the obligations stemming from the May 14, 1955 Warsaw Treaty"

7 Remington, The Warsaw Pact, p. 203.

8 See Patrick Moore, "The Ceausescu Saga," RAD Background Report/275 (Romania), Radio Free Europe Research, 20 Dec. 1978, p. 3. See also Nicolae Ceausescu's remarks in Ilie Ceausescu, The Entire People's War for the Homeland's Defense with the Romanians (Bucharest: Military Publishing House, 1980) p. 309: "'In keeping with this consistent policy of our Party and State, we will continue developing collaboration with the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries. But we wish this collaboration to rely on the socialist principles of relations among states, hence among armies too, on the principles of equality and respect for each one's independence, therefore, for that of each army as well, by starting from the fact that each national army can be but under the command of the respective Party and State bodies, that it can but act upon the order and decision of these bodies, which are solely invested with the right to commit the army to any kind of action. Nobody else can do it! Never will we admit that the Romanian army should be committed to any military action by anybody else except we ourselves, except our people!"

9 Grozea, "The Socio-Political Foundations of National Defense," in Cernat et al., eds., National Defense, p. 188.

10 See Moore, "The Ceausescu Saga."

11 "Speech by Nicolae Ceausescu ... at the Plenary Meeting of the CC of the RCP," in Romania: Documents/Events (Bucharest: Agerpress, Nov. 1978).

12 "Greece and Romania Urge Talks to Rid Balkans of Nuclear Arms," New York Times, November 6, 1982, p. 3. The text of the joint declaration is in FBIS-EEU, November 10, 1982, p. H-4.

13 See the New York Times article of November 6, 1982 for a brief discussion of this possibility.

- 14 "Military Disengagement, Disarmament Needed for Real Security," Era Socialista No. 4, 1976, translated in Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) No. 67236, May 3, 1976, p. 40.
- 15 Ibid., pp. 40-41, also Romanian Situation Report/32, Radio Free Europe Research, (RFER), Sept. 12, 1972, p. 10, and the RFE Situation Reports (Romania) for: March 9, 1978; June 2, 1978; March 17, 1983. See also H. Gordon Skilling, "CSCE in Madrid, Problems of Communism 30 (July-August, 1981):13.
- 16 Romanian Situation Report (SR)/5, (RFER), March 17, 1983, p. 9: "Romania's main goal at the present (Madrid) CSCE session is to persuade the gathering to convene a European conference for confidence-building and disarmament patterned upon the 'democratic structure' of the CSCE pan-European follow-up meetings. This would be the first session on military problems held in 'a new, democratic framework.' This, commentator Ion Stoica argued in Romania Libera, would be a marked departure from the present practices at the Geneva and the Vienna disarmament talks, where 'the discussions take place either on a bloc-to-bloc basis or between the (militarily dominant) countries.' According to another (Romanian) commentator, Romania's policy on disarmament in Europe is directed toward gradually 'diminishing the military role of the Warsaw and North Atlantic pacts in favor of their political aspect, aiming ... toward their simultaneous dissolution.'
- 17 See "Statement of the Stand of the Romanian Workers' Party, April 1964," in William E. Griffith, ed., Sino-Soviet Relations 1964-1965 (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1967) p. 280.
- 18 Remington, Warsaw Pact, Article 11 of the Warsaw Treaty, p. 204.
- 19 Ibid., pp. 84-85.
- 20 Romulus Neagu, "Military Disengagement and Disarmament as a Major Aim of Constructing Real Security in Europe," Era Socialista No. 4, 1976, translated in JPRS No. 67236, May 3, 1976, p. 40. See also Romanian SR/ , RFER, June 2, 1979, p. 4.

- 21 See John G. Keliher, The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Central Europe (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), pp. 34-38.
- 22 At the May 1978 session of the Political Executive Committee of Romania. See Romanian SR/14, RFER, June 2, 1978, p. 5.
- 23 Romanian SR/5, RFER, March 17, 1983, p. 16.
- 24 See Romanian SR/23, RFER, pp. 2 and ff.; FBIS-EEU June 30, 1983, p. H-2; "Soviet Bloc Session Does Not Issue Expected Threat on New Missiles," New York Times, June 29, 1983, p. A-4.
- 25 See Lawrence S. Kaplan, "NATO and the Warsaw Pact: The Past," in Kaplan and Robert W. Clawson, eds., The Warsaw Pact: Political Purpose and Military Means (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1982), p. 84. For an argument that the West may have missed an independent Polish arms control initiative, see Hansjakob Stehle, The Independent Satellite (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 220-251.
- 26 See F. Stephen Larrabee, Balkan Security: Adelphi Paper No. 135 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977), pp. 25-29.
- 27 Col. Gheorghe Stanciulescu, "The Resistance Movement," in Cernat et al., eds. National Defense, p. 142.
- 28 "Law Concerning the Organization of the National Defence of the Socialist Republic of Romania," Scinteia, December 29, 1972, translated in JPRS No. 58017, January 18, 1973, p. 33. For a discussion of a virtually identical provision in the Yugoslav National Defense Law see Slobodan Stankovic, "Yugoslavia's New Defense Law," RAD Background Report/126 (Yugoslavia), RFER, May 28, 1972.
- 29 Colonel Mihai Arsintescu, "The People's War of Defense: Its Theory and Practice in Retrospect," in Cernat et al., eds., National Defense, p. 20.
- 30 See Article 11 of the 1972 Defense Law in JPRS translation No. 58017, January 18, 1973, pp. 38-39.

31 Romanian SR/3, RFER, February 19, 1983, p. 12.

32 For a further description of this system see Ilie Ceausescu, The Entire People's War for the Homeland's Defense with the Romanians (Bucharest: Military Publishing House, 1980), pp. 324-325. See also David P. Burke, "Defense and Mass Mobilization in Romania," Armed Forces and Society 7 (Fall 1980):31-49.

33 International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1982-1983 (IISS: London, 1982), p. 23.

34 Col. Constantin Stanculescu, "The Components of the National Defense System," in Cernat et al., eds., National Defense, pp. 175-176.

35 Ibid., p. 173.

36 Miroslav Lazanski, "Panduri kao uzor," Danas (Yugoslavia) No. 32, Sept. 28, 1982.

37 Stanculescu, "Components...," pp. 176, 177.

38 Lt. General Constantin Petcu, "Organization of the Territory for Defense," in Cernat et al., eds., National Defense, p. 231.

39 Stanculescu, "Components ...," p. 177.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid., pp. 178-179.

42 Ibid., p. 176.

43 Ibid., pp. 170-171.

44 IISS, The Military Balance, 1982-1983, p. 23.

45 Stanculescu, "Components ...," pp. 170-171.

46 Ibid., pp. 196-201.

47 Ibid., pp. 189-196; 201-209.

- 48 Ibid., pp. 179-184.
- 49 "Ceausescu March 5 Speech to Army Aktiv Meeting," translated in FBIS-EEU, March 8, 1983, pp. H-1 and H-2: "... the speech made by the defense minister and the discussions conducted here have pointed out both the results attained and various shortcomings which, unfortunately, are still manifest in certain military units. However, I do not wish to dwell now on the shortcomings in various military units. The comrades who addressed the meeting referred to them During (recent) military exercises and in other combat training activity, the Army has improved its cooperation with the Patriotic Guards, the Paramilitary Youth Formations and the units of the Ministry of the Interior, in accordance with the overall orientation of our party and state concerning the participation of all the people in the country's defense ... I would like to state that these joint actions were most important both for the Army's training and for the better training of the Patriotic Guards, the Paramilitary Youth Formations and the Ministry of the Interior units."
- 50 Ibid., p. H-1 and "Olteanu Describes Unity of Army, People," translated in FBIS-EEU, May 16, 1983, p. H-6: "... a new expression of the relations between the Army and the people is the cooperation of the Army with the units of the Ministry of the Interior and the people's units in combat training. Reflecting the vigor of this composition of the national defense system, the directive of the higher command regarding the military and political training of the Army over 1981-1985, the first one in the history of our socialist Army, sets that each locality and socioeconomic unit become 'a city of work, fight and defense'."
- 51 "Ceausescu Interview with Swedish Papers Detailed," translated in FBIS-EEU, June 30, 1983, p. H-1: "... Romania is of the opinion that, under the current international circumstances, and even in the matter of military training, military manoeuvres are unnecessary. Rather, we are of the opinion that military exercises are in fact shows of force that in no way contribute to the policy of détente, of building up confidence and collaboration. That is why

we decided not to permit (Warsaw Pact) manoeuvres (in Romania) -- I am of course referring to troop manoeuvres -- nor to send Romanian troops to manoeuvres on the territory of other states. We are in favor of other forms of cooperation and joint training with our allies, and we participate in such forms of training exercises. However, I repeat, we believe that, particularly in the current circumstances, there should be no military manoeuvres on the territory of other states, shows of force in general should be given up and action be taken to build up confidence, to develop cooperation, to promote disarmament, nuclear disarmament first and foremost."

- 52 Cernat, "The Political and Strategic Aims of the War of the Entire People," in Cernat et al., eds., National Defense, pp. 109-110.
- 53 Ibid., pp. 100 and 113.
- 54 Ibid., p. 110.
- 55 Ibid., p. 111.
- 56 Grozea, "General Characteristics," in Cernat et al., eds., National Defense, pp. 92-93. For a Western evaluation of the plausibility of the Romanian strategy see Burke, "Defense and Mass Mobilization in Romania."
- 57 Stanculescu, "The Resistance Movement," in Cernat et al., eds., National Defense, pp. 148-158.
- 58 Ibid., p. 140.
- 59 See: Ilie Ceausescu, The Entire People's War; Cernat, et al., eds., National Defense; Ilie Ceausescu, ed., Pages from the History of the Romanian Army (in English) (Bucharest: Military Publishing House, 1975); Col. Dr. A.G. Savu, ed., The Army and Romanian Society (in English) (Bucharest: Military Publishing House, 1980). Walter M. Bacon is preparing for publication an extensive bibliography of Romanian publications on military affairs.
- 60 See Romanian SR/3, RFER, February 19, 1983, p. 12.

- 61 Ibid., pp. 8-11.
- 62 See Daniel Nelson, ed., Romania in the 1980s (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1980), *passim*.
- 63 Ivan Volgyes, The Political Reliability of the Warsaw Pact Armies: The Southern Tier (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1982), p. 52. See also the following RFER Romanian SRs over possible dissatisfaction within the Romanian officer corps: June 25, 1982, p. 11 and ff; February 1983, p. 8; March 17, 1983, pp. 17-18.
- 64 "Ceausescu Speech of March 5, 1983," translated in FBIS-EEU, p. H-5.
- 65 "Ceausescu Interview For Swedish Press Published," translated in FBIS-EEU, p. H-1.
- 66 "Ceausescu Speech March 5, 1983 to Army Aktiv Meeting," translated in FBIS-EEU, March 8, 1983, p. H-6.
- 67 According to a restricted-circulation Soviet military journal obtained and translated by the CIA, Romania participated in a joint Hungarian-Soviet-Romanian troop exercise in Hungary in the spring of 1962. See Col. D. Diev., Lt. Col. K. Spirov, "Combat Collaboration of the Armies of the Warsaw Pact States," Voennaia Mysl' No. 2, 1968, in Central Intelligence Agency, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Foreign Press Digest 0049/69, Selected Translations from Voennaia Mysl', April 25, 1969, pp. 63-64. Later, in October, 1962, Romania was host to a joint Romanian-Soviet-Bulgarian exercise commanded by the Romanian Minister of Defense, Leontin Salajin. According to the Soviet Army newspaper, the exercise was conducted "according to the plan of preparation of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact." See Krasnaia Zvezda, October 19, 1962, p. 1. According to the issue of Voennaia Mysl' cited above, General Salajin also commanded a 1963 exercise in Romania of Soviet, Bulgarian and Romanian troops. According to a volume published under the editorship of the current commander of the Warsaw Pact "formations and units" of the Romanian, Soviet and Bulgarian armies conducted a joint troop exercise in Bulgaria in 1964. See V.G. Kulikov, ed., Varshavskii

dogovor -- soiuz vo imia mira i sotsializma (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1980), p. 276.

68 Kulikov, Varshavskii dogovor, p. 278.

69 See A.A. Epishev and Velko Panin, eds., Na veki vmeste (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1969), pp. 287-292, esp. p. 290: "For raising the effectiveness of the administration of troops in the exercises, there were mutual exchanges of groups and representatives among the units and formations of various countries. This method of work was widely practised: Bulgarian and Soviet officers (note the omission of any reference to Romanian officers) jointly worked out documents or participated in practical measures. As a result, the operational capabilities of staffs were raised and the possibility was achieved of broadly and openly exchanging opinions on the questions decided."

70 Lazanski, "Panduri Kao uzor," Danas No. 32, September 28, 1982, pp. 33-35.

71 Kulikov, Varshavskii dogovor, p. 279.

72 Ibid.

73 Lazanski, "Panduri ..."

74 Col. S. Aleshin, "Moshch' i splochennost'," Krasnaia Zvezda, October 20, 1970, p. 1.

75 "Na semi iazykov," Krasnaia Zvezda, October 16, 1970, p. 1.

76 Kulikov, Varshavskii dogovor, p. 291; Krasnaia Zveda, May 20, 1979, p. 1.

77 Tanjug, Belgrade, August 25, 1980, translated in FBIS-EEU, August 26, 1980, p. AA-1.

78 Belgrade Domestic Service September 25, 1982, translated in FBIS-EEU, September 27, 1982, p. AA-1: "The logo of the Shield-82 manoeuvres also incorporates the Romanian flag and Major General Dragu, representative of the Romanian Army, attended a soiree in Sofia on the Bulgarian Army anniversary. Thus, it could be concluded that a contingent of the Romanian armed forces had arrived for manoeuvres.

However, Romanian sources in Sofia assert that only staff units are participating. Since 1968 Romania has not participated in any joint manoeuvres but merely sent staff officers."

- 79 "Na semi iazykov," Krasnaia Zvezda, September 20, 1982, p. 3.
- 80 "Pribytie voennykh delegatsii," Krasnaia Zvezda, September 29, 1982, p. 1.
- 81 "Shield-82 Meeting-Parade," Narodna Armia, October 2, 1983, translated in JPRS 82219, November 12, 1982, pp. 65-69.
- 82 Kulikov, Varshavskii dogovor, p. 279.
- 83 Ibid., p. 284.
- 84 Ibid., p. 285.
- 85 Ibid., p. 286.
- 86 Ibid., p. 290.
- 87 Ibid., p. 286.
- 88 Ibid., p. 281.
- 89 Ibid., p. 284.
- 90 Ilie Ceausescu, Entire People's War, p. 313.
- 91 Ibid.
- 92 Aurel Braun, Romanian Foreign Policy Since 1965: The Political and Military Limits of Autonomy (New York: Praeger, 1978), p. 171.
- 93 Ibid.
- 94 "La défense roumaine," Armées d'aujourd'hui, July-August 1977, p. 69.
- 95 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), World Armaments and Disarmament (Cambridge, Mass: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, Inc., 1982), p. 169.

- 96 William J. Lewis, The Warsaw Pact: Arms, Doctrine and Strategy (New York: McGraw Hill, 1982), p. 216.
- 97 SIPRI, World Armaments ... 1982, p. 169.
- 98 SIPRI, World Armaments ... 1979, p. 148.
- 99 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1982-1983, p. 23.
- 100 Ibid.
- 101 Romanian SR/4, RFER, March 7, 1983, p. 10.
- 102 Ibid.
- 103 David A. Brown, "Romania Seeks Partners in Growth Plan," Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 13, 1982, pp. 53 and ff.
- 104 "New Aircraft Designs Under Test in Romania," Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 24, 1983, p. 52.
- 105 Brown, "Romania Seeks Partners," p. 53.
- 106 David A. Brown, "IAR.93 Strike Fighter Enters Service," Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 3, 1983, p. 52.
- 107 Alex Alexiev, "Romania and the Warsaw Pact: the Defence of a Reluctant Ally," The Journal of Strategic Studies (March 1981): 10.
- 108 Brown, "Romania Seeks Partners," p. 62.
- 109 "Ceausescu Speech of March 5, 1983," translated in FBIS-EEU, March 8, 1983, p. H-4: "Today's Romanian Industry can resolve the most complex scientific and technical problems and can produce the most modern equipment for the entire economy, including the production of the most modern combat equipment."
- 110 "Speech by Defence Minister Constantin Olteanu at the RCP National Conference, December 17, 1982," translated in FBIS-EEU, December 22, 1982, p. H-9.

- 111 Klaus Schroder, "Rescheduling the Debts of CMEA Countries," Aussenpolitik (English edition) 34 No. 2 (1983): 145-152.
- 112 Alex Alexiev, Party-Military Relations in Romania (Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND Corp, December 1977), p. 23.
- 113 SIPRI, World Armaments ... 1982, p. 150.
- 114 Volgyes, Political Reliability, p. 29.
- 115 "Ceausescu Speech of March 5, 1983," translated in FBIS-EEU, March 8, 1983, p. H-6.
- 116 IISS, The Military Balance, 1980-81 (London: IISS, 1981), p. 112. The 1982-83 edition of The Military Balance lists a combined total of 240 MIG-21 and MIG-23 fighters.
- 117 The Military Balance, 1982-1983, p. 45.
- 118 Alexiev, "Romania and the Warsaw Pact," p. 10.
- 119 John Erickson, "Military Management and Modernization Within the Warsaw Pact," in Robert W. Clawson and Lawrence S. Kaplan, eds., The Warsaw Pact: Political Purpose and Military Means (Wilmington, Del: Scholarly Resources, 1982) p. 223.
- 120 Romanian SR/4, RFER, March 7, 1983, p. 11.
- 121 Thomas O. Cason, "The Warsaw Pact Today: The East European Military Forces," in Clawson and Kaplan, eds., The Warsaw Pact, pp. 159-160. Cason observes on p. 158: "The military forces of Romania may not appear on the surface to be noticeably different from those of the other East European Warsaw Pact members; that is, they are organized in similar kinds of units and operate with the same kinds of equipment. The present-day Romanian military forces have similar origins to the other East European military forces and overall similarities are more obvious than the differences. But the similarities are superficial. Although Romania is still a member of the Warsaw Pact and does participate in a limited fashion in Warsaw Pact activities, the Romanian military forces have been given as their primary task the protection of the

sovereignty and independence of Romania against any outside aggressor." He further observes on p. 160: "... in practical terms Romanian military forces are unavailable in any form to the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact and must be considered as a defensive force whose only likely attackers are the Soviet Union or other East European Warsaw Pact members."

- 122 V.G. Kulikov, "Vazhnyi faktor povysheniia oboronospособности Organizatsii Varshavskogo dogovora," Tekhnika i vooruzhenie No. 5, 1980, p. 10.
- 123 Kulikov, Varshavskii dogovor, pp. 159-160.
- 124 Col. P. Skorodenko, "Vozrastanie roli Kommunisticheskikh parti v ukreplenii boevogo sodruzhestva bratskikh armii," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal No. 5, 1983, p. 55.
- 125 A series of articles in 1970 in the Soviet journal Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil on each of the Warsaw Pact armies used the present tense to state that a portion of the national officer corps of each army studies in Soviet military academies. In the article on Romania (issue No. 16, p. 74) the text used the past tense in stating: "Part of the generals and officers (of the Romanian military) received a higher and middle-level military education in the military-education institutions of the Soviet Union."
- 126 A.V. Antosiak et al., eds., Zarozhdenie narodnykh armii stran-uchastnits Varshavskogo dogovora, 1941-1949 (Moscow: Nauka, 1975), p. 230; Mihai Inoan et al. eds., Armata Romania in primii ani ai revolutiei si constructiei socialiste (Bucharest: Editura Militara, 1975), p. 154.
- 127 Inoan, Armata Romana, pp. 292-293.
- 128 "Vse sily i znanie," Krasnaia Zvezda, July 4, 1965, p. 1.
- 129 "Vse sily i znanie . . .," Krasnaia Zvezda, June 28, 1983, p. 3.
- 130 See Grozea, "The Socio-Political Foundations of National Defense," in Cernat et al., eds., National Defense, p. 70. "A characteristic, fundamental trait

of the treaties concluded between Romania and other socialist countries is the fact that they provide for respect for national independence and sovereignty. Military assistance will be granted only at the request of the state which is the victim of imperialist aggression, and the forms and volume of such assistance are established by agreement between the legal leaderships, since the elected party and state bodies alone have the responsibility for the destinies of a socialist nation and it is only they who can decide whether the cause of socialism and the revolutionary gains of the people are threatened."

- 131 See V.G. Kulikov, Akademija Generalnogo Shtaba ... imeni K.E. Voroshilova (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), p. 242.
- 132 Ibid., p. 244.
- 133 Skorodenko, "Vozrastanie ..." p. 551.
- 134 Constantin Antoniu et al., eds., Armata Republicii Socialiste Romania (Bucharest: Editura Militara, 1978), pp. 184, 187-189.
- 135 Ibid., p. 190.
- 136 See Walter M. Bacon, Jr., "Romania: Value Transformations in the Romanian Military," Studies in Comparative Communism 11 (Autumn 1978):243; Lazanski, "Panduri kao uzor"; Inoan et al., eds., Armata Romana, p. 153; Col. Ion Capet, "The Future Officer Viata Militara, May 1974, translated in JPRS No. 62531, July 22, 1974.
- 137 "Speech Made at the Festive Meeting in Bucharest on the Occasion of the Graduation of the 1968 Batch from the General Military Academy," in Nicolae Ceausescu, Romania on the Way of Completing Socialist Construction, Vol. 3 (Bucharest: Meridian Publishing House, 1969), p. 335.
- 138 Professor Colonel Schutze, "Stanovlenie i razvitiye Natsional'noi armii GDR," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal No. 10, 1974, p. 116.
- 139 See the section in Vol. I, Phase II of this study on the work of the allied political administrations.

- 140 S.A. Tiushkevich et al., eds., Sovetskie vooruzhennye sily: istorija stroitel'stva (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1978), p. 438.
- 141 A.A. Grechko, "Patrioticheskii i internatsional'nyi dolg vooruzhennykh sil SSR," Krasnaia Zvezda, October 6, 1961, p. 3.
- 142 Ilie Ceausescu, Entire People's War, p. 287.
- 143 Ibid.
- 144 Ibid., p. 288.
- 145 See Lt. General Gheorghe Gomoiu, "The Organizational Development of Party Work Within the Army, 1948-1975," in Ilie Ceausescu, ed., File din istoria militara a poporului roman, Vol. 4 (Bucharest: Editura Militara, 1977), pp. 303-314.
- 146 Col. D. Diev, "Vooruzhennye sily Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki Rumynii," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil No. 16, 1970, p. 73.
- 147 See the discussion of the joint political activities of the Warsaw Pact in Vol. I, Phase II of this study.
- 148 A.A. Epishev, Ideologicheskaja bor'ba po voennym voprosam (Moscow: Voenzidat, 1974), p. 91.
- 149 Major General Victor Voichita, "The Ideological, Cultural and Educational Activity Carried on by the Romanian Communist Party in the Process of Making and Strengthening the People's Army," in Ilie Ceausescu, File, Vol. 4, pp. 314-343; see English summary on page 366. See also Alexiev, "Party-Military Relations in Romania," pp. 26-27.
- 150 Ilie Ceausescu, File, Vol. 3, *passim*; see English-language summaries of these arguments in Cernat et al., eds., National Defense, Chapters 1 and 2.
- 151 Kulikov, Varshavskii dogovor, p. 148.
- 152 Volgyes, Political Reliability, p. 44; Alexiev, "Romania and the Warsaw Pact," p. 8; Dionisie Gherman, "The Socialist Republic of Romania," in

Rudolph Woller, ed., Warsaw Pact Reserve Systems
(Munich: Bernard and Graefe Verlag, 1978),
pp. 106-107.

- 153 Ilie Ceausescu, Entire People's War, pp. 263 and ff. In a section entitled "Development of the Military Doctrine of the Whole People's Fight," Ceausescu discussed at some length a document drawn up in 1947 by the Romanian General Staff, "Orientation Towards a New Doctrine." Ceausescu writes on p. 263, "Among other things, it (the General Staff paper) stressed the necessity of permanent training of the troops for the country's defense; it included the view on what the position and role of the small countries ought to be in a war of coalition; on the army organization, mobilizations and instruction; stress was also placed on the idea that the development of motor and armored means called for 'special attention to be paid to mountain divisions, given the importance we must pay to the mountain regions in our country's specific configuration'.... By the end of 1947, as the thesis of the inter-war period referring to the 'armed nation' gained in depth, new valuable opinions were set forth, related to the concept of 'whole people's preparedness for defense.' Maintaining that the Romanian army's organization and equipment demanded action based on a general plan of the state's preparation for the country's defense, the above-mentioned document pointed out, among other things, that the preoccupation of the relevant bodies or the country's defense 'has to be extended to preparing for defense of the whole people.' The homeland's defense and ensuring of an as high military potential as possible -- the survey shows -- 'are possible only if the whole people, that is, all able-bodied persons are apt to act in a certain direction and are in a position to understand and accept the exceptional demands of the defense war, getting instructed and educated for bearing and overcoming them; to join the activity of the bodies and formations that extend the military potential and defend the territory; to collaborate, wherever necessary with the operative armies ...'" On page 297, in a discussion of the evolution of Romania's doctrine during the 1950s Ceausescu observes: "From the view point of military theory, there were also circulated theses and conceptions which were not in harmony with Romania's conditions, with the spirit and

fight traditions of the Romanian army, which led to the wearing out of our cadres' creative thinking in the superior capitalization of the traditional military art elements Although not expressed formally, there were also tendencies of espousing the wrong opinion that there would be no military doctrine of socialist Romania, but instead a doctrine valid for all socialist countries."

154 Ibid., pp. 281-282.

155 Cited in Pedro Ramet, "Soviet-Yugoslav Relations Since 1976," Survey, Spring, 1982, p. 70.

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